King v. King

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 19, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-02479
StatusUnknown

This text of King v. King (King v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
King v. King, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SHARIF KING, Plaintiff, 22-CV-2479 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND SHAROD KING, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Five Points Correctional Facility, invokes this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, asserting a breach of contract claim against Defendant Sharod King, who is incarcerated at the Vernon C. Bain Center in Bronx, New York. By order dated April 7, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 47 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the complaint. In June 2019, Plaintiff Sharif King and Defendant Sharod King entered into an agreement for the sale of a vehicle. The terms of the

agreement included the following: (1) Plaintiff would sell his 1999 Prevost H3-45 coach bus to Defendant in the amount of $112,000, and (2) Defendant would deliver a check for the sale price to Plaintiff’s agent in Stockbridge, Georgia.2 After Defendant took possession of the vehicle, Plaintiff learned that the check provided to Plaintiff’s agent was “wholly fabricated . . . [and] was not associated with or drawn on any bank or account.” (ECF 2, at 2.) From September 23, 2019, to May 28, 2020, “Defendant, without Plaintiff’s knowledge, used the coach bus to traffic[ ] over 23 handguns, 10 high capacity magazines and hundreds of rounds of ammunition between Virginia and Queens, N.Y.” (Id. at 3.) On July 21, 2020, officers from the New York City Police Department arrested Defendant, charged him with sale and trafficking of firearms and ammunition, and seized the coach bus. Since the arrest, “Plaintiff has

been unable to take possession [of the bus] because Defendant has already registered the vehicle in the name of his co-conspirator in the crimes charged by the N.Y.P.D.” (Id.) Plaintiff brings a breach of contract claim and asserts that both New York and Georgia law applies. He also states that he is a resident of Georgia, as he resided in Georgia before his incarceration and plans to return to Georgia after his release. As for Defendant’s residency, he

2 According to records maintained by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), DOCCS took custody of Plaintiff on December 21, 2018, before the sale of the vehicle to Defendant. See DOCCS, Inmate Information, Sharif King http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130. only states that the Defendant is incarcerated in the Bronx. Plaintiff sees $112,000 in compensatory damages. DISCUSSION A. Diversity Jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. Plaintiff invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction but does not allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction of his state law claims. To establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled, which is defined as the place where he “has his true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For an individual who is “incarcerated in a state different from his

previous domicile, there is a rebuttable presumption that the prisoner retains his pre-incarceration domicile rather than acquiring a new domicile.” Liverpool v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-4629, 2020 WL 3972737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2020). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although Plaintiff alleges facts suggesting that his claim meets the jurisdictional amount, he does not allege enough facts showing that the parties are diverse. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of Georgia, but he does not allege any facts regarding Defendant’s residence before his incarceration. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state facts regarding Defendant’s pre-incarceration domicile.

B. Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. Under § 1391(c), a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
524 U.S. 381 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Palazzo v. Corio
232 F.3d 38 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
King v. King, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/king-v-king-nysd-2022.