Kopf v. Monroe Stone Co.

95 N.W. 72, 133 Mich. 286, 1903 Mich. LEXIS 493
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedMay 29, 1903
DocketDocket No. 47
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 95 N.W. 72 (Kopf v. Monroe Stone Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kopf v. Monroe Stone Co., 95 N.W. 72, 133 Mich. 286, 1903 Mich. LEXIS 493 (Mich. 1903).

Opinions

Grant, J.

{after stating the facts). 1. Plaintiff knew that he was employed as a driller; that Lemerand was the foreman who employed him, and who alone had the right to direct him. He saw Lemerand daily. He knew that Freedon was the loader and shooter, and was under the control of Lemerand; and, after Freedon was injured by an explosion, that one Poland was the loader and shooter. Freedon was injured about a month before plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff testified; “Mr. Ed. Lemer- and had charge of the drilling. He was boss.” He knew that Freedon had no control over him. Freedon sometimes asked him to load the last hole, and he continued to do so under Poland. Plaintiff gave no word of testimony tending to show that he supposed that Freedon had any control over him, or the right to direct what he should do. He testified:

“Ed. Lemerand, the boss of the quarry, set me drilling holes. Charles Freedon had charge of shooting these .holes. He was the man under the foreman that had charge of the shooting, — drilling, loading, and shooting blasts. Freedon had charge of the loading and shooting of the holes after they were drilled. As far as I know, Mr. Ed. Lemerand had charge of the drilling. He was [290]*290boss. * * * Freedon did not give me any orders while I was drilling there, about drilling and loading the holes. Freedon set me to work there. I was working under Lemerand, as far as I knew. Freedon he told me to load the last holes. There were two, — one at 11:30, and another in the afternoon. * * :!: When Freedon asked me to load the holes, I said I did not want to load them; ‘ I am afraid of it.5 He said the rest handled it; ‘you might handle it.’ ”

Evidently the holes before had been large enough to receive the stick of dynamite, and there was no danger in loading such holes. He found this one too small. Upon this point his testimony is as follows:

Q. You found the hole was too small ?
‘‘A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why didn’t you leave it alone?
° “A. I never had any warning to do anything of the kind.
Q. You knew the hole was too small?
“A. I didn’t think it would do any harm to squeeze it. * * *
Q. What did you do with this to get it down into the hole?
“A. I squeezed on this a little. It was sticking up a little, and I squeezed it. I thought I had better let it alone.”

Plaintiff’s counsel, in their brief, say:

“It is probable knowledge, common to the ordinary man, that dynamite will explode when sufficiently jarred.”

Plaintiff was familiar with the use of dynamite, and had seen it used every day for eight weeks. He had handled it before. He knew its liability to explode; that the only danger was from an explosion; that jarring is liable to cause one; and, if the hole was too small, he might have drilled another, and he thought he had better let it alone. Yet, without requirement from anybody to force this dangerous material into a hole too small, without any'pretense that he had ever seen the work so done before, without any protest to his employer, or any direction from him, knowing that his employer had never seen [291]*291him do this work, and that he was not employed for that purpose, he chose to handle this dangerous material, and to force it into a hole in the- rock, at the request of one who he knew had no control over his action, and no right to direct him. One servant has no right to assume that a fellow-servant has any control over his movements, or any authority or right to direct him in his work. It is his duty tp look to the master, or his alter ego, for directions; and when he is employed to do one kind of work, which is entirely safe, he has no right to assume to do another kind, especially when dangerous, without the direction of his master. Where the servant may perform his work in Two ways, one safe, the other dangerous, the master is not responsible for injuries to him when he voluntarily assumes the dangerous way. Upon the same principle, when he is employed to do work unattended with danger, he cannot make the master liable because he either occasionally or habitually chooses to do dangerous work which he knows another is assigned to do. Under all the authorities, as I read them, he assumed the risk. The injury was the result of his own carelessness and voluntary assumption of work he was not required to do. It would seem to me unnecessary to cite authorities. The following, in my judgment, sustain the proposition: Bailey, Mast. Liab. 169; St. Louis Bolt & Iron Co. v. Brennan, 20 Ill. App. 555; Brown v. Byroads, 47 Ind. 435; Knox v. Coal Co., 90 Tenn. 546 (18 S. W. 255); Lindstrand v. Lumber Co., 65 Mich. 254 (32 N. W. 427). The language of Mr. Justice Campbell in the last case is applicable here:

“Mill owners cannot be supposed to anticipate that laborers in other work about the mill will handle the saws, or assume that any such direction as was given in this case was meant to give any such discretion. Plaintiff does not testify that he supposed the foreman required him to run any such risk. Had such orders [for a laborer to use a circular saw] been given, they would not have justified him in doing what he did.”

The law does not impose upon the master the duty to [292]*292warn or instruct his servant in regard to work he is. neither employed nor required to do.

2. Assuming that defendant knew that plaintiff was engaged in loading holes, what notice should have been given to him other than was given? Plaintiff testified that Mr. Freedon told him how to do the work. Freedon testified that he did give plaintiff dynamite to load some holes with, and explained the circumstances. “He was drilling three big stones in front of the car. The cal-men would have had to lie idle if I had not left dynamite.” He testified that the car men insisted upon his leaving it for the hole, and he did so. He testified: “I told Kopf how to fix it; how it would be safe, also told him to be careful.” We must assume, therefore, that he instructed him as to the method which Mr. Freedon safely pursued. If this was so, the instructions were sufficient. The most competent man, undoubtedly, to instruct the plaintiff, was Mr. Freedon. Was defendant or Freedon bound to anticipate that plaintiff would attempt to force this dangerous explosive into a hole too small, and to warn him not to do it ? Common sense would teach any reasonable man better than to do that. It requires a jar to explode this material, and there is certainly danger of a jar in forcing a stick of dynamite into a hole too small. Whatever danger there was in that was as apparent to plaintiff as to any employé of the defendant. If the dynamite had exploded in consequence of plaintiff’s attempt to drive it in with a stone, would it have been the duty of the defendant to anticipate this, and warn him that it was dangerous to •strike it with a stone? The only witness to the transaction, aside from plaintiff himself, is another employé, who testified that plaintiff did strike it with a stone, and he was about to speak to him when the explosion occurred.

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Bluebook (online)
95 N.W. 72, 133 Mich. 286, 1903 Mich. LEXIS 493, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kopf-v-monroe-stone-co-mich-1903.