OPINION
BISSETT, Justice.
In this case, we are called upon to construe a mineral deed executed in 1929 by Frank Roncaba and wife, Josefa Roncaba in favor of Walter A. Mang. The appellees herein, whose title is derived from the Ron-cabas, sued the appellants and others, as successors in title to Mang, to determine the ownership and seek a partition of the mineral estate. The trial court determined that the deed in question conveyed an undivided ½6 mineral interest to Mang. Based on this determination, the court ordered a partition in kind, to reflect ownership of the minerals as 15/i6 belonging to the appellees, claimants under the Roncabas, and the remaining ½6 to the appellants and others, claimants under Mang.
The sole question before this Court is the quantity of the interest conveyed in the Roncaba-Mang deed. The material terms of the deed are as follows:
“THE STATE OF TEXAS § § KNOW ALL MEN BY COUNTY OF GONZALES § THESE PRESENTS:
THAT Frank Roncaba and wife Josefa Roncaba of the County of Gonzales, State of Texas, has and by those presents do grant, bargain, sell, convey, set over and assign and deliver unto Walter A. Mang the following to-wit: one-half of the one-eighth interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands situated in Gonzales County, Texas, to-wit:
.. . together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling and exploring said lands for oil, gas and other minerals, and removing the same therefrom.
And said above described lands being now under an oil and gas lease originally executed in favor of Cranfill-Reynolds and now held by them, it is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to said lease, but covers and includes ½6 of all the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due to be paid under the terms of said lease.
It is agreed and understood that none of the money rentals which may be paid to extend the term within which a well may be begun under the terms of said lease is to be paid to the said Walter A. Mang, and in the event that the said above described lease for any reason becomes cancelled or forfeited, then and in that event, the lease interests and all future rentals on said land, for oil, gas and mineral privileges shall be owned jointly by Walter A. Mang of Gonzales, Texas and Frank Roncaba and wife, Josefa Roncaba each owning a one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in and upon said land, together with one-half interest in all future rents.
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It is a well settled rule that in construing a deed, it is the duty of a court to seek the intention of the parties to that deed. Terrell v. Graham, 576 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Sup.1979). The intention of the parties is to be ascertained from a consideration of all the language which appears in the deed, and by harmonizing, if possible, those provisions which appear to be in conflict. McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 408, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957).
It is also well established that should there be any doubt in ascertaining the intention of the parties as their intention is expressed in the deed in its entirety, that doubt, after considering the deed from its four corners, should be resolved against the grantors, whose language it is, and the deed [466]*466must be construed most favorably to the grantee, as conveying to him the largest estate permissible within the language of the deed. Garrett v. Dils Company, 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957).
Even though different parts of a deed may appear to be contradictory and inconsistent with each other, a court, in construing the words in a deed so as to give effect to all parts thereof, will not strike down any part of the deed, unless there is an irreconcilable conflict where one part of the instrument effectively destroys another part thereof. Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953).
With these rules in mind, we examine the Koncaba-Mang deed. The first clause plainly conveys a ½6 mineral interest in the tract described therein. This is followed by language which recognizes the existence of a valid oil and gas lease in force on the property and making the sale subject thereto. This same paragraph grants a ½6 interest in all royalties due on oil and gas produced under the described lease. The succeeding paragraph reserves all rights to delay rentals under the current lease to the grantors and provides that, upon termination of the then existing oil and gas lease, the mineral estate would be owned ½ by the grantors and ½ by the grantee. This is the clear meaning of the words used.
The appellees imply that the third paragraph is ambiguous and would have us consider later deeds as evidence of the parties’ intent. We must reject this argument and hold that there is no ambiguity. The language used is common and has been interpreted as we do here by Texas courts for many years. See Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563, 564 (1945); Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d 143 (1960); Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The question to be answered is whether the third paragraph is in direct conflict with, and repugnant to, the formal “granting” clause. We hold that it is not. Since the record reflects that the oil and gas lease under which the Roncaba deed was burdened had expired at the time of trial, this Court need only concern itself with the proper division of mineral interests owned by the grantors and the grantee upon termination of the said oil and gas lease.
Construing the deed as a whole and giving effect to every provision, we conclude that the Roncabas intended to convey to Mang, prior to the termination of the then existing oil and gas lease, an undivided ½6 th perpetual mineral interest in and to the involved land, subject, to the then existing oil and gas lease, and that the grantee therein would be paid ½6⅛ of all of the royalty on oil and gas due or to become due in the event production was obtained under said lease.
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OPINION
BISSETT, Justice.
In this case, we are called upon to construe a mineral deed executed in 1929 by Frank Roncaba and wife, Josefa Roncaba in favor of Walter A. Mang. The appellees herein, whose title is derived from the Ron-cabas, sued the appellants and others, as successors in title to Mang, to determine the ownership and seek a partition of the mineral estate. The trial court determined that the deed in question conveyed an undivided ½6 mineral interest to Mang. Based on this determination, the court ordered a partition in kind, to reflect ownership of the minerals as 15/i6 belonging to the appellees, claimants under the Roncabas, and the remaining ½6 to the appellants and others, claimants under Mang.
The sole question before this Court is the quantity of the interest conveyed in the Roncaba-Mang deed. The material terms of the deed are as follows:
“THE STATE OF TEXAS § § KNOW ALL MEN BY COUNTY OF GONZALES § THESE PRESENTS:
THAT Frank Roncaba and wife Josefa Roncaba of the County of Gonzales, State of Texas, has and by those presents do grant, bargain, sell, convey, set over and assign and deliver unto Walter A. Mang the following to-wit: one-half of the one-eighth interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands situated in Gonzales County, Texas, to-wit:
.. . together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling and exploring said lands for oil, gas and other minerals, and removing the same therefrom.
And said above described lands being now under an oil and gas lease originally executed in favor of Cranfill-Reynolds and now held by them, it is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to said lease, but covers and includes ½6 of all the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due to be paid under the terms of said lease.
It is agreed and understood that none of the money rentals which may be paid to extend the term within which a well may be begun under the terms of said lease is to be paid to the said Walter A. Mang, and in the event that the said above described lease for any reason becomes cancelled or forfeited, then and in that event, the lease interests and all future rentals on said land, for oil, gas and mineral privileges shall be owned jointly by Walter A. Mang of Gonzales, Texas and Frank Roncaba and wife, Josefa Roncaba each owning a one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in and upon said land, together with one-half interest in all future rents.
* * * »
It is a well settled rule that in construing a deed, it is the duty of a court to seek the intention of the parties to that deed. Terrell v. Graham, 576 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Sup.1979). The intention of the parties is to be ascertained from a consideration of all the language which appears in the deed, and by harmonizing, if possible, those provisions which appear to be in conflict. McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 408, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957).
It is also well established that should there be any doubt in ascertaining the intention of the parties as their intention is expressed in the deed in its entirety, that doubt, after considering the deed from its four corners, should be resolved against the grantors, whose language it is, and the deed [466]*466must be construed most favorably to the grantee, as conveying to him the largest estate permissible within the language of the deed. Garrett v. Dils Company, 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957).
Even though different parts of a deed may appear to be contradictory and inconsistent with each other, a court, in construing the words in a deed so as to give effect to all parts thereof, will not strike down any part of the deed, unless there is an irreconcilable conflict where one part of the instrument effectively destroys another part thereof. Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953).
With these rules in mind, we examine the Koncaba-Mang deed. The first clause plainly conveys a ½6 mineral interest in the tract described therein. This is followed by language which recognizes the existence of a valid oil and gas lease in force on the property and making the sale subject thereto. This same paragraph grants a ½6 interest in all royalties due on oil and gas produced under the described lease. The succeeding paragraph reserves all rights to delay rentals under the current lease to the grantors and provides that, upon termination of the then existing oil and gas lease, the mineral estate would be owned ½ by the grantors and ½ by the grantee. This is the clear meaning of the words used.
The appellees imply that the third paragraph is ambiguous and would have us consider later deeds as evidence of the parties’ intent. We must reject this argument and hold that there is no ambiguity. The language used is common and has been interpreted as we do here by Texas courts for many years. See Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563, 564 (1945); Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d 143 (1960); Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The question to be answered is whether the third paragraph is in direct conflict with, and repugnant to, the formal “granting” clause. We hold that it is not. Since the record reflects that the oil and gas lease under which the Roncaba deed was burdened had expired at the time of trial, this Court need only concern itself with the proper division of mineral interests owned by the grantors and the grantee upon termination of the said oil and gas lease.
Construing the deed as a whole and giving effect to every provision, we conclude that the Roncabas intended to convey to Mang, prior to the termination of the then existing oil and gas lease, an undivided ½6 th perpetual mineral interest in and to the involved land, subject, to the then existing oil and gas lease, and that the grantee therein would be paid ½6⅛ of all of the royalty on oil and gas due or to become due in the event production was obtained under said lease. We further conclude that after the termination of said lease, that the parties intended that the mineral interest conveyed to Mang in the granting clause would be increased to an undivided ½ interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals on, in and under said land.
Such an interpretation is supported by prior cases which have given effect to the plain intent of the grantor to enlarge or restrict the granting clause by subsequent language in the deed. See Associated Oil Co. v. Hart, 277 S.W. 1043 (Tex.Comm’n App.1925, judgmt. adopted); Texas and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Martin, 123 Tex. 383, 71 S.W.2d 867; Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, supra, at 145-46. It is also consistent with our Supreme Court’s recognition that different estates in minerals may be conveyed by the same instruments. See Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617, 621 (1954); Richardson v. Hart, supra.
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment which declares that the Roncaba-Mang deed was intended to convey only a perpetual ¾6 mineral interest to Mang, and render judgment that the same conveyed fully ½ of the grantors’ reversionary interest in the minerals in and under the said tract, together with all the usual rights associated therewith.
We also reverse that portion of the judgment which affixes the respective percentage shares of ownership of the present [467]*467claimants, and the portion of the judgment which orders partition of the property based on the trial court’s determination of ownership. We remand that portion of the case to the trial court for further consideration in light of this opinion.
We have not been asked to construe any of the subsequent deeds through which the parties trace their titles, and we express no opinion about them. However, it may well be that a construction of those deeds by the trial court is necessary in order for that court to properly order a partition in the proper fractional shares to the appellees, the appellants and to the defendants who were cited by publication and possibly to Walter A. Mang, if living, and to his heirs at law or devisees, as the case may be, if deceased.
Those portions of the trial court’s judgment not mentioned above are affirmed. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, and reversed and remanded in part.