Klahr v. Williams

339 F. Supp. 922
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 8, 1972
DocketCiv. No. 5112
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 339 F. Supp. 922 (Klahr v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Klahr v. Williams, 339 F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1972).

Opinion

339 F.Supp. 922 (1972)

Gary Peter KLAHR, Plaintiff,
Herbert L. Ely, individually and as Chairman of the Democratic Party of Arizona, and Peter MacDonald, individually and as Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, Intervenor-Plaintiffs,
v.
Jack WILLIAMS, Governor of the State of Arizona, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 5112.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

March 8, 1972.

*923 Simon & Jekel, J. Stephen Simon, Scottsdale, Ariz., for plaintiff Klahr.

Harrison, Myers & Singer, Robert D. Myers, Phoenix, Ariz., for intervenor-plaintiff Ely.

Brown, Vlassis & Bain, Bruce E. Babbitt, Phoenix, Ariz., for intervenor-plaintiff MacDonald.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. of Arizona, John M. McGowan, II, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants.

Before JERTBERG, Senior Circuit Judge, and WALSH and CRAIG, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE

PER CURIAM.

In this case, we take a further step "in the long and fitful attempt to devise a constitutionally valid reapportionment scheme for the State of Arizona.".[1] The earlier steps are detailed in Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F.Supp. 537, and 254 F. Supp. 997, Klahr v. Williams, 303 F. Supp. 224, Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148, and Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 91 S.Ct. 1803, 29 L.Ed.2d 352, and we find it unnecessary to retrace them here.

In October 1971, the 30th Arizona Legislature, First Special Session, passed and the Governor of Arizona approved, legislation entitled and hereinafter referred to as "Chapter 1", which districted Arizona for the election of representatives in the United States Congress, *924 and legislation entitled and hereinafter referred to as "Chapter 4", which apportioned the state for the election of members of the Arizona Legislature. Chapter 1 divides Arizona into four congressional districts, and Chapter 4 provides for a state Legislature of 30 Senate members and 60 House of Representatives members apportioned among 30 legislative districts, one senator and two representatives to be elected from each district, the representatives running at large.

Shortly after the approval of Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 by the Governor, the defendants filed with this court, which has retained jurisdiction in the case, pleadings containing certified copies of that legislation. In our prior opinion we assumed that the Arizona Legislature would enact valid apportionment and districting plans by November 1, 1971, (313 F.Supp. 148, 154) and by filing Chapters 1 and 4 with this court the defendants attempt to demonstrate that such has been achieved. A hearing was requested by the defendants and in due course responsive pleadings were filed by plaintiff, Klahr, and intervenor-plaintiff Ely. Plaintiff's pleadings attack the validity of Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 for the reason that they do not provide for apportionment between decennial census years. The court is asked to consider plaintiff's plan for "continuing apportionment" of the congressional and legislative districts of Arizona.[2] Intervenor-plaintiff Ely's pleadings assert that Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 are invalid upon grounds and for reasons we discuss hereafter.

Motions for leave to intervene in the case for the purpose of attacking the validity of Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 were also filed by Clovis Campbell, a member of the Arizona Senate, by Arizona Cattle Growers Association and a number of organizations based in Apache County, Arizona, and by Peter MacDonald, individually and as Chairman of the Tribal Council of the Navajo Indian Tribe. We gave MacDonald leave to intervene as a party-plaintiff but the motions of the other movants were denied for the reason that their interests were adequately represented by intervenor-plaintiff Ely. Trial was held on December 14 and 15, 1971, and on February 1, 1972, the court ordered the case reopened for the taking of further evidence on two specific points. The further hearing was held on February 11, 1972, and at its conclusion the matter was submitted for decision.[3]

Plaintiff, Klahr, makes no criticism of either Chapter 1 or Chapter 4 for what is affirmatively provided by them but claims they are invalid because of a deficiency in each measure, viz: the failure to provide for periodic determinations of Arizona population between decennial censuses and for districting and apportionment promptly following such determinations.

Plaintiff argues that the population of Arizona has grown, and will continue to grow, at such a rapid rate that, unless districting and reapportionment is done more frequently than *925 every ten years, the people of Arizona will not have what was promised by the "one man, one vote" cases decided in the 1960s. Obviously, we could not but approve a plan which the Arizona Legislature might adopt providing districting and apportionment based upon dependable population figures to be carried out more frequently than every ten years; but that we cannot require the Legislature to do so clearly appears from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1393, 12 L.Ed.2d 506. "While we do not intend to indicate that decennial reapportionment is a constitutional requisite, compliance with such an approach would clearly meet the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of legislative representation."

As stated above, Chapter 4 provides a legislature of 30 legislative districts with one senator and two representatives to be elected from each district. Intervenor-plaintiffs contend the multi-member House districts are inherently invidious and violative of the "Equal Protection Clause" of the 14th Amendment basing their position upon Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 91 S.Ct. 1760, 29 L.Ed.2d 268, rehearing denied 403 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 2220, 29 L.Ed.2d 702. The short answer to this contention is that we think Connor is not applicable here. To begin with, Connor involves a court designed apportionment plan providing a multi-member district in which there would run at large the candidates for five senatorial seats and twelve representative seats. Further, it is evident in the case that, with the time and census information which were available to it, the court could have devised single-member districts for the legislative area involved in ample time before the next election. Our case involves an apportionment plan adopted by a legislature rather than a court, and we believe the controlling cases hold that the Equal Protection Clause does not require such a legislature in apportioning itself to provide all single-member legislative districts, especially where the multi-member districts are limited to one house of the legislature and the seats to be contested at large are limited to two in each district. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363.

Intervenor-plaintiff Ely makes one attack upon Chapter 4 which is in reality a general attack upon an expert in the field of data processing who was employed in the apportionment efforts which resulted in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4.

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339 F. Supp. 922, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/klahr-v-williams-azd-1972.