Landesbank Baden-Württemberg v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.

821 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2011 WL 4495034
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 28, 2011
DocketNo. 10 Civ. 7549 (WHP)
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 821 F. Supp. 2d 616 (Landesbank Baden-Württemberg v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 821 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2011 WL 4495034 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:

This action arises from the devaluation and downgrade of a mortgage backed Credit Default Obligation (“CDO”) known as Davis Square Funding VI (“Davis Square”). Plaintiff Landesbank BadenWürttemberg (“Landesbank”) sues Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) and TCW Asset Management Company (“TCW,” together, “Defendants”) for common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are gleaned from the Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), and Plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true for this motion.

I. The Parties

Landesbank is an international commercial bank headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, with assets of Q12 billion and 13,000 employees worldwide. (Amended Complaint, filed November 4, 2010 (“Compl.”) ¶ 20.)

Goldman is a global investment banking, securities, and investment management firm headquartered in New York. (Compl. ¶ 21.) TCW is a California corporation that manages collateral for mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities. (Compl. ¶ 22.)

II. The Davis Square CDO

On March 30, 2006, Goldman underwrote and issued Davis Square, a CDO collateralized by residential mortgage-backed securities. (Compl. ¶4, 5.) Residential mortgage-backed securities are structured asset-backed securities that are collateralized by thousands of individual residential mortgage loans. (Comp-¶ 4.) TCW managed the collateral for Davis Square. (Compl. ¶ 22)

Goldman and TCW marketed Davis Square to institutional investors as a $2 billion “High Grade Structured Product CDO” in a private placement pursuant to Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 144A and Regulation S. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7.) Goldman and TCW touted the notes’ triple-A ratings and represented that the “Strengths of the Transaction” lay in Davis Square’s collateral portfolio of investment grade mortgage-backed securities. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Landesbank purchased two Davis Square notes totaling $37 million in the initial offering. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5.)

Before the transaction, Goldman provided Landesbank and other investors with an Offering Circular (“Circular”) disclosing details about the risks inherent in Davis Square’s mortgage-backed securities portfolio. (Compl. ¶4, 7.) In particular, the Circular warned that Davis Square would invest in “subordinate classes” of mortgage-backed securities, which “are more sensitive to risk of loss and writedowns” and would include risky mortgage loans such as “jumbo” and “balloon payment” loans that might experience higher default rates than traditional mortgages. (Declaration of Christopher J. Dunne, dated Jan[619]*619uary 31, 2011 (“Dunne Decl.”) Ex. B 1) Countrywide Financial Corporation (“Countrywide”), New Century Financial Corporation (“New Century”), and Fremont General Corporation (“Fremont”) originated approximately 32%, or $648,490,000, of Davis Square’s mortgage-loan collateral. (Compl. ¶ 8.) In addition, 6%, or $118,833,000, of the collateral consisted of “[mortgage-backed securities] underwritten by Goldman itself, and backed by whole loans purchased directly from Countrywide New Century, Fremont and other sub-prime mortgage lenders.” (Compl. ¶ 9.) Approximately 79% of the residential mortgages undergirding Davis Square were below prime and had an elevated risk of default. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Nevertheless, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s rated Davis Square AAA and Aaa, respectively. (Compl. ¶ 5.) The Circular warned investors to “consider and assess for themselves the likely level of defaults of the collateral assets, as well as the likely level and timing of recoveries on the collateral assets.” (Dunne Decl. Ex. B.)

The Circular required Landesbank to represent that it (1) was a sophisticated investor, (2) understood that investing in Davis Square involved the risk of loss of its entire investment, (3) had access to the financial information of the underlying mortgage-backed securities, (4) had evaluated the purchase price of Davis Square with a full understanding of the risks involved, and (5) had consulted with its own experts and made its own investment decisions. In addition, the Circular required Landesbank to acknowledge that neither Goldman nor TCW was “acting as a fiduciary or financial or investment advisor for [Landesbank] ... [and Landesbank was] not relying ... upon any advice, counsel or representations ... of [Defendants] other than in the Circular.” (Dunne Decl. Ex. B.)

Further, the issuers, including Goldman, filed detailed disclosures pursuant to SEC Regulation AB concerning the mortgage-backed securities collateral backing Davis Square. (Dunne Decl. Ex. B) These disclosures included descriptions of the offered securities, periodic remittance reports on loan-level default rates, and historical information on the past performance of securities with similar underlying assets. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1102, 229.1103, 229.1111, 229.1114. And as collateral manager, TCW represented that it had performed loan-level due diligence, analyzed the collateral, and reviewed “all metrics available for the pool.” (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 88-90.)

III. Fraud Claims

The Complaint alleges that prior to offering Davis Square, Goldman learned that many of the underlying mortgages did not conform to the originator’s eligibility requirements and were riskier than the Circular disclosed or the triple-A ratings indicated. During 2005 and 2006, Goldman purchased billions of dollars worth of mortgage pools from Countrywide, New Century, and Fremont. In turn, Goldman bundled those mortgages into mortgage-backed securities, which collateralized CDOs and other securities such as Davis Square. (Compl. ¶ 9.) As part of this process, Goldman analyzed the underlying mortgages and obtained detailed loan-level due diligence from Clayton Holdings, Inc. (“Clayton”). (Compl. ¶ 10.) At the time, Clayton was the largest provider of mortgage loan due diligence for investment [620]*620banks, and Goldman was its largest client. (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30.)

Specifically, Landesbank alleges that Goldman was aware through its relationship with Clayton that a high percentage of mortgages were delinquent or in default, or did not conform to the originator’s stated guidelines. (Compl. ¶ 33.) In 2007, Clayton reported to Goldman that 22% of the loans it reviewed in the first quarter of 2006 were nonconforming and thus labeled as “Reject” (“Clayton Report”). (Compl. ¶ 33.) Clayton also informed Goldman that Countrywide and New Century loans had a significantly higher percentage of “Reject” loans than the industry average. (Comp.f 33.) Nonetheless, Goldman securitized mortgage loan pools with nonconforming loans and over-weighted Davis Square with Countrywide and New Century loans. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 33.)

Landesbank further alleges that Goldman concealed the true quality of the mortgages from the rating agencies when it obtained the triple-A credit ratings for Davis Square. (Compl. ¶¶ 78-87.) Goldman then used the fraudulently obtained credit ratings in marketing materials for Davis Square.

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Bluebook (online)
821 F. Supp. 2d 616, 2011 WL 4495034, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/landesbank-baden-wurttemberg-v-goldman-sachs-co-nysd-2011.