LAVARDO JOHN BASDEN v. WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 11 LAVARDO JOHN BASDEN, ) Case No.: 1:26-cv-00123-KES-SKO (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) A-Number: 240-452-962 ) 13 ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ) DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 14 v. ) CORPUS 15 ) ) [21-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD] 16 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ) ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al., )

17 ) Respondents. ) 18 )

20 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 21 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 22 Petitioner filed the instant petition on January 8, 2026.1 (Doc. 1.) He challenges his continued 23 detention by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He claims his prolonged 24 detention without a bond hearing violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth 25 26 27 1 Petitioner filed a second habeas petition raising the same claims in Case No. 1:26-cv-1647-DAD-SCR. That 28 petition was ordered refiled in the instant case. (Doc. 16.) 1 Amendment. He claims he should be provided a bond hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at 2 which the Government must justify his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. 3 On February 13, 2026, Respondent filed a response to the petition. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner did not 4 file a reply. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will recommend the petition be denied. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 Petitioner is a native and citizen of the Bahamas. (Doc. 14-2 at 1.) He entered the United States 7 on July 26, 2001, as a visitor for pleasure. (Doc. 14-2 at 1.) He overstayed his visa beyond January 25, 8 2002, without authorization. (Doc. 14-2 at 1.) He has not applied for any form of lawful status. (Doc. 9 14-1 at 2.) 10 On March 9, 2022, Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the 11 Southern District of Florida of carjacking, a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) and was 12 sentenced to 48 months in prison. (Doc. 14-1 at 2.) 13 On April 6, 2022, Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial 14 Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, of robbery/strongarm, a felony, in violation of Florida 15 Statute § 812.13(2)(c) and sentenced to 366 days in prison. (Doc. 14-1 at 2.) Both convictions 16 constitute aggravated felonies under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 101(a)(43). (Doc. 14- 17 1 at 2.) After release from criminal custody, on October 1, 2025, Petitioner was taken into ICE 18 custody. 19 Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings, and his next immigration hearing was scheduled 20 for March 18, 2026. (Doc. 14-1 at 2.) He has not filed for any applications for relief in the immigration 21 court or visa petitions with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 A. Jurisdiction 24 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in 25 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 26 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to 27 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez- 28 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 1 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Supreme Court specifically directed that federal courts have jurisdiction to 2 review a constitutional challenge to a non-citizen's detention under § 1226(c). See Demore v. Kim, 3 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 4 B. Mandatory Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 5 Petitioner has been detained for approximately 5 months pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), 6 which, in relevant part, provides: 7 (c) Detention of criminal aliens

8 (1) Custody

9 The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who--

10 (A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title, 11 (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 12 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,

13 (C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence1 to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, 14 (D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 15 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, or

16 (E)(i) is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this title; and (ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, 17 or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that 18 results in death or serious bodily injury to another person,

19 when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be 20 arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

21 . . . .

22 (4) Release

23 The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of Title 18 that release of the alien 24 from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate 25 family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien 26 will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take 27 place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien. 28 1 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226 (West). 2 Petitioner’s prior criminal convictions for carjacking and robbery/strongarm both qualify as 3 aggravated felonies for crime of violence. See United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 4 2017) (finding carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 is categorically a crime of violence); Castro- 5 Mercedes v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 21-127321, 2025 WL 833203 at *3 (11th Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) 6 (recognizing that Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(c) was a crime of violence pursuant to Stokeling v. United 7 States, 586 U.S. 73 (2019)). Because Petitioner has been convicted of aggravated felonies involving 8 crimes of violence, he is deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and, thus, subject to 9 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). 10 Section 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to release aliens on bond, “[e]xcept as provided 11 in subsection (c).” As noted above, Section 1226(c) states that the Attorney General “shall take into 12 custody any alien who” falls into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and 13 terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Section 1226(c)(2) then states that the Attorney General 14 may release an alien described in § 1226(c)(1) “‘only if the Attorney General decides’ both that doing 15 so is necessary for witness-protection purposes and that the alien will not pose a danger or flight risk.” 16 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2)) (emphasis in original). 17 In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that “together with § 1226(a), § 1226(c) makes clear that 18 detention of aliens within its scope must continue ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be 19 removed from the United States.’” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Further, the Supreme Court noted 20 that “[b]y expressly stating that the covered aliens may be released ‘only if’ certain conditions are met, 21 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2), the statute expressly and unequivocally imposes an affirmative prohibition on 22 releasing detained aliens under any other conditions.” Id. at 304 (emphasis in original). Thus, the 23 Supreme Court held that “§ 1226(c) mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope and that 24 detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is released for 25 witness-protection purposes.” Id. Here, Petitioner does not meet the conditions for release. Therefore, 26 statutorily, § 1226(c) mandates detention. Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that his detention without 27 28 1 a bail review hearing has become so unreasonably prolonged as to violate his Fifth Amendment 2 procedural due process rights. 3 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of 4 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 5 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 6 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional 7 problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Supreme Court nevertheless has 8 recognized that “[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of 9 [the deportation] process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 10 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure”). 11 Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under § 1226(c), and he does not meet any of the 12 conditions for release pursuant to § 1226(c)(2). Petitioner nevertheless contends his detention has 13 become so unreasonably prolonged that due process requires that he be provided an individualized 14 bond hearing. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of prolonged 15 detention in the context of an as-applied challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); however, the Supreme 16 Court’s statutory decisions regarding mandatory detention provide guidance regarding prolonged 17 detention in an as-applied challenge under the Due Process Clause. 18 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court considered a due process challenge to 19 detention of aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which governs detention following a final order of removal. 20 The Court in Zadvydas read § 1231 to authorize continued detention of an alien following the 90-day 21 removal period for only such time as is reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal. Id. at 699. 22 Zadvydas is materially different from the present case. In Zadvydas, the aliens challenging their 23 detention following final orders of deportation were ones for whom removal was “no longer 24 practically attainable.” Id. at 690. The civil confinement at issue was not limited, “but potentially 25 permanent.” Id. at 691. The Court observed that where “detention's goal is no longer practically 26 attainable, detention no longer bears a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual was 27 committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Zadvydas distinguished § 1231 from 28 § 1226 on these very grounds, noting that “post-removal-period detention, unlike detention pending a 1 determination of removability, has no obvious termination point.” Id. at 697. Here, however, removal 2 is practically attainable. As the Supreme Court noted in Jennings, “detention under § 1226(c) has a 3 definite termination point: the conclusion of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 304. 4 In Demore v. Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien challenged the no-bail provision of the 5 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), complaining that his six-month detention violated due 6 process because he had not been provided an individualized bond hearing. 538 U.S. 510. The Supreme 7 Court rejected this claim, observing first that Congress, in its “broad power over naturalization and 8 immigration proceedings,” “regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to United 9 States citizens.” Id. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). Additionally, 10 detention pending removal necessarily serves the purpose of preventing aliens from fleeing prior to or 11 during removal proceedings. Id. at 527-28. Also, the Court noted that detention under § 1226(c) has a 12 definite termination point. Id. at 529. Although the Supreme Court did not specify an outer limit as to 13 what constitutes a permissible detention period, it acknowledged that “the detention at stake under § 14 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases ... and about five months in the 15 minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 530. Nevertheless, the majority went on 16 to hold that six months did not run afoul of the due process clause in part because the delayed 17 proceedings were the result of the alien’s own requests. Id. at 530–31. In analyzing whether 18 prolonged detention violates due process, many courts have looked to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 19 in Demore, which noted that, “since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, 20 a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized 21 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 22 unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 23 In 2015, the Ninth Circuit applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold that for 24 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide 25 periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention.” 26 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.2015). In Jennings v. Rodriguez, however, the Supreme 27 Court determined that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and 28 the “implicit 6-month time limit on the length of mandatory detention” under § 1226(c) fell “far short 1 of a ‘plausible statutory construction.’” 583 U.S. 281, 296, 303-04. The Jennings Court interpreted § 2 1226(c) as having a “definite termination point” to the length of detention, - the “conclusion of 3 removal proceedings” – and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to consider the constitutional 4 arguments on their merits. Id. at 304. Jennings therefore held that § 1226(c) on its face authorized 5 detention without a bond hearing. The Court did not, however, provide guidance on whether an alien 6 could assert a challenge under the Fifth Amendment due process clause as applied to a petitioner in his 7 individual circumstance. 8 Several circuit courts and numerous district courts, including this Court, have found that 9 unreasonably long detention periods may violate the due process clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin 10 (“Rodriguez IV”), 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (the Ninth Circuit asserted “grave doubts that any 11 statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional....”); Diop v. 12 ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (detention of an alien for a period of nearly 13 three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the 14 removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable, and, 15 therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause”); German Santos v. Warden Pike, 965 F.3d 203 (3d 16 Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding to district court to order bond hearing while detained under § 17 1226(c)); Diep v. Wofford, 1:24-cv-01238-SKO, 2025 WL 604744 (E.D. Cal Feb. 25, 2025) (ordering 18 bond hearing for noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for 13 months); A.E. v. Andrews, 1:25- 19 cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) (ordering bond hearing for 20 noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) for 20 months). 21 The Ninth Circuit has also noted that many courts have applied the Mathews2 test in 22 considering due process challenges in the immigration context. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 23 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022). However, the Supreme Court, when confronted with constitutional 24 challenges to immigration detention, has not resolved them through express application of Mathews. 25 See, e.g., Demore, 538 U.S. at 523, 526–29; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168, 26 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all- 27

28 2 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 1 embracing test for deciding due process claims.”). Nevertheless, several district courts in the Ninth 2 Circuit including this Court have employed the Mathews test in the context of evaluating whether due 3 process entitles a petitioner to a bond hearing. See, e.g., Jensen v. Garland, 2023 WL 3246522, at *4 4 (C.D. Cal. 2023); Galdillo v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2021 WL 4839502, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2021); 5 Jimenez v. Wolf, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Riego v. Scott, 2025 WL 660535 (E.D. 6 Cal. 2025); Diep, No. 1:24-CV-01238-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 604744; A.E., 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 7 2025 WL 1424382. 8 The Ninth Circuit has also noted the common use of the Mathews test and assumed (without 9 deciding) that it applies to due process claims in the immigration detention context. Rodriguez Diaz v. 10 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Court finds application of the Mathews test 11 in this case appropriate. 12 Under the Mathews test, the “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally 13 requires consideration of three distinct factors.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. “First, the private 14 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 15 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 16 procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the 17 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 18 entail.” Id. at 335. 19 In the first factor, the Court must evaluate Petitioner’s private interest. Petitioner has now been 20 detained approximately 5 months. Compared to the 90-day removal period plus the six-month 21 presumptive period set forth in Zadvydas beyond which continued detention becomes prolonged, 22 Petitioner’s period of detention is well within the presumptively reasonable period of time. Zadvydas, 23 533 U.S. at 701. This is also not a case where the detention period is indefinite in nature. There is a 24 definite endpoint: the conclusion of removal proceedings. Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of the 25 Government. 26 As to the second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s] interest through 27 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” 28 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of the Government. The “risk of 1 an erroneous deprivation of [a petitioner's] interest is high” where “[h]e has not received any bond or 2 custody redetermination hearing[.]” Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at *3. Here, there is no indication that 3 Petitioner has been provided a bond hearing. However, Petitioner was taken into ICE custody 4 immediately after serving his sentence for an aggravated felony. The probable value of a bond hearing 5 is diminished where, as here, the danger to the public is self-evident. Thus, the second factor weighs in 6 favor of the Government. 7 In the third factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, “including the function 8 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would 9 entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. As previously discussed, the government has a strong interest in 10 effecting removal. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. In addition, the government has a strong interest in 11 protecting the public. Significantly, here, Petitioner has demonstrated his inability to abide by the law. 12 He was taken into ICE custody immediately after completing his federal sentence for carjacking. 13 Certainly, the Government’s interest in protecting the public from an aggravated felon is substantial. 14 Thus, the third factor also weighs in favor of the Government. 15 While it is true that the key government interest at stake here “is not the continued detention of 16 Petitioner, but the government's ability to detain him without a bond hearing,” Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE 17 Field Office Director, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. 2020) (collecting cases), Petitioner has not 18 carried his burden under the Mathews test. Detention under § 1226(c) is mandatory, the period of 19 detention is not prolonged, and it is apparent he poses a risk of danger to the public if released. 20 The Court concludes that due process does not require Petitioner be provided a bond hearing at 21 this time. The petition should be denied without prejudice to refiling in the future, should detention 22 continue with no reasonable likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future. 23 III. RECOMMENDATION 24 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS the petition for writ of habeas 25 corpus be DENIED without prejudice. 26 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 27 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 28 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within twenty- 1 one (21) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a party may file 2 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Id. The document should be 3 captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall not exceed 4 fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not consider 5 exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party 6 should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, 7 or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page 8 limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and 9 Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 10 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 11 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is 12 immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 13 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's 14 judgment. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 Dated: March 26, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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