COLE, Judge.
We shall decide in this case whether a husband may be required to support a child who, though born to his wife during wedlock, was not sired by him.
We set forth the salient facts as follows. Charles and Cledythe Knill had been married for ten years and had two children at the time of Stephen’s birth in 1970. One and one-half years before Stephen’s birth, Charles had undergone a full vasectomy, and the parties agree that Stephen is not Charles’s son. Charles apparently forgave Cledythe for her infidelity because the marriage continued for another twelve years with Stephen being reared as a member of the Knill family.
During this period, Stephen had no knowledge of his illegitimacy. Cledythe, however, had told her other two children that Charles was not Stephen’s father. In the aftermath of a tumultuous family argument in March of 1982, Cledythe informed Stephen that Charles was not his father. Immediately thereafter, Charles attempted to comfort Stephen. Charles admitted to Stephen that he was not [530]*530Stephen’s father, but that he still loved Stephen. Two years later, Charles and Cledythe separated. Charles continued to support Stephen until January of 1984, when Cledythe sued for divorce in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. Among her prayers for relief, Cledythe requested child support for Stephen. Charles, in turn, denied that Stephen was his natural child and asserted that he was not legally obligated to support him.
In a deposition taken prior to trial, Cledythe testified that a man named James Herring is Stephen’s natural father. Mr. Herring, who testified at trial, is a retired federal employee of the Atomic Energy Commission and is also the owner of a gasoline service station. Herring admitted knowing Cledythe, but stated that because of his alleged alcoholism, he could neither admit nor deny paternity. The evidence at trial indicated that Mr. Herring was at all times available for process and financially able to support Stephen. No evidence suggested that Charles had done anything to prevent Mr. Herring from supporting Stephen, or that Charles had at any time during the marriage discouraged Cledythe from pursuing Mr. Herring for support. Moreover, there was no evidence that Cledythe ever sought support from Mr. Herring. The circuit court concluded, nonetheless, that Charles was equitably estopped from denying an obligation to support Stephen. Following a final decree of divorce, Charles appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel under the circumstances of this case. We issued a writ of certiorari prior to argument in that court.
Charles contends that no legal basis exists for imposing an obligation upon him to support a child other than his own natural or adopted child. The obligation to provide support, Charles asserts, must be based upon the legal relationship between the two parties. Charles argues that, at most, he stood in loco parentis to Stephen during the twelve years that he voluntarily supported him. Charles asserts that because the in loco parentis relationship is temporary in [531]*531character, he owed no legal duty to continue to support Stephen after the parties separated. On the other hand, Cledythe acknowledges that Charles is not Stephen’s father, but maintains that “by his overt behavior,” Charles is now equitably estopped to deny paternity. She reasons that Charles “did everything a father would do and more,” and that Charles represented himself to the child and to the community as Stephen’s father.
I
Maryland Code (1984), § 5-203(b)(l) of the Family Law Article provides, “The parents of a minor child are jointly and severally responsible for the child’s support____” The term “parents of a minor child” encompasses both natural and adoptive parents. See § 5-308(b) of the Family Law Article. The duty of child support extends to the natural parents of an illegitimate child, but not to a stepparent. See Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982); Commonwealth of Virginia v. Autry, 293 Md. 53, 441 A.2d 1056 (1982); Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980). Indeed, a long line of Maryland cases places the responsibility of child support squarely upon the shoulders of the natural parents. See Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, supra; Brown v. Brown, supra; Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977); Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463 (1945); Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 A. 841 (1927); Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, 67 A. 132 (1907); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369 (1868); Thompson v. Dorsey, 4 Md. Ch. Dec. 108 (1853); Addison v. Bowie, 2 Bland 575 (1830). Long ago, Sir William Blackstone articulated the rationale underlying this obligation:
[T]he duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: ... By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that [532]*532the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *447, quoted in Brown v. Brown, supra, 287 Md. at 284, 412 A.2d at 402.
Notwithstanding this general rule, Cledythe argues that the child support obligation may be placed on an individual who is not the child’s natural parent through the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. She claims that the doctrine should be applied to prevent an inequitable and unconscionable result. In other words, she argues that Stephen should not be made to “suffer the ultimate humiliation of having no support from a man who for all purposes acted as a father for fourteen years.” Brief for Appellee at 6.
II
Although the issue has not been considered by this Court, many jurisdictions have addressed the applicability of equitable estoppel in the context of a child support proceeding. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 11 Cal.Rptr. 707 (1961); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 429 A.2d 833 (1980); Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C.1968); R.D.S. v. S.L.S., 402 N.E.2d 30 (Ind.App.1980); Berrisford v. Berrisford, 322 N.W.2d 742 (Minn.1982); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984); Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
In the majority of these cases, the courts have declined to apply the doctrine to estop the husband from denying paternity and an obligation to support the child. See Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, supra
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COLE, Judge.
We shall decide in this case whether a husband may be required to support a child who, though born to his wife during wedlock, was not sired by him.
We set forth the salient facts as follows. Charles and Cledythe Knill had been married for ten years and had two children at the time of Stephen’s birth in 1970. One and one-half years before Stephen’s birth, Charles had undergone a full vasectomy, and the parties agree that Stephen is not Charles’s son. Charles apparently forgave Cledythe for her infidelity because the marriage continued for another twelve years with Stephen being reared as a member of the Knill family.
During this period, Stephen had no knowledge of his illegitimacy. Cledythe, however, had told her other two children that Charles was not Stephen’s father. In the aftermath of a tumultuous family argument in March of 1982, Cledythe informed Stephen that Charles was not his father. Immediately thereafter, Charles attempted to comfort Stephen. Charles admitted to Stephen that he was not [530]*530Stephen’s father, but that he still loved Stephen. Two years later, Charles and Cledythe separated. Charles continued to support Stephen until January of 1984, when Cledythe sued for divorce in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. Among her prayers for relief, Cledythe requested child support for Stephen. Charles, in turn, denied that Stephen was his natural child and asserted that he was not legally obligated to support him.
In a deposition taken prior to trial, Cledythe testified that a man named James Herring is Stephen’s natural father. Mr. Herring, who testified at trial, is a retired federal employee of the Atomic Energy Commission and is also the owner of a gasoline service station. Herring admitted knowing Cledythe, but stated that because of his alleged alcoholism, he could neither admit nor deny paternity. The evidence at trial indicated that Mr. Herring was at all times available for process and financially able to support Stephen. No evidence suggested that Charles had done anything to prevent Mr. Herring from supporting Stephen, or that Charles had at any time during the marriage discouraged Cledythe from pursuing Mr. Herring for support. Moreover, there was no evidence that Cledythe ever sought support from Mr. Herring. The circuit court concluded, nonetheless, that Charles was equitably estopped from denying an obligation to support Stephen. Following a final decree of divorce, Charles appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel under the circumstances of this case. We issued a writ of certiorari prior to argument in that court.
Charles contends that no legal basis exists for imposing an obligation upon him to support a child other than his own natural or adopted child. The obligation to provide support, Charles asserts, must be based upon the legal relationship between the two parties. Charles argues that, at most, he stood in loco parentis to Stephen during the twelve years that he voluntarily supported him. Charles asserts that because the in loco parentis relationship is temporary in [531]*531character, he owed no legal duty to continue to support Stephen after the parties separated. On the other hand, Cledythe acknowledges that Charles is not Stephen’s father, but maintains that “by his overt behavior,” Charles is now equitably estopped to deny paternity. She reasons that Charles “did everything a father would do and more,” and that Charles represented himself to the child and to the community as Stephen’s father.
I
Maryland Code (1984), § 5-203(b)(l) of the Family Law Article provides, “The parents of a minor child are jointly and severally responsible for the child’s support____” The term “parents of a minor child” encompasses both natural and adoptive parents. See § 5-308(b) of the Family Law Article. The duty of child support extends to the natural parents of an illegitimate child, but not to a stepparent. See Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982); Commonwealth of Virginia v. Autry, 293 Md. 53, 441 A.2d 1056 (1982); Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980). Indeed, a long line of Maryland cases places the responsibility of child support squarely upon the shoulders of the natural parents. See Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, supra; Brown v. Brown, supra; Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977); Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463 (1945); Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 A. 841 (1927); Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, 67 A. 132 (1907); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369 (1868); Thompson v. Dorsey, 4 Md. Ch. Dec. 108 (1853); Addison v. Bowie, 2 Bland 575 (1830). Long ago, Sir William Blackstone articulated the rationale underlying this obligation:
[T]he duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: ... By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that [532]*532the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *447, quoted in Brown v. Brown, supra, 287 Md. at 284, 412 A.2d at 402.
Notwithstanding this general rule, Cledythe argues that the child support obligation may be placed on an individual who is not the child’s natural parent through the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. She claims that the doctrine should be applied to prevent an inequitable and unconscionable result. In other words, she argues that Stephen should not be made to “suffer the ultimate humiliation of having no support from a man who for all purposes acted as a father for fourteen years.” Brief for Appellee at 6.
II
Although the issue has not been considered by this Court, many jurisdictions have addressed the applicability of equitable estoppel in the context of a child support proceeding. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 11 Cal.Rptr. 707 (1961); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 429 A.2d 833 (1980); Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C.1968); R.D.S. v. S.L.S., 402 N.E.2d 30 (Ind.App.1980); Berrisford v. Berrisford, 322 N.W.2d 742 (Minn.1982); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984); Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
In the majority of these cases, the courts have declined to apply the doctrine to estop the husband from denying paternity and an obligation to support the child. See Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, supra (court held evidence was insufficient to establish elements of equitable estoppel where husband married wife while she was pregnant, executed an affidavit of parentage, and publicly acknowledged that he was child’s natural father); Fuller v. Fuller, supra (court held husband not equitably estopped to deny support duty absent evidence of misrepresentation of fact causing [533]*533prejudice to the child); R.D.S. v. S.L.S., supra (court held husband not equitably estopped to deny paternity in support proceedings where husband married wife while she was pregnant by another man and later acknowledged the child as his own); Berrisford v. Berrisford, supra (court held husband not estopped from denying paternity in support proceeding where husband married wife while she was pregnant by another man, permitted his name to be used on the birth certificate as the father, and assumed role of father during parties’ brief marriage); Walton v. Walton, supra (court held husband not equitably estopped to deny paternity in support proceeding where husband married woman while she was pregnant with another man’s child, permitted child to use surname, and supported child over eight-year period); Wiese v. Wiese, supra (court held husband not equitably estopped from denying liability for support of stepson where record was barren of any evidence that mother had ever approached natural father for support, even though husband had consented to be named as father on birth certificate, had caused decree of divorce between him and mother to reflect that child was the issue of the marriage, and had treated child as his own and supported him).
Two jurisdictions, California and New Jersey, have held that equitable estoppel may apply to estop the husband from denying paternity and a support obligation. Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra (court held record before it was insufficient to establish estoppel, but pointed out facts necessary to establish estoppel where husband asserts illegitimacy in denying support obligation); In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 (1975) (court held that evidence was sufficient to find estoppel where husband by his conduct represented to child that he was his father, child relied on such representation and was injured when husband disavowed parental relationship); Miller v. Miller, supra (court held husband may be equitably estopped from denying paternity, but only where husband actively interferes with children’s support from their natural parent). [534]*534See also In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal.App.3d 848, 152 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1979) (court held husband estopped from denying paternity where he assumed role of child’s father from birth and continued to play that role for six years); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 100 N.J. 567, 498 A.2d 775 (1985) (equally divided court affirmed lower court’s judgment that held husband was equitably estopped to deny support of wife’s illegitimate child born during parties’ marriage).
Ill
The definition of equitable estoppel that has been consistently applied in Maryland is as follows:
Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 804 (5th ed. 1941), qupted in Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop Services, 289 Md. 204, 211, 424 A.2d 336, 339 (1981).
Thus, equitable estoppel requires that the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have been misled to his injury and changed his position for the worse, having believed and relied on the representations of the party sought to be estopped. Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 487, 356 A.2d 221, 230-31 (1976); Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 319, 216 A.2d 521, 523 (1966). Although wrongful or unconscionable conduct is generally an element of estoppel, an estoppel may arise even where there is no intent to mislead, if the actions of one party cause a prejudicial change in the conduct of the other. Bean v. Steuart Petroleum, 244 Md. 459, 224 A.2d 295 (1966); Travelers v. Nationwide, 244 Md. 401, 224 A.2d 285 (1966); [535]*535Alvey v. Alvey, 220 Md. 571, 155 A.2d 491 (1959). Of course, the party who relies on an estoppel has the burden of proving the facts that create it. Doub v. Mason, 2 Md. 380, 406 (1852); First Nat. Bank v. Mayor and City Council, 27 F.Supp. 444, 454 (D.Md.1939).
As indicated by the definition set forth above, equitable estoppel is comprised of three basic elements: “voluntary conduct” or representation, reliance, and detriment. These elements are necessarily related to each other. The voluntary conduct or representation of the party to be estopped must give rise to the estopping party’s reliance and, in turn, result in detriment to the estopping party. See Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., supra; Savonis v. Burke, supra. Clearly then, equitable estoppel requires that the voluntary conduct or representation constitute the source of the estopping party’s detriment.
In Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra, the wife sought support from the husband for an illegitimate child born to the wife during the marriage. The court indicated that an important element in determining estoppel in this situation was whether the husband, during the marriage, had deprived the child of the potential action of the mother, as his guardian, to hold the natural father liable for child support. Under such circumstances, a detriment would inure to the child because of the child’s reliance on the husband’s representation that he would support the child.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Miller v. Miller, supra, recognized that the representation or conduct of the party to be estopped must give rise to the detriment incurred by the estopping party. In Miller, the wife sought child support from her husband for her two daughters by a prior marriage. Although the case thus involved stepchildren, its analysis of the application of equitable estoppel is nonetheless instructive. In addressing the wife’s estoppel argument, the New Jersey high court set forth the same three-element test for equitable estoppel as enunciated above. The court then declared:
[536]*536To prove equitable estoppel, the custodial parent has the burden to establish not only representation of support and reliance but also detriment, i.e., that the children will suffer future financial detriment as a result of the stepparent’s representation or conduct that caused the children to be cut off from their natural parent’s financial support.
Id. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358 (emphasis supplied). The court refused to permit the establishment of estoppel based upon a showing of representation and reliance without the element of detriment, because “no court has ever applied equitable estoppel to force a husband to support the children of his divorced spouse merely because he developed a close relationship with the children, nurtured them into a family unit with himself as the father, and had the children call him ‘daddy.’ ” Id.
Indeed, the evidence in Miller showed that the husband refused all offers from the children’s natural father to contribute to their support and even tore up a check tendered for that purpose. Notwithstanding such evidence, the court required the wife, before looking to the stepfather for child support, to bring the natural father before the court and to seek child support from him. In so doing, the Miller court emphasized that “the natural parent should always be considered the primary recourse for child support because society and its current laws assume that the natural parent will support his or her child.” Id. at 169, 478 A.2d at 359. The court limited the application of equitable estoppel to situations where “a stepparent by his or her conduct actively interferes with the children’s support from their natural parent.” Id.
IV
We turn now to the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the facts of the instant case. We believe that the estoppel elements of representation and reliance are present here. Although there was no evidence that Charles ever expressly told Stephen that he was his [537]*537father, such a representation was implicit in Stephen’s twelve-year relationship with Charles as a fully-supported member of the Knill family. In common with the Knills’ other two children, Stephen used the Knill surname and was so known in the community in which the Knills resided. We therefore think it reasonably inferable that Charles intended that Stephen consider him as his father. As to the reliance element, the record discloses that Stephen believed that Charles was his father until his mother, in apparent anger, told Stephen that Charles was not his father. Plainly, Stephen was relying upon Charles for support until this point in time.
The evidence in this case, however, fails to demonstrate any financial detriment incurred by Stephen as a result of Charles’s course of conduct during their twelve-year relationship. Indeed, if any detriment was incurred by Stephen, it was emotional and attributable to his mother. It was she who ripped the “cloak of legitimacy” off the boy following a family dispute, when she revealed to him that Charles was not his father, a fact she had not concealed from the rest of the family. Charles’s attempt to console Stephen demonstrates his concern for Stephen’s emotional well-being.
In any event, Stephen incurred no financial loss as a result of his relationship with Charles. The evidence fails to support even an inference that Charles’s voluntary support caused Cledythe to forego the possibility of pursuing support from Stephen’s natural father. Because there is no longer any statute of limitations in paternity cases, Cledythe may still bring a paternity action against Stephen’s natural father and establish his duty to support.1 Cf [538]*538Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra (court noted that husband’s representation that he was the father deprived the child of mother’s potential action to hold natural father liable for support). The availability and accuracy of genetic testing refutes any suggestion that the passage of time has compromised the likelihood of a successful paternity action on Stephen’s behalf against his natural father.2 Therefore, we think Cledythe is obliged to look to the natural father as the source of support for Stephen.
Nonetheless, Cledythe maintains that, unless the court finds an estoppel, Stephen will suffer the “ultimate humiliation of having no support from a man who for all purposes was his father for fourteen years.” We do not believe, however, that this loss or injury is the type of detriment that gives rise to equitable estoppel. Here, the detriment that must be established is a financial loss.
In this case, Charles knew that Stephen was not his son and, nevertheless, treated him as his son and as a member of the Knill family. Such conduct is consistent with this State’s public policy of strengthening the family, the basic unit of civilized society. We encourage spouses to undertake, where feasible, the support, guidance, and rearing of [539]*539their spouses’ children, so long as such conduct does not deprive the children of their right to support from their natural parents. Here, Charles demonstrated his regard for Stephen as a part of his family without depriving him or his mother of the right or opportunity to seek legal support from his natural father. We believe that he should not be penalized for his conduct under the circumstances as described. Thus we hold that Charles is not equitably es-topped to deny a duty to support.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED. APPELLEE TO PAY THE COSTS.