Langsett v. Marmet Corporation

231 F. Supp. 759, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 903, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9079
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 5, 1964
DocketCiv. A. 3449
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 231 F. Supp. 759 (Langsett v. Marmet Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Langsett v. Marmet Corporation, 231 F. Supp. 759, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 903, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9079 (W.D. Wis. 1964).

Opinion

RABIN O VITZ, District Judge.

This is a patent infringement action. Victor M. Langsett, a resident of Illinois, is trustee of the Kessler patent. Kesko Products, Inc., is the exclusive licensee of the Kessler patent. Kesko is an Indiana corporation. Marmet Corporation is a Wisconsin corporation, having its principal place of business in Wausau, Wisconsin. Letters Patent, Number 2,-654,920, were issued to the late Ward P.. Kessler on October 13, 1953.

Defendant denied infringement, and alleged that the patent in suit is invalid because the patent was anticipated by the prior art; that it was obvious in light of the prior art; and that it was on sale more than one year prior to the date of the application for the patent.

This case was tried the week of October 15, 1962, in this District before Judge Patrick T. Stone, who died prior to rendering his decision. The parties-agreed that judgment should be made-upon further briefs, the transcript, exhibits and oral arguments. A full day of oral arguments was had on April 21, 1964, whereat this Court had the benefit-of a full explanation of the patent in suit and the accused device.

The Kessler patent is for an “Insulated Metal Window Closure”. The problem to which both Kessler and Marmet have-directed their efforts is known as “through-metal conductivity”. The use of metal window frames may result in moisture or condensation forming on the-inside of the window because of the rapid or efficient heat transfer characteristics of metal.

Plaintiffs and defendant both claim this problem has been solved by use of an insulating medium to separate the-window frame into exterior and interior metal channels. Dispute arose as to the-duration of this problem. Plaintiffs-maintain the problem is of long duration,, dating back to the Crystal Palace erected', in the 1850s in England. Defendant maintains the problem is one of limited scope and one which did not come into-commercial significance until after World. War Two. After the War, this country’s expanded aluminum facilities found new use for their capacity in civilian lines. Increased knowledge of metal fabrication; is factor. Defendant further maintains; *761 Hie problem is limited to places having exceptionally high humidity problems, .such as indoor swimming pools.

This Court believes that the matter of validity may be disposed of on ene of several grounds. However, I believe that the interests of justice and efficient administration of the rights of litigants require a complete disposal of "the case. In other words, all points will he discussed. Halstead v. Globe Hoist Co., 141 U.S.P.Q. 465, 231 F.Supp. 1012 (D.C.N.D.Cal.S.Div.1964). A court has ■the power to adjudge a patent, which it has found not to have been infringed, invalid. Lockwood v. Langendorf United Bakers, Inc., 324 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1963). With the public also a party to patent litigation, a full consideration should be in order. This should be the approved practice. Philip and K & J Trading Corp. et al. v. Wildman Jacquard Co., 225 F.Supp. 955 (D.C.E.D.Pa.1963). Such a practice was employed by the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Miller v. Zarharias, et al., 72 F.Supp. 29 (E.D.Wis.1947), wherein the Court said: “In "the event it should be determined by a reviewing court either that the amendment should not have been allowed, or that the plaintiff was not estopped in this action by reason of the provisions of his license agreement, I should make known my views as to the validity of the •claims of the patents here in issue.” In accord: W. F. and John Barnes Co. et al. v. International Harvester Co. et al., 51 F.Supp. 254 (N.D.Ill.E.D.1943) and Barry, et al. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., et al., 31 F.Supp. 879 (N.D.Ill.E.D.1940).

PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF PATENT IN SUIT

The granting of a patent raises a presumption as to the validity of said patent. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282. However, such presumption is not conclusive; it may be rebutted by demonstrating invalidity by convincing evidence of error. Hobbs v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 250 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1957). The Patent Office in the instant case did not cite what this Court finds to be pertinent prior art. Specifically, Pierson, Coulson and Marsh, Jr. were not cited. The presumption of validity does not exist as against a showing that the prior art was not cited by the Patent Office. “(T)here is every indication, contrary to appellant’s statement, that the prior art was not before the Patent Office at the time it passed on the patent here in issue.” Hobbs v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., supra.

Kesko cites Elgen Mfg. Corp. v. Grant Wilson, Inc., 285 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1961). There the Patent Office had not cited certain prior art, which was in the same class and subclass as the patent in suit. The court there said that it “concluded the examiner reviewed these patents and discarded them.” Further, the court determined such prior art did not “meet the invention singly,” that it was not analogous art.

In AR, Inc. v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 311 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1962), it is stated, “ * * * there is no presumption that a patent is valid as embodying an invention over pertinent prior art not cited ov considered by the Patent Office.” The court distinguished the Eigen case on the ground that the prior art in Eigen would not suggest to anyone skilled in the field how to combine the prior art and obtain the result as shown in the patent in suit. The posture of the case at bar is aptly described by Ar, Inc., “The Olson patent in and of itself disclosed both combination and the functional relationship of Villchur. There can be no presumption that the examiner reviewed and discarded it. It is more likely that he missed it.”

This Court is satisfied that the patent examiner failed to consider relevant prior art. Further, as appears below, the examiner failed to understand the significance of one pertinent example of prior art before him.

*762 ' Witness Clarence T. Fishleigh * testified at the trial for the defendant as follows: “Well, there is no possible question in my mind that the patents cited by defendant in this litigation are far closer to the — and far more pertinent to the question for the validity of the Kessler patent than were those cited by the file wrapper — or by the Patent Office and appearing in the file wrapper.”

“In fact, I would say that, in the many years that I have worked with patents and patent litigation, I can’t recall of a case where there was such a striking difference between the pertinency of the prior art cited by defendant and that which was considered by the Patent Office.”

The Gustafsson patent was cited by the Patent Office, but it missed the pertinency of the patent. Had none of the relevant patents been cited by the Patent Office, possibly less weight would be given to the failure to cite the prior art. Briggs v. M & J Diesel Locomotive Filter Corp., 228 F.Supp. 26 (N.D.Ill.E.D.1964).

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231 F. Supp. 759, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 903, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/langsett-v-marmet-corporation-wiwd-1964.