PAULSON, Judge (on reassignment).
This is a petition for review of the Ward County District Court’s decision which rejected certain absent voters’ ballots cast in a state legislative contest. Such decision was made by the district judge in the course of conducting a ballot recount for the office of State Representative from the 41st Legislative District on November 26, 1976, pursuant to § 16-01-10(3), N.D.C.C.
The parties concede that this court has personal jurisdiction of the parties.
This court has jurisdiction to hear the subject matter, pursuant to § 16-01— 10(3), N.D.C.C., wherein it is provided that
“Correcting errors on ballots — Requiring performance of duty or desistance from wrongful performance. — Whenever it shall be made to appear by an affidavit to the supreme court, or to the district court of the proper county that:
“3. Any wrongful act has been or is about to be done by any judge or clerk of election, county auditor, canvassing board, member thereof, or other person charged with any duty concerning the election. . .
a judge of such court shall order the officer or person charged with such error, wrong, or neglect to correct the error, desist from the wrongful act, perform the duty, or show cause at a time and place to be fixed by the court why he should not do so. . . .”
Such specific grant of jurisdiction is in addition to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction granted by § 86 of the North Dakota Constitution, as amended at the primary election on September 7, 1976. See 32 N.D. L.Rev. 199, 204 (1956), and cases cited therein.
This matter arises out of the same factual situation as in State ex rel. Olson v. Thompson N.D., 1976, 248 N.W.2d 347 wherein we stated:
“This matter arose following the November 2, 1976, general election. The county auditor of Ward County forwarded to the Secretary of State the certified abstract of votes required by law, including that of State Representative from the 41st District as follows:
Walsh.2,402
Forsberg.1,928
Wentz.2,283
Kuhn.2,291
Subsequent to the receipt of such certification, the Secretary of State was served with a copy of a Demand for Recount by Janet Wentz, pursuant to § 16 — 13—47.1, N.D.C.C., as amended. .
“Within fifteen days after the Demand for Recount was filed by Wentz, the Secretary of State received the results of the recount conducted pursuant to § 16-13-47.1, N.D.C.C., as amended, certified by the Honorable William M. Beede, District Judge of Ward County, which indicated the following:
[233]*233Kuhn.2,205
Wentz.2,206
Walsh.2,311
Forsberg . 1,850 "
In the present proceeding, this court is asked to review the decision of the district court which declared void and did not count 202 absent voters’ ballots which were not endorsed with the official stamp and initialed pursuant to §§ 16-12-04, 16-18-17, and 16-13-01, N.D.C.C. We are further requested to determine, in the event this court approves the decision of the district court, whether or not the constitutional rights of the 202 absentee voters were violated by the district court’s action in voiding their absent voters’ ballots.
Section 16-12-04, N.D.C.C. provides:
“Delivering ballot to elector — Stamping. — The inspector or one of the judges of election shall deliver ballots to the qualified electors and at primary elections only, shall inform each elector that if he splits his ballot or votes for candidates of more than one party his ballot will be rejected. Before delivering any ballot to an elector, the inspector or judge shall stamp once at the top of the back of the ballot the designation ‘official ballot’ and the other words provided for in section 16-11 — 11, and also shall write his initials thereon. Failure to stamp and initial a ballot in the proper place on the ballot shall not invalidate such ballot but a failure to stamp and initial a ballot at any place on a ballot shall invalidate the ballot.”
Such stamping and initialing requirement is made applicable to absent voters’ ballots under § 16-18-17, N.D.C.C., which, after instructing the inspector of elections or the judges of elections to open the outer envelope and compare the signatures, then provides, in pertinent part:
“. . .If the judges find that the statement is sufficient and that the signatures correspond, and that the applicant is then a duly qualified elector of such precinct and has not voted at such election, they shall open the absent voter’s envelope in such manner as not to destroy the statement thereon. They shall take out the ballot or ballots contained therein without unfolding the same, or permitting the same to be opened or examined, and after endorsing the same as other ballots are endorsed, they shall deposit the ballot in the proper ballot box and show by the records of such election that such elector has voted. .” [Emphasis added.]
The effect of a failure to stamp and initial a ballot is specified in § 16-13-01(1), N.D. C.C., which provides, in pertinent part:
“Ballots void and not counted — Part of ballot may be counted. — In the canvass of the votes at any election, a ballot shall be void and shall not be counted if:
“1. It is not endorsed with the official stamp and initials as provided in this title [Title 16] ... ”
[Emphasis added.]
The district court construed such statutory provisions to be mandatory, ruling that all ballots not so stamped and initialed are void and are not to be counted. Such ruling by the district court resulted in the voiding of 202 absent voters’ ballots and is the subject of this review. It is noted that absent voters’ ballots cast in five of the seven precincts comprising the 41st Legislative District were properly stamped and initialed. All of the absent voters’ ballots voided were cast in precincts which used voting machines for those electors who voted in person.
The petitioner contends that North Dakota statutes do not require stamping and initialing of absent voters’ ballots which are cast on voting machines. Petitioner contends that such requirement is applicable only to absent voters’ ballots cast in precincts using ballot box voting, but is not applicable to absent voters’ ballots cast in precincts using voting machines. Petitioner cites § 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., as authority for her contention, indicating that § 16-18 — 20 is the only statute which specifically refers to the casting of absent voters’ ballots in [234]*234precincts using voting machines. Section 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., provides:
“Registration of absent voters’ ballots on voting machines. — Absent voters’ ballots, if any, shall be registered on the voting machines by two election officials of opposed interests, if such there be, otherwise by any two election officials. The voting of absent voters’ ballots on the voting machines shall be done in secrecy by the two election officials during the voting day at such intervals as are available when machines are not in use by voters..”
Petitioner further contends, because § 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., contains no reference to the endorsement of absent voters’ ballots, it is presumed that the legislature did not intend that the endorsement requirement be. applicable to absent voters’ ballots cast in precincts using voting machines. We disagree.
If this court were to accept petitioner’s contention that the procedural requirements set forth in § 16-18-17, N.D.C.C., but not included in § 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., are not applicable to absent voters’ ballots cast in precincts using voting machines, it would follow that most of the procedural safeguards the legislature employs to assure the integrity of the election process in the casting and counting of absent voters’ ballots in precincts using voting machines would be circumvented. Section 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., does not provide for a comparison of an absent voter’s signature on the outer envelope of such ballot with the absent voter’s signature on his application for an absent voter’s ballot; it does not require a determination that the absent voter be a duly qualified elector of such precinct; it does not require a determination that the absent voter has not voted at such election; it does not require an examination of the absent voter’s ballot; it does not require the election officials to enter in the records of such election the fact that such elector has voted; it does not provide a procedure for preserving absent voters’ ballots which are found to be defective; and it does not require that the absent voters’ ballots be endorsed.
We find that the legislature, in enacting § 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., intended only to establish a procedure whereby absent voters’ ballots could be effectively counted in those precincts using voting machines, and that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the procedural safeguards already provided to protect the integrity of the election process in the casting and counting of absent voters’ ballots. Such interpretation gives effect to both § 16-18-17 and § 16-18-20, N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, N.D.C.C.
Next, it is contended that, even if the endorsement requirement is applicable to absent voters’ ballots cast in precincts using voting machines, such requirement should be found to be directory and not mandatory. Such issue was raised in Weber v. O’Connell, 55 N.D. 867, 215 N.W. 539, 540-541 (1927), wherein this court held:
“This court has consistently held that the requirements of section 985 [§ 16-12-04, N.D.C.C.] as to indorsements by the official stamp and initials, construed in the light of section 1006 [§ 16-18-01, N.D.C.C.], are mandatory and that ballots not so indorsed by both stamp and initials are void and shall not be counted. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
“The defendant in this behalf contends, and this was the view taken by the trial court, that the absent voters’ statute was an innovation in the law and was enacted long subsequent to the enactment of sections 985 and 1006 [§§ 16-12-04 and 16— 13-01, N.D.C.C.]; that the Legislature, when it enacted the latter sections, had no intention that such section should apply to absent voters’ ballots, and that when the Legislature in 1913 enacted the absent voters’ statute, it clearly did not contemplate that the provision for the indorsement of absent voters’ ballots should be mandatory; that the reasons for the enactment of section 1006 [§ 16— 13-01] do not exist in the ease of absent voters’ ballots, and the reasons not existing, this statute was not intended to apply. On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that applying the ordinary and [235]*235usual rules of construction, all of the statutes governing the conduct of elections must be construed together, and that, when the Legislature enacted the absent voters’ statute in 1913, it did so having in view section 1006 [§ 16-13-01] and other statutes touching elections and the construction and effect given to the same by this court, and contemplated that the same should apply.
“So it seems clear to us, applying these rules in the instant case, that we must hold that section 1006 [§ 16-13-01] applies to absent voters’ ballots as well as to other ballots. It is urged that the chief reason for indorsement of ballots as required by section 985 [§ 16-12-04], that is, to make sure that the elector shall vote the official ballot and shall have no opportunity to substitute in place thereof an unofficial ballot which may have been marked prior to his coming to the polls, does not apply in the case of absent voters’ ballots; that the Legislature has carefully safeguarded every step of the proceedings prior to the depositing of the absent voter’s ballot in the ballot box so that this may not occur; and that the voter ought not to be deprived of the right to cast his vote through the default or neglect of election officers since he is not present and cannot protect himself in this respect. But it must be remembered that in granting the right to vote to absent voters the Legislature has the right to prescribe such reasonable requirements as it sees fit. So that regardless of reasons therefor the Legislature is well within its power in imposing such a requirement. If it imposes such a requirement and the voter knows that when absent from his polling place he votes at his peril as regards defaults of the election officers, he cannot complain. Besides, it cannot be said that there is no reason for the imposition of the requirement that the ballot be indorsed. As is said in the case of Miller v. Schallern, supra [8 N.D. 395, 79 N.W. 865 (1899)]:
“ ‘The reasons for this requirement are two-fold: First, to insure the use of the official ballot; next, to identify the ballot in case of contest. Though the first of these two reasons may not exist in the case of absent voters’ ballots, the second does just as much in the one case as in the other.’
“It must also be remembered that the only provision made for the counting of ballots and prescribing the manner in which this shall be done is contained in section 1006 [§ 16 — 13—01]. The absent voters’ statute says nothing whatsoever respecting the manner in which the votes shall be counted. It leaves this subject to pre-existing statutes, that is, to section 1006, and, as this court has repeatedly held . . . , the provision of section 1006, that ballots not indorsed with stamp and initials shall be void and not counted, is mandatory. We must presume, of course, that the Legislature had in mind section 1006 and the judicial construction put upon it when it enacted the absent voters’ statute.”
Such issue was again raised in Torkelson v. Byrne, 68 N.D. 13, 276 N.W. 134 (1937), wherein this court held, in paragraph 1 of the syllabus:
“1. Ballots which have not been indorsed as required by section 985, Comp. Laws 1913 [§ 16-12-04, N.D.C.C.], are void whether they be absent voters ballots or regular ballots.”
It is urged that this court’s holdings in Weber and in Torkelson, supra, are distinguishable on their facts because in these cases the precincts involved used paper ballots for those electors casting their votes in person, and because the absent voters’ ballots were counted individually along with ballots cast by electors voting in person. We find no substance in such distinctions.
Absent voters’ ballots cast in Weber and in Torkelson were just as easily distinguished from those ballots cast by electors voting in person as in the present proceeding because, in 1927 and in 1937, North Dakota law required that absent voters’ ballots be of a different color than the ballots used by electors casting their votes [236]*236in person. Section 994, Comp.Laws 1913 [§ 16-18-03, N.D.C.C.]. Further, the fact that such absent voters’ ballots are now registered on voting machines in the presence of two election officials of opposed interests, does not transform such absent voters’ ballots into something not identifiable — such absent voters’ ballots are still identifiable in the case of an election recount or election contest, are still capable of being inspected to evaluate their authenticity in the event of an election recount or election contest, and, if found to be void, they can be subtracted from the voting machine totals, as was done by the recount board in the present proceeding.
The contention is made that, because fraud has not been alleged in the casting of the 202 absent voters’ ballots which were not endorsed with the official stamp and initials, they should be counted notwithstanding that the law specifically provides that such ballots are void. If we were to hold that unless fraud is alleged such ballots shall be counted, we would be encouraging such allegations in the future. An allegation of fraud is easily made but is difficult to prove. Certainly it would follow that we would have to require more than a mere allegation of fraud. We would need to require proof of fraud. What kind of proof would we require? The proof of fraud that is usually required to vitiate consent in a normal business transaction is proof that is clear and convincing. Such proof of fraud is difficult to obtain under most circumstances, and to require such proof of fraud in an election recount or an election contest would ultimately result in the encouragement of fraud itself. It is no doubt because of this difficulty and the consequences in the election process of such a requirement that the legislature required the stamping and initialing of ballots in order to prevent fraud in the first instance. Although we can conceive of means by which such a procedural safeguard might be circumvented, and although there may be other means that could be devised to prevent fraud, we cannot conclude that the means adopted by our legislature does “not contribute substantially to the integrity of the election process.” Craig v. Peterson, 39 Ill.2d 191, 196, 233 N.E.2d 345, 348 (1968).
It should also be noted that the legislature also acts to discourage carelessness and possible connivance on the part of an election officer by providing that the failure on the part of an election officer to comply with the stamping and initialing requirement may constitute a class A misdemean- or. Section 16-01 — 17, N.D.C.C., provides, in pertinent part:
“Election offenses — Penalty.—It shall be unlawful for a person to:
“1. Fraudulently alter another person’s ballot or substitute one ballot for another, or to otherwise defraud a voter of his vote.
A violation of subsections 1 through 6 of this section shall be a class A misdemean- or. . . .” [Emphasis added.]
Section 12.1-32-01(4), N.D.C.C., provides:
“Classification of offenses — Penalties. —Offenses are divided into six classes, which are denominated and subject to maximum penalties, as follows:
“4. Class A misdemeanor, for which a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment, a fine of one thousand dollars, or both, may be imposed.”
We thus find that this court’s holdings in Weber v. O’Connell and in Torkelson v. Byrne, supra, to be controlling in the present proceeding. We find that § 16-13-01(1), N.D.C.C., which provides that: “In the canvass of the votes at any election, a ballot shall be void and shall not be counted if: (1) It is not endorsed with the official stamp and initials as provided in this title [Title 16] . ” applies to absent voters’ ballots registered on voting machines pursuant to § 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., and where such absent voters’ ballots are not so endorsed, they are void and cannot be counted.
Having determined that the decision of the district court in the present proceeding [237]*237is in accordance with North Dakota law, we now turn to petitioner’s contention that the constitutional rights of the 202 absentee voters were violated by the voiding of their absent voters’ ballots pursuant to such law. (Petitioner has not specified what particular constitutional rights of the 202 absent voters have been violated.) Petitioner appears to contend that such regulatory provision operates unequally upon equally qualified voters and that it does not contribute substantially toward ensuring the honesty and integrity of the election process. Craig v. Peterson, supra 233 N.E.2d 345, is cited in support of such contention. We disagree.
In Porter v. Bainbridge, 405 F.Supp. 83 (S.D.Ind.1975), the federal district court found that a rule adopted by the Indiana State House of Representatives not to count absentee ballots which did not bear the seal and initials of the county clerk and the precinct election clerk’s initials in precincts in which the only paper ballots cast were absentee ballots did not violate such absentee voters’ constitutional rights. Specifically, the federal district court found that such rule did not violate these absentee voters’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances — as incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; nor did such rule violate their rights to equal protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court in Porter v. Bair-bridge, supra 405 F.Supp. at 91, found that such rule
“. . . requiring that the election clerks initial the ballots, is a reasonable and logical requirement to assure that only the ballots of properly registered and qualified voters are in fact deposited in the ballot box at the precinct. This procedure assures qualified and registered voters that their votes will not be diluted or nullified by votes of unqualified and unregistered persons.”
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Weber v. O’Connell, supra 215 N.W. at 541, stated:
“But it must be remembered that in granting the right to vote to absent voters the Legislature has the right to prescribe such reasonable requirements as it sees fit. So that regardless of reasons therefor the Legislature is well within its power in imposing such a requirement. If it imposes such a requirement and the voter knows that when absent from his polling place he votes at his peril as regards defaults of the election officers, he cannot complain. Besides, it cannot be said that there is no reason for the imposition of the requirement that the ballot be indorsed.”
Our statutory scheme for handling absent voters’ ballots cast on voting machines contemplates a time interval between the time the absent voters’ ballots are opened and endorsed, pursuant to § 16-18-17, N.D.C.C., and the time they are registered on the voting machines, pursuant to § 16-18-20, N.D.C.C., “during the voting day at such intervals as are available when machines are not in use by voters”. During this time interval, between step 1 and step 2, the absent voters’ ballots are open and are subject to potential illegal substitutions or additions. By the lack of endorsement, the inspector would be unable to identify the absent voters’ ballots voted in step 2 as being the same ballots opened in step 1.
In Miller v. Schallern, 8 N.D. 395, 79 N.W. 865, 866-867 (1899), wherein our Supreme Court first held that the statutory provision requiring that ballots be properly endorsed is mandatory, not directory, this court stated that:
“. . . counsel’s utmost contention is that an enforcement of the statute as it reads may in some cases operate, and in the case at bar will operate, practically to deprive electors of their constitutional right to vote, and to have their votes counted. But this cannot be made a test of the validity of any regulative statute. There are many regulative provisions in election statutes the enforcement of which will and do operate to deprive voters of their privilege, and yet their consti[238]*238tutionality cannot be successfully challenged. .
“. . . But the case cited by plaintiff . . . while conceding to the lawmaker the general right of legislative control, holds that the prohibition against the counting of votes on which the initials of a precinct official are not written is an unreasonable regulation, and, as it may possibly operate, in isolated instances, to disfranchise the voter, it is therefore unconstitutional and void. But, in our judgment, this reasoning is fallacious, and moreover, trenches upon very dangerous ground. It proceeds upon the false notion that .it is the province of the courts to enter the conceded domain of the legislature, and, upon a question of the expediency of a given regulative measure, substitute the judgment of the courts for that of the constitutional body which has the original right to make the regulation.” [Emphasis added.]
We find that the legislature could have concluded that the requirement of endorsement of absent voters’ ballots is reasonable and logical to aid in assuring the integrity of the election process. The endorsement requirement is as valuable today in precincts using voting machines for electors casting their votes in person as such endorsement requirement was when first held applicable to absent voters’ bal-. lots fifty years ago, when electors casting their votes in person used different colored ballots than those used by electors casting absentee ballots. We find such requirement is intended to assure that only the ballots of properly registered and qualified voters are in fact registered on the voting machines and to assure qualified and registered voters that their votes will not be diluted or nullified by votes cast by unqualified persons.
Finally, we reach the question of whether fifteen qualified electors living in the 41st Legislative District of the State of North Dakota should be allowed, pursuant to Rule 24 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, to intervene in the present proceeding. Such electors had cast absent voters ballots at the general election of November 2, 1976, in which election they voted for their choices for State Representatives for the 41st Legislative District, which ballots were subsequently voided by the decision of the district court which is the subject of this proceeding.
It is contended that because there is no statute conferring on such electors a right to intervene, and because such electors’ rights will be adequately represented by the parties to this proceeding, this court should deny intervention. We disagree.
Rule 24(a)(2), N.D.R.Civ.P., provides:
“Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”
Although we believe that such electors’ interests are adequately represented by the existing parties, we will, without indicating what we might do in future cases, allow intervention in this proceeding, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2), N.D.R.Civ.P., because of the unique circumstances of this matter — i. e., that election recounts made pursuant to the requirements of § 16-13-47.1, N.D.C.C., must be conducted within a very short time frame, giving no practical opportunity for intervention prior to an election recount; and that the subject matter of this proceeding affects and concerns intervenors’ rights to vote and have their votes counted.
Having thus decided to allow intervention, we find that the arguments made by the intervenors parallel arguments made by the petitioner and that they are adequately resolved earlier in this opinion, with the exception of one issue — Does the application of § 16-13-01(1), N.D.C.C., violate Section 122 of the North Dakota Constitution, which provides:
“Section 122. The legislative assembly shall be empowered to make further ex[239]*239tensions of suffrage hereafter, at its discretion, to all citizens of mature age and sound mind, not convicted of crime, without regard to sex; but no law extending or restricting the right of suffrage shall be in force until adopted by a majority of the electors of the state voting at a general election.”
We find no distinction between the application of § 16-13-01(1), N.D.C.C., to the present proceeding and its application as to any elector voting on a paper ballot in North Dakota — all paper ballots are subject to the same endorsement requirement and will be declared void and not counted if not so endorsed. This court has consistently held since 1899 that such statutory provision is a valid enactment and is not repugnant to any provision of the North Dakota Constitution. Miller v. Schallern, 79 N.W. 865, supra ¶ 2 of Syll.
We find it appropriate to conclude with an observation made by this court in 1899:
“If experience should show that the provisions of section 524 [§ 16-13-01, N.D. C.C.] are unnecessarily rigid, — we do not think it will, — then it will become the duty of the legislature to intervene and devise some different regulation of the elective franchise.” Miller v. Schallern, supra, 79 N.W. at 868.
The relief requested in the petition for review is denied; the relief requested in the petition of the intervenors is denied; and the provisions of § 16 — 13-01, N.D.C.C., are held to be constitutional, mandatory, and applicable to absent voters’ ballots cast in precincts using voting machines.
ERICKSTAD, C. J., concurs.