Klitzke v. Herm

8 N.W.2d 400, 242 Wis. 456, 1943 Wisc. LEXIS 229
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 9, 1943
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 8 N.W.2d 400 (Klitzke v. Herm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Klitzke v. Herm, 8 N.W.2d 400, 242 Wis. 456, 1943 Wisc. LEXIS 229 (Wis. 1943).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

On December 16, 1940, Otto Knoener, deceased, by warranty deed conveyed to the defendants certain described real estate. Immediately following the description of the real estate is the clause, “Including all livestock and machinery.” At the time of making the aforesaid conveyance, *458 grantor had upon his farm a considerable amount of personal property aside from his livestock and machinery. This action involves the ownership of the personal property alleged to have been converted by defendants. As indicated in the foregoing statement, in the pretrial conference the court entered an order specifying the particular items, title to which might be litigated, even though the pleadings put in issue many additional items, ownership of which was in dispute and concerning which the parties were unable to agree. The court on the basis of the matters disclosed at the conference, without agreement of counsel, ordered that certain items should not be considered at the trial.

Respondents have not raised the question whether the order entered by the court is an appealable order under the provisions of sec. 274.33, Stats. This court will on its own motion determine whether it has jurisdiction. If the order from which the appeal is taken is not an appealable order, then we are without jurisdiction. Sec. 274.33 specifies the orders from which appeals may be taken to the supreme court:

“Appealable orders. The following orders when made by the court may be appealed to the supreme court:
“(1) An order affecting a substantial right, made in any action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken.
“(2) A final order affecting a substantial right made in* special proceedings or upon a summary application in an action after judgment.
“(3) When an order grants, refuses, continues or modifies a provisional remedy or grants, refuses, modifies or dissolves an injunction, or sets aside or dismisses a writ of attachment, grants a new trial or sustains or overrules a demurrer or denies an application for summary judgment, but no order of the 'circuit court shall be considered appealable which simply reverses or affirms an order of the civil court of Milwaukee county, unless the order of the civil court grants, refuses, continues, modifies or dissolves a provisional remedy or injunction.
*459 ‘(4) Orders made by the court vacating or refusing to set aside orders made at chambers, where an appeal might have been taken in case the order so made at chambers had been made by the court in the first instance. . .

The order in question does not come within any of the foregoing provisions. This court therefore is without jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.

Even though the appeal herein must be dismissed, it brings before us for the first time an order entered by a trial court in the course of pretrial proceedings. Pretrial procedure is a comparatively new development in the judicial process. It has been employed for some ten or fifteen years in the Wayne county, Michigan circuit courts, and in more recent years has been adopted in a number of jurisdictions.

Pretrial procedure was introduced into the law of this state by supreme court order effective January 1, 1940, being sec. 269.65, Stats., which is as follows:

“Pretrial procedure. (1) In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:
“ (a) The simplification of the issues ;
“(b) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
“ (c) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
“(d) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
“(e) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
“(f) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
“(2) The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest *460 injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all actions.”

This section is identical with Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the- United States, adopted by the supreme court of the United States, effective September 17, 1937. There are'only two adjudicated cases 1 upon the subject. Such literature as there is is scanty and not readily accessible.

It is evident that there is some misconception as to the meaning and purpose of sec. 269.65, Stats. For that reason we shall attempt to clarify the section and indicate the methods for its use. It is not proposed to lay down any hard and fast rule of law but to make available to the bench and bar of the state some of the developments of the procedure in those jurisdictions 'where it has been longest in use.

There is general agreement that in order to accomplish the purpose of pretrial procedure and make it serve a useful purpose in the process of adjudication, there must be a spirit of co-operation between the court and the lawyers representing litigants. In order to bring this about there must be a mutual understanding of what may properly be accomplished by a pretrial conference. In some quarters there seems to be a notion that it is a procedure adopted to enable the pretrial judge to force a settlement of the case. It would be most unfortunate if that idea was to prevail generally. Litigants as well as counsel often resent what they regard as an unjustified interference by the court with their legal rights. For that reason the judge before whom the pretrial conference is held must proceed with tact and understanding, and above all, with patience.

*461 In order to make accessible to the bench and bar' the experience of a federal judge, we set out the following condensation of an article entitled “Pretrial Procedure Under the New Federal Rules,” 1 by Justice Bolitha J. Laws, United States district court for the District of Columbia. Without attempting to quote him exactly, Justice Laws in substance says :

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Bluebook (online)
8 N.W.2d 400, 242 Wis. 456, 1943 Wisc. LEXIS 229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/klitzke-v-herm-wis-1943.