Ladell Spann, Etc. v. Louie L. Wainwright, Etc.

Eleventh Circuit

Ladell Spann, Etc. v. Louie L. Wainwright, Etc.

742 F.2d 606, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18332

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedSeptember 24, 1984

Docket83-3030

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 742 F.2d 606 (Ladell Spann, Etc. v. Louie L. Wainwright, Etc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ladell Spann, Etc. v. Louie L. Wainwright, Etc., 742 F.2d 606, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18332 (11th Cir. 1984).

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LEWIS R. MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Ladell Spann, the appellant, was arrested in Florida in 1974 following his involvement in a murder. Following initial investigation, an assistant state attorney offered him a plea bargain whereby he would face charges of attempted grand larceny and testify against another participant in the crime. He accepted the proposal and made a sworn statement that revealed his deeper personal involvement in the crime. The state attorney reneged on the bargain before an indictment was returned. Spann then was indicted for first degree murder. At trial the judge suppressed all statements given by Spann in reliance on the plea bargain. The jury convicted Spann [607]*607and the court sentenced him to life in prison.

The only issue in this appeal from the denial of Spann’s habeas corpus petition is whether a defendant’s mere acceptance of a prosecutor’s proposed plea bargain creates a due process right to have the bargain specifically enforced. The Supreme Court recently held that no such due process right exists. Mabry v. Johnson, — U.S. —, —, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). That holding controls the disposition of this ease.

Although Mabry concerned the enforceability of a rescinded executory plea agreement by a defendant who had pleaded guilty pursuant to a later plea agreement, its holding need not be restricted to that context. The Court in Mabry premised their holding upon the fact that “[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest.” Id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2546.¹ Since the concern of the due process clause is the “manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty,” id. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2547, a breached executory plea agreement without more is insufficient ground for the granting of habeas corpus relief.

The dissent expresses concern that Spann’s trial was rendered unfair by the use of evidence gained from him by his reliance upon the revoked plea agreement. Spann did not raise this issue in his petition for habeas corpus. It is therefore not properly before this court. McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1361 n. 10 (11th Cir.1982); Messelt v. Alabama, 595 F.2d 247, 250-51 (5th Cir.1979); Davis v. Beto, 368 F.2d 999, 999 (5th Cir.1966).

We accordingly affirm denial of the writ.

AFFIRMED.

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LEWIS R. MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Ladell Spann, the appellant, was arrested in Florida in 1974 following his involvement in a murder. Following initial investigation, an assistant state attorney offered him a plea bargain whereby he would face charges of attempted grand larceny and testify against another participant in the crime. He accepted the proposal and made a sworn statement that revealed his deeper personal involvement in the crime. The state attorney reneged on the bargain before an indictment was returned. Spann then was indicted for first degree murder. At trial the judge suppressed all statements given by Spann in reliance on the plea bargain. The jury convicted Spann [607]*607and the court sentenced him to life in prison.

The only issue in this appeal from the denial of Spann’s habeas corpus petition is whether a defendant’s mere acceptance of a prosecutor’s proposed plea bargain creates a due process right to have the bargain specifically enforced. The Supreme Court recently held that no such due process right exists. Mabry v. Johnson, — U.S. —, —, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). That holding controls the disposition of this ease.

Although Mabry concerned the enforceability of a rescinded executory plea agreement by a defendant who had pleaded guilty pursuant to a later plea agreement, its holding need not be restricted to that context. The Court in Mabry premised their holding upon the fact that “[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest.” Id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2546.¹ Since the concern of the due process clause is the “manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty,” id. at-, 104 S.Ct. at 2547, a breached executory plea agreement without more is insufficient ground for the granting of habeas corpus relief.

The dissent expresses concern that Spann’s trial was rendered unfair by the use of evidence gained from him by his reliance upon the revoked plea agreement. Spann did not raise this issue in his petition for habeas corpus. It is therefore not properly before this court. McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1361 n. 10 (11th Cir.1982); Messelt v. Alabama, 595 F.2d 247, 250-51 (5th Cir.1979); Davis v. Beto, 368 F.2d 999, 999 (5th Cir.1966).

We accordingly affirm denial of the writ.

AFFIRMED.

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742 F.2d 606, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18332, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ladell-spann-etc-v-louie-l-wainwright-etc-ca11-1984.

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