Lavi v. DWS

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 7, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-07501
StatusUnknown

This text of Lavi v. DWS (Lavi v. DWS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lavi v. DWS, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK OMEGA IND. INC. PENSION PLAN AND TRUST; PARVIZ LAVI, Plaintiff, 22-CV-7501 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND DWS; DEUTSCHE BANK, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Parviz Lavi is proceeding pro se. By order dated September 16, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which names as plaintiffs Parviz Lavi and “Omega Ind. Inc. Pension Plan and Trust” (Omega), and names as defendants Deutsche

Bank and DWS, a “unit” of Deutsche Bank. (ECF 2 at 1.) On June 2, 1977, DWS “deposited a substantial amount of money” into Plaintiff’s “pe[n]sion plan and trust” account. (ECF 2 at 1.) Plaintiff “does not remember the amount of the deposit, but it “should be about $150,000, because in 1977, [his] salary was $300,000.” (Id. at 2.) Attached to the complaint is a 2021 DWS statement showing a balance of approximately $2,500. (Id. at 3.) In a February 9, 2022 email, DWS advised Plaintiff that according to its records, he did not have the account in 1977, and that “representa[t]ive[s]” of Plaintiff’s account, named “Geller” and “Vantis,” executed three “redemptions” on the account: the first for $81,765.90 on May 15, 1985; the second for $39,269.31 on July 26, 1989; and the third for $70.143.56 on August 28, 1989. (Id. at 2, 8-9.) The email further states that the representatives “would have been appointed by” Omega, were “not affiliated with DWS,” and would have been affiliated with Wachovia Securities, “which was acquired by Wells Fargo.” (Id.) The email further stated that DWS had contacted the bank on which the $39,269.31 check had been drawn, but the bank was

“unable to provide a copy given the age of the check.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff Lavi resides in Suffolk County, New York, and he provides a Manhattan address for Deutsche Bank and a Missouri address for DWS. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff does not provide a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, and he does not assert any specific claims or specify the relief he seeks. DISCUSSION A. Claims on behalf of Omega Ind. Inc. Pension Plan Plaintiff purports to bring this complaint on his own behalf and on behalf of Omega. As a pro se litigant, however, Plaintiff cannot act on behalf of another. See U.S. ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n individual who is not licensed as an attorney may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.”). It is well established that a pro se plaintiff cannot represent a corporation, even if he is the sole member or shareholder of that corporation. Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold that a sole member limited liability company must be represented by counsel to appear in federal court.”). Omega Ind. Inc. Pension Plan is therefore dismissed as a party from the action without prejudice. B. Subject matter jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO vy. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (‘Tf the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter Jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574

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Lavi v. DWS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lavi-v-dws-nysd-2022.