Knightly v Gula et al

2017 DNH 123

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: June 19, 2017
• Docket: 16-cv-124-AJ
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Debbie Knightly

v. Civil No. 16-cv-124-AJ Opinion No. 2017 DNH 123 Stanley E. Gula et al.

Stanley E. Gula et al.

v.

Robert Lanctot

O R D E R

Stanley E. Gula and Virginia L. Gula bring a third-party

action against Robert Lanctot, seeking contribution from Lanctot

should they be found liable in the underlying action brought

against them by Debbie Knightly. Lanctot moves to dismiss,

arguing that the third-party action is barred by New Hampshire

Revised Statutes Annotated (“RSA”) § 507:7-g because Debbie

Knightly did not consent to its filing. Doc. no. 27. The Gulas

object, arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)

14(a), not RSA 507:7-g, governs third-party contribution actions

in federal court. Doc. no. 29.

As relevant here, RSA 507:7-g prohibits the defendant in an

action from bringing a third-party claim for contribution in

that same action without the consent of the plaintiff. RSA

507:7-g, IV(c). In contrast, Rule 14(a) states that “[a] defendant party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons

and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for

all or part of the claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1).

The parties do not dispute that the Gulas’ third-party action is

the sort contemplated by RSA 507:7-g and Rule 14(a). Nor do

they dispute that the Gulas filed the third-party action without

Debbie Knightly’s consent. Thus, whether dismissal is

appropriate turns on which of these two provisions applies.

When resolving conflicts between state law and a federal

rule, “[t]he initial step is to determine whether . . . the

scope of [the rule] is sufficiently broad to cause a direct

collision with the state law or, implicitly, to control the

issue before the court, thereby leaving no room for the

operation of that law.” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480

U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,

there is plainly a direct collision between RSA 507:7-g and Rule

14, as one requires plaintiff consent to bring a third-party

contribution action and the other does not.

In the event of a direct collision between state law and a

federal rule, the federal rule governs “unless it exceeds

statutory authorization or Congress’s rulemaking power.” Shady

Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.

393, 398 (2010) (citation omitted). Under the Rules Enabling

Act, federal courts must apply the federal rules unless they

2 “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2072(b). “Rules that are ‘strictly procedural’ can be adopted

through the Rules Enabling Act,” as can “rules that fall ‘within

the uncertain area between substance and procedure, but are

rationally capable of classification as either.’” United States

v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (brackets omitted)

(quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 5). “The test is

not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights;

most procedural rules do.” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408

(citations omitted). “What matters is what the rule itself

regulates: If it governs only the manners and the means by which

the litigants’ rights are enforced, it is valid; if it alters

the rules of decision by which the court will adjudicate those

rights, it is not.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Decisions from this district and others are split on

whether Rule 14(a), when applied in the present context,

abridges a substantive right bestowed upon plaintiffs by RSA

507:7-g. See, e.g., Connors v. Suburban Propane Co., 916 F.

Supp. 73, 77–81 (D.N.H. 1996) (concluding that RSA 507:7-g must

be applied over Rule 14(a) because the former bestows a

substantive right upon plaintiffs to exclude third-party

defendants); Gilbert v. CPM Constructors, 96-cv-481-PB (D.N.H.

1998) (slip op. at 3) (holding that “the right to engage in

3 third-party practice under Rule 14(a) affects only the process

of enforcing litigant’s rights rather than the rights

themselves”); Z.B. v. Ammonoosuc Cmty. Health Servs., 225 F.R.D.

50, at 61 – 62 (D. Me. 2004) (reaching the same conclusion as

Gilbert). In the court’s view, each of these decisions has its

relative merits. As such, the court is compelled to conclude

that Rule 14(a), when applied in this particular context, “falls

within the uncertain area between substantive and procedure

[that is] rationally capable of classification as either.” See

Walsh, 75 F.3d at 6 (citation omitted). As discussed above, the

federal rule governs under such circumstances. See id.; see

also Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. Thus, Rule 14(a) applies,

and the Gulas may properly bring a third-party claim for

contribution as part of this action without Debbie Knightly’s

consent.

Accordingly, Lanctot’s motion to dismiss the Gulas’ third-

party complaint (doc. no. 27) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Andrea K. Johnstone United States Magistrate Judge

June 19, 2017

cc: Jonathan S. Frizzell, Esq. Nicholas James Deleault, Esq. John L. Riff, IV, Esq. Gary M. Burt, Esq.