KS Corp. v. Chemstrand Corporation

203 F. Supp. 230, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 530, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5683, 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,215
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 19, 1962
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 203 F. Supp. 230 (KS Corp. v. Chemstrand Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KS Corp. v. Chemstrand Corporation, 203 F. Supp. 230, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 530, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5683, 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,215 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).

Opinion

PALMIERI, District Judge.

Defendant The Chemstrand Corporation (Chemstrand) has moved for an order sustaining its objections to certain interrogatories propounded by plaintiff in a private treble damage action against Chemstrand, a manufacturer of synthetic fibers, and Fabrex Corp. (Fabrex), a competing converter. The complaint contains three causes of action, two of which are relevant to the instant motion. The first charges that defendant Chemstrand violated section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13, by its refusal to grant plaintiff advertising, promotional allowances, service», and inventory financing, repeatedly granted to defendant Fabrex, and by its refusal to grant plaintiff a license to use Chem-strand’s trademarks Acrilan and A-Acri-lan even though such license was granted defendant Fabrex free of charge and for use on finished goods no better than or inferior to the finished goods of plaintiff. The second cause of action alleges that defendants Chemstrand and Fa-brex engaged in a conspiracy, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, to maintain and increase the position and sales volume of defendant Fabrex in the women’s and children’s sportswear, *232 dress and coat market, and to prevent plaintiff from becoming a substantial competitor and to eliminate it from that market. The complaint alleges that pursuant to that conspiracy defendants sought to induce and induced others to cease doing business with the plaintiff and diverted such business to Fabrex; secured from plaintiff its business secrets and utilized the information for the benefit of Fabrex; induced plaintiff to discontinue a contract action against the defendants; and engaged in the conduct described above under the Robinson-Pat-man cause of action.

Oft repeated objections to the interrogatories are that the interrogatories are irrelevant because not confined to what defendant considers to be the scope of the complaint; that denial of a license does not constitute a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act; and that the information requested is confidential.

I shall not discuss the extent to which the information called for by the various interrogatories relates directly to issues raised by the pleadings, because I do not think the pleadings should be the sole determinant of permissible discovery. See Freund, The Pleading and Pre-Trial of an Antitrust Claim, 46 Cornell L.Q. 555, 573, n. 103 (1960-61). Pleadings are easily amended, and deemed to be amended to conform to the evidence that has been introduced. See Rule 15, Fed.R.Civ.P. 28 U.S.C.A.; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ff 15.02. Rather, the problem is to permit a litigant to obtain whatever information he may need to prepare adequately for the issues that may develop, without imposing an onerous burden of information gathering on his adversary. It is with those criteria in mind that I have considered and modified the interrogatories objected to.

Defendant has cited no case in support of the proposition that discrimination in granting or withholding of a trademark does not violate the Robinson-Patman Act. A conclusion that such discrimination is within the scope of conduct prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act is not precluded by the language of that statute 1 and is consonant with its purpose of protecting purchasers against discrimination resulting from unequal furnishing of facilities for marketing the seller’s goods. See Simplicity Pattern Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 258 F.2d 673, 678 (1958) , affirmed in part, reversed on other grounds, 360 U.S. 55, 79 S.Ct. 1005, 3 L.Ed.2d 1079, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 855, 80 S.Ct. 41, 4 L.Ed.2d 93 (1959) . Plaintiff should not be foreclosed from information that may enable it to establish the factual background which would permit it to urge that legal result. Moreover, much of the information objected to on this ground is relevant to plaintiff’s contention that Chem-strand’s denial of the trademarks to plaintiff was an element of the conspiracy to eliminate it as a competitor.

The problem created by the confidential character of some of the information can probably be solved best by counsel agreeing that counsel for plaintiff will not divulge the information to their client or that the information be deposited under seal with the clerk of the court pending whatever use the trial court may see fit to make of it and subject to further order of this Court. If counsel cannot agree, the Court will give consideration to appropriate conditions in the order to be submitted.

Interrogatories 1(d), 1(e) and 1(f)

Defendant is directed to answer Interrogatories 1(d), 1(e), and 1(f) by stating the amount it has expended to advertise its trademarks Acrilan and AAcrilan (1) annually, for each of the six years preceding the filing of the corn- *233 plaint, and (2) the total so expended to date.

I cannot agree with defendant Chem-strand that there is no correlation between the amounts expended on the advertising of a trademark and its value. Evidence that the trademarks were widely publicized and that defendant expended large sums to this end would permit the trier of facts to infer that these trademarks were valuable, and' that defendant so considered them; both inferences are relevant to the conspiracy allegation, and may be relevant to the Robinson-Patman allegation.

Interrogatories 1(g), 14 and 15

These interrogatories request detailed information on all advertisements containing the trademarks Acrilan or AAcrilan appearing in 1959 and 1960, and on advertising benefits and promotional assistance furnished by Chemstrand during those years. Defendant is directed to answer these interrogatories as follows:

Interrogatory No. 1(g) : With respect to each such advertisement featuring or including the name “Acrilan” or “A-Acrilan,” appearing in the calendar years 1959 and 1960, state:

(i) The name and medium of communication in which such advertisement or publicity appeared.
(ii) The date of appearance of each such advertisement.
(iii) Whether Chemstrand paid for the advertisement, and the amount paid by Chemstrand, whether directly or indirectly (by way of allowances, rebates or otherwise), for each such advertisement.
(iv) Whether or not the amount paid by Chemstrand was in full or part payment for each such advertisement.
(v) If Chemstrand’s payment was part payment only, the name of the person or entity making the balance of the payment, and the amount of such balance.
(vi) The name of the recipient of each payment or contribution made by Chemstrand for such advertisements.

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203 F. Supp. 230, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 530, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5683, 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ks-corp-v-chemstrand-corporation-nysd-1962.