Lanier v. District of Columbia

871 F. Supp. 20, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18258, 1994 WL 716082
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 14, 1994
DocketCiv. A. 94-0013
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 871 F. Supp. 20 (Lanier v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lanier v. District of Columbia, 871 F. Supp. 20, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18258, 1994 WL 716082 (D.D.C. 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SPORKIN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and Defendant United States’ cross-motion to dismiss. This case presents an issue of statutory construction. Plaintiffs are all retired members of the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division (“Secret Service”). Although they were federal employees, their retirement is governed by the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act (“District Retirement Act”), D.C.Code §§ 4-601 through 4-634. The issue presented to the Court is whether pursuant to the District Retirement Act’s “equalization provision,” § 4-605(c), the plaintiffs’ retirement pay should be increased to reflect the “locality pay adjustments” given to active duty officers of the Secret Service.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In this case, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the issue before the court is solely one of law.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, who are retired members of the Secret Service, are covered by the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act (“District Retirement Act”), §§ 4-601 through 4-634. At the time of their retirement, all plaintiffs were serving in the Washington, D.C. — Maryland—Virginia Statistical Metropolitan Area (‘Washington, D.C”). See Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts No. 3. Sixty-four perce.nt of the plaintiff class, which is 311 plaintiffs, currently reside in the Washington, D.C. area. See Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts No. 5.

Under the Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act of 1990 (“FLEPRA”), incorpo *22 rated as Title IV of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (“FEPCA”) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5304), federal law enforcement officials, including active members of the Secret Service, were given special adjustments in salary in certain cities to reflect the higher cost of living in those cities. The locality pay increase in Washington, D.C. was set at 4% by 404(b)(1) of FEPCA, 5 U.S.C. § 5305. The active members of the Secret Service began receiving these benefits on the first pay period after January 1, 1993. See Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts No. 11.

Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to the “equalization provision” in the District Retirement Act, D.C.Code § 4-605(c), they are entitled to have their retirement pensions increased by 4% to reflect the “locality pay adjustment” given to active members. 1

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The “equalization provision” provides:

Each individual retired from active service and entitled to receive a pension allowance or retirement compensation under §§ 4— 607 to 4-630 shall be entitled to receive, without making application therefore, with respect to each increase in salary, granted by any law which takes effect after the effective date of the District of Columbia Police and Firemen’s Salary Act Amendments of 1972, to which he would be entitled if he were in active service, an increase in his pension relief allowance or retirement compensation computed as follows: His pension relief allowance or retirement compensation shall be increased by an amount equal to the product of such allowance or compensation and the per centum increase made by such law in the scheduled rate of compensation to which he would be entitled if he were in active service on the effective date of such increase in salary.

§ 4r-605(c) (Emphasis added).

Principles of statutory construction dictate that the Court is to interpret a statute according to its plain terms. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 71 L.Ed.2d 748. In analyzing the meaning to be attached to particular phrases, it is necessary to view the statute as a whole, informed by its overall purpose and objective. See In Re Mitchell, 977 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1992) (“particular phrases must be construed in light of the overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory scheme.”); Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.”)

The plain terms of the statute indicate that the retirees are to receive commensurate percentage increases in their retirement compensation for “each increase in salary, granted by any law ... to which he would be entitled if he were in active service____” (emphasis added.) The Court finds that the 4% locality increase is an “increase in salary granted by law” to which active members in the Washington, D.C. area are entitled. A plain reading of the phrase “increase in salary” would include any increase in the amount that a worker receives in pay.

The government contends that the equalization provision limits the type of salary increases to which retirees are entitled to benefit from only to those increases “in the scheduled rate of compensation” and that a locality increase is not such an increase in the “scheduled rate of compensation.”

This contention fails on several counts. First, the term, “scheduled rate of compensation,” is no where defined by statute. Second, it is clear that this language is meant to be merely instructive as to how to apply the provision and is not meant to limit the coverage of the provision in any regard.

The legislative history supports the Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute. The Report from the Committee on the District of *23 Columbia states that the equalization provision provides that

in the event of future salary increases for active members, the annuities of members then retired shall continue to be increased by a percentage not less than the percentage increase in salary for the class and step to which such retirees are assigned for annuity increase computation purposes.

H.R. No. 92-1180, Salary Increases for District of Columbia Police and Fireman, June 27, 1972, Title I, § 114 (emphasis added).

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Bluebook (online)
871 F. Supp. 20, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18258, 1994 WL 716082, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lanier-v-district-of-columbia-dcd-1994.