1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEVIN MASSENGALE, Case No. 1:24-cv-00066-JLT-CDB
12 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING OCTOBER 3, 2025, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. 14 (Docs. 14, 16) KERN COUNTY MUNICIPALITY, 15 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION Defendant. FOR LEAVE TO FILE A THIRD AMENDED 16 COMPLAINT
17 (Doc. 15) 18 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 19 DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS AND PROCEED ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS OF THIRD 20 AMENDED COMPLAINT 21 (Doc. 17) 22 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 23 24 I. Relevant Background 25 Plaintiff Kevin Massengale (“Plaintiff”) is a former pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and 26 in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 1, 9). 27 The Court issued its first screening order on March 18, 2025, finding Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state any cognizable claim against Defendant “Kern County Municipality” and granting 1 leave to amend his complaint. (Doc. 10). Following Plaintiff’s filing of a first amended complaint 2 (Doc. 11), on May 2, 2025, the Court issued its second screening order, finding that Plaintiff’s first 3 amended complaint again failed to state any cognizable claim against Defendant “Kern County” 4 and granting leave to amend his complaint. (Doc. 12). 5 Following Plaintiff’s timely filing of a second amended complaint (“SAC”), on October 3, 6 2025, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations to dismiss the action for failure to state 7 a claim, finding that further amendment would be futile as Plaintiff failed to remedy identified 8 deficiencies after he twice was granted leave to amend his claims. (Doc. 14). The findings and 9 recommendations were served on Plaintiff and contained notice that any objections were to be filed 10 within 14 days of the date of service thereof. Id. at 15. 11 II. Order Vacating Findings and Recommendations and Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for 12 Leave to File Third Amended Complaint 13 On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed objections to the findings and recommendations 14 and a motion for leave to file his lodged third amended complaint (“TAC”). (Docs. 15-17). In his 15 objections, Plaintiff concedes that his SAC “incorporates inartful legal theories” under RICO and 16 double jeopardy and that the Court was correct to dismiss these claims but asserts that “[the SAC’s] 17 factual core alleges stark, plausible violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments … which are 18 more than sufficient to state a claim” under § 1983. (Doc. 16 at 1-2, 4, 9). Plaintiff argues he 19 should be granted an additional opportunity for further amendment because he can cure the 20 deficiencies identified by the Court. Id. at 10. Plaintiff asserts that his proposed TAC cures the 21 defects identified in the Court’s second screening order by removing legally untenable claims, 22 clarifying his allegations, and specifically pleading a policy under Monell. (Doc. 15 at 2-3). 23 Based on Plaintiff’s representations supporting his motion for one final opportunity to 24 amend, the undersigned finds good cause to vacate the October 3, 2025, findings and 25 recommendations to dismiss the action. Further, because the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s 26 proposed, lodged TAC states a cognizable claim under Monell based on violation of his Fourth 27 Amendment rights and a state law false imprisonment claim but fails to state any other claim, the 1 and issue findings and recommendations in screening the TAC as set forth below. See 2 AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 15(a) 3 is very liberal and leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’”) (citation 4 omitted); Chodos v. W. Publ. Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“it is generally our policy 5 to permit amendment with ‘extreme liberality.’”) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. 6 Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). 7 III. Findings and Recommendations 8 The undersigned proceeds to screen Plaintiff’s lodged TAC. 9 A. Screening Requirement 10 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 11 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), federal courts must screen in forma pauperis 12 complaints and dismiss any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which 13 relief may be granted” or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See Lopez v. Smith, 14 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires 15 a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also id. at 1129 16 (“section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.”). 17 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 18 is entitled to relief…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required but 19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 20 do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 21 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a 22 claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a 23 cognizable legal theory. See Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are to be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 25 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, “the liberal pleading standard … applies only to a 26 plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n .9 27 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 1 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not 2 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 3 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 4 2. Linkage and Causation 5 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 6 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 7 section 1983, a “plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 8 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 9 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable 10 to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through 11 the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 12 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 13 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 14 constitutional deprivation”) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 375-77 (1976)). The 15 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, 16 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 17 affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required to do that causes the 18 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) 19 (citation omitted). 20 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations of the TAC1 21 In the TAC, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant County of Kern. (Doc. 17 at 1). 22 Plaintiff alleges that in 2006, he was arrested and detained for eight days on charges related to a 23 single count of misdemeanor domestic violence and that “the time for prosecuting this charge 24 expired in 2007” under the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff was released after 25 serving eight days in pretrial detention as the 2006 case was never brought to trial and resulted in 26 no conviction. Id. at 2. 27
1 The undersigned accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the TAC as true only for the purpose of 1 On August 21, 2023, Plaintiff was arrested by Kern County Sheriff’s Office deputies based 2 on a warrant issued for the same 2006 charge. Id. Plaintiff alleges that at the time of this arrest, 3 the statute of limitations had been expired for approximately 16 years. Plaintiff returned to state 4 court on September 7, 2023, and was transported back to jail at the Kern County Sheriff’s Detention 5 Facility without any legal basis for the arrest or detention and was held on a $50,000 bond. Id. 6 Plaintiff remained in custody for 28 days from August 31, 2023, to September 28, 2023, “solely 7 due to his inability to pay the $50,000 bond for a legally void charge.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that 8 Defendant knowingly ignored the expired statute of limitations as evidenced by internal jail records 9 which list the offense date as “2006” next to a field for “statute of limitations expired[.]” Id. 10 Plaintiff alleges that he is a “devout Vegan” with “sincerely held religious beliefs against 11 non-violence toward animal[s that] requires him to consume non-dairy, non-meat, no animal base 12 food.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that upon booking into jail, he immediately submitted a request 13 for a religious diet but despite “repeated verbal requests and written grievances” the Kern County 14 Sheriff’s Office denied him access to vegan option meals for the entire 28-day period of his 15 confinement, “forcing him to choose between eating non-compliant food or starving.” Id. Plaintiff 16 attempted to mitigate the burden by purchasing vegan-compliant food from the commissary but 17 was denied by jail staff of these purchases. Plaintiff alleges that the official response to his 18 grievance stated that he “will receive a no bean allergy diet only.” Plaintiff alleges he was told by 19 at least two deputies on different occasions that religious meals are not provided for short-term 20 inmates. 21 Plaintiff alleges that his unlawful detention was not an isolated incident but was caused by 22 the County’s official policies, customs, and practices, including a custom of inadequate screening 23 based on a “widespread practice within the Kern County Sheriff’s Office of failing to train and 24 require its deputies and booking clerks to conduct a basic probable cause screening for the validity 25 of warrants, including checking the statute of limitations.” Id. at 4. He alleges Defendant has an 26 “official policy or custom of denying religious diet accommodations to inmates deemed ‘short- 27 term,’ despite the substantial burden it places on religious exercise, as applied to [him].” Id. 1 on the fundamental requirement that a time-barred charge cannot provide probable cause for 2 detention and their obligations under RLUIPA and the First Amendment, and this failure “amounts 3 to deliberate indifference to the constitutional protected rights of persons within Kern County, as 4 such violations were a highly predictable consequence of the lack of training.” Id. 5 In Count I, Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim for unlawful seizure and detention in 6 violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, 7 acting under color of state law, seized and imprisoned him without probable cause as the sole basis 8 for his detention was a charge that was void due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. 9 at 5. He alleges that as a direct and proximate result of this unlawful detention, he was deprived of 10 his liberty for 28 days and suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation, and mental anguish. Id. 11 In Count II, Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim for violation of RLUIPA and the First 12 Amendment, alleging that Defendant, through an official policy and custom, imposed a substantial 13 burden on his sincerely held religious beliefs by systematically denying him a religious diet, and 14 this burden was not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and was not the least 15 restrictive means of achieving any such interest. Id. 16 In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a Monell liability claim based on the constitutional violations 17 raised in Counts I and II, alleging that the violations were directly caused by the County’s official 18 policies and customs of inadequate warrant screening and denying religious accommodations.2 Id. 19 at 5-6. 20 In Count IV, Plaintiff raises state law claims for false imprisonment and intentional 21 infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), alleging that Defendant, without privilege or consent or 22 any legal justification, intentionally confined him within the fixed boundaries of the Kern County 23 jail for 28 days, causing him IIED, and that he was conscious of the confinement and was harmed 24 by it. Id. at 6. 25 Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages of $1 million per day of confinement 26 for a total of $28 million for the deprivation of liberty, emotional distress, and for violation of his 27
2 Because Count III under Monell is based on his claims under Section 1983, the 1 constitutional rights. Id. Plaintiff further seeks declaratory judgment that Defendant’s policies and 2 customs violate the Fourth and First Amendments and the RLUIPA, and injunctive relief to 3 expunge records, order Defendant to revise its policies to mandate warrant validity and statute of 4 limitations checks upon booking, to cease the practice of denying religious diet accommodations 5 based on the length of an inmate’s stay, and to implement comprehensive training on these issues. 6 Id. at 6-7. 7 C. Plaintiff Adequately Pleads a Monell Claim Based on Violation of the Fourth 8 Amendment by Defendant County of Kern (“Count I”) 9 1. Governing Authority 10 City or county governments, including departments within them, cannot be held liable under 11 section 1983 for the acts of an employee. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 12 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, local governments “can be sued directly under [Section] 1983 for 13 monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where …the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 14 implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted 15 and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. 690. “In order to establish liability for governmental 16 entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right 17 of which she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to 18 deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving 19 force behind the constitutional violation.’” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th 20 Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th 21 Cir.1997)). 22 Thus, to state a Section 1983 claim against the County of Kern, a plaintiff would have to 23 allege that a department policy or custom caused his injuries. Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cnty. of 24 Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). This could be demonstrated by an unconstitutional 25 policy, or that the department “through inaction, failed to implement adequate policies or 26 procedures to safeguard” the constitutional rights of a jail detainee. Id. “Liability for improper 27 custom … must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 1 the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 2 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 To hold a County liable for a failure to act, the plaintiff would need to demonstrate that the 4 County or its department “exhibited deliberate indifference” to the violation of his rights. Id. A 5 municipality is deliberately indifferent to the violation of constitutional rights where it has a policy 6 that is “obviously, facially deficient,” or where there is a “pattern of prior, similar violations of 7 federally protected rights, of which the relevant policymakers had actual or constructive notice.” 8 Id. at 1142. 9 Accordingly, the undersigned considers below whether Plaintiff adequately alleges (1) a 10 violation of a constitutional right, and (2) a deliberately indifferent policy, custom or practice by 11 Defendant that caused the constitutional violation. 12 2. Analysis 13 a. Constitutional Violation – Unlawful Seizure and Detention 14 The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 15 houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” 16 U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the 17 Fourteenth Amendment.” Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 18 528 (1967). 19 A claim for unlawful arrest and detention is cognizable under Section 1983 as a violation 20 of the Fourth Amendment provided “the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” 21 Dubner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). To state a claim under 22 Section 1983 for false arrest and detention, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating “that there 23 was no probable cause to arrest him.” See Cabrera v. City of Huntingdon Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 24 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing George v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992)). Probable 25 cause “exists when under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent 26 person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the person arrested] had 27 committed a crime.” Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). 1 First, Plaintiff adequately alleges a Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest and detention in 2 violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that County of Kern unlawfully arrested and 3 detained him for 28 days from August 31, 2023, to September 28, 2023, without probable cause for 4 a charge that was void under the applicable statute of limitations. He alleges that the sole basis for 5 his detention was based on a warrant issued for a 2006 charge that was void due to the expiration 6 of the statute of limitations, which, at the time of his arrest, “had been expired for approximately 7 16 years.” Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating that his arrest was 8 without probable cause or other justification and that his resulting detention therefrom was 9 unlawful. Dubner, 266 F.3d at 964. 10 b. Constitutional Violation – Failure to Train 11 “Failure to train may constitute a basis for Monell liability where the failure amounts to 12 deliberate indifference to the rights of those who deal with municipal employees. Benavidez v. 13 Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 14 378, 388–89 (1989)). “To allege a failure to train, a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to 15 support a reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy 16 that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional 17 injury would not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.” Id. (citation 18 omitted). 19 Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that his unlawful detention was not an isolated incident 20 but was caused by the County’s failure to train its law enforcement and detention personnel on the 21 requirement that a time-barred charge cannot provide probable cause for detention, and the failure 22 amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional protected rights of persons within Kern 23 County, “as such violations were a highly predictable consequence of the lack of training.” (Doc. 24 17 at 4). Although Plaintiff would be required to present evidence of a constitutionally deficient 25 training policy to survive a motion for summary judgment on this claim, at the pleading stage, 26 Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient. Cf. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 27 1989) (granting summary judgment to defendant; “Davis has failed to establish that there is a 1 plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom based solely on the occurrence 2 of a single incident of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.”); Hutton v. City 3 of Berkeley Police Dep't, No. 13-cv-03407-JCS, 2014 WL 4674295, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 4 2014) (granting summary judgment to defendant; “Where, as here, a Monell claim is based on an 5 alleged policy of constitutional violations based on deliberate indifference to the training and 6 supervision of officers, a plaintiff must show that the city’s decision-makers acted with deliberate 7 indifference. … One way to demonstrate such a conscious disregard is to show that there is a pattern 8 of constitutional violations on the part of officers that should have made it “plainly obvious” to the 9 City that they were receiving inadequate training.”). 10 c. Deliberately Indifferent Policy or Practice and Causation 11 Second, Plaintiff adequately alleges a deliberately indifferent policy, custom or practice of 12 Defendant that is “the moving force behind [Plaintiff’s] alleged constitutional violation.” 13 Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900; see Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (“Absent a formal governmental policy, 14 [a plaintiff] must show a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating 15 procedure of the local government entity.’”). 16 Plaintiff identifies Defendant County of Kern’s custom of inadequate screening as a 17 “widespread practice within the Kern County Sheriff’s Office of failing to train and require its 18 deputies and booking clerks to conduct a basic probable cause screening for the validity of warrants, 19 including checking the statute of limitations.” (Doc. 17 at 4). Plaintiff alleges his unlawful 20 detention was not an isolated incident but caused by this custom or practice of Defendant. Id. 21 Thus, and construing all facts and allegations in favor of Plaintiff for the purposes of 22 screening, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that County of Kern is liable 23 under Monell for its deliberately indifferent custom or practice of inadequate screening for the 24 validity of warrants and failure to train its deputies and booking clerks to conduct a probable cause 25 screening, including to review issues regarding statutes of limitations, in violation of Plaintiff’s 26 Fourth Amendment right against unlawful arrest and detention. However, as with his failure to 27 train claim, to survive a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff will bear the burden of presenting 1 Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or 2 sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and 3 consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”). 4 D. Plaintiff Adequately Pleads a State Law False Imprisonment Claim 5 Under California law, false imprisonment is the “‘unlawful violation of the personal liberty 6 of another.’” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Asgari 7 v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757 (1997)). The elements of a false imprisonment claim 8 are: “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and 9 (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” Maric v. Fresno Cnty., No. 1:12–cv–00102 10 LJO GSA, 2012 WL 3133477, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) (citing Easton v. Sutter Coast 11 Hospital, 80 Cal. App. 4th 484, 496 (2000)). 12 Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts stating a state law claim for false imprisonment. He 13 alleges that Defendant subjected him to confinement “without privilege or consent, and without 14 any legal justification” for 28 days and that he was “conscious of the confinement and was harmed 15 by it.” (Doc. 17 at 6). He pleads that his unlawful confinement was based on Defendant 16 “knowingly” ignoring the expired statute of limitations of the warrant for the 2006 charge and 17 explains that the 2006 case “was never brought to trial and resulted in no conviction” and that the 18 time for prosecuting this charge expired in 2007. Id. at 2. Plaintiff attaches to his TAC “Exhibit 19 A" which reflects that the charge against him was filed on October 31, 2006, although he was 20 arrested on August 31, 2023. Id. at 8. These allegations put Defendant on notice of the 21 circumstances of his unlawful detention, including the circumstances of his previous case and of 22 the expired statute of limitations from that case. 23 E. Plaintiff Fails to Plead any other Cognizable Claim 24 1. RLUIPA and First Amendment Claim (“Count II”) 25 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s official policy and custom of denying him access to vegan 26 option meals during his 28-day detention imposed a substantial burden on his sincerely held 27 religious beliefs as a “devout vegan” by systematically denying him a religious diet. (Doc. 17 at 1 “Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, ‘including its directive 2 that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 3 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)); see Hartmann, 707 4 F.3d at 1122 (“The First Amendment, applicable to state action by incorporation through the 5 Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits government from making a law prohibiting the free exercise [of 6 religion]. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prisoners retain the protections of the First 7 Amendment.”). However, “‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or 8 limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our 9 penal system.’” Id. To merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a 10 religious claim must satisfy two criteria: “(1) the [plaintiff’s] proffered belief must be sincerely 11 held; the First Amendment does not extend to so-called religions which ... are obviously shams and 12 absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity[; and (2)] the claim must 13 be rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns.” Malik v. Brown, 16 14 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). 15 Additionally, “[a] person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government 16 action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her religion.” Jones v. Williams, 17 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). “When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 18 constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 19 interests.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 883-84 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The four 20 factors to be balanced in determining whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate 21 penological interests include: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison 22 regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are 23 alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to inmates; (3) whether accommodation 24 of the asserted constitutional right will impact guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of 25 prison resources generally; and (4) whether there is an absence of ready alternatives versus the 26 existence of obvious, easy alternatives. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. 27 The RLUIPA provides in relevant part that “’[n]o government shall impose a substantial 1 burden results from a rule of general applicability,’ unless the government demonstrates the burden 2 is ‘in furtherance of a compelling government interest’ and ‘is the least restrictive means of 3 furthering that compelling government interest.’” Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 4 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). “To state a claim under RLUIPA, a [plaintiff] must show 5 that: (1) he takes part in a ‘religious exercise,’ and (2) the State’s actions have substantially 6 burdened that exercise.” Id. (citing Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888-89); see Greene v. Solano County 7 Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). “RLUIPA does not define ‘substantial burden,’ but [the 8 Ninth Circuit] has held that ‘a substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a significantly 9 great restriction or onus upon such exercise.’” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1124–25 (citing San Jose 10 Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). “In the context of a 11 prisoner’s constitutional challenge to institutional policies, this court has held that a substantial 12 burden occurs ‘where the state ... denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by 13 religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 14 violate his beliefs.’” Id. (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)). 15 As noted above, because the single defendant named in Plaintiff’s TAC (County of Kern) 16 is a municipality, it may only be liable under § 1983 if Plaintiff pleads and proves that Defendant 17 maintained a deliberately indifferent policy that was the “moving force” behind any constitutional 18 violation suffered by Plaintiff. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges that 19 Defendant County of Kern has an “official policy or custom of denying religious diet 20 accommodations to inmates deemed ‘short-term,’ despite the substantial burden it places on 21 religious exercise, as applied to Plaintiff” and that the failure to train its law enforcement and 22 detention personnel on their obligations under the RLUIPA and the First Amendment amounts to 23 deliberate indifference to the constitutional protected rights of persons within Kern County. (Doc. 24 17 at 4). 25 However, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is deficient as he has not adequately alleged 26 that Defendant substantially burdened the practice of any religion by denying him access to a 27 “proper religious diet” during his 28-day incarceration or from otherwise engaging in conduct 1 held religious beliefs against non-violence towards animals” does illustrate how his claim is “rooted 2 in religious belief” but rather stems from “purely secular philosophical concerns.” Malik, 16 F.3d 3 at 333. Plaintiff also has failed to allege any facts as to any regulation of Defendant related to his 4 religious claims and how that regulation is not related to any legitimate penological interests. Thus, 5 Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the First Amendment. 6 Additionally, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under the RLUIPA. Plaintiff’s assertion 7 that he was denied access to a proper religious diet falls short of showing that he takes part in a 8 religious exercise and does not identify what that religious exercise entails. Nor does the TAC 9 provide sufficient factual context to illustrate the substantial burden he faced on that unidentified 10 religious exercise. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either the First Amendment or the 11 RLUIPA. 12 The Court previously identified for Plaintiff these same pleading deficiencies in Plaintiff’s 13 SAC (see Doc. 14 at 10-13). Plaintiff objected to the undersigned’s earlier findings and 14 recommendations to dismiss these claims (see Doc. 16), requested leave to amend his complaint 15 (see Doc. 15), and lodged the TAC (Doc. 17) that he represented “cures these defects” (Doc. 15 at 16 1-2). As set forth above, however, the pleading defects are not cured in the TAC. Thus, because 17 it does not appear Plaintiff may be able to save these claims through further amendment, the 18 undersigned will recommend Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims against County of 19 Kern be dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1130. 20 2. State Law Claim for IIED (“Count IV”) 21 To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) in California, a 22 plaintiff must show three elements: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the 23 intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the 24 plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of 25 the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 26 704 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Conduct is “outrageous” or “extreme” 27 where it “exceed[s] all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” Schneider v. TRW, 1 Here, the TAC alleges that Defendant’s detention of Plaintiff for 28 days without privilege 2 or consent caused him IIED. (Doc. 17 at 6). Liberally construed, the TAC fails to state a claim for 3 IIED. The TAC does not allege that the harm he faced was severe, extreme, or outrageous. Lawler, 4 704 F.3d at 1245. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for IIED. 5 The Court previously identified for Plaintiff these same pleading deficiencies in Plaintiff’s 6 SAC (see Doc. 14 at 13-14). Although Plaintiff objected to the undersigned’s earlier findings and 7 recommendations to dismiss this claim (see Doc. 16), in requesting leave to amend his complaint 8 (see Doc. 15), he did not specifically address how he proposed to remedy the IIED claim’s pleading 9 deficiencies. As set forth above, Plaintiff did not remedy the pleading defects in the TAC. Thus, 10 because it does not appear Plaintiff may be able to save these claims through further amendment, 11 the undersigned will recommend Plaintiff’s state law IIED claim against County of Kern be 12 dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1130. 13 * * * * * * * * * 14 In sum, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has pleaded the following cognizable claims: 15 (1) a Monell claim based on violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendant County of Kern 16 (Count I); and (2) a state law claim for false imprisonment (Count IV). The undersigned will 17 recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining non-cognizable claims for violation of RLUIPA and 18 First Amendment (Count II) and state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 19 (Count IV). 20 IV. Conclusion, Order, and Recommendations 21 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 22 1. The findings and recommendations issued on October 3, 2025 (Doc. 14) are 23 VACATED. 24 2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint (Doc. 15) is GRANTED. 25 3. Plaintiff’s lodged third amended complaint (Doc. 17) is deemed Plaintiff’s operative 26 pleading. 27 /// 1 And it is RECOMMENDED that: 2 1. Following screening of the third amended complaint (Doc. 17), this action proceeds on 3 Plaintiff's cause of action under Monell based on violation of the Fourth Amendment 4 (“Count I’) and state law claim for false imprisonment (“Count IV”) against Defendant 5 County of Kern. 6 2. All remaining claims be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 7 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 8 | assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after 9 | being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 10 | objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to 11 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave 12 | of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections, 13 | but a party may refer to exhibits in the record by CM/ECF document and page number. Any pages 14 | filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing 15 | these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(C). A party’s failure to file any 16 | objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson 17 | v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 18 | ITIS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ May 5, 2026 | Wr bY 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 146