La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States

175 U.S. 423, 20 S. Ct. 168, 44 L. Ed. 223, 1899 U.S. LEXIS 1576
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided December 18, 1899·No. 29·Published·Cited by 111 cases

Opinion

Mr. Justice Harlan,

after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

In the light of this history of the claim of the La Abra *451 Company we proceed to the consideration of such of the principal questions presented in argument as are essential to the disposition of the case.

I. If, as insisted by the appellants, the above act of December 28, 1892, was not so approved by the President as to become under the Constitution a law, it would be unnecessary to consider any other question raised by the pleadings; for that act is the only basis of jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to render a judgment that would be conclusive between the parties and which could be reviewed by this court. "We must therefore first consider whether that act is liable to the constitutional objection just stated.

The ground of this contention is that having met in regular session at the time appointed by law, the first Monday of December, 1892, and having on the 22d day of that month (two days after the presentation of the bill to the President) by the joint action of the two Houses taken a recess to a named day, January 4, 1893, Congress was not actually sitting when the President on the 28th day of December, 1892, by signing it formally approved the act in question. The proposition, plainly stated, is that a bill passed by Congress and duly presented to the President does not become a law if his approval be given on a day when Congress is in recess. This implies that the constitutional power 'of the President to approve a bill so as to make it a law is absolutely suspended while Congress is in recess for a fixed time. It would follow from this that if both Houses of Congress by their joint or separate action were in recess from some Friday until the succeeding Monday, the President could not exercise that power on the intervening Saturday. Indeed, according to the argument of counsel the President could not effectively approve a bill on any day when one of the Houses, by its own separate action, was legally in recess for that day in order that necessary repairs be made in the room in which its sessions were being held. Yet many public acts and joint resolutions of great importance together with many private acts have been treated as valid and enforceable which were approved by the President during the recesses of Congress covering the *452 Christmas holidays. In the margin will be found a reference to some of the more recent of those statutes. 1

Do the words of the Constitution, reasonably interpreted, sustain the views advanced for appellant ?

That instrument provides:

“ The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, •unless they shall by law appoint a different day.” Art. I, § 4.

“Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.” Art. I, § 5.

“ Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on the journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that *453 House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it' shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House, respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.” Art. I, § 7.

“ Every order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary, (except on a case of adjournment,) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.” Art. I, § 8.

It is said that the approval by the President of a bill passed by Congress is not strictly an executive function, but is legislative in its nature; and this view, it is argued, conclusively shows that his approval can legally occur only on a day when both Houses are actually sitting in the performance of legislative functions. Undoubtedly the President when approving bills passed by Congress may be said to participate in the enactment of laws which the Constitution requires him to execute. But that consideration does not determine the question before us. As the Constitution while authorizing the President to perform certain functions of a limited number that are legislative in their general nature does not restrict the exercise of those functions to the particular days on which the two Houses of Congress are actually sitting in the transaction of public business, the court cannot impose such a restriction upon the Executive. It is made his duty by the Constitution to examine and act upon every bill passed by Congress. The time within which he must approve or dis *454 approve a bill is prescribed. If he approve a bill, it is made his duty to sign it. The Constitution is silent as to the time of his signing, except that his approval of a bill duly presented to him — if the bill is to become a law merely by virtue of such approval —must be manifested by his signature within ten days, Sundays excepted, after the bill 'has been presented to him. It necessarily results that a bill when so signed becomes from that moment a law. But in order that his refusal or failure to act may not defeat the will of the people, as expressed by Congress, if a bill be not approved and be not returned to the House in which it originated within that time, it becomes a law in like manner as if it had been signed by him. We perceive nothing in these constitutional provisions making the approval of a bill by the President a nullity if such approval occurs while the two Houses of Congress are in recess for a named time. After a bill has been presented to the President, no further action is required by Congress in respect of that bill unless it be disapproved by him and within the time prescribed by the Constitution be returned for reconsideration. It has properly been the practice of the President to inform Congress by message of his approval of bills, so that the fact may be recorded. But the essential thing to be done in order that a bill may become a law by, the ápproval of the President is that it be signed within the prescribed time after being presented to him.

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La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 20 S. Ct. 168, 44 L. Ed. 223, 1899 U.S. LEXIS 1576 (1899).

175 U.S. 423 (La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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