Kevin Swope, et al. v. City of Dearborn Heights, and City of Dearborn Heights City Council

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

KEVIN SWOPE, et al., Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 24-cv-10240 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH CITY OF DEARBORN HEIGHTS, Defendant, and CITY OF DEARBORN HEIGHTS CITY COUNCIL,

Intervening Defendant. ___________________________________/ OPINION & ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkts. 115, 116) Plaintiffs Kevin Swope, Paul Vanderplow, and Jerrod Hart—former top officials in the Dearborn Heights Police Department—brought this lawsuit alleging violations of federal and state law. In their telling, they were constructively discharged and otherwise victimized by Defendant City of Dearborn Heights due to racial prejudice and Defendant City Council’s displeasure over Plaintiffs’ efforts to clean up an allegedly corrupt city government. Before the Court are motions for summary judgment by the City and Council (Dkts. 115, 116). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motions in part and denies the motions in part.1 I. BACKGROUND

1 Because oral argument will not aid the Court’s decisional process, the motion will be decided based on the parties’ briefing. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). In addition to the motion, the briefing includes Plaintiffs’ response (Dkt. 123), Council’s reply (Dkt. 125), and the City’s reply (Dkt. 126). To address the legal issues raised by the motions, it is necessary to understand the pertinent facts developed by the parties, as they have presented them in their summary judgment briefing. The pertinent factual record presented by the parties, set forth below, lays out the history of Plaintiffs’ assumption of their positions and the friction with Council that Plaintiffs assert as the claimed basis for proceeding to trial.

A. Hiring Plaintiffs Before becoming mayor in January of 2021, Bill Bazzi heard rumors of corruption in the City’s police department. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5039 (Dkt. 123-2).2 After becoming mayor, Bazzi learned more about these rumors, which included allegations of “ticket fixing,” awarding business to towing companies owned by friends of police officers, unspecified sexual misconduct, and misappropriation of evidence that had been held in police custody. Id. at PageID.5039–5041, 5127.3 To combat the concerns about corruption and misconduct in the police department, Bazzi appointed Joe Thomas, as police commissioner. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5042; Hart Dep. at

PageID.3533 (Dkt. 115-2). About a month into the job, Thomas told Bazzi that he needed help and that he wanted someone from the “outside” because he could not trust anyone in the police department. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5043, 5045. Bazzi hired Hart as police chief in February of 2022. Id. at PageID.5045–5046; Hart Dep. at PageID.3530. Bazzi hired Hart because, as an “outsider,” Hart could better root out corruption and effectuate Bazzi’s “intent to clean up the

2 Bazzi was appointed mayor (by some unspecified person or body) in January of 2021 and then elected to the position in November of that year. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5039.

3 For example, Bazzi saw a video of City Councilman Mo Baydoun interfering with a traffic stop of Baydoun’s brother-in-law. Id. at PageID.5041. In another instance, Bazzi explained that a former police chief told him that the city was a “pay-to-play” municipality and “to get used to it.” Id. at PageID.5042. Bazzi also witnessed a “golden circle” of certain police officers who were granted unspecified favoritism and perquisites. Id. at PageID.5043. police department and . . . give the City of Dearborn Heights the best service . . . in law enforcement.” Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5043, 5046. Thomas passed away unexpectedly when Hart “was in transition trying to fix things,” so Bazzi hired Swope and Vanderplow, also outsiders, because Hart needed “extra help.” Id. at PageID.5046. In January 2023, Swope was hired as “Director of Police Operations;” Vanderplow

was hired as “Director of Support Services.”4 Id. at PageID.5046–5047; Swope Dep. at PageID.3902 (Dkt. 115-3); Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4300 (Dkt. 115-4); Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5289 (Dkt. 123-14). No Plaintiff was hired through the Michigan civil service procedures law set out in Act 78. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5101–5102.5 B. Collective Bargaining Agreement and Employment Contracts The police union was “not happy” that Bazzi had hired Hart, Vanderplow, and Swope because they, as non-union employees, were outsiders. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5047. In March 2023, the union and the City resolved differences, with Council approving a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Command Officers Association of Michigan (“COAM”). CBA at

PageID.761–765 (Dkt. 48-2); Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5047–5048. The collective bargaining agreement stated the Plaintiffs were “grandfathered in under this agreement,” and that they would retain their positions. CBA at PageID.763. The compromise reached was that “[s]hould the City

4 The parties do not define the term “Director.” In his deposition, Hart states the director positions were new positions created by Bazzi. Hart Dep. at PageID.3582. Hart described the Director of Support Services position as being responsible for investigative staff, records, vehicle maintenance, dispatch, and the budget. Id. Bazzi described the director of police operations positions as “responsible for purchasing and serving everything at the police station” and internal affairs. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5111–5112.

5Act 78 is a voter-authorized civil service system, which requires promotion from qualified applicants within the existing workforce of a police department. Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.501 et seq. desire to fill these Director positions in the future, it [would] do so under the provisions of Act. 78.” Id. Notwithstanding that a CBA had been signed, Bazzi subsequently signed written, individual contracts with all three Plaintiffs. Hart Contract at PageID.799–803 (Dkt. 48-2); Vanderplow Contract at PageID.793–797 (Dkt. 48-2); Swope Contract at PageID.805–809 (Dkt.

48-2). C. Plaintiffs’ Discoveries Upon Assuming Office Immediately upon starting as Chief, Hart found that what he described as “dysfunction” within the police department was “understated.” Hart Aff. at PageID.5277 (Dkt. 123-13). For example, “[k]eycard access systems were broken…sensitive areas were accessible to unauthorized personnel” and “[e]vidence, property, cash, and firearms were stored throughout the building without proper controls.” Id. at PageID.5278. Hart discovered “large quantities of cash, jewelry, and evidence,” which were unsecured in the Directed Patrol Unit. Id. at PageID.5278. He reported his discovery to Bazzi and requested

that the Michigan State Police audit the Unit. Id. at PageID.5279. Hart also found “failed accreditation compliance” and reported it to the Michigan Law Enforcement Accreditation Commission. Id. Further, Hart found “illegal purchasing and possession” of firearms that was done on police department letterhead. Id. He reported this finding to Bazzi and Councilmembers Dave Abdallah and Ray Muscat. Id. at PageID.5280. Vanderplow also discovered issues in the department. For example, during his first week on the job, he asked to audit and inspect the department’s seized property room. Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5289. Upon gaining access he “observed extreme disorganization[,] . . . gross policy violations and possible criminal conduct.” Id. He immediately reported what he found to Bazzi and City corporate counsel. Id. The City hired an external auditing firm to correct the issues within the room. Id. at PageID.5290. Vanderplow also discovered that the department failed to enter approximately 900 pistol sale records into the State of Michigan database, as required by law. Id. at PageID.5290; Swope Aff. at PageID.5309 (Dkt. 123-15). This violation was also reported to the Michigan State Police. Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5290.

Swope similarly claimed to have found dysfunction. For instance, Swope investigated an alleged “ticket-fixing scheme,” which involved traffic violations being improperly “voided and dismissed” at Dearborn Heights District Court by officers. Swope Aff. at PageID.5309. Swope reported the results of his investigation to the FBI. Id. at PageID.5310. D. Requests for Preferential Treatment In addition to the alleged dysfunctionality with process, Plaintiffs also encountered alleged personnel dysfunctionality within the Department, which Plaintiffs attempted to correct— prompting alleged interference by Council. For example, Plaintiffs described a meeting they had with Council at which Councilman Baydoun requested that Sergeant Mohamad Bazzy receive

“preferential treatment”—which they described as requests that Bazzy be promoted and protected from discipline. Hart Aff . at PageID.5280; Swope Aff. at PageID.5305–5306; Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5290–5292.6 Plaintiffs refused this request. Id. In another instance, Bazzy, and other officers, were disciplined after a use-of-force incident, for policy violations. Swope Aff. at PageID.5310–5311; Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5055– 5056. Councilmen Baydoun and Hassan Ahmad “pressure[ed]” Hart to reverse Bazzy’s discipline—warning that if he did not, Council would “trash” Swope at a Council meeting. Bazzi

6 There is no familial relationship between Bazzi and Bazzy. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5040. Dep. at PageID.5056. Bazzi also testified that Council told him that Swope would be fired and that he would lose the election, if Bazzy was not promoted. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5058. E. Council’s Resistance to Plaintiffs’ Administration of the Police Department According to Hart, as Plaintiffs exposed alleged misconduct and refused to provide preferential treatment, he and the Directors “became targets.” Hart Aff. at PageID.5281. On

December 12, 2023, a motion to defund Plaintiffs’ positions was approved for placement on Council’s agenda, but Council did not vote on the motion. Hart Email at PageID.767 (Dkt. 48-2); Swope Aff. at PageID.5315. Another time, on January 9, 2024, Councilman Hassan Saab introduced—and Council approved—a resolution to “eliminate[]” the compensation for the “unauthorized positions” of director of police operations and director of support services. 11-A Resolution at PageID.777 (Dkt. 48-2). On January 22, 2024, Bazzi vetoed the resolution. 1/22/24 Veto Ltr. at PageID.780–786 (Dkt. 48-2). On January 23, 2024, Council overrode Bazzi’s veto. 1/25/24 Email at PageID.788– 789. (Dkt. 48-2). On January 24, 2024 Bazzi “order[ed]” Swope and Vanderplow to “remain

employed” by the City “at full pay and benefits as outlined in their respective contracts.” 1/24/24 Memo at PageID.791 (Dkt. 48-2). On another occasion, on January 21, 2025, Interim Police Chief Hussein Farhat “attempted to suspend Director Vanderplow without due process, and under false pretenses.” Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5066; Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4565. Neither Bazzi nor Vanderplow were more specific than that in making these assertions. At some point during his time with the City, Vanderplow became the interim comptroller, in addition to director of support services. Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4355. On April 22, 2025, Council voted 6-0 to remove Vanderplow’s ability to sign financial documents on behalf of the City. Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5297. Vanderplow stated that prior to this vote, Council had never voted to veto “administrative signatory authority,” and that the vote “effectively stripped [him] of [his] core” responsibilities as interim comptroller. Id. at PageID.5298. In contrast, Bazzi had no issues with the Plaintiffs’ work performances and felt Council’s criticism was unjustified. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5062–5063.

F. Plaintiffs’ Resignations Hart suffered a heart attack at work on October 10, 2023. Hart Aff. at PageID.5283. He attributed it to the stress he was undergoing because of his employment. Id. at PageID.5283–5384. Hart tendered his resignation to Bazzi on July 3, 2024. Hart Ltr. at PageID.5131–5132 (Dkt. 123- 3). After Hart resigned, Swope became police chief. Swope Aff. at PageID.5323; Swope Dep. at PageID.3907. Vanderplow “considered [himself] constructively discharged” on April 22, 2025, the day the Council voted to remove his signatory authority, but he continued working for the City until May 9, 2025. Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5298.

Bazzi emailed Swope asking him to “submit [his] resignation effective end of Friday January 10, 202[5].” 12/4/24 Email at PageID.5209 (Dkt. 123-8).7 Swope complied and resigned on January 10, 2025. Swope Ltr. at PageID.5210 (Dkt. 123-8). II. ANALYSIS8

7 Bazzi’s email and Swope’s letter both state the resignation date as “January 10, 2024.” 12/4/24 Email at PageID.5209; Swope Ltr. at PageID.5210. That must be a typo as Bazzi’s email requesting Swope resign is date stamped, “12/4/24” 12/4/24 Email at PageID.5209.

8 The Court applies the traditional summary judgment standard as articulated in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The movant is entitled to summary judgment if that party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the movant makes an initial showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the nonmovant can only survive summary Plaintiffs brought this action alleging ten counts. See Am. Compl. (Dkt. 48). In Counts I and IX, Plaintiffs alleged violations of their right to free speech as public employees and assert First Amendment retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 57–62; 124–137. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege a violation of their rights under Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (“WPA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.361 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 63–67. In Count III, Vanderplow and Swope allege a violation of the Fair

Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 68–78. In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege a breach of their employment contracts. Id. ¶¶ 79–91. In Counts V and VI, Plaintiffs bring a race discrimination claim in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 92–105. In Count VII, Hart brings a disability discrimination claim in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 106–116. In Count VIII, Plaintiffs bring a claim for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 117–123. In Count X, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 138–150.

The Court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing Resolution 11-A, which purported to defund Plaintiffs’ positions. See 2/1/24 Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 4). A. Federal Claims

1. Counts I and IX—Right of Free Speech of Public Employees and First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims allege that they “engaged in First Amendment Conduct . . . including speech intended to combat, discuss, and expose instances of public corruption” within

judgment by coming forward with evidence showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324–325 (1986). the City and that Defendants actions “injured Plaintiffs in a way likely to chill a person of ordinary firmness from further participation in . . . free speech activity.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 125. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims require a showing that they were engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Harcz v. Boucher, 763 F. App’x 536, 542 (6th Cir. 2019); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2015) (as to First Amendment retaliation claim).

To determine whether the speech of a public employee is protected, the Court must engage in a three-step inquiry. Barrow v. City of Hillview, 775 F. App’x 801, 811 (6th Cir. 2019) (punctuation modified). The first step asks whether the speech addressed a “matter of public concern.” Id. The second step asks whether the employee spoke as a private citizen or in furtherance of his official duties. Id. The third step requires the Court to balance “the interests of the parties and determine if the employee’s speech interest outweighs the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. (punctuation modified) The parties only dispute the second step of the inquiry. Council Mot. at PageID.3487–3491; City Mot. at PageID.4765–4773.

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.” 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The Court clarified in Lane v. Franks that “[t]he critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014). Plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that their reporting of public corruption to outside law enforcement agencies was part of their jobs. Hart. Dep. at PageID.3750–3753 (responding “[a]bsolutely” when asked whether the series of reports he made to outside entities regarding the misconduct he found was a part of his job responsibilities); Swope Dep. at PageID.4186–4187 (Q: “When you and the other plaintiffs reported these issues that you reported, did you, as in you personally, Kevin Swope, feel that it was part of your duties to end up reporting these things?” A: “yes.”); Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4589 (Q: “[w]e’ve talked about any number of different things today in terms of things that you recall reporting to various individuals and entities, for example,

the evidence management system, the pistol sales, the ticket quotas, the forfeiture funds. Were all these things done as part of your duties as an employee of the City of Dearborn Heights?” A: “Yes.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs were not speaking as private citizens when they reported alleged misconduct to outside law enforcement agencies. Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. To start, Plaintiffs misstate the rule in Lane. Plaintiffs state that in Lane, the Court “ruled that a public employee who had taken actions to combat corruption as part of his job duties and who was subsequently laid off, supposedly due to budgetary and financial concerns, had in fact spoken as a private citizen.” Resp. at PageID.5019. That’s not what happened in Lane. Lane considered whether the First Amendment protected “a

public employee who provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.” 573 U.S. at 231. Because Plaintiffs’ speech occurred during the course of their ordinary job responsibilities, Lane is not factually similar. Plaintiffs’ next argument similarly fails. Here, Plaintiffs take an about face to their first argument and concede that “fighting corruption may have ‘concerned’ their jobs” but that it was also something they all did “as a personal service to Dearborn Heights and to this State.” Resp. at PageID.5019. They explain that they “left high-paying jobs for the altruistic purpose of fighting corruption in Dearborn Heights” and that fighting corruption was a “personal and political choice” not one “made merely in a professional capacity.” Id. at PageID.5019–5020. Plaintiffs cite to no authority that makes this distinction, and the Court has found none. Plaintiffs may have multiple reasons for reporting alleged misconduct to external agencies. But because reporting was admittedly part of their job descriptions, they have not shown that their speech was constitutionally protected. Cf. Barrow, 775 F. App’x at 813 (finding constitutionally protected speech by police officers who cooperated with the FBI when their ordinary job responsibilities did not include

reporting allegations of public corruption to outside authorities). Because Plaintiffs cannot show that they were engaged in constitutionally protected activity, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants as to Counts I and IX. 2. FLSA Claim – Count III The City and Council argue that Vanderplow and Swope’s FLSA claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. City Mot. at PageID.4779–4782; Council Mot. at PageID.3498– 3499. “[A]n FLSA plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she performed work for which he or she was not properly compensated.” Myers v. Copper Cellar

Corp., 192 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1991) (punctuation modified). Early in this proceeding, this Court entered an injunction requiring that the three Plaintiffs remain in their positions, without loss of compensation and that the City Council’s defunding resolution could not be enforced during the pendency of the case. 2/1/24 Preliminary Injunction at PageID.81. Vanderplow and Swope acknowledge that due to the injunction, they have been paid their regular salaries through the date of their resignations from the City. Resp. at PageID.5017; Swope Dep. at PageID.3987; Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4330–4331, 4348. Because Swope and Vanderplow have resigned their employment with the City and they acknowledge that they have been paid their entire salary for the period that they worked for the City, there is no violation of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Vanderplow and Swope’s FLSA claim. 3. Counts V and VI—Race Discrimination Claims Plaintiffs may establish a race discrimination claim under Title VII by either direct or indirect evidence. Brown v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 814 F. App’x 72, 79 (6th Cir. 2020); Sniecinski v.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 666 N.W.2d 186, 192–193 (2003) (stating the same for ELCRA).9 As explained below, the Court concludes that there is no direct evidence of discrimination as to any Plaintiff, but there is sufficient indirect evidence to support Vanderplow and Swope’s racial discrimination claims; Hart does not have sufficient indirect evidence of racial discrimination. a. Direct Versus Indirect Evidence “[D]irect evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th

Cir. 2003). Indirect evidence of discrimination allows the factfinder to draw inferences of discrimination through circumstantial proof. Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348–349 (6th Cir. 1997). When Plaintiffs rely on indirect evidence to show discrimination in violation of Title VII and ELCRA, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime applies. Brown, 814 F. App’x at 79–80 (punctuation modified); Johnson, 319 F.3d at 856–866; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court first analyzes whether Plaintiffs have established direct

9 Although this opinion discusses federal claims initially, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ ELCRA claim in this section because the standard for ELCRA is the same as it is under federal law. Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999). evidence of racial discrimination. Finding that they have not, the Court proceeds to analyze Plaintiffs’ claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Plaintiffs argue that they have shown direct evidence of race discrimination. Resp. at PageID.5010–5014. They describe the direct discrimination evidence as follows: (i) they were put under pressure to “promote an underserving Arab-American” sergeant; (ii) Bazzi was told that he

needed to “find an Arab police chief or lose the next election[;]” (iii) Sergeant Bazzy’s brother uploaded an Instagram story “announcing his little brother’s potential future” as police chief; (iv) Vanderplow was replaced by a less experienced Arab-American comptroller; and (v) Swope was asked to resign to be replaced by an “under-qualified Arab-American.” Resp. at PageID.5011– 5014. Plaintiffs’ examples are not evidence of direct discrimination. None is a statement of proscribed animus directed to any Plaintiff. “Direct evidence is composed of only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor.” Umani v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 432 F. App’x 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2011)

(punctuation modified) (analyzing a discrimination claim under § 1983 but stating that it is still proved through the McDonnell Douglas framework). Plaintiffs’ listed examples may raise inferences of racial preference concerning others, but Plaintiffs have not provided evidence that anyone made a racist comment to Plaintiffs targeting them for adverse consequences based on Plaintiffs’ race. Because Plaintiffs have not pointed to any direct evidence of race discrimination related to their resignations, the Court examines their claims under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiffs have the initial burden of establishing their prima facie case; if they do so, the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. 411 U.S. at 802–804. If Defendants satisfy this showing, then the burden shifts back to Plaintiffs to show that the Defendants’ proffered reasons are pretextual. Id. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiffs must show: “that he was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified

for the position, and (4) replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated nonminority employees.” Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 303 (6th Cir. 2016) (punctuation modified). Defendants contest whether Plaintiffs have met elements two and four of their prima facie case. See City Mot. at PageID.4784–4786; Council Mot. at PageID.3491–3498. Plaintiffs argue that they have established a prima facie case for race discrimination. Resp. at PageID.5010–5016. As explained below, the Court agrees, but only as to Vanderplow and Swope. b. Adverse Action Council argues that Plaintiffs have not shown that they were subjected to an adverse action.

Council Mot. at PageID.3495–3498. Council states that Plaintiffs “continued in their positions or were promoted[;]” were fully paid in excess of what was authorized by Council; and received “unauthorized” raises. Id. at PageID.3495. Council adds that Plaintiffs have not suffered any adverse action because the status quo was enforced by the Court’s preliminary injunction. Id. In response, Plaintiffs argue that they were constructively discharged. Resp. at PageID.5014. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs, finding an issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs were constructively discharged.10

10 Council argues that Vanderplow and Swope may not invoke constructive discharge because it was not expressly mentioned in the amended complaint. Council Mot. at PageID.3496; Council Reply at PageID.5391–5393. They offer no authority in support of this proposition. The case that To demonstrate constructive discharge, Plaintiffs must show “1) the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person, and 2) the employer did so with the intention of forcing the employee to quit.” Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 568–569 (6th Cir. 2001) (punctuation modified). “To determine if there is a constructive discharge, both the employer’s intent and the employee’s objective feelings must be examined.” Id.

(punctuation modified). The Logan Court further explained: Whether a reasonable person would have fe[lt] compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee’s former status.

Id. at 569.

Hart alleges that Council removed his “executive support” (Vanderplow and Swope), which made it “impossible for [him] to continue as Chief.” Hart Aff. at PageID.5282. 11 And that in June 2024, Council “gutted the police budget, eliminated positions, and cut operational funding” and that these actions “rendered [his] continued employment untenable.” Id. Hart states that for

they cite, Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emp., 407 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005), has nothing to do with constructive discharge or the posture of our case. That case stands for the proposition that a claim not pled in a complaint (in Tucker, the omitted claim was promissory estoppel) cannot be raised in response to a summary judgment motion to avoid dismissal of a case (which in Tucker had been based on breach of contract). Nothing in Tucker says that a plaintiff must articulate specific theories as to particular elements of a claim. Here, constructive discharge is simply a theory to substantiate the element of adverse action; it is not a claim.

11 The City argues that Plaintiffs’ affidavits attached to their response must be disregarded because they are unsworn. Reply at PageID.5437. However, they were made under “penalty of perjury” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 which is permissible in lieu of a sworn affidavit. Thomas v. Harvey, 381 F. App’x 542, 546 (6th Cir. 2010); Hart Aff. at PageID.5284; Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5299; Swope Aff. at PageID.5331. Therefore, the affidavits are properly before the Court. some time, he continued working, to the detriment of his health, until he was constructively discharged. Id. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Hart, reasonable jurors could disagree about whether these actions rendered Hart constructively discharged. Hart and Bazzi both testified that when Hart became chief, he needed help to properly execute the role. Hart Dep. at

PageID.3572–3574; Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5046. Stripping him of this help could reasonably be found by a jury as making his working conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person would resign. Vanderplow asserts that he was constructively discharged in April of 2025 when Council voted 6-0 to prevent him from fulfilling his duties as interim comptroller and removed his authority to sign financial documents on behalf of the city. Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5297–5298. Vanderplow argues that this action “stripped” him of his core responsibilities and “rendered [his] employment untenable.” Id. at PageID.5298. Again, reasonable jurors could disagree as to whether these actions rendered Vanderplow constructively discharged. Vanderplow testified that

one of his “main” roles as interim comptroller was to sign checks. Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4492. A reasonable person may feel compelled to resign because he was being prevented from doing one of his main tasks. Logan, 259 F.3d at 569 (reducing job responsibilities). 12 Swope states that Bazzi asked him to resign on December 4, 2024, and so he did. Swope Aff. at PageID.5327; Swope Ltr. at PageID.5210. There is no dispute that asking someone to resign, essentially firing them, is an adverse action. Bazzi disputes that he asked Swope to resign.

12 Council’s argument that the Saab stalking complaint is not an adverse action because Saab was not on Council at the time is irrelevant, Council Mot. at PageID.3497, because the Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Vanderplow was constructively discharged when his authority to sign checks was removed. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5069. Thus, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Swope was asked to resign, which must be resolved by a jury.13 Accordingly, each Plaintiff has established a disputed issue as to whether he suffered an adverse action. c. Comparators and Replacements

The City argues that Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case for race discrimination because they have not shown that they were treated differently than a similarly situated employee outside their class. City Mot. at PageID.4784–4786. Plaintiffs argue that the “direct comparators” are Hussein Farhat, Mohamad Bazzy, and Mahdi Baydoun. Resp. at PageID.5015 But Plaintiffs make no effort to show how these individuals are “direct comparators.” To establish that an individual is similarly situated, Plaintiffs must show: the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.

Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) (punctuation modified).

Plaintiffs do not make any such showing related to Farhat, Bazzy, and Baydoun. Instead, Plaintiffs merely argue that these three individuals were only promoted because of their race. Resp. at PageID.5015. That, however, has nothing to do with whether they are properly characterized as comparators.

13 Council’s argument that their failure to pay for Swope’s training is insufficient to show an adverse employment action, Council Mot. at PageID.3497–3498, is also irrelevant because the Court found Swope has created a genuine issue of material fact when he stated he was asked to resign. Having failed to raise an issue of fact regarding comparators, Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate the fourth element of the prima facie case by showing that they were replaced by persons outside their protected class. Clayton v. Meijer, 281 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2002). This method works for Vanderplow and Swope but not for Hart. When Hart resigned, he was immediately replaced by Swope, a person in his protected

class, which Plaintiffs allege includes members of the white race. Resp. at PageID.5007 (“Swope…replaced Hart as Police Chief”), 5014 (stating that Plaintiffs are white); Swope Dep. at PageID.3918, 4092. Therefore, Hart has not shown he was replaced by someone outside his protected class. The fact that Swope was then replaced by Hussein Farhat does not mean that Hart was replaced by Farhat. Swope was Hart’s replacement. Swope Dep. at PageID.3907 (“At one point, I was interim police chief, then acting police chief, then ultimately police chief.”). Because Hart has not shown that he was replaced by someone outside his protected class, he has not established a prima facie case for race discrimination. As for Vanderplow, he was replaced as interim comptroller by Mahdi Baydoun who is

“Arab American.” Vanderplow Aff. at PageID.5298; Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4566. As for Swope, he was replaced by Hussein Farhat, a person outside of his protected class. Swope Dep. at PageID.4012; Swope Aff. at PageID.5327. Therefore, Vanderplow and Swope have shown they were replaced by someone outside their protected class and thus have established a prima facie case for race discrimination. d. Pretext Defendants have stated a legitimate business reason for voting to defund the Director positions: “the Director positions were created outside of the City Charter and bypassed legal procedure, which result in a burden on the City.” City Mot. at PageID.4787. Therefore, Vanderplow and Swope “must produce sufficient evidence from which the jury may reasonably reject the employer’s explanation” to withstand summary judgment. Warfield v. Lebanon Corr. Inst., 181 F.3d 723, 730 (6th Cir. 1999) (punction modified). Pretext may be established either directly by persuading the trier of fact that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. A plaintiff will usually demonstrate pretext by showing that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action either (1) has no basis in fact, (2) was not the actual reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain the employer’s action.

Idemudia v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 434 F. App’x 495, 503 (6th Cir. 2011) (punctuation modified). The Court “ultimately must decide whether the plaintiff’s evidence of pretext, combined with the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case, would permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Id. (punctuation modified). Vanderplow and Swope have shown a triable issue of fact as to pretext. As to Vanderplow, the City’s rationale for adverse action only explains why it was taken with respect to his directorship position. The City does not purport to explain why they took adverse action with respect to his interim comptroller position. Further, he was replaced in his interim comptroller duties by a person outside his protected class. Therefore, Vanderplow has shown a triable issue of fact as to pretext. Swope has shown a triable issue of fact for the same reason. When Bazzi asked Swope to resign, he was police chief, not director of police operations. Swope Aff. at PageID.5323, 5327. Therefore, the City’s legitimate business reason that the Director positions created a “burden” on the City is not persuasive as to why Swope was constructively discharged from the police chief position. Summary judgment is granted as to Hart’s race discrimination claims under Title VII and ELCRA. Summary judgment is denied as to Vanderplow and Swope’s race discrimination claims under Title VII and ELCRA. 4. Count VIII—Age Discrimination The same McDonnell Douglas burden shifting regime applies to claims of discrimination

under the ADEA. Tennial, 840 F.3d at 305–306. To state a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he was at least 40 years old at the time of the alleged discrimination; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) he was otherwise qualified for the position; and (4) he was replaced by a younger worker.” George v. Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 464 (6th Cir. 2020) (punctuation modified). The City argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case for age discrimination because Plaintiffs cannot show that they were replaced by a younger employee. Mot. at PageID.4801–4802 (arguing that none have shown that they were replaced by Bazzy, who the Court assumes, but the City did not state, is younger). Council argues that Plaintiffs have not

established that they suffered an adverse action. Council Mot. at PageID.3491–3498. As previously stated, Hart was replaced by Swope. Resp. at PageID.5007; Swope Dep. at PageID.3918, 4092. Hart states in his affidavit that he is 57 years old. Hart. Aff. at PageID.5274. Swope states in his affidavit that he is 48. Swope Aff. at PageID.5301. Therefore, Hart was replaced by a younger worker. Plaintiffs stated that Swope and Vanderplow were replaced by Farhat and Baydoun but they do not provide their ages. Resp. at PageID.5017. It is not the Court’s job to hunt through the record for evidence. See Emerson v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 446 F. App’x 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2011). Therefore, Swope and Vanderplow have failed to state a prima facie case under the ADEA. Even though Hart is able to establish a prima facie case, “the sole fact that he was replaced by a younger person is insufficient as a matter of law to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether [the City’s] nondiscriminatory reason for [his constructive discharge] was pretextual.”

Tennial, 840 F.3d at 305–306. Further, the only instance where Plaintiffs argue that Hart was discriminated against based on his age was when Hart stated in his affidavit that Councilman David Abdallah said to him “why he did not just go home to play with his granddaughter and enjoy his old age rather than attempt to go down in a sinking ship with Mayor Bazzi.” Resp. at PageID.5016. “Age-related comments referring directly to the worker may support an inference of age discrimination.” Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1993). But “isolated and ambiguous comments are too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a finding of age discrimination.” Id. (punctuation modified). Even if credited, Councilman Abdallah’s remark is too “isolated and ambiguous” to support Hart’s age discrimination claim.

Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a prima facie claim for age discrimination, Count VIII is dismissed. 5. Count VII—Disability Discrimination The City argues that Hart has not stated a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the intentional or failure to accommodate frameworks. City Mot. at PageID.4790–4794. Council again argues that Hart has not established he was subjected to an adverse action so he cannot show he was discriminated against based on disability. Council Mot. at PageID.3491– 3498. Hart argues that Defendants knew that he suffered from a “heart condition, diabetes[,] and other physical ailments,” yet they “heaped abuse and stress upon him.” Resp. at PageID.5016. Hart also says that he had a heart attack on the job “due to retaliatory stress.” Id. Further, Hart argues that the “accommodation” he requested was to “be spared the harassment and abuse” that eventually lead him to be constructively discharged and that he requested an accommodation on

multiple occasions. Id. The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability against “a qualified individual on the basis of a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Two types of claims are cognizable under [ADA] Title II: claims for intentional discrimination and claims for a reasonable accommodation.” Roell v. Hamilton Cnty., 870 F.3d 471, 488 (6th Cir. 2017) (punctuation modified). Hart appears to plead both. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106–116. To establish a prima facie case of indirect intentional disability discrimination, Hart must show that “1) he or she is disabled; 2) otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; 3) suffered an adverse employment decision; 4) the employer knew

or had reason to know of the plaintiff’s disability; and 5) the position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced.” Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 703 (6th Cir. 2008) (punctuation modified). A prima facie case is not established if the decisionmaker is unaware of the specifics of an employee’s disabilities or restrictions, even if the decisionmaker has a general knowledge that a disability exists. Arthur v. Am. Showa, Inc., 625 F. App’x 704, 708 (6th Cir. 2015). Hart has failed to present proof that Defendants were aware of his “disabilities or restrictions.” Hart testified that, generally, Defendants knew about his health conditions. He described a lunch meeting early in his tenure with members of Council where he told them about his diabetes and how he had to be strict with his diet. Hart. Dep. at PageID.3656. Later when asked who knew about his diabetes and heart issues, he responded, “the entire police department.” Id. at PageID.3689. But general knowledge is not enough. Arthur, 625 F. App’x. at 708. And Hart presents no evidence showing that he had any specific restrictions that he communicated to anyone. Even assuming the avoidance of stress would suffice as a condition that would be protectible under

the ADA, Hart has presented no evidence that he said anything about that to Defendants. Further, Bazzi testified that he did not know about Hart’s “health issues” until he had the heart attack on October 10, 2023. Bazzi Dep. at PageID.5056. Because Hart has not shown that Defendants knew specifically of his disabilities and restrictions, he has not stated a prima facie case for intentional disability discrimination. To state a prima facie case of disability discrimination based on failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, Hart must show that: “(1) [he] is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) [the City] knew or had reason to know about [his] disability; (4) [he] requested an

accommodation; and (5) [the City] failed to provide the necessary accommodation.” McDonald v. UAW-GM Ctr. for Hum. Res., 738 F. App’x 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2018) (punctuation modified). The Act defines reasonable accommodation to include: (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and

(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The Court agrees with the City that Hart has failed to establish a prima facie case because he has not shown that he proposed a reasonable accommodation and that the City denied that accommodation. Hart had the initial burden of showing that he requested the accommodation and demonstrating that it is reasonable. Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir. 2010) (punctuation modified). Hart argues that his requested accommodation was to “be spared

the harassment and abuse.” Resp. at PageID.5016. Hart does not identify to whom he made this statement, just that he made the request “on multiple occasions.” Id. This request is too vague to constitute an accommodation. And it is not remotely comprehended within the categories of reasonable accommodation found in § 12111(9). No reasonable juror could conclude that a request to “be spared harassment and abuse” was a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Because Hart has failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination or to provide direct evidence of a request for a reasonable accommodation, his ADA claim is dismissed. B. State Law Claims 1. Count II – Whistleblower

Council and the City argue that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under Michigan’s whistleblower statute because they have not demonstrated that they were subject to an adverse action. Council Mot. at PageID.3491–3498; City Mot. at PageID.4776–4778. The City argues that even if Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they were subjected to an adverse action, they have not shown pretext. City Mot. at PageID.4778. Plaintiffs assert that they have shown that they were constructively discharged and that they have shown pretext for the City’s legitimate business reason. Resp. at PageID.5007–5010. The Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) makes it unlawful to “discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee . . . reports or is about to report . . . a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation . . . to a public body . . . unless the employee knows that the report is false. . . .” Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.362. “[T]he law does not differentiate between employees who are actually discharged and those who are constructively discharged.” Champion v. Nationwide Security, Inc., 545 N.W.2d 596, 600 (Mich. 1996)

(overruled in part on other grounds). “In other words, once individuals establish their constructive discharge, they are treated as if their employer had actually fired them.” Id. WPA claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Delbano-Griffin v. Lake Cnty., 828 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Mich. 2013). To establish a prima facie case under the WPA, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they: (1) [were] engaged in one of the protected activities listed in the provision; (2) the employee was discharged, threatened, or otherwise discriminated against regarding his or her compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment; (3) [a] causal connection exists between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s act of discharging, or otherwise discriminating against the employee.

Wurtz v. Beecher Metro. Dist., 848 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Mich. 2014). Defendants only challenge adverse action and pretext. Constructive discharge serves to establish adverse action. Under Michigan law, constructive discharge “is established where an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation or, stated differently, when working conditions become so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would feel compelled to resign.” Vagts v. Perry Drug Stores, Inc., 516 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Mich. 1994) (punctuation modified). This is essentially the same standard as under federal law. And, as stated above, all three have shown that there is at least a genuinely disputed issue of fact whether they were constructively discharged under federal law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of fact whether they were constructively discharged under Michigan law. Further, as stated above, Vanderplow and Swope have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. And Hart has established pretext for the same reason that Swope has—the justification for the challenged action does not relate to Hart’s position as police chief.

Therefore, summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ whistleblower claims is denied. 2. Count IV – Breach of Contract The City argues that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law. City Mot. at PageID.4794. Council argues that Plaintiffs’ employment contracts were at-will and thus can be terminated at any time. Council Mot. at PageID.3499–3500. Plaintiffs confusingly make various arguments in response. Resp. at PageID.5002–5006. From what the Court can discern, Plaintiffs argue: (i) their employment contracts are valid because Bazzi had authority to hire them, id. at PageID.5002–5003; (ii) they were constructively discharged, id. at PageID.5005–5006; (iii) Plaintiffs can show that Defendants’ stated business

reason is pretext because “PERA trumps Act 78[,]” id. at PageID.5003–5005; and (iv) because they were constructively discharged, the City breached the severance provisions in the employment contracts. Id. at PageID.5005–5006. a. Constructive Discharge All three employment contracts unequivocally state that the employment relationship was terminable at will. Vanderplow Contract at PageID.795; Hart Contract at PageID.801; Swope Contract at PageID.807–808. “To overcome the presumption of employment at will, a party must present sufficient proof either of a contractual provision for a definite term of employment or a provision forbidding discharge absent just cause.” Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 597 (1993) (punctuation modified). Plaintiffs have not made any such showing. Even if Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact that they were constructively discharged related to other claims that they bring, that does not mean that they have shown proof of a contractual provision for a definite term of employment or forbidding discharge absent just cause. Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of contract under a constructive discharge theory relative

to compensation. b. Severance Provisions The City argues that the severance provisions of Plaintiffs’ employment contracts were not breached because Hart “admit[ted]” to receiving his full severance, Swope testified that he received the “benefits due to him under the contract[,]” and Vanderplow also admitted to receiving his full pay and benefits. City Reply at PageID.5438–5439. Council argues that the severance claims are not properly before the Court because they were not pled in the complaint. Council Reply at PageID.5391–5393.14 Under the individual employment contracts, if Hart was terminated prior to his contract’s

expiration date, he was entitled to receive “a sum equal to [his] annual base salary together with payment for unused vacation time and accumulated vacation time; and unused sick days; and all other accumulated benefits as set forth in the policies of the City [].” Hart Contract at PageID.802. Further, the City would pay Hart’s COBRA premiums for medical, dental and vision insurance for up to one year unless he secured medical, dental, and vision insurance from another source. Id. Swope and Vanderplow’s contracts contain the same provisions but they were only entitled to

14 Again, Council offers no appropriate authority in support of this proposition. As the Court explained above, Tucker has nothing to do with how specifically an element of a claim is pled. Tucker addresses whether an unpled claim can be raised in opposition to a summary judgment motion. Here, there is no question that a breach of contract claim was pled. And counsel offers no authority that requires a plaintiff to set forth every single alleged breach in his complaint. receive pay and benefits for 180-days instead of one year. Swope Contract. at PageID.808; Vanderplow Contract at PageID.796. Hart acknowledges that he received his full twelve months of severance pay. Resp. at PageID.5006. Hart also admitted that he and his family continued to receive their health benefits, though it is unclear for how long. Hart Dep. at PageID.3569, 3707–3709, 3792–3793. He testified

that he “received a partial honor of [his] severance[,]” which he clarified meant that the COBRA health insurance premiums were deducted from his severance pay. Id. at PageID.3569, 3708. Swope did not receive any severance. He testified that he is owed $204,000 in severance, including unpaid vacation, sick leave and health insurance benefits, but he admitted that the City paid one hundred percent of his health insurance benefits. Swope Dep. at PageID.3898, 4047– 4050. Vanderplow testified that he is owed approximately $300,000 in unpaid severance, holiday pay, and sick time. Vanderplow Dep. at PageID.4501–4502. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims are limited to whether: (i) Swope and

Vanderplow are owed any severance pay and (ii) if all three Plaintiffs are owed continuation of health insurance benefits. C. Count X—Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from terminating Plaintiffs and enforcing their resolution to defund Swope’s and Vanderplow’s positions. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 138–150. As previously stated, the Court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing Resolution 11-A which was adopted on January 9, 2024 regarding defunding. See 2/1/24 Preliminary Injunction. Injunctive and declaratory relief are remedies, not substantive legal claims. See Goryoka v. Quicken Loan, Inc., 519 F. App’x 926, 929 (6th Cir. 2013) (injunctive relief); McCann v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 823, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (punctuation modified) (declaratory relief). These remedies can only be granted if the plaintiff prevails on a separate cause of action. Id. Summary judgment as to Count X will be granted as there is no substantive claim for

declaratory and injunctive relief. Given that Plaintiffs have left office, it is unclear to the Court whether the preliminary injunction continues to serve any valid purpose in relation to any surviving claim. Plaintiffs will be given 10 days to show cause why the injunction should not be dissolved. Defendants may file opposing briefs within seven days after service of Plaintiffs’ brief. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motions for summary judgment in full as to Counts I (First Amendment), III (FLSA), VII (ADA), VIII (ADEA), IX (First Amendment). The motions are granted as to Counts V (Title VII race discrimination) and VI

(ELCRA race discrimination) related to Hart’s claims but denied as to Vanderplow and Swope’s claims. The Court denies Defendants’ motions for summary judgment in full as to Count II (Whistleblower). The Court denies Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to Count IV (breach of contract) related to the severance and health insurance provisions. Summary judgment is awarded to Defendants on Count X and Plaintiffs must show cause within 10 days why the preliminary injunction should not be dissolved. SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2026 s/Mark A. Goldsmith Detroit, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH United States District Judge CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on August 28, 2026.

s/Joseph Heacox JOSEPH HEACOX Case Manager