Laborers' Local 231 Pension Fund v. Pharmerica Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedSeptember 24, 2019
Docket3:18-cv-00109
StatusUnknown

This text of Laborers' Local 231 Pension Fund v. Pharmerica Corporation (Laborers' Local 231 Pension Fund v. Pharmerica Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laborers' Local 231 Pension Fund v. Pharmerica Corporation, (W.D. Ky. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

LABORERS’ LOCAL #231 PENSION FUND and DANIEL RIORDAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs

v. Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-109-RGJ PHARMERICA CORPORATION, FRANK E. COLLINS, W. ROBERT DAHL, JR., MARJORIE W. DORR, PATRICK G. LEPORE, GEOFFREY G. MEYERS, ROBERT A. OAKLEY, GREGORY S. WEISHAR, KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS & CO. L.P. and WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC., Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on two motions to dismiss. The first is filed by PharMerica Corporation and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. [DE 55]. The second is filed by PharMerica’s Board of Directors, Frank E. Collins, W. Robert Dahl, Jr, Marjorie W. Dorr, Patrick G. Lepore, Geoffrey G. Meyers, Robert A. Oakley, Gregory S. Weishar (collectively, the “Board of Directors”). [DE 56]. Plaintiffs, Laborer’s Local #231 Pension Fund and Daniel Riordan, on behalf of himself and those similarly situation, responded and request oral argument. [DE 59]. These issues have been extensively briefed. Thus, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary. Plaintiffs’ request for oral argument is DENIED, and for the reasons below, both motions to dismiss, [DE 55, 56], are GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, Laborer’s Local #231 Pension Fund and Daniel Riordan, were both shareholders of the PharMerica Corporation (“PharMerica” or the “Company”) before affiliates of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (“KKR”) and Walgreen Boots Alliance, Inc. (“Walgreens”) acquired the Company through a cash-out merger. [DE 1, Complaint at 1, ¶1; 7, ¶23]. Plaintiffs bring this putative class action lawsuit, against PharMerica and its Board of Directors, KKR, and Walgreens, under the Securities Exchange Act Section 14(a) and SEC Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder alleging that the Proxy Statement (the “Proxy”) contained both affirmative material misleading

statements and material omissions. [Id. at 35–37]. Plaintiffs also seek to hold PharMerica’s Board of Directors, KKR, and Walgreens, liable as control persons under the Securities Exchange Act Section 20(a). [Id. at 37–39]. A. PharMerica’s Acquisitional Growth PharMerica was a publicly traded Fortune 1000 company. [Id. at 10, ¶44]. It was the second largest institutional pharmacy company in the United States. [Id.] PharMerica’s headquarters was in Louisville, Kentucky. [Id. at 7, ¶24]. PharMerica had a three-part growth plan. [Id. at 28, ¶135]. One of those parts was growth through acquisitions. [Id.]. PharMerica had successfully grown through acquisition before the merger and made many public statements

about its intent to continue to grow in this way, including in its SEC filings. [Id. 10–20]. B. Bank of America Merrill Lynch (“BAML”) and UBS Securities LLC (“UBS”) Facilitate PharMerica’s Merger with KKR and Walgreens PharMerica engaged BAML and UBS to explore potential business combinations and act as financial advisors. [Id. at 21, ¶95]. In January 2016, BAML and UBS began discussing with KKR and Walgreens the potential acquisition of PharMerica. [Id.]. Both BAML and UBS had previous relationships with KKR and Walgreens. [Id. at 21–23]. BAML earned roughly $74 million in fees from KKR and roughly $49 million in fees from Walgreens in the two years before the merger. [Id. at 21, ¶97]. Similarly, UBS earned roughly $125 million in fees from KKR and Walgreens in the two years before the merger. [Id. at 22, ¶103]. Both BAML and USB stood to earn far less money from the merger than the money they had earned from their relationships with KKR and Walgreens. [Id. at 22, ¶98; 23, ¶104]. Along with their previous relationship, BAML also had an ongoing relationship with KKR and Walgreens during the merger. [Id. at 22, ¶99]. For example, a senior member of the BAML team working on the merger was also a member of the coverage team for Walgreens and a member

of the financial advisory team advising Walgreens on other acquisitions. [Id. at 22, ¶100]. On September 14, 2016, KKR and Walgreens submitted a tentative proposal to purchase PharMerica in a cash-out merger for $28.75 per share. [Id. at 24, ¶111]. Upon, receiving price feedback from UBS, KKR, and Walgreens orally increased their price to $29.25 per share on September 19, 2016. [Id. at 24, ¶¶112-13]. On April 27, 2017, KKR and Walgreens formalized the $29.25 per share offer. [Id. at 24, ¶117]. Throughout the sales process PharMerica’s management periodically prepared financial forecasts for the Company (the “Projections”). [Id. at 29, ¶138]. Projections were created in 2015, April 2016, September 2016, April 2017, and July 2017. [Id. at 24, ¶119]. The Projections—

except the July 2017 Projections—contained two scenarios: one scenario assumed future acquisitions, and one scenario assumed no future acquisitions. [Id.]. The July 2017 Projections, however, contained only the scenario assuming no future acquisitions. [Id.; Id. at 25, ¶125]. The July 2017 Projections included a footnote stating that they excluded acquisitions. [Id. at 27, ¶131]. On August 1, 2017, PharMerica’s Board of Directors met with UBS and BAML to review the formal offer from KKR and Walgreens. [Id. at 26, ¶126]. While PharMerica included all five sets of projections in its Proxy statement, the Company only approved the July 2017 Projections for UBS and BAML to use for their fairness opinions. [Id. at 28, ¶132]. Based on the July 2017 Projections and other provided information, BAML and UBS issued fairness opinions, which stated that the $29.25 per share price was fair from a financial standpoint. [Id. at 26, ¶126]. Relying in part upon these fairness opinions, the Directors determined that the merger was “fair to and in the best interests” of the Company’s stockholders and voted to approve the merger and executed the Merger Agreement. [Id. at 26, ¶127].

C. The Proxy On October 3, 2017, Defendants published the Proxy. [Id. at 27, ¶130]. Two lawsuits were filed, one of which alleged that “the Preliminary Proxy did not disclose sufficient information relating to (i) PharMerica’s financial projections, (ii) the analysis underlying UBS’s and BAML’s fairness opinions, and (iii) the potential conflicts of interest of PharMerica’s management” and another that “added allegations related to UBS’s potential conflicts of interest.” [DE 55, Def. Mot. to Dismiss, at 381]. On October 27, 2017, Defendants supplemented the Proxy. [Id. at 384]. After the additional disclosures, plaintiffs in the two lawsuits dismissed the suits. [Id.]. The approximately 100-page Proxy recommends that shareholders vote for adopting the Merger

Agreement and states that the contemplated merger is “fair to and in the best interests of the Company and its Shareholders.” [DE 55-2, Proxy Statement, at 408]. The Proxy also states that the $29.25 per share price is fair to and in the best interest of PharMerica stockholders. [Id. at 444–45]. 1. The Projections The Proxy contains summaries of all five sets of projections. [Id. at 462–63]. It also discloses that the July 2017 Projections excluded acquisitions. [Id. at 463]. The Proxy also states that the financial advisors relied on the July 2017 Projections in their evaluation of the merger and the formation of their fairness opinions. [Id.]. Finally, the Proxy contains a long disclaimer stating that stockholders should not rely on the Projections as suggesting the occurrence of future events, and that the Projections may not be accurate. [Id. at 461]. 2. Conflicts of Interest The Proxy disclosed information about each financial advisor’s relationship with KKR and Walgreens and stated that those relationships were disclosed to the PharMerica Board of Directors

before voting on the merger. [Id. at 454, 459–60].

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Laborers' Local 231 Pension Fund v. Pharmerica Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laborers-local-231-pension-fund-v-pharmerica-corporation-kywd-2019.