Brown v. Summers

201 F. Supp. 2d 60, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5807, 2002 WL 507495
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 27, 2002
DocketCIV.A. 98-1282(JR)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 201 F. Supp. 2d 60 (Brown v. Summers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Summers, 201 F. Supp. 2d 60, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5807, 2002 WL 507495 (D.D.C. 2002).

Opinion

*61 MEMORANDUM

ROBERTSON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are retired Secret Service criminal investigators whose retirement annuities are governed by the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act, D.C.Code §§ 5-701 et seq. Their dispute with the District and with the Department of Treasury concerns the calculation of their benefits. They maintain that the locality pay component of each retired investigator’s annuity should be calculated using the locality pay in effect at the location of his or her last active job assignment, and not, as the Treasury Department maintains, using a weighted national average locality pay. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs’ motion will be granted. The defendants’ will be denied.

Background

For most of the twentieth century, the U.S. Secret Service overlapped significantly with the District of Columbia police department in personnel, duties, and employment benefits. See generally Floyd v. District of Columbia, 129 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C.Cir.1997). There is overlap in the retirement systems as well, and Secret Service agents hired before 1984 with ten years of “protective service” may convert from the federal retirement system to the higher-paying District of Columbia retirement system. D.C.Code § 5-703. The statute that permits this arrangement assigns the responsibility for administration of annuity payments to the District of Columbia and the Mayor, D.C.Code §§ 5-724, 5-743, and authorizes federal reimbursement of the District for any costs that exceed the agents’ pension contributions. Id. § 5-732.

Unlike the federal retirement program, the D.C. retirement system does not provide directly for cost of living adjustments. Instead, it contains an “equalization clause,” under which retirees

shall be entitled to receive, without making application therefor, with respect to each increase in salary, granted by any law ... to which he would be entitled if he were in active service, an increase in his pension relief allowance or retirement compensation computed as follows: His pension relief allowance or retirement compensation shall be increased by an amount equal to the product of such allowance or compensation and the per centum increase made by such law in the scheduled rate of compensation to which he would be entitled if he were in active service on the effective date of such increase in salary.

Id. § 5-745(c). This provision was intended to ensure that retirement benefits under the D.C. system would keep pace with rising costs. H.R.Rep. No. 92-1180, at 6 (1972).

The instant suit was filed in May 1998 to establish that locality pay increases that had been awarded to active agents in certain cities since 1991 1 were “increases in salary” subject to the equalization clause. It was dismissed without prejudice in December 1998 when Treasury agreed to include locality pay in retirement annuities, but reopened in July 1999 when plaintiffs still had not received adjustments for locality pay. Treasury then made its decision about how to factor locality pay into retirement annuities, and the focus of the *62 suit shifted to Treasury’s methodology— which was to calculate a national weighted average locality pay increase for Secret Service agents for each year since 1991 and to apply it across the board. 2 The defendants provided lump sum backpay-ments to all retirees and then used the national weighted average method to adjust annuity benefits for 1999 and each subsequent year.

The adoption of the weighted average method forced the withdrawal of plaintiffs’ counsel in January 2000, because the conflict of interest between those plaintiffs who benefitted from the national weighted average system and those who were dissatisfied with it was irreconcilable. In May 2000, new counsel appeared on behalf of those plaintiffs contending for a locality pay component based on the locality pay at the place of the agent’s last active assignment. Those plaintiffs amended their complaint in November 2000. A defense motion to dismiss was denied in May 2001.

Analysis

Defendants assert that this case is governed by the familiar standards established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and argue for deference to their national weighted average method. They maintain that their method is simpler to administer than an individualized calculation and more fair, because it spreads locality pay increases across all retirees to account for the fact that they would be subject to reassignment at any time if they were still on active status. This argument for deference is not persuasive. The District of Columbia, not the Treasury Department, is charged with determining pension allowances, promulgating rules, and otherwise implementing the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act. Floyd v. District of Columbia, 129 F.3d 152, 156-57 (D.C.Cir.1997) (District of Columbia is not a federal agency or instrumentality under the Act); see also Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 269 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2001) (interpretations of statutes not committed to an agency’s administration reviewed de novo). Moreover, the Treasury Department’s decision to adopt the national weighted average method was not the product of formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, and there are no other indications that Congress intended that Chevron deference apply. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). Indeed, the defendants promulgated their calculation method informally, during the course of this litigation. Cf. Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. United States Dept. of Treasury, Financial Mgmt. Serv., 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C.Cir.1989) (agency litigation positions are often not accorded deference where there is a risk that the positions have been developed under special pressure or without adequate opportunity for the presentation of opposing views). 3

*63

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
201 F. Supp. 2d 60, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5807, 2002 WL 507495, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-summers-dcd-2002.