IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
LARRY D. CAMPBELL, No. 85100-4-I
Appellant,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION AT&T, INC.; and THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES, State of Washington,
Respondents.
BOWMAN, J. — Larry Campbell appeals a superior court order affirming a
Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) decision denying his workers’
compensation claim for major depressive disorder (MDD). Campbell asserts that
the superior court failed to appropriately consider his testimony and medical
evidence, leading to an inequitable result. Because substantial evidence
supports the superior court’s decision, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 19, 2016, 57-year-old Campbell sustained an industrial
injury to his back while working for his employer, AT&T Inc. Prior to the accident,
Campbell led an active life and did not suffer from significant physical or mental
health problems. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) allowed
his workers’ compensation claim, and in June 2017, Campbell underwent back
surgery. The surgery reduced his pain but did not resolve it. In 2018, Campbell No. 85100-4-I/2
attended Pacific Rehabilitation Center, a multidisciplinary treatment clinic that
helps patients manage pain. Campbell found the treatment “somewhat helpful”
and it allowed him to improve his overall functioning. But Campbell continued to
experience “depressed mood” and “feelings of uselessness.”
On August 20, 2020, the Department ordered AT&T “to accept [MDD] as
related to [Campbell’s] injury.” AT&T protested the order. On January 12, 2021,
the Department issued a superseding order stating AT&T was not responsible for
the condition of MDD “because it was not caused or aggravated by [Campbell’s]
industrial injury.” On March 16, 2021, the Department affirmed the order. On
April 19, 2021, Campbell appealed the Department’s March 16, 2021 order to the
Board.
An industrial appeals judge (IAJ) held a telephonic evidentiary hearing on
January 5, 2022. Campbell testified at the hearing and presented the deposition
testimony of psychiatrist Dr. Cassie Yu, who conducted an independent medical
examination (IME) of Campbell to determine the presence or absence of
psychiatric illness.
Campbell testified that he is still in constant pain and often feels
depressed and “useless” because the pain prevents him from functioning as well
as he did before the industrial injury. He said that he is “tired all the time,”
“miserable,” unmotivated in his daily activities and hobbies, “moody” with his wife,
and does not go fishing with his friends as often as he used to. He also said that
his wife and daughter told him that his memory is not as good as it used to be.
2 No. 85100-4-I/3
Campbell admitted he was reluctant to reveal his depression to others but he
was open and honest with Dr. Yu because she made him feel comfortable.
Dr. Yu testified about her IME report, issued June 6, 2020.1 Her initial
impression was that Campbell was doing well. He appeared “funny and
reserved” with “excellent eye contact” and “articulate [ ] speech and language.”
Campbell insisted that he did not have major depression and that his memory
was “very strong.” But after more questioning, Campbell reported insomnia, low
appetite, lethargy, feeling worthless, and “passive suicidal death wishes,” which
Dr. Yu viewed as “marked neurovegetative symptoms” consistent with MDD. As
part of a “mini mental status examination” (MMSE), Dr. Yu asked Campbell to
count backward by 7 starting with the number 100. She also asked him to recall
three words after three minutes of unrelated discussion. Campbell completed the
first test with one error and failed the second.
Dr. Yu concluded that the MMSE results combined with Campbell’s
reports of depressed mood indicated the presence of “pseudodementia,” which
she could only explain as MDD. Dr. Yu stated that Campbell was positive for
eight of nine major depression symptoms2 in the DSM-53 and diagnosed him with
1 Dr. Yu also reviewed Campbell’s medical history as part of the IME. 2 Dr. Yu testified that the nine symptoms of MDD are (1) reports of depressed mood most of the day, (2) marked disinterest or pleasure in previously enjoyed activities, (3) significant weight loss or weight gain, (4) insomnia or hypersomnia, (5) fatigue or loss of energy every day, (6) psychomotor agitation or retardation, (7) self-concept high to the point of near delusion, (8) decreased ability to concentrate, and (9) recurrent thoughts of death. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 3
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
3 No. 85100-4-I/4
MDD proximately caused by his industrial injury on a more probable than not
basis.
AT&T presented the deposition testimony of psychiatrists Dr. Paul
Ciechanowski, Dr. Jean Dalpe, and Dr. Michael Ward. Dr. Ciechanowski and Dr.
Dalpe performed IMEs of Campbell and Dr. Ward conducted a forensic records
review.4 None of the doctors found the presence of a psychiatric condition and
all three disagreed with Dr. Yu’s diagnosis of MDD.
On April 8, 2022, the IAJ issued a detailed proposed decision and order
with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The IAJ concluded that as of March
16, 2021, the date the Department affirmed its order, Campbell “did not have the
psychiatric condition of major depression as a residual condition of his industrial
injury.” Because the Department issued its order based on the finding that
Campbell had MDD but the condition “was not caused or aggravated by the
industrial injury,” the IAJ reversed and remanded to the Department to reject the
claim on the basis that Campbell “did not have” MDD.
Campbell petitioned the Board to review the IAJ’s decision and the Board
accepted review. On June 7, 2022, the Board issued an order denying
Campbell’s petition for review and adopting the IAJ’s proposed decision and
order as its own.
Campbell appealed the Board’s decision to the superior court. On
February 10, 2023, the superior court issued an order on judicial review affirming
All three doctors also reviewed Campbell’s medical history. Dr. Ward’s review 4
included the three IMEs of Dr. Yu, Dr. Ciechanowski, and Dr. Dalpe and the depositions of Dr. Yu and Dr. Dalpe.
4 No. 85100-4-I/5
the Board’s decision because it “acted within its power,” “correctly construed the
law,” and “correctly found the facts.”
Campbell appeals.
ANALYSIS
The Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, governs judicial review of
workers’ compensation determinations. Rogers v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 151
Wn. App. 174, 179, 210 P.3d 355 (2009). The superior court acts in an appellate
capacity in an appeal from the Board’s decision and reviews the decision de
novo. RCW 51.52.115; Rogers, 151 Wn. App. at 179. The Board’s decision is
prima facie correct and the opposing party must support its challenge by a
preponderance of the evidence. RCW 51.52.115; Ruse v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
LARRY D. CAMPBELL, No. 85100-4-I
Appellant,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION AT&T, INC.; and THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES, State of Washington,
Respondents.
BOWMAN, J. — Larry Campbell appeals a superior court order affirming a
Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) decision denying his workers’
compensation claim for major depressive disorder (MDD). Campbell asserts that
the superior court failed to appropriately consider his testimony and medical
evidence, leading to an inequitable result. Because substantial evidence
supports the superior court’s decision, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 19, 2016, 57-year-old Campbell sustained an industrial
injury to his back while working for his employer, AT&T Inc. Prior to the accident,
Campbell led an active life and did not suffer from significant physical or mental
health problems. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) allowed
his workers’ compensation claim, and in June 2017, Campbell underwent back
surgery. The surgery reduced his pain but did not resolve it. In 2018, Campbell No. 85100-4-I/2
attended Pacific Rehabilitation Center, a multidisciplinary treatment clinic that
helps patients manage pain. Campbell found the treatment “somewhat helpful”
and it allowed him to improve his overall functioning. But Campbell continued to
experience “depressed mood” and “feelings of uselessness.”
On August 20, 2020, the Department ordered AT&T “to accept [MDD] as
related to [Campbell’s] injury.” AT&T protested the order. On January 12, 2021,
the Department issued a superseding order stating AT&T was not responsible for
the condition of MDD “because it was not caused or aggravated by [Campbell’s]
industrial injury.” On March 16, 2021, the Department affirmed the order. On
April 19, 2021, Campbell appealed the Department’s March 16, 2021 order to the
Board.
An industrial appeals judge (IAJ) held a telephonic evidentiary hearing on
January 5, 2022. Campbell testified at the hearing and presented the deposition
testimony of psychiatrist Dr. Cassie Yu, who conducted an independent medical
examination (IME) of Campbell to determine the presence or absence of
psychiatric illness.
Campbell testified that he is still in constant pain and often feels
depressed and “useless” because the pain prevents him from functioning as well
as he did before the industrial injury. He said that he is “tired all the time,”
“miserable,” unmotivated in his daily activities and hobbies, “moody” with his wife,
and does not go fishing with his friends as often as he used to. He also said that
his wife and daughter told him that his memory is not as good as it used to be.
2 No. 85100-4-I/3
Campbell admitted he was reluctant to reveal his depression to others but he
was open and honest with Dr. Yu because she made him feel comfortable.
Dr. Yu testified about her IME report, issued June 6, 2020.1 Her initial
impression was that Campbell was doing well. He appeared “funny and
reserved” with “excellent eye contact” and “articulate [ ] speech and language.”
Campbell insisted that he did not have major depression and that his memory
was “very strong.” But after more questioning, Campbell reported insomnia, low
appetite, lethargy, feeling worthless, and “passive suicidal death wishes,” which
Dr. Yu viewed as “marked neurovegetative symptoms” consistent with MDD. As
part of a “mini mental status examination” (MMSE), Dr. Yu asked Campbell to
count backward by 7 starting with the number 100. She also asked him to recall
three words after three minutes of unrelated discussion. Campbell completed the
first test with one error and failed the second.
Dr. Yu concluded that the MMSE results combined with Campbell’s
reports of depressed mood indicated the presence of “pseudodementia,” which
she could only explain as MDD. Dr. Yu stated that Campbell was positive for
eight of nine major depression symptoms2 in the DSM-53 and diagnosed him with
1 Dr. Yu also reviewed Campbell’s medical history as part of the IME. 2 Dr. Yu testified that the nine symptoms of MDD are (1) reports of depressed mood most of the day, (2) marked disinterest or pleasure in previously enjoyed activities, (3) significant weight loss or weight gain, (4) insomnia or hypersomnia, (5) fatigue or loss of energy every day, (6) psychomotor agitation or retardation, (7) self-concept high to the point of near delusion, (8) decreased ability to concentrate, and (9) recurrent thoughts of death. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 3
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
3 No. 85100-4-I/4
MDD proximately caused by his industrial injury on a more probable than not
basis.
AT&T presented the deposition testimony of psychiatrists Dr. Paul
Ciechanowski, Dr. Jean Dalpe, and Dr. Michael Ward. Dr. Ciechanowski and Dr.
Dalpe performed IMEs of Campbell and Dr. Ward conducted a forensic records
review.4 None of the doctors found the presence of a psychiatric condition and
all three disagreed with Dr. Yu’s diagnosis of MDD.
On April 8, 2022, the IAJ issued a detailed proposed decision and order
with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The IAJ concluded that as of March
16, 2021, the date the Department affirmed its order, Campbell “did not have the
psychiatric condition of major depression as a residual condition of his industrial
injury.” Because the Department issued its order based on the finding that
Campbell had MDD but the condition “was not caused or aggravated by the
industrial injury,” the IAJ reversed and remanded to the Department to reject the
claim on the basis that Campbell “did not have” MDD.
Campbell petitioned the Board to review the IAJ’s decision and the Board
accepted review. On June 7, 2022, the Board issued an order denying
Campbell’s petition for review and adopting the IAJ’s proposed decision and
order as its own.
Campbell appealed the Board’s decision to the superior court. On
February 10, 2023, the superior court issued an order on judicial review affirming
All three doctors also reviewed Campbell’s medical history. Dr. Ward’s review 4
included the three IMEs of Dr. Yu, Dr. Ciechanowski, and Dr. Dalpe and the depositions of Dr. Yu and Dr. Dalpe.
4 No. 85100-4-I/5
the Board’s decision because it “acted within its power,” “correctly construed the
law,” and “correctly found the facts.”
Campbell appeals.
ANALYSIS
The Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, governs judicial review of
workers’ compensation determinations. Rogers v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 151
Wn. App. 174, 179, 210 P.3d 355 (2009). The superior court acts in an appellate
capacity in an appeal from the Board’s decision and reviews the decision de
novo. RCW 51.52.115; Rogers, 151 Wn. App. at 179. The Board’s decision is
prima facie correct and the opposing party must support its challenge by a
preponderance of the evidence. RCW 51.52.115; Ruse v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,
138 Wn.2d 1, 5, 977 P.2d 570 (1999).
We review the decision of the superior court, not the decision of the
Board. Birgen v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 186 Wn. App. 851, 856, 347 P.3d 503
(2015); see RCW 51.52.140. The superior court’s decision is subject to the
ordinary standard of review for civil appeals. RCW 51.52.140; Malang v. Dep’t of
Lab. & Indus., 139 Wn. App. 677, 683, 162 P.3d 450 (2007). We review the
record to determine “ ‘whether substantial evidence supports the findings made
after the superior court’s de novo review, and whether the court’s conclusions of
law flow from the findings.’ ” Rogers, 151 Wn. App. at 1805 (quoting Ruse, 138
Wn.2d at 5). Substantial evidence is enough evidence to persuade a fair-
minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise. Potter v. Dep’t of
5 Internal quotation marks omitted.
5 No. 85100-4-I/6
Lab. & Indus., 172 Wn. App. 301, 310, 289 P.3d 727 (2012). We review the
record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in superior court.
Robinson v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 181 Wn. App. 415, 425, 326 P.3d 744 (2014).
And we do not reweigh or rebalance competing testimony and inferences.
Harrison Mem’l Hosp. v. Gagnon, 110 Wn. App. 475, 485, 40 P.3d 1221 (2002).
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to AT&T, we
conclude substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that Campbell did
not have the condition diagnosed as major depression as of March 16, 2021. Dr.
Ciechanowski, Dr. Dalpe, and Dr. Ward acknowledged that Campbell’s life was
altered by his industrial injury and that he sometimes experienced symptoms
such as depressed mood. But they agreed that his symptoms did not cross the
threshold to support a DSM-5 diagnosis of MDD. They testified that many of
Campbell’s symptoms were generated by his chronic pain from the industrial
injury, not due to a psychiatric condition. In this context, they noted the DSM-5
specifies that if symptoms are attributable to another condition like chronic pain,
those symptoms cannot be used to diagnose MDD. They also found that
Campbell’s demeanor and engagement during his IMEs indicated a level of
functioning not attributable to major depression and that sadness is a “normal”
part of life. All three doctors also disagreed with Dr. Yu’s assessment of
pseudodementia because the MMSE she administered is insufficient as a
diagnostic tool and she misinterpreted the results.
6 No. 85100-4-I/7
Campbell does not assert that the superior court’s finding was
unsupported by substantial evidence. Instead, he argues that the lower court
failed to provide the “appropriate weight” to his medical evidence based on its
assessment of the credibility of the independent medical examiners. He
contends that Dr. Yu’s testimony was more credible because her in-person IME
provided a more complete opportunity to assess his condition, while Dr. Dalpe
performed the IME remotely and Dr. Ward merely conducted a records review.
But Campbell effectively asks us to reweigh the evidence, make credibility
determinations, and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to him.
And as discussed above, we will not do so. See also McClure & Sons, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 16 Wn. App. 2d 854, 861, 487 P.3d 186 (2021) (appellate
court does not weigh the evidence but instead construes it in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party).
Campbell’s reliance on Price v. Department of Labor and Industries, 101
Wn.2d 520, 682 P.2d 307 (1984), does not compel a different outcome. In Price,
the court addressed whether a claim for workers’ compensation for a
psychological disability may be awarded based on expert medical testimony
about wholly subjective symptoms or whether the medical testimony must include
at least some objective findings. Id. at 521. The court concluded that a jury
instruction on the distinction between objective and subjective evidence was
improper. Id. at 529. In so holding, the court noted that “[m]edical opinions
derived from psychiatric examination are primarily based on conversations with
the patient” and that “[s]ymptoms of psychiatric injury are necessarily subjective
7 No. 85100-4-I/8
in nature.” Id. at 528. Price provides no support for the proposition that Dr.
Dalpe’s and Dr. Ward’s findings were of limited evidentiary value just because
the doctors did not interact with Campbell in person.6
Campbell also argues that the superior court did not adequately consider
his own testimony about his condition, so it failed to defer to the IIA’s
presumption in favor of the worker. See RCW 51.04.010. He points out that
unlike the other three doctors, he felt comfortable being open and honest with Dr.
Yu about his depression. He further argues that the superior court’s decision is
inequitable because his symptoms fluctuate over time, yet he is forever barred
from the claim.
The IIA is construed liberally in favor of injured workers to achieve the
legislature’s intent to provide compensation to all covered employees injured in
their employment. RCW 51.04.010; Dennis v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 109 Wn.2d
467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). But this court applies the liberal rule of
construction to interpretation of the IIA, not to questions of fact. Value Vill. v.
Vasquez-Ramirez, 11 Wn. App. 2d 590, 595-96, 455 P.3d 216 (2019) (citing
Ehman v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 33 Wn.2d 584, 595, 206 P.2d 787 (1949)). And
because AT&T prevailed below, Campbell bears the burden of supporting his
challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. Ruse, 138 Wn.2d at 5. As
discussed above, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that
Campbell did not have the condition diagnosed as MDD as of March 16, 2021.
6 Dr. Dalpe testified that the American Psychiatric Association allows psychiatric examinations to be conducted via “telehealth” video conferencing.
8 No. 85100-4-I/9
We affirm the superior court’s order on judicial review affirming the
Board’s decision.
WE CONCUR: