Kopf v. Monroe Stone Co.

95 N.W. 72, 133 Mich. 286, 1903 Mich. LEXIS 493
Michigan Supreme Court·Decided May 29, 1903·No. Docket No. 47·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinions

Grant, J.

{after stating the facts). 1. Plaintiff knew that he was employed as a driller; that Lemerand was the foreman who employed him, and who alone had the right to direct him. He saw Lemerand daily. He knew that Freedon was the loader and shooter, and was under the control of Lemerand; and, after Freedon was injured by an explosion, that one Poland was the loader and shooter. Freedon was injured about a month before plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff testified; “Mr. Ed. Lemer- and had charge of the drilling. He was boss.” He knew that Freedon had no control over him. Freedon sometimes asked him to load the last hole, and he continued to do so under Poland. Plaintiff gave no word of testimony tending to show that he supposed that Freedon had any control over him, or the right to direct what he should do. He testified:

“Ed. Lemerand, the boss of the quarry, set me drilling holes. Charles Freedon had charge of shooting these .holes. He was the man under the foreman that had charge of the shooting, — drilling, loading, and shooting blasts. Freedon had charge of the loading and shooting of the holes after they were drilled. As far as I know, Mr. Ed. Lemerand had charge of the drilling. He was [290] boss. * * * Freedon did not give me any orders while I was drilling there, about drilling and loading the holes. Freedon set me to work there. I was working under Lemerand, as far as I knew. Freedon he told me to load the last holes. There were two, — one at 11:30, and another in the afternoon. * * :!: When Freedon asked me to load the holes, I said I did not want to load them; ‘ I am afraid of it.5 He said the rest handled it; ‘you might handle it.’ ”

Evidently the holes before had been large enough to receive the stick of dynamite, and there was no danger in loading such holes. He found this one too small. Upon this point his testimony is as follows:

Q. You found the hole was too small ?
‘‘A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why didn’t you leave it alone?
° “A. I never had any warning to do anything of the kind.
Q. You knew the hole was too small?
“A. I didn’t think it would do any harm to squeeze it. * * *
Q. What did you do with this to get it down into the hole?
“A. I squeezed on this a little. It was sticking up a little, and I squeezed it. I thought I had better let it alone.”

Plaintiff’s counsel, in their brief, say:

“It is probable knowledge, common to the ordinary man, that dynamite will explode when sufficiently jarred.”

Plaintiff was familiar with the use of dynamite, and had seen it used every day for eight weeks. He had handled it before. He knew its liability to explode; that the only danger was from an explosion; that jarring is liable to cause one; and, if the hole was too small, he might have drilled another, and he thought he had better let it alone. Yet, without requirement from anybody to force this dangerous material into a hole too small, without any'pretense that he had ever seen the work so done before, without any protest to his employer, or any direction from him, knowing that his employer had never seen [291] him do this work, and that he was not employed for that purpose, he chose to handle this dangerous material, and to force it into a hole in the- rock, at the request of one who he knew had no control over his action, and no right to direct him. One servant has no right to assume that a fellow-servant has any control over his movements, or any authority or right to direct him in his work. It is his duty tp look to the master, or his alter ego, for directions; and when he is employed to do one kind of work, which is entirely safe, he has no right to assume to do another kind, especially when dangerous, without the direction of his master. Where the servant may perform his work in Two ways, one safe, the other dangerous, the master is not responsible for injuries to him when he voluntarily assumes the dangerous way. Upon the same principle, when he is employed to do work unattended with danger, he cannot make the master liable because he either occasionally or habitually chooses to do dangerous work which he knows another is assigned to do. Under all the authorities, as I read them, he assumed the risk. The injury was the result of his own carelessness and voluntary assumption of work he was not required to do. It would seem to me unnecessary to cite authorities. The following, in my judgment, sustain the proposition: Bailey, Mast. Liab. 169; St. Louis Bolt & Iron Co. v. Brennan, 20 Ill. App. 555; Brown v. Byroads, 47 Ind. 435; Knox v. Coal Co., 90 Tenn. 546 (18 S. W. 255); Lindstrand v. Lumber Co., 65 Mich. 254 (32 N. W. 427). The language of Mr. Justice Campbell in the last case is applicable here:

“Mill owners cannot be supposed to anticipate that laborers in other work about the mill will handle the saws, or assume that any such direction as was given in this case was meant to give any such discretion. Plaintiff does not testify that he supposed the foreman required him to run any such risk. Had such orders [for a laborer to use a circular saw] been given, they would not have justified him in doing what he did.”

The law does not impose upon the master the duty to [292] warn or instruct his servant in regard to work he is. neither employed nor required to do.

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Kopf v. Monroe Stone Co., 95 N.W. 72, 133 Mich. 286, 1903 Mich. LEXIS 493 (Mich. 1903).

95 N.W. 72 (Kopf v. Monroe Stone Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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