JUSTICE MILLER
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Dominick Lafata, brought this action against multiple defendants in the circuit court of Du Page County, seeking to recover damages for injuries he sustained on October 21, 1985, when he was struck by an earth-moving machine known as an endloader while working at a construction site. At the time of the accident, the endloader was transporting a section of concrete pipe, suspended from a cable attached to- the bucket of the endloader, from a stockpile of pipe sections located on the construction site to a place near where the pipe section was to be installed in a sewer drainage system. Plaintiff alleged in count I of his complaint a violation of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, pars. 60 through 69), and named as defendants under that count the Village of Lisle (the Village) and Frank Novotny and Associates, Inc. (Novotny). Count II of the complaint was brought against different defendants and is not relevant here. The trial judge granted the Village’s and Novotny’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that the endloader was not a mechanical contrivance within the contemplation of the Structural Work Act. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. (185 Ill. App. 3d 203, 207.) We granted the Village and Novotny’s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
Plaintiff was employed as a laborer by Benchmark Construction Company. Benchmark contracted with the Village to widen the intersections of Route 53, McKinley Avenue, and Burlington Street in Lisle, Illinois. The contract also involved the removal and replacement of the curbs and gutters, and the placement of new sewer and water pipes.
Normally, the carrier delivering the sections of sewer and water pipe to the jobsite would string the pipe sections along the trenches where the sections would be installed. At other times, however, the pipe sections would be stockpiled at one site. On those occasions, an endloader, a dirt-moving vehicle with a shovel-type bucket in front, was used to transport the pipe sections from the stockpile to the place where they were to be installed in the sewer system. After the pipe was delivered, a backhoe would then be used to lower the sections down into the trench.
On the day of the accident the pipe sections had been stockpiled at one site. Plaintiff was assigned to help transport the sections of pipe from the stockpile to the shoulders of the trenches where the sections would be installed, a distance of about one-half block. To accomplish this task, plaintiff and a co-worker attached one end of a wire cable to the endloader’s bucket, wrapped the other end of the cable around the middle of a pipe section, and then lifted the bucket so that the section was elevated approximately three to four feet above the ground. Each pipe section was approximately eight feet long and weighed several hundred pounds. As plaintiff’s coworker drove the endloader to the place where the section was to be installed, plaintiff walked ahead of the endloader and held one end of the pipe section to prevent it from tilting in either direction.
On one trip, when a pipe section had been moved approximately half the distance to its intended destination, plaintiff tripped on an unidentified object. He was then struck by the endloader; its left front wheel came to rest on top of plaintiff as he was lying on the ground. As a result of the incident, plaintiff suffered multiple injuries.
Plaintiff filed a one-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the Village, alleging that the proximate cause of his injuries was a violation of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, pars. 60 through 69). Plaintiff later amended the count to add Novotny, the engineering firm that prepared the drawings, plans and specifications for the repair of the sewer systems, as a defendant. Plaintiff later added a second count to the complaint. The additional count is based on the manufacture and design of the endloader involved in the incident and is not at issue here.
The Village moved for summary judgment, arguing that the endloader, as it was being used at the time of plaintiff’s injuries, was not a mechanical contrivance within the meaning of the Structural Work Act. The Village reasoned that the endloader was not being used for the support of tools, equipment, or workers, but rather that the device’s sole use at the time of plaintiff’s injuries was for the purpose of transporting sections of pipe from one area of the construction site to another. In the alternative, the Village argued that a violation of the statute was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The trial judge granted the Village’s motion for summary judgment; the judge determined that the endloader, as it was being used at the time of plaintiff’s injuries, was not a device covered by the Structural Work Act. He did not reach the Village’s second contention relating to proximate cause. After the trial judge issued his ruling, Novotny also moved for summary judgment. Finding that the issues raised by Novotny were identical to those addressed by the Village, the trial judge entered an order granting Novotny’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Initially, the appellate court addressed the division of authority among the appellate court districts concerning whether the Structural Work Act applies solely to devices that are used to support workers or whether the Act also includes within its coverage devices that are used to support materials. (See generally Urman v. Walter (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1085.) The appellate court concluded that the intent of the Act was to provide a cause of action for recovery for injuries caused by the failure of those in charge of construction to provide support for work materials as well as for workers, or for injuries caused by the inadequacy of the support provided. 185 Ill. App. 3d at 207.
Further, the appellate court concluded that whether a specific device is included within the scope of the Structural Work Act is determined by the use to which the device is being put at the time of the incident. (See Prange v. Kamar Construction Corp. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1125, 1128.) The court found that at the time of the incident the endloader here was being used as a support for construction materials. Based on its conclusions that the Act applies to supports for materials and that the endloader here was being used as a device contemplated by the Act, the appellate court held that the device was a mechanical contrivance within the meaning of the Act. Because it believed that the issue was beyond the scope of the trial judge’s ruling, the appellate court declined to consider whether a violation of the Structural Work Act was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The Structural Work Act was enacted to provide protection to workers “engaged in extrahazardous work.” (St. John v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 271, 274.) Section 1 of the Act requires:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
JUSTICE MILLER
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Dominick Lafata, brought this action against multiple defendants in the circuit court of Du Page County, seeking to recover damages for injuries he sustained on October 21, 1985, when he was struck by an earth-moving machine known as an endloader while working at a construction site. At the time of the accident, the endloader was transporting a section of concrete pipe, suspended from a cable attached to- the bucket of the endloader, from a stockpile of pipe sections located on the construction site to a place near where the pipe section was to be installed in a sewer drainage system. Plaintiff alleged in count I of his complaint a violation of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, pars. 60 through 69), and named as defendants under that count the Village of Lisle (the Village) and Frank Novotny and Associates, Inc. (Novotny). Count II of the complaint was brought against different defendants and is not relevant here. The trial judge granted the Village’s and Novotny’s motions for summary judgment, concluding that the endloader was not a mechanical contrivance within the contemplation of the Structural Work Act. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. (185 Ill. App. 3d 203, 207.) We granted the Village and Novotny’s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
Plaintiff was employed as a laborer by Benchmark Construction Company. Benchmark contracted with the Village to widen the intersections of Route 53, McKinley Avenue, and Burlington Street in Lisle, Illinois. The contract also involved the removal and replacement of the curbs and gutters, and the placement of new sewer and water pipes.
Normally, the carrier delivering the sections of sewer and water pipe to the jobsite would string the pipe sections along the trenches where the sections would be installed. At other times, however, the pipe sections would be stockpiled at one site. On those occasions, an endloader, a dirt-moving vehicle with a shovel-type bucket in front, was used to transport the pipe sections from the stockpile to the place where they were to be installed in the sewer system. After the pipe was delivered, a backhoe would then be used to lower the sections down into the trench.
On the day of the accident the pipe sections had been stockpiled at one site. Plaintiff was assigned to help transport the sections of pipe from the stockpile to the shoulders of the trenches where the sections would be installed, a distance of about one-half block. To accomplish this task, plaintiff and a co-worker attached one end of a wire cable to the endloader’s bucket, wrapped the other end of the cable around the middle of a pipe section, and then lifted the bucket so that the section was elevated approximately three to four feet above the ground. Each pipe section was approximately eight feet long and weighed several hundred pounds. As plaintiff’s coworker drove the endloader to the place where the section was to be installed, plaintiff walked ahead of the endloader and held one end of the pipe section to prevent it from tilting in either direction.
On one trip, when a pipe section had been moved approximately half the distance to its intended destination, plaintiff tripped on an unidentified object. He was then struck by the endloader; its left front wheel came to rest on top of plaintiff as he was lying on the ground. As a result of the incident, plaintiff suffered multiple injuries.
Plaintiff filed a one-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the Village, alleging that the proximate cause of his injuries was a violation of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, pars. 60 through 69). Plaintiff later amended the count to add Novotny, the engineering firm that prepared the drawings, plans and specifications for the repair of the sewer systems, as a defendant. Plaintiff later added a second count to the complaint. The additional count is based on the manufacture and design of the endloader involved in the incident and is not at issue here.
The Village moved for summary judgment, arguing that the endloader, as it was being used at the time of plaintiff’s injuries, was not a mechanical contrivance within the meaning of the Structural Work Act. The Village reasoned that the endloader was not being used for the support of tools, equipment, or workers, but rather that the device’s sole use at the time of plaintiff’s injuries was for the purpose of transporting sections of pipe from one area of the construction site to another. In the alternative, the Village argued that a violation of the statute was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The trial judge granted the Village’s motion for summary judgment; the judge determined that the endloader, as it was being used at the time of plaintiff’s injuries, was not a device covered by the Structural Work Act. He did not reach the Village’s second contention relating to proximate cause. After the trial judge issued his ruling, Novotny also moved for summary judgment. Finding that the issues raised by Novotny were identical to those addressed by the Village, the trial judge entered an order granting Novotny’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Initially, the appellate court addressed the division of authority among the appellate court districts concerning whether the Structural Work Act applies solely to devices that are used to support workers or whether the Act also includes within its coverage devices that are used to support materials. (See generally Urman v. Walter (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1085.) The appellate court concluded that the intent of the Act was to provide a cause of action for recovery for injuries caused by the failure of those in charge of construction to provide support for work materials as well as for workers, or for injuries caused by the inadequacy of the support provided. 185 Ill. App. 3d at 207.
Further, the appellate court concluded that whether a specific device is included within the scope of the Structural Work Act is determined by the use to which the device is being put at the time of the incident. (See Prange v. Kamar Construction Corp. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1125, 1128.) The court found that at the time of the incident the endloader here was being used as a support for construction materials. Based on its conclusions that the Act applies to supports for materials and that the endloader here was being used as a device contemplated by the Act, the appellate court held that the device was a mechanical contrivance within the meaning of the Act. Because it believed that the issue was beyond the scope of the trial judge’s ruling, the appellate court declined to consider whether a violation of the Structural Work Act was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The Structural Work Act was enacted to provide protection to workers “engaged in extrahazardous work.” (St. John v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 271, 274.) Section 1 of the Act requires:
“All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 60.)
Section 9 of the Act imposes liability on those “in charge of” the construction “[f]or any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of this Act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 69.
In our recent decision in Meyer v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 1, we determined that the Structural Work Act applies to devices used for the support of materials as well as to devices used for the support of workers. In Meyer, we focused on the language of the statute requiring that the device “be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.” (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 60.) Because the Act contemplates injuries to persons “passing under or by” hoists, cranes and stays whose primary function is to provide support for materials, we con-eluded in Meyer that the Act applies to injuries caused as a result of the failure to provide support for work materials as well as for workers, and for injuries caused by the inadequacy of the support provided. Meyer, 135 Ill. 2d at 13.
We need then only determine whether the use to which the endloader was being put at the time of the occurrence transformed the machine into a mechanical contrivance within the meaning of the Structural Work Act. Defendants renew here their argument below that because the endloader was being used to transport, rather than support, the pipe section, it was not a mechanical contrivance within the meaning of the Act at the time of the occurrence in question. Plaintiff contends that because the endloader elevated the pipe and suspended it against gravity, the endloader was being used as a support for construction materials.
Although the Structural Work Act should be liberally construed to provide protection to construction workers engaged in particularly hazardous activities, this court has recognized that the Act was not intended to cover all construction work. (See McNellis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 146, 151; Vuletich v. United States Steel Corp. (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 417, 422.) The Structural Work Act, by its terms, requires that the injury involve the use of a scaffold, hoist, crane, stay, ladder, support or other mechanical contrivance before the provisions of the Act apply. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 60.
In analyzing whether a particular device is covered by the Act, “we must ascertain the intended use of the device in question at the time of the injury.” (Vuletich, 117 Ill. 2d at 422.) Further, the use of a mechanical contrivance at the time of the injury must be such that the device exhibits characteristics similar to scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders or supports. (See Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (applying doctrine of ejusdem generis).) Thus, if the intended use of the mechanical device at the time of plaintiff’s injury was to elevate or provide support for materials, or for persons employed or engaged on the device, it possessed the characteristics that would cause it to be considered a mechanical contrivance within the meaning of the statute.
Plaintiff contends that the endloader was used to support the pipe, a structural material, against gravity and therefore exhibits the characteristics required of a mechanical contrivance under the Act. He likens the endloader, as it was being used here, to a stationary crane, the sole difference being the mobility of the endloader. Plaintiff argues that the Act does not distinguish the vertical transportation of material 75 feet by a crane (cf. Panteleo v. Gamm (1969), 106 Ill. App. 2d 116 (hoist that was elevating roofing material to roof of building at the time of plaintiff’s injury was a device under the Act)) from the horizontal transportation of that same material for the same distance in the way in which it was transported by the endloader here.
Defendants concede that the endloader lifted the pipe section above the ground and therefore provided support for the material. Defendants, however, point to the statutory provision that requires that the device be erected or constructed “for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, viaduct, or other structure” and cites Crafton v. Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc. (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 533, for the proposition that a device transporting workers or material horizontally from one area of a construction site to another is not engaged in structural work under the Act.
In Crafton, the plaintiff sought recovery under the Act for an injury he sustained after falling off a tractor equipped with a 30-foot side boom hoist. At the time of the accident, the tractor was being used to transport bundles of structural steel from a storage yard to a building site. The bundles were fastened to a cable hoist attached to the tractor and lifted nine inches to two feet above the ground. The plaintiff helped load a bundle of steel onto the hoist, and was injured when the tractor lurched as he was attempting to climb onto the back of the tractor to ride to the building site. In addition to finding that a violation of the Act was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, the court in Crafton concluded: “It is clear from the plain wording of the statute that the Allis-Chalmers tractor simply does no[t] fall within the statute, nor was it the intent of the legislature to cover such a situation. It is difficult for us to understand how, from the plain wording of the statute, the Allis-Chalmers tractor was ‘erected or constructed by any person *** for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any *** structure.’ ” 46 Ill. 2d at 537-38.
Without addressing Crafton, plaintiff cites Prange v. Kamar Construction Corp. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1125, and argues that this court should follow the appellate court’s decision there. In Prange, the court concluded that the Structural Work Act applied to an injury sustained by the driver of a tractor equipped with a forklift while the tractor was transporting several poles used in the construction of a pole barn from a storage area to their place of installation. Each pole was 18 feet long and weighed 300 to 600 pounds. The plaintiff was injured when several poles slid from the forklift onto the operator’s compartment while he was raising the forklift device.
We believe that defendants misapprehend our holding in Crafton. In Crafton this court analyzed the tractor involved as a device that was engaged in the transport of workers and that happened to be equipped with a hoist and to be carrying a bundle of steel. As we recently stated, “[t]here are certain hazards present on structural work sites which are not unique to the construction industry. These hazards do not fall within the purview of the Structural Work Act merely by virtue of the fact that they are present on a structural work site.” (Meyer, 135 Ill. 2d at 13.) The routine transport of workers from one location on the construction site to another would not be considered an activity sufficiently unique to the construction industry.
On the other hand, we believe that the transport of the pipe section here, like the transport of the poles in Prange, would be considered an activity sufficiently unique to the construction industry. In determining whether a device is covered under the Structural Work Act, a court should look past the mere elevation of the worker or material and consider whether the hazard created by the elevation was one the Act was designed to prevent. (See Vuletich, 117 Ill. 2d at 423.) The pipe section involved in the accident here was approximately eight feet long and weighed several hundred pounds. A special device was being used to transport the unwieldy pipe section; the section was suspended by a cable attached to the bucket of a moving endloader. Plaintiff was assigned to walk alongside the endloader to prevent the section from tilting. All of these considerations, in combination, prompt us to believe that the activity here was of a particularly hazardous nature and one that the General Assembly was attempting to alleviate when it passed the Structural Work Act. See Louis v. Barenfanger (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 445, 450.
Defendants nevertheless attempt to distinguish the device here from the device in Prange by noting that the tractor involved there was used to install the poles upon arrival into holes which had been previously dug for that purpose. The defendants reason that because the endloader was not used in the installation of the pipe sections in the sewer system, it was not used in the construction of the structure. We believe, however, that the danger inherent in the way in which the endloader was used had a peculiar connection with the construction of the structure. The transport of the pipe section from the stockpile to the place where it was to be installed was crucial to the installation of the sewer system and sufficiently unique to a construction site to fall within the coverage of the Act. Moreover, the plaintiff here and the plaintiff in Prange were exposed to the same risk inherent in the construction industry at the time of the respective incidents. We do not believe that the General Assembly meant for coverage of the Act to depend on how the device was to be used after the accident occurred.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the endloader, as used in this case, was a mechanical contrivance engaging in activity within the contemplation of the Structural Work Act.
Defendants also argue here that a violation of the Structural Work Act was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Although raised by defendants in both the appellate and trial courts, neither court decided the issue. Because this issue was not decided in the lower courts, we decline to reach the merits of the argument here. The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.