GARRARD, Presiding Judge.
In 1973 Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger and Sandor Lippai began plans for the construction of an indoor tennis facility to be located on real estate which they owned in the City of Lafayette. On April 7, 1973, a proposal was submitted by C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. (Ellison) to provide materials, labor and equipment for the general construction of the facility. This proposal included site work, concrete, building systems, the storm drain system, masonry, and miscellaneous work for a total price of $103,000. Work was to commence within one week and be substantially completed within 112 days. Ellison also made additional proposals for other segments of the work which were accepted by the owners subsequent to the commencement of construction.
Plans for the building and a survey of the property were completed by the owners at the beginning of April and Ellison began construction on April 11, 1973. The erection of the steel building was sublet by Ellison to A & B Construction, Inc. Numerous problems developed which resulted in substantial delays in the construction. The responsibility for these delays and the additional proposals by Ellison form the basis of the dispute on appeal.
Ellison contends that its work was substantially completed on September 11,1973, and it filed a notice of mechanic’s lien on September 12, 1973 in the amount of $80,-000. The notice was properly filed, served and recorded. On October 19, 1973, A & B Construction, Inc. filed a notice of mechanic’s lien in the amount of $10,954.90. This notice was also properly filed, served and recorded. On November 19, 1973 Sidney Berger, as President of the Lafayette Tennis Club, sent a letter to Mr. Ellison which stated:
“In spite of repeated efforts on our part to obtain an itemized statement from you for the work, including extras which you claim to have been done by you on our property, we seem to be unable to get one.
Please file suit on your Mechanic’s Lien which you filed in order that the matter may be brought to a head.”
Mr. Ellison failed to respond to this letter and did not file suit.
[1213]*1213Litigation was initiated on July 18, 1974 by A & B Construction, Inc. to recover $11,202 from C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. and to foreclose its mechanic’s lien against the real estate. Named as defendants in the suit were C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc., Lafayette Tennis Club, Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger, Sandor Lippai, Carolyn Lippai, Indiana National Bank and Indiana Mortgage Corporation, John Howe, Kemple Construction Company, and Berger Steel Company, Inc. Subcontractors John Howe and Kemple Construction Company disclaimed any interest in the real estate because they had received payment from the owners. After a motion to default, C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint and a counter-claim against A & B Construction, Inc. The remaining defendants filed a joint answer in which Carolyn Lippai, Indiana Mortgage Corporation and Berger Steel Company, Inc. disclaimed all interests. Ellison also filed a cross-claim seeking judgment against the defendants, Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger, Sandor Lippai, Carolyn Lippai and Berger Steel Company, Inc. and requesting foreclosure of its mechanic’s lien. Subsequently, the cross-claim was amended to provide greater detail and statistics. An answer was properly filed by the cross-defendants which alleged, in Legal Paragraph II, that Ellison’s mechanic’s lien was filed on September 13, 1973; that the owners gave Ellison notice to sue on November 19, 1973; that no suit was brought on the mechanic’s lien until the original cross-claim was filed on June 14, 1974; and that by virtue thereof, Ellison lost its right to claim or foreclose its mechanic’s lien by failing to file suit within 30 days after notice.
Ellison then filed a motion to strike Legal Paragraph II of the cross-defendants’ answer. On April 29, 1975 the trial court granted this motion. Trial was held and on September 10, 1975 judgment was entered. Both Ellison and the cross-defendant owners filed motions to correct errors and on January 9, 1976 the court entered a second order amending and correcting the first order. C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. was granted judgment entitling it to foreclose its mechanic’s lien against the real estate in the amount of $75,203.19. A & B Construction, Inc. was granted a judgment against Ellison in the amount of $13,224 plus interest and a foreclosure sale was ordered.
Four motions to correct errors were subsequently filed and a special judge was appointed. On October 20, 1977 the special judge overruled all pending motions to correct errors. This appeal was brought by the cross-defendant owners, Lafayette Tennis Club, Inc., Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger and Sandor Lippai (Tennis Club).
The first issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in striking Legal Paragraph II from the cross-defendants’ answer to Ellison’s amended cross-claim, which asserted that Ellison had lost its right to assert and foreclose its mechanic’s lien by failing to file suit within 30 days after receiving notice to sue.
Tennis Club contends that the letter from Sidney Berger on November 19, 1973, ante, constituted notice to commence suit under the statute hereinafter set forth. The trial court held otherwise, and we agree.
The Indiana decisions have established twin principles applicable to the construction of mechanic’s lien laws. Provisions relating to the creation, existence or persons entitled to claim a lien are to be strictly construed since the lien rights created are in derogation of the common law. Provisions relating to enforcement of the lien, once it has attached, should be liberally construed to effect the remedial purposes of the statute. See 19 I.L.E. Mechanics Liens § 4 and cases cited therein.
We are thus asked to construe the provision of the statute that furnishes the landowner with a means for securing prompt determination of lien interests. IC 32-8-3— 10 provides:
“The owner of property upon which a mechanic’s lien has been taken, or any person or corporation having an interest therein, including mortgagees and lien-holders, may notify, in writing, the owner or holder of the lien to commence suit [1214]*1214thereon and if he fails to commence such suit within thirty (30) days after receiving such notice, the lien shall be null and void, but nothing contained herein shall prevent the claim from being collected as other claims are collected by law.
Any person who has given such notice by registered or certified mail to the holder of the lien at the address given in the notice of lien recorded may file an affidavit of service of said notice to commence suit with the recorder of the county in which said real estate is situated, which affidavit shall state the facts of said notice and that more than thirty (30) days have passed and no suit for foreclosure of said lien is pending and no unsatisfied judgment has been rendered on said lien; and it shall be the duty of the recorder to record said affidavit in the miscellaneous record book of his office and to certify on the face of the record of any such lien that the same is fully released and the real estate described in said lien shall thereupon be released from the lien thereof.”
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GARRARD, Presiding Judge.
In 1973 Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger and Sandor Lippai began plans for the construction of an indoor tennis facility to be located on real estate which they owned in the City of Lafayette. On April 7, 1973, a proposal was submitted by C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. (Ellison) to provide materials, labor and equipment for the general construction of the facility. This proposal included site work, concrete, building systems, the storm drain system, masonry, and miscellaneous work for a total price of $103,000. Work was to commence within one week and be substantially completed within 112 days. Ellison also made additional proposals for other segments of the work which were accepted by the owners subsequent to the commencement of construction.
Plans for the building and a survey of the property were completed by the owners at the beginning of April and Ellison began construction on April 11, 1973. The erection of the steel building was sublet by Ellison to A & B Construction, Inc. Numerous problems developed which resulted in substantial delays in the construction. The responsibility for these delays and the additional proposals by Ellison form the basis of the dispute on appeal.
Ellison contends that its work was substantially completed on September 11,1973, and it filed a notice of mechanic’s lien on September 12, 1973 in the amount of $80,-000. The notice was properly filed, served and recorded. On October 19, 1973, A & B Construction, Inc. filed a notice of mechanic’s lien in the amount of $10,954.90. This notice was also properly filed, served and recorded. On November 19, 1973 Sidney Berger, as President of the Lafayette Tennis Club, sent a letter to Mr. Ellison which stated:
“In spite of repeated efforts on our part to obtain an itemized statement from you for the work, including extras which you claim to have been done by you on our property, we seem to be unable to get one.
Please file suit on your Mechanic’s Lien which you filed in order that the matter may be brought to a head.”
Mr. Ellison failed to respond to this letter and did not file suit.
[1213]*1213Litigation was initiated on July 18, 1974 by A & B Construction, Inc. to recover $11,202 from C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. and to foreclose its mechanic’s lien against the real estate. Named as defendants in the suit were C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc., Lafayette Tennis Club, Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger, Sandor Lippai, Carolyn Lippai, Indiana National Bank and Indiana Mortgage Corporation, John Howe, Kemple Construction Company, and Berger Steel Company, Inc. Subcontractors John Howe and Kemple Construction Company disclaimed any interest in the real estate because they had received payment from the owners. After a motion to default, C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint and a counter-claim against A & B Construction, Inc. The remaining defendants filed a joint answer in which Carolyn Lippai, Indiana Mortgage Corporation and Berger Steel Company, Inc. disclaimed all interests. Ellison also filed a cross-claim seeking judgment against the defendants, Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger, Sandor Lippai, Carolyn Lippai and Berger Steel Company, Inc. and requesting foreclosure of its mechanic’s lien. Subsequently, the cross-claim was amended to provide greater detail and statistics. An answer was properly filed by the cross-defendants which alleged, in Legal Paragraph II, that Ellison’s mechanic’s lien was filed on September 13, 1973; that the owners gave Ellison notice to sue on November 19, 1973; that no suit was brought on the mechanic’s lien until the original cross-claim was filed on June 14, 1974; and that by virtue thereof, Ellison lost its right to claim or foreclose its mechanic’s lien by failing to file suit within 30 days after notice.
Ellison then filed a motion to strike Legal Paragraph II of the cross-defendants’ answer. On April 29, 1975 the trial court granted this motion. Trial was held and on September 10, 1975 judgment was entered. Both Ellison and the cross-defendant owners filed motions to correct errors and on January 9, 1976 the court entered a second order amending and correcting the first order. C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. was granted judgment entitling it to foreclose its mechanic’s lien against the real estate in the amount of $75,203.19. A & B Construction, Inc. was granted a judgment against Ellison in the amount of $13,224 plus interest and a foreclosure sale was ordered.
Four motions to correct errors were subsequently filed and a special judge was appointed. On October 20, 1977 the special judge overruled all pending motions to correct errors. This appeal was brought by the cross-defendant owners, Lafayette Tennis Club, Inc., Sidney L. Berger, Harriett Berger and Sandor Lippai (Tennis Club).
The first issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in striking Legal Paragraph II from the cross-defendants’ answer to Ellison’s amended cross-claim, which asserted that Ellison had lost its right to assert and foreclose its mechanic’s lien by failing to file suit within 30 days after receiving notice to sue.
Tennis Club contends that the letter from Sidney Berger on November 19, 1973, ante, constituted notice to commence suit under the statute hereinafter set forth. The trial court held otherwise, and we agree.
The Indiana decisions have established twin principles applicable to the construction of mechanic’s lien laws. Provisions relating to the creation, existence or persons entitled to claim a lien are to be strictly construed since the lien rights created are in derogation of the common law. Provisions relating to enforcement of the lien, once it has attached, should be liberally construed to effect the remedial purposes of the statute. See 19 I.L.E. Mechanics Liens § 4 and cases cited therein.
We are thus asked to construe the provision of the statute that furnishes the landowner with a means for securing prompt determination of lien interests. IC 32-8-3— 10 provides:
“The owner of property upon which a mechanic’s lien has been taken, or any person or corporation having an interest therein, including mortgagees and lien-holders, may notify, in writing, the owner or holder of the lien to commence suit [1214]*1214thereon and if he fails to commence such suit within thirty (30) days after receiving such notice, the lien shall be null and void, but nothing contained herein shall prevent the claim from being collected as other claims are collected by law.
Any person who has given such notice by registered or certified mail to the holder of the lien at the address given in the notice of lien recorded may file an affidavit of service of said notice to commence suit with the recorder of the county in which said real estate is situated, which affidavit shall state the facts of said notice and that more than thirty (30) days have passed and no suit for foreclosure of said lien is pending and no unsatisfied judgment has been rendered on said lien; and it shall be the duty of the recorder to record said affidavit in the miscellaneous record book of his office and to certify on the face of the record of any such lien that the same is fully released and the real estate described in said lien shall thereupon be released from the lien thereof.”
The purpose of this section is to provide a party with an interest in the real estate a method of bringing matters to a head and clearing title or determining the extent of a claimant’s lien rights without having to await the pleasure or endure the harassment of a lien claimant who otherwise may take a full year or longer to commence an action.1 ' Also by shifting the burden of commencing suit to the claimant, it provides an inexpensive means of clearing title where a claimant is merely disgruntled over past transactions but has no real desire to litigate.
In the present case, of course, no affidavit as referred to in the second paragraph of IC 32-8-3-10 was filed with the recorder, nor does it appear that the purported notice was sent to the claimant by registered or certified mail. (The “formality” of using certified or registered mail might, itself, be deemed some indication to a reasonably prudent person that the contained communication imparted some official or legally significant information.)
Here the letter from the owners, after referring to repeated efforts to secure an itemized statement, simply concluded, “Please file suit on your Mechanic’s Lien which you filed in order that the matter may be brought to a head.”
Of course, we must acknowledge the rubric that all are presumed to know the law. Nor do we miss the element of retribution inherent in the observation that it was the claimant, after all, that invoked the law of mechanic’s liens in this dispute.
Our task, however, is to construe the statute before us. There is ambiguity in the phrase “. . may notify, in writing, the owner or holder of the lien to commence suit thereon and if he fails to commence such suit within thirty [30] days . .” Reasonable minds might differ as to whether the form employed required or did not require the notification that failure to commence suit within thirty days would result in forfeiture of the lien.
We should construe the statute, if possible, to effect the intent of the legislature. In terms of the purposes already identified, that is done whether we hold the notice must contain some alert to the consequences of noncompliance or not.
On the other hand, the remedial purpose of the statute which dictates a liberal construction concerning enforcement of a lien properly acquired would dictate that IC 32-8-3-10 should not be treated as intended to create a trap for the unwary. So do the principles of basic fairness.
Furthermore, the policy of the law generally discourages litigation. We do not advance that policy or the negotiation and settlement of disputes by the construction favored by the Tennis Club. In effect, it [1215]*1215urges that a disputant must sue now or suffer the consequences even though the parties’ differences may be subject to settlement.
Accordingly, we hold the letter of November 19,1973 insufficient to constitute the notice required by IC 32-8-3-10 and find the trial court properly precluded that defense.
It therefore also follows that the court did not err in making an award of attorney fees since such an award is authorized in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure. IC 32-8-3-14.
The remaining issues2 attack the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the court’s findings as to various items of damage or credit. In these respects the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed absent a showing that the judgment is clearly erroneous. Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(A); Hurt v. Polak (1979), Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 1051. It would unduly burden this opinion to separately review the twenty specifications urged by Tennis Club and their relation to the transcript, which is in excess of fourteen hundred pages. We have reviewed these matters and have concluded that the recovery awarded to Ellison is not clearly erroneous. The evidence favoring the judgment and the reasonable inferences that might have been drawn therefrom concerning the written contract and additional agreements for extras do not lead us to the clear conviction that the court erred.
However, the award to A & B Construction, Inc., subcontractor of Ellison, should be allowed as a credit or set-off for the owners against the award to Ellison because the work performed by A & B was included in the contract between the owners and Ellison. To that extent we modify the judgment pursuant to Appellate Rule 15(N).
As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
STATON, J., concurs,
HOFFMAN, J., dissents and files separate opinion.