Lavigne v. Great Salt Bay Community School Board

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: July 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-1509
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1509

AMBER LAVIGNE,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

GREAT SALT BAY COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD; SAMUEL ROY, in his official capacity as a social worker at Great Salt Bay Community School; KIM SCHAFF, in her official capacity as the principal of the Great Salt Bay Community School; LYNSEY JOHNSTON, in her official capacity as the superintendent of the schools of Central Lincoln County School System; and JESSICA BERK, in her official capacity as a social worker at Great Salt Bay Community School,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Jon D. Levy, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo, Howard, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.

Adam Shelton, with whom John Thorpe and Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater Institute were on brief, for appellant. Melissa A. Hewey, with whom Susan M. Weidner and Drummond Woodsum were on brief, for appellees. Katherine L. Anderson, David A. Cortman, Vincent M. Wagner, Glynis R. Gilio, and Alliance Defending Freedom on brief for Tammy Fournier, amicus curiae. Mary E. McAlister, Vernadette R. Broyles, and Child & Parental Rights Campaign, Inc., on brief for Child & Parental Rights Campaign, Inc., amicus curiae. Alan Wilson, Attorney General of South Carolina, Robert D. Cook, Solicitor General, J. Emory Smith, Jr., Deputy Solicitor General, Thomas T. Hydrick, Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, Joseph D. Spate, Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, and State of South Carolina Office of the Attorney General on brief for South Carolina, Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia, amici curiae.

July 28, 2025 MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Amber Lavigne

initiated this lawsuit against the Great Salt Bay Community School

Board (the "Board") and various individual members of the school

staff1 (together, "defendants"), alleging that defendants

infringed on her constitutional right to parent. Lavigne claims

that defendants acted unconstitutionally by providing her child,

A.B., a chest binder -- "a device used to flatten a female's chest

so as to appear male" -- and referring to A.B. by a name and set

of pronouns different from those given to A.B. at birth without

telling Lavigne, adhering to what Lavigne alleges is a school-wide

policy of withholding such information. We now consider whether

the district court correctly determined that the Board could not

be held liable for the alleged constitutional violations. For the

reasons explained below, we agree with the district court that

Lavigne has not plausibly alleged that the Board had a custom or

policy in place of withholding this type of information and,

1 For reasons more fully explained later, see infra Part I.B., the district court dismissed the claims against defendants Samuel Roy, a social worker at the school; Jessica Berk, another social worker; Kim Schaff, the school principal; and Lynsey Johnston, the district superintendent. Lavigne's Notice of Appeal in this case lists that order of dismissal as one which she appeals, but she does not raise any argument relevant to that order in her briefing. Accordingly, to the extent she seeks to raise any error with respect to that decision, any such claim is waived. See United States v. Mayendía-Blanco, 905 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) ("[I]t is a well-settled principle that arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are waived." (citing Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de P.R., 212 F.3d 607, 616 (1st Cir. 2000))).

- 3 - accordingly, affirm the district court's decision granting the

Board's motion to dismiss.

I. Background

A. Facts

We draw the relevant facts from Lavigne's complaint,

"accept[ing] the well-pleaded facts . . . as true and draw[ing]

all reasonable inferences in [Lavigne's] favor." Torres-Estrada

v. Cases, 88 F.4th 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Núñez Colón v.

Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2011)).

1. Underlying Conduct

A.B. started at Great Salt Bay Community School ("Great

Salt"), a kindergarten through eighth grade school, in 2019, and,

initially, Lavigne was "generally pleased" with the education A.B.

received. However, in December 2022, when A.B. was thirteen,

Lavigne and A.B. were cleaning A.B.'s room when Lavigne discovered

a chest binder, which the complaint defines as "a device used to

flatten a female's chest so as to appear male." A.B. told Lavigne

that defendant Samuel Roy, a school social worker, provided the

chest binder and instructed A.B. on how to use it. Lavigne also

alleges that, on the same day, Roy gave A.B. a second chest binder

and informed A.B. that "he was not going to tell A.B.'[s]

parents . . . and A.B. need not do so either." Lavigne was never

informed that A.B. would be or had been given a chest binder and

taught how to use it.

- 4 - Around the same time, Lavigne learned that, at school,

A.B. was using a name and pronouns different from those given to

A.B. at birth. But the school never told Lavigne that A.B. was

using a different name and pronouns from those used at home.

Lavigne alleges that defendants "withheld and concealed" the

information about the chest binders and A.B.'s use of a different

name and pronouns "pursuant to a blanket policy, pattern, and

practice of withholding and concealing information respecting

'gender-affirming' treatment of minor children from their

parents." She further alleges that there is no policy or procedure

allowing parents to provide input regarding a student's decision

to use "a different name and pronouns" at school.

2. Lavigne Brings Concerns to Great Salt's Attention

a. Meeting with Great Salt Principal and School Superintendent

Shortly after discovering the chest binder, Lavigne met

with defendants Principal Kim Schaff and Superintendent Lynsey

Johnston. Both "expressed sympathy . . . and concern that th[e]

information had been withheld and concealed." Two days later,

Superintendent Johnston "explained that no policy had been

violated by the giving of chest binders to A.B.[] or by school

officials . . . employing a different name and pronouns." Soon

after, Lavigne withdrew A.B. from Great Salt, citing its "policy,

pattern, and practice of withholding and concealing of crucially

- 5 - important and intimate psychosexual information about her minor

child."

b. Great Salt's Written Policies

According to Lavigne, the school pointed to several

written policies as supporting defendants' actions, specifically

Great Salt's Transgender Students Guidelines (the "Guidelines")

and the Staff Conduct with Students Policy ("Staff Conduct

Policy").

The Guidelines provide, in relevant part, that:

• Their purpose is "[t]o foster a learning environment that is safe[] and free from discrimination, harassment and bullying."

• They "are not intended to anticipate every possible situation that may occur, since the needs of particular students and families differ depending on the student's age and other factors. In addition, the programs, facilities and resources of each school also differ. Administrators and school staff are expected to consider the needs of students on a case-by-case basis, and to utilize these guidelines and other available resources as appropriate."

• In addressing needs raised by a transgender student, the school should, among other steps, develop a plan "in consultation with the student, parent(s)/guardian(s) and others as appropriate."

The Guidelines do not include any provision directing school staff

to withhold information from transgender students' parents or

guardians. Lavigne alleges in her complaint that the Guidelines

are "silent with respect to the giving of chest binders or any

other devices with or without the involvement or consent of

- 6 - parents" and "do not mandate the involvement of parents at any

point in the process of deciding whether to use alternate names

and pronouns."

The only relevant provision of the Staff Conduct Policy

is an explicit prohibition on staff asking students to keep

secrets.

c. Board Meeting

In late December 2022, Lavigne spoke at a Board meeting

about these incidents. In her statement to the Board, Lavigne

"detailed the trust that had been broken by [d]efendants

withholding and concealing vitally important information from her

respecting her minor child's psychosexual development and stated

that the 'decisions made [by Great Salt] drove a wedge between'"

A.B. and Lavigne.

d. Great Salt Statements

The Board did not respond to Lavigne during the Board

meeting but later released two separate statements. Great Salt's

principal also released a statement.

i. The Board's First Statement

In the first statement, issued shortly after the

meeting, the Board explained that it was unable "to discuss

confidential student and staff information" but emphasized that

its "first priority is always to provide a safe, welcoming and

inclusive educational environment for all students and staff" and

- 7 - that it "has specific policies and procedures in place that must

be followed" when addressing student and parent concerns. It also

emphasized that its "policies comply with Maine law, which protects

the right of all students and staff, regardless of gender/gender

identity, to have equal access to education, the supports and

services available in [Great Salt Bay area] schools, and the

student's right to privacy regardless of age." The statement did

not explicitly address Lavigne, A.B., or any member of Great Salt

staff.

ii. The Board's Second Statement

In the second statement, issued in January 2023, the

Board addressed recent bomb threats made to the school, explaining

that a "grossly inaccurate and one-sided story" gave rise to the

threats. The Board again emphasized its obligation to maintain

confidentiality of students and staff but explained that "[t]hose

promoting th[e] false narrative are apparently disturbed by [Great

Salt's] ongoing and steadfast commitment to providing all students

with safe and equal access to educational opportunities without

discrimination." The Board then cited several Maine laws as

providing students the right to access mental health services

without parental consent, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1502

("a minor may consent to treatment for substance use disorder or

for emotional or psychological problems"), and the right to

confidential counseling with school-based mental health service

- 8 - providers, see id. tit. 20-A, § 4008. Finally, the statement

explained that "neither the Board nor school administration [was]

aware of any violation of policy or law which requires further

action."

iii. Principal's Statement

Great Salt Principal Schaff then issued a statement in

February 2023, primarily addressing ongoing threats against Great

Salt and its staff. Principal Schaff explained that, under Maine

law, "a school counselor or school social worker may not be

required, except as provided by [law], to divulge or release

information gathered during a counseling relation with a client or

with the parent, guardian[,] or a person or agency having legal

custody of a minor client." As Lavigne alleges, the statement

"offered no explanation of how the giving of a chest compression

device or the employment of alternate names and pronouns

constitutes 'information gathered.'" That statement did not

mention A.B., Lavigne, or any facts relevant to A.B. and did not

discuss or allude to Great Salt policies.

e. Post-Lawsuit Developments

Finally, following the filing of this lawsuit, the Board

unanimously approved a second-year contract term for Roy, the

school social worker who provided the chest binders to A.B.2

2 Lavigne did not include this fact in her original complaint and did not file an amended complaint to include it. Instead, she

- 9 - B. Procedural History

In April 2023, Lavigne filed suit against the

defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the

defendants' actions to conceal the chest binders and A.B.'s

alternative name and pronouns used at school violated Lavigne's

substantive due process rights as a parent "to control and direct

[A.B.'s] education and general upbringing." Lavigne also alleged

the defendants violated her procedural due process rights by

denying her the ability to participate in the decision-making

process regarding A.B.'s gender-identity expression at school.

She also advanced claims against the individual defendants and a

municipal liability claim against the Board.

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that (1) the claims

against the individual defendants in their official capacities

were "redundant" because these claims were captured by Lavigne's

municipal liability claim; (2) the municipal liability claim

failed because Lavigne had alleged no facts establishing the

alleged unconstitutional acts were caused by an institutional

policy or custom; and (3) even assuming Lavigne had alleged the

existence of such a policy, the defendants' actions did not violate

introduced this fact in her response to the motion to dismiss, asking the district court to take judicial notice of it. She asks the same of us. Given our ultimate disposition of this case, we assume without deciding that we may take judicial notice of this fact.

- 10 - Lavigne's constitutional rights. In response, Lavigne contended

that (1) retaining named individual defendants is permitted in

municipal liability cases because it provides plaintiffs with "a

better opportunity to prove [their] case"; (2) her allegations

established that the defendants' acts were pursuant to a policy or

custom of withholding information from parents and were ratified

by the Board, either of which could establish municipal liability;

and (3) she had alleged resulting constitutional violations.

After a short hearing on the motion to dismiss, the

district court granted the motion as it related to the named

individuals, the two social workers, the Great Salt principal, and

the district superintendent, supra note 1, as Lavigne was not

seeking any relief from them and obtaining their testimony "should

not be a problem." The district court took the remainder of the

motion under advisement.

Later, the district court issued a written decision

granting the motion to dismiss with respect to the Board,

determining that Lavigne had failed to plausibly show municipal

liability. To begin, the district court explained that, because

all of Lavigne's claims "center[ed] on" her right to not have

information withheld pursuant to a withholding policy, the success

- 11 - of her suit hinged on whether she had properly alleged the

existence of such a withholding policy.3

In its decision, the district court focused on the second

element of municipal liability -- whether a municipality is itself

responsible for the alleged constitutional violation -- concluding

that the complaint did not allege facts that could plausibly

support liability. Specifically, the district court determined

that Lavigne was required to show that the Board's "policy or

custom [wa]s responsible for causing the constitutional

violation," and so it concentrated its inquiry on whether Great

Salt had a policy or custom of withholding information. (Quoting

Abdisamad v. City of Lewiston, 960 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020)).

The district court found that Lavigne had not plausibly alleged

that the so-called "withholding policy" was a settled custom or

practice at Great Salt because she relied on "conclusion[s]

unsupported by factual allegations." The court also determined

that Lavigne could not satisfy municipal liability by ratification

because Great Salt's statements were too vague to constitute active

approval of the individual defendants' withholding of information.

3In their briefing on the motion to dismiss, the parties treated Lavigne's substantive due process claim as a § 1983 municipal liability claim but treated her procedural due process claim as a standalone claim not tethered to any liability framework. On appeal, Lavigne appears to have abandoned her procedural due process claim, only addressing her substantive due process argument. We therefore deem any due process claim waived. See Mayendía-Blanco, 905 F.3d at 32.

- 12 - Accordingly, the district court dismissed Lavigne's complaint, and

she timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

"We review the district court's grant of [the] motion to

dismiss de novo." Wadsworth v. Nguyen, 129 F.4th 38, 61 (1st Cir.

2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Torres-Estrada, 88 F.4th at 23). To

assess whether a complaint can withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

we "must accept as true all well-pleaded facts 'indulging all

reasonable inferences in [appellant's] favor.'" Fantini v. Salem

State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Nisselson v.

Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006)). Our federal pleading

standard "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And,

importantly, "assertions nominally cast in factual terms but so

general and conclusory as to amount merely to an assertion that

unspecified facts exist to conform to the legal blueprint" are

insufficient to state a cognizable claim. Menard v. CSX Transp.,

Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2012).

Accordingly, "we will not accept a complainant's

unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law." Wash. Legal

Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993)

(citing United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir.

1992)). But "[b]ecause a dismissal terminates an action at the

- 13 - earliest stages of litigation without a developed factual basis

for decision, we must carefully balance the rule of simplified

civil pleading against our need for more than conclusory

allegations." Id.

III. Discussion

Municipalities cannot be held liable for the conduct of

their employees unless the municipality itself is also responsible

in some way for that conduct. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.

of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) ("[A] municipality cannot be

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other

words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory."). As the Supreme Court has explained,

"[a] municipality or other local government may be liable under

[§ 1983] if the governmental body itself 'subjects' a person to a

deprivation of rights or 'causes' a person 'to be subjected' to

such deprivation." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). Indeed, "it is only when the

governmental employees' 'execution of a government's policy or

custom . . . inflicts the injury' and is the 'moving force' behind

the constitutional violation that a municipality can be liable."

Young v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 25

(1st Cir. 2005) (omission in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694). Thus, the "two basic elements" of the inquiry are whether

Lavigne's "harm was caused by a constitutional violation" and

- 14 - whether the municipal entity, in this case the Board, can be held

"responsible for that violation." Id. at 25-26. We address only

the second element because if Lavigne has failed to allege facts

sufficient to show that Great Salt is in some way responsible for

any constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability.

Under that element, as relevant here, a plaintiff must show either

the existence of a municipal policy or custom directing or

requiring the allegedly unconstitutional actions or that the

municipality ratified the alleged actions of a subordinate after

the fact. See Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 941-42 (1st Cir.

2008).

On appeal, Lavigne argues that the district court erred

in dismissing her claim because (1) her allegations sufficiently

establish the existence of a policy or custom of withholding;

(2) the district court erred in declining to address the first

element of municipal liability; and (3) her allegations

established that the Board violated her right to direct the

education of her child. Like the district court, we resolve this

case by addressing only the second element of municipal liability,

concluding that Lavigne's allegations fail to plausibly show that

either the Board had a policy of withholding or that the Board

- 15 - later ratified the individual defendants' decisions to withhold

information from Lavigne.4

A. Structure of Monell Liability Analysis

We begin by addressing Lavigne's contention that the

district court erred in beginning -- and ending -- its analysis

with the second element of municipal liability. Lavigne has not

directed our attention to a single case requiring a district court

to begin its municipal liability analysis with the constitutional

question, nor are we aware of any such cases. Indeed, our case

law indicates that the opposite is true. See Freeman v. Town of

Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of

complaint against city solely because "[t]he

4 During the pendency of this appeal, this court released our decision in Foote v. Ludlow Sch. Comm., 128 F.4th 336 (1st Cir. 2025) (per curiam). In that case, we addressed a similar claim involving parental rights protected by the Due Process Clause, concluding that a school's admitted policy of withholding from parents a student's decision to "go by a different name and to use different pronouns than those given to them at birth" did not "restrict any fundamental parental right protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 340, 355-56. Following that decision, we ordered supplemental briefing from the parties in this case to address Foote's impact on their arguments. Lavigne contended that Foote was not controlling despite the similarities. For its part, the Board maintained that Foote need not be considered because, unlike in Foote, there was no policy of withholding alleged here. The Board also contended that if we were to disagree and conclude that Lavigne's complaint satisfied the second element of municipal liability, Foote would be controlling as to the question of whether defendants violated Lavigne's constitutional rights. Because we agree with the Board that Lavigne's complaint does not satisfy the second element of municipal liability, we need not consider Foote's applicability to this case.

- 16 - complaint . . . references no state or local laws establishing the

policymaking authority of any individual or group of individuals"

and "gives no guidance about which acts are properly attributable

to the municipal authority"); Collins v. City of Harker Heights,

503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992) (in municipal liability case, assuming

constitutional violation and addressing second element); see also

Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 511 (1st Cir. 2011)

("It is bedrock that the 'long-standing principle of judicial

restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.'" (quoting

Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445

(1988))). Accordingly, we see no error in the district court's

decision to address only the second element, and we do the same

ourselves.

Thus, we turn to whether Lavigne's allegations

demonstrate either: (1) the existence of an unwritten policy of

withholding information about students' gender identity and gender

expression from parents or (2) that the Board later ratified the

individual defendants' decisions to withhold such information from

Lavigne.5

5 Before the district court, in addition to arguing the existence of an unwritten policy or custom and liability via ratification, Lavigne argued that defendants' acts stemmed from a persistent practice of failing to properly train staff on the rights of parents. But the district court rejected this argument, concluding that the allegations only suggested an insufficient

- 17 - B. Monell's Second Element: Policy or Custom of Withholding

At this stage of litigation, with respect to the second

element of municipal liability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege

that the "municipal action at issue . . . constitute[s] a 'policy

or custom' attributable to" the municipality, that "the municipal

policy or custom actually . . . caused the plaintiff's injury,"

and "the municipality possessed the requisite level of fault."

Young, 404 F.3d at 26. Here, we begin -- and end -- our inquiry

with the question of whether Lavigne has plausibly alleged the

existence of any policy or custom at all.

An official municipal policy can take the form of either

an "officially adopted" policy statement or regulation, Monell,

436 U.S. at 690, or an informal custom amounting to a widespread

practice that, although "not authorized by written law," is "so

permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage'

with the force of law," Abdisamad, 960 F.3d at 60 (quoting Monell,

436 U.S. at 691). The Supreme Court has also held that if

"authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the

basis for it," that ratification is chargeable to the municipality

as an official policy or custom "because their decision is final."

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)

training program, which was not enough to establish liability. Lavigne has not advanced this theory in her opening brief, so, to the extent she seeks to raise that argument on appeal, it is waived. See Mayendía-Blanco, 905 F.3d at 32.

- 18 - (plurality opinion); see Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 ("Official

municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's

lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices

so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of

law.").

Lavigne argues that she has satisfied Monell's policy or

custom requirement by alleging facts that compel the inference

that (1) an unwritten but official policy or custom of withholding

existed or (2) the Board ratified the individual defendants'

choices to withhold information from her. We reject these

contentions and thus conclude that Lavigne has not pleaded facts

sufficient to establish the existence of a permanent and

well-settled policy or custom of withholding and concealing

information.

1. Unwritten Policy or Custom

In support of the first theory, Lavigne directs our

attention to various statements from the Board and school officials

defending the legality of defendants' conduct, arguing that each

denial of wrongdoing compels the inference that the Board did

indeed maintain a policy of withholding information from parents.

Specifically, Lavigne argues that because Superintendent Johnston

told Lavigne that "no policy was violated" by the defendants'

actions, "the logical conclusion is that the[] actions were the

policy." Lavigne cites the Board's January 14, 2023 statement

- 19 - that "[n]either the Board nor school administration are aware of

any violation of policy or law [that] requires further action at

this time" as supporting the same inference. She also points to

Principal Schaff's February 26, 2023 statement attributing recent

threats against the school to "[a] misunderstanding of [the] laws

pertaining to gender identity and privileged communication between

school social workers and minor clients," which Lavigne says

amounts to a statement that defendants' conduct was consistent

with school policies. Finally, she alleges that social worker

Roy's conduct violated written school policies and yet the Board

decided to renew his contract, arguing that the "obvious

explanation" for this decision is that Roy's conduct complied with

an unwritten policy of withholding.

However, none of these allegations support the inference

that the Board maintained an unwritten custom or policy of

withholding information from parents. As Lavigne herself

emphasizes, the Board's written policies encourage the opposite:

the Guidelines state that "[a] plan should be developed by the

school, in consultation with the student, parent(s)/guardian(s)

and others as appropriate, to address the [transgender] student's

particular needs," and the Staff Conduct Policy prohibits

"[a]sking a student to keep a secret." But Lavigne argues that

defendants' alleged misconduct "should amount to violations" of

these policies. In other words, Lavigne concedes that the Board

- 20 - maintained written policies that apply to the conduct in question.

Common sense thus dictates that it was these written policies to

which the Board and school officials were referring in the

statements cited by Lavigne.

Contrary to Lavigne's contentions on appeal, there need

not have been some superseding unwritten custom of active

concealment for the Board and school officials to conclude that

the alleged misconduct did not run afoul of the Board's existing

written policies. While the Guidelines state that school personnel

"should" consult with parents "as appropriate" in addressing the

needs of transgender students, they also expressly note that they

are to be "interpreted in light of applicable federal and state

laws and regulations." This would include the Maine state law

protecting the confidentiality of communications between students

and school social workers, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 20-A, § 4008,

which both the Board and Principal Schaff cite in their statements

alluding to the issues raised by Lavigne. Defendants' repeated

references to the protections provided to student and counselor

relationships under state law suggest that they interpreted state

law to either support the individual defendants' alleged decision

to withhold information from Lavigne or believed there was enough

ambiguity to make it unclear whether that decision violated Board

policy. Indeed, Lavigne acknowledged that it is not entirely clear

whether the actions of the individual defendants would violate the

- 21 - Board's express policies when she correctly alleged that the

Guidelines do not explicitly address "the giving of chest binders

or any other devices to students," nor do they affirmatively

"mandate the involvement of parents at any point in the process of

deciding whether to use alternate names and pronouns."

"We have explained that assessing plausibility is 'a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense.'" Frith v. Whole Foods

Mkt., Inc., 38 F.4th 263, 270 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting

Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.

2013)). Here, there are "obvious alternative explanation[s]," id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567)), for Superintendent Johnston's

statement to Lavigne that "no policies had been violated" and the

similar sentiments expressed in the Board's January 14, 2023

statement that belie the suggestion of an unwritten policy of

withholding. The same is true for the school's decision to renew

Roy's contract. We likewise see no basis to infer the existence

of an unwritten withholding policy from the statement Principal

Schaff addressed to the wider school community in response to

threats to the school, which provides only a general summation of

relevant "laws pertaining to gender identity and privileged

communication between school social workers and minor clients" and

makes no reference to any policies and practices of the school.

Finally, nothing about the staff's conduct itself allows for the

- 22 - inference that they were acting pursuant to a known and

well-settled policy.6

Without this factual support, Lavigne's contention that

the school acted pursuant to an unwritten "blanket policy, pattern,

and practice of intentional withholding and concealment of such

information from all parents" is based solely on her "information

and belief." But the phrase "information and belief" does not

excuse "pure speculation," Menard, 698 F.3d at 45, and a "legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation" is not entitled to a

6 In addition to the actions of social worker Roy, Lavigne also alleges that other "school officials had been calling A.B. by a name not on A.B.'s birth certificate and were referring to A.B. with gender-pronouns not typically associated with A.B.'s biological sex" and did not inform Lavigne of these facts. At times, where there is other evidence of a custom or policy, concerted actions by municipal employees may provide "some proof of the existence of the underlying policy or custom." See Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1157 (1st Cir. 1989). However, Lavigne has not pled any facts to suggest that these officials intentionally withheld information from her, encouraged A.B. to do so, or were even aware of Lavigne's lack of involvement in the school's treatment of her child. And given the lack of any other indicia of a custom or policy as explained above, these meager pleadings, which ultimately suggest only the isolated actions of one employee, do not allege a "well settled and widespread" practice of withholding information from parents. Cf. id. at 1156 (noting that all involved "acted in concert" in determining that plaintiff had established existence of a policy); see also Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524-25 (7th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of Monell claim where "allegations of two isolated incidents fail[ed] to plausibly allege that the [school district] ha[d] a widespread practice of using excessive force to punish students with behavioral disabilities").

- 23 - presumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).7

2. Board Ratification

Lavigne also contends that regardless of whether the

Board maintained a policy of withholding, it is liable based on

its later ratification of the individual defendants' choices to

withhold information from Lavigne. We disagree.

"[I]t is plain that municipal liability may be imposed

for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate

circumstances." Welch, 542 F.3d at 942 (quoting Pembaur v. City

of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). Where "authorized

policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for

it, their ratification [is] chargeable to the municipality because

their decision is final." Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. Although

this court has yet to fully delineate the "precise contours of

this ratification doctrine," we have explained the requirement

that municipal approval must be active, not passive. Saunders v.

7 To the extent Lavigne suggests that discovery will reveal the necessary facts, we note that, given the complaint's shortcomings, discovery would be nothing more than "a fishing expedition." DM Rsch., Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Conclusory allegations in a complaint, if they stand alone, are a danger sign that the plaintiff is engaged in a fishing expedition."). Further, Lavigne's suggestion underscores that her allegations of the existence of a policy are unsupported by facts and thus are based on "pure speculation." Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012).

- 24 - Town of Hull, 874 F.3d 324, 330 (1st Cir. 2017). We have also

explained that the active approval must be with respect to both

the "subordinate's decision and the basis for it." Id. (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126). And, as the

Supreme Court set out in Praprotnik, "[s]imply going along with [a

subordinate's] discretionary decisions" or "mere[ly] fail[ing] to

investigate the basis of a subordinate's discretionary decisions"

does not equal ratification. 485 U.S. at 130.

Lavigne relies primarily on the Board's January 14

statement that it was unaware of any policy violation requiring

further action, arguing that from this statement one can

"reasonabl[y] infer[] that the Board ratified the challenged

conduct." She also points to the Board's decision to approve a

second contract for Roy, arguing that by doing so the Board

ratified Roy's conduct.

We agree with the district court that the Board's "vague

expression" does not "identify[] any particular decision or

decisions of a subordinate" and thus does not plausibly show that

the Board ratified the individual decisions to not tell certain

information about A.B. to Lavigne. Nothing in the Board's

statement expressed approval for any of the alleged conduct or any

reasoning behind it. The statement only explained that no policy

was violated. This is nothing like the type of actively approving

statement that the Praprotnik Court considered as the basis for

- 25 - ratification. And, moreover, Lavigne has not pointed us to any

cases, nor are we aware of any, that extended Praprotnik's holding

to vague statements like the one made by the Board here. Nothing

about the Board's decision to grant Roy another contract, without

more, expresses active approval of Roy's alleged conduct with

respect to A.B. and Lavigne. Accordingly, we agree with the

district court that Lavigne has failed to plausibly allege that

the Board's "'execution of a [municipal] policy or

custom . . . inflict[ed] the [alleged] injury' and [was] the

'moving force' behind the constitutional violation." Young, 404

F.3d at 25 (omission in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at

694).

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal.

- 26 -