Komatsu v. Urban Pathways, Inc.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TOWAKI KOMATSU, Plaintiff, 22-CV-9080 (LTS) -against- ORDER URBAN PATHWAYS, INC., et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff filed this action pro se. On January 26, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended compliant to assert claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against Defendants Daniels Norelli Cecere & Tavel PC, Harold Rosenthal, Allison Heilbraun, and Eric Tavel; the Court dismissed the majority of Plaintiff’s remaining claims – brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and New York State and City law – as frivolous, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and for seeking monetary relief from defendants that are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Finally, the Court dismissed the claims brought against Steve Banks, Penny Ringel, and Lorri Kletter, that arose out of public meetings, pursuant to the prefiling injunction issued in Komatsu v. City of New York, No. 20-CV- 07046 (ER) (ECF 45). Following the issuance of the January 26, 2023, order, Plaintiff filed several letters requesting (1) reconsideration of the order, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60, and (2) the undersigned’s recusal. The Court construes Plaintiff’s letters as also seeking reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3. The Court denies Plaintiff’s requests and grants Plaintiff an additional 30 days to file an amended complaint. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) A party who moves to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been

previously put before it. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’”) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

A motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Id. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the dismissed action. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). B. Motion for Reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 The standards governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 are the same. R.F.M.A.S., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (discussion in the context of both Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). Thus, a party seeking reconsideration of any order under Local Civil Rule 6.3 must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. R.F.M.A.S., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d at 509. A motion brought under Local Civil Rule 6.3 must be filed within 14 days “after the entry of the Court’s determination of the original motion, or in the case of a court order resulting in

a judgment, within . . . (14) days after the entry of the judgment.” Id. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the dismissed action. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion under Local Civil Rule 6.3. C. Motion for Reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district court’s order or judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion based on reasons (1), (2), or (3) must be filed “no more than one year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The Court has considered Plaintiff’s arguments, and even under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the grounds listed in the first five clauses of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) apply. Therefore, the motion under any of these clauses is denied. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5).” United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of HHS, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985)). A party moving under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot circumvent the one-year limitation applicable to claims under clauses (1)-(3) by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b). Id. A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show both that the motion was

filed within a “reasonable time” and that “‘extraordinary circumstances’ [exist] to warrant relief.” Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Servs. of America, Inc., 301 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950). D. Recusal A judge is required to recuse herself from “any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). When a judge’ s impartiality is questioned on bias or prejudice grounds, “what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). That is, recusal is warranted if “ an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts . . . entertain

significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 169 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The showing of personal bias to warrant recusal must ordinarily be based on “ extrajudicial conduct . . . not conduct which arises in a judicial context.” Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d 1138, 1141 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted); see Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 199 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of recusal motion filed in case by plaintiff where judge had ruled against him on all his motions and where plaintiff had “speculated that the judge may have been acquainted with [him]”). In rare circumstances, judicial “opinions formed by [a] judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the [court] proceedings, or of prior proceedings,”

may be the basis of a recusal motion, but only if those opinions “display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (1994). Plaintiff’s assertion that the Court shows bias is merely an assertion; the undersigned did not grant Plaintiff leave to amend, or dismiss his claims, because of any bias or impropriety. The January 26, 2023, order was issued based on the legal standards set forth in that order. Plaintiff states no facts suggesting that the undersigned “displayed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Any reasonable and objective observer would perceive Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction only with the Court’s rulings. If Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the Court’s rulings, he is free to appeal them to the Court of Appeals. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (noting that “[a]lmost invariably, [judicial rulings] are proper grounds

for appeal, not for recusal”). As there is no need for the undersigned to recuse herself from this action, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion seeking the Court’s recusal. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s letter-motions for reconsideration (ECF 10, 16, 17, 21) are denied. Plaintiff’s letter-motion seeking the undersigned’s recusal (ECF 22) is also denied. The Court grants Plaintiff an additional 30 days to file his amended complaint. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2023 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge