Kenneth Johnson v. Department of Veterans Affairs

2023 MSPB 9
CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 28, 2023
DocketCH-0752-17-0442-I-1
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 2023 MSPB 9 (Kenneth Johnson v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kenneth Johnson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 9 (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 2023 MSPB 9 Docket No. CH-0752-17-0442-I-1

Kenneth J. Johnson, Appellant, v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency. February 28, 2023

William J. O’Malley, Esquire, Columbus, Ohio, for the appellant.

Amber Groghan, Esquire, Akron, Ohio, for the agency.

Nicholas E. Kennedy, Esquire, Chillicothe, Ohio, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 30-day suspension. The appellant has filed a petition for enforcement of the order for interim relief, which we consider as a motion to dismiss the petition for review. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the appellant’s motion and DISMISS the agency’s petition for review. 2

BACKGROUND ¶2 The agency proposed the appellant’s removal from his GS -11 Social Worker position based on the following charges: (1) Conduct Unbecom ing (four specifications); and (2) Absence Without Leave (AWOL) (five instances totaling 126 hours). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 4-6. After the appellant responded to the notice, IAF, Tab 12 at 14, the deciding official found the charges proven and removed the appellant. IAF, Tab 8 at 73, 78. ¶3 The appellant filed an appeal challenging his removal; he requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. He subsequently added, as affirmative defenses, discrimination based on race, age, disability, and gender, and ret aliation for protected equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. IAF, Tab 16. ¶4 Thereafter the administrative judge issued an initial decision in which she did not sustain any of the four specifications under the Conduct Unbecoming charge or the charge itself. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-15. She found that the agency proved the AWOL charge as to 120 of the 126 hours charged, and that therefore the AWOL charge was sustained. ID at 15-20. The administrative judge next carefully considered, but found unproven, all of the appellant’s affirmative defenses. ID at 20-31. The administrative judge then found that the agency proved there was a nexus between the sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service. Finally, she addressed the pena lty, noting that she had sustained only one of the two charges brought against the appellant. ID at 32. She found the testimony of the deciding official not credible regarding the extent to which he considered the relevant Douglas factors 1 prior to making his decision. She further found that, even if she had found the deciding official credible, he did

1 Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981) (holding that the Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness). 3

not address whether he would have removed the appellant if not all the charges were sustained. ID at 33. Under these circumstances, the administrative j udge found the agency’s penalty determination not worthy of deference. ID at 33 -34. Based on the evidence of record, including the hearing testimony regarding the sustained misconduct, the administrative judge considered all of the pertinent Douglas factors and determined that the maximum reasonable penalty in this case was a 30-day suspension. ID at 34-41. She ordered the agency to provide the appellant with interim relief if either party filed a petition for review. ID at 42. ¶5 The agency has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1, to which the appellant has responded. 2 PFR File, Tab 4. The agency has replied to the appellant’s response to its petition for review. PFR File, Tab 6. The appellant has also filed a petition for enforcement of the administrative judge’s interim relief order, PFR File, Tab 3, to which the agency has responded, PFR File, Tab 5, and the appellant has replied to the agency’s response, PFR File, Tab 7.

2 The appellant has not, in a properly filed petition or cross petition for review, challenged the administrative judge’s findings that the agency proved t he AWOL charge and that he (the appellant) did not establish any of his affirmative defenses. We find no basis to disturb these findings, which show that the administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made re asoned conclusions. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987). Even so, we consider an aspect of the appellant’s race, age, disability, and gender discrimination and EEO reprisal affirmative defenses not addressed in the initial decision. ID at 26-31. Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show that any prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the agency’s actions, we need not resolve the issue of whether the appellant proved that discrimination or retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the agency’s decisions. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33. 4

ANALYSIS ¶6 When an appellant is the prevailing party in an initial decision and the administrative judge has ordered interim relief under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A), an agency must submit a certification with its petition for review that it has either complied with the interim relief order or that it has made a determination that the appellant’s return to, or presence in, the workplace would be unduly disruptive. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). An agency’s failure to provide the required certification or to provide evidence of compliance in response to a Board order may result in the dismissal of the agency’s petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e). 3 ¶7 There are two elements to interim relief. The first is returning the appellant to the workplace while the petition for review is pending unless the agency determines that the return or presence of the appellant would be unduly disruptive. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii). The second element is providing the appellant with pay and benefits while the petition for review is pending; the agency must provide pay and benefits even if it does not return the appellant to the workplace. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(B). When an appellant alleges noncompliance with an interim relief order, the Board’s authority is restricted to reviewing whether an undue disruption determination was made when required,

3 The agency took its removal action in this case under the legal authority of 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, IAF, Tab 8 at 73, and the administrative judge took jurisdiction over this appeal under chapter 75, ID at 1. On June 23, 2017, the same day the agency removed the appellant, the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (VA Accountability Act), Pub L. No. 115 -41, § 202(a), 131 Stat. 862, 869-73 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 714), was enacted into law.

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Bluebook (online)
2023 MSPB 9, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kenneth-johnson-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2023.