L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo

139 So. 121, 103 Fla. 552
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedNovember 14, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by60 cases

This text of 139 So. 121 (L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 139 So. 121, 103 Fla. 552 (Fla. 1931).

Opinions

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 554 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 555 The sole relief sought by the bill of complaint in this case is an injunction enjoining and restraining the defendants, as officers of the State of Florida, from enforcing the provisions of certain statutes of the State, and certain regulations issued under authority thereof by the Commissioner of Agriculture, and for no other relief. The statutes involved are Chapter 10103, Acts of 1925, Chapter 11844, Acts of 1927, Laws of Florida (Sections *Page 556 3220-3254, C. G. L.) as amended by Chapter 14495, Acts of 1929, and Chapter 14662, Acts of 1931, of the laws of said State.

The Circuit Judge, upon bill, answer and affidavits, heard an application for a temporary restraining order, denied the injunction and dismissed the bill. From this order an appeal has been taken to this Court and the cause advanced for hearing on its merits upon appellants' application here for the relief sought in the court below. This application is grounded on two contentions: (1) that section 4 Chapter 11844, Acts of 1927, as amended by section 4 of Chapter 14485, Acts of 1929, is unconstitutional, and (2) that even if the Acts are constitutional and valid, that complainants have brought themselves within the provisions of an exemption recognized in Chapter 14485, to the effect that the provisions of Chapter 11844, as amended, shall not apply to fruit gathered within an area which had been quarantined for the Mediterranean fruit fly during the period of one year following the lifting of such quarantine.

The acts in question were before the Federal Courts in the case of Kilgore, et al. v. Mayo, Comm'r., et al., where an injunction on Federal constitutional grounds was denied August 26, 1931. See 51 F.2d page __________.

While the constitutionality of the Acts referred to is attacked by the bill here on the same and other grounds, and there is also questioned the validity of the Commissioner of Agriculture's regulations prescribed thereunder, and the enforcement of these regulations is sought to be prohibited, both on the ground that the acts under which they were made are invalid, and on the ground that the acts under consideration do not authorize such regulations, even if the acts are valid, we find it unnecessary to pass upon either of these questions, in order to dispose of the pending appeal. The practice of not doing so is the established one usually followed by this Court when difficult *Page 557 constitutional questions of grave import to the public welfare are presented in the course of litigation which can be fully disposed of on other points which make a decision of the constitutional questions unnecessary. See Carolina-Florida Planting Co. v. Maige, 64 Fla. 235, 60 So.2d 346.

The bill of complaint alleges that the Commissioner of Agriculture has promulgated rules and regulations dated August 15, 1931, by the terms of which he has directed his inspectors to go upon the private property of persons where he has reason to believe citrus fruit has been sprayed with arsenic spray, and to seize and take possession of it, and that by such regulations the Commissioner undertakes to make a distinction and exception between persons who have sprayed their trees and fruit since the lifting of a quarantine in the State commonly referred to as the Mediterranean Fruit Fly Quarantine, and that unless enjoined and restrained from so doing that the defendants will seize and destroy a large amount of valuable citrus fruit belonging to the appellants and thereby deprive them of their property rights in same without due process of law.

The bill further alleges that the citrus fruits upon all of the groves of the appellants have been grown since the lifting of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly quarantine, which is alleged to have been discontinued in the State of Florida since the 6th day of December, 1930; that prior to said date the entire State of Florida East of the Aucilla River had been quarantined by the Federal Government and by the State Plant Board so that all fruit grown upon citrus groves East of the Aucilla River was within the quarantined area so quarantined on account of the existence of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly; that the groves of the appellants were situated within this area and that during the existence of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly quarantine the spraying of fruit trees with arsenic was permitted and authorized as a legal act and that there was never any order of the State Plant Board directing the persons using arsenic *Page 558 sprays on their groves to cease using the same, which use had been a common practice from the early part of the Summer of 1929 until the date the quarantine was lifted.

The bill contains, among others, a special prayer to the effect that if the Court holds that the Acts of the Legislature under attack are not unconstitutional and void that then the Court should decree and determine that the fruit grown by the appellants during the year 1931, and which it may pick and gather from its groves before the 6th day of December, 1931, are not subject in any manner to seizure or destruction because of the special exceptions in favor thereof contained in the Act of 1929 which is hereinbefore referred to.

Chapter 14085, Acts of 1929, was an Act to amend Sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Chapter 11844, Acts of 1927, prohibiting the use of arsenic, or any of its derivatives, as a fertilizer or spray on bearing citrus fruit trees, and to prohibit the sale or transportation of citrus fruit containing any arsenic.

The five Sections which were amended by the 1929 Act were amended so as to read as follows:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, association or corporation owning, managing or tending and cultivating citrus groves or trees to use arsenic or any of its derivatives or any combination, compound or preparation containing arsenic as a fertilizer or spray on bearing citrus trees except when so ordered by the Federal Government or State Plant Board for the purpose of destroying the Mediterranean fruit fly.

Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, association or corporation to sell or offer for sale, transport, prepare, secure or deliver for transportation or market, any citrus fruit of any variety which shall contain any arsenic, or any compound or derivative of arsenic, provided it does not come from within a quarantined area or which has been within a quarantined area for one year previous to time of gathering of fruit.

Section 3. The citrus fruit inspectors who shall be *Page 559 employed by the Commissioner of Agriculture in accordance with Section 9, Chapter 11875 of the Acts of 1927, shall be authorized to inspect citrus fruit hereunder at any packing house or other place where citrus fruit is being received or prepared for sale and transportation and to carry out the provisions of this Act in general under the direction and supervision of the Commissioner of Agriculture and subject to the provisions of law and the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Agriculture, provided that this Section shall not apply to fruit within the area quarantined on account of the Mediterranean fruit fly.

Section 4.

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Bluebook (online)
139 So. 121, 103 Fla. 552, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/l-maxcy-inc-v-mayo-fla-1931.