UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
KELLY KENNEMER, Case No. 3:25-cv-00032-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
E. CLAYNE TYLER,
Defendant.
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Kelly Kennemer’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional
claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative
defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court is not required to comb through a plaintiff’s exhibits or other filings to determine if the complaint states a plausible claim. Therefore, in its review under §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court has reviewed only the Complaint found at Docket No. 3, not the
police report or other documents attached to the Complaint. See General Order 342, In Re: Procedural Rules for Prisoner Civil Case Filings and for Prisoner E-Filing Program, § A(1)(b) and (c) (“No exhibits may be attached to a complaint or any type of amended complaint, except those showing exhaustion of administrative remedies[,] [and] [n]o affidavits may be attached to a complaint or any type of amended complaint.”).
2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate in the Clearwater County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tyler, the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s state court criminal case, violated Plaintiff’s rights by suborning perjury from a police officer in the course of that case. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant conspired with Defendant’s wife, a
Clearwater County Jail nurse, to “deny treatment that would have yielded exculpatory evidence,” which Plaintiff could have presented in his criminal case. Id. 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following.
A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does
an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). i. Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Course of Plaintiff’s Prosecution Plaintiff claims Defendant knew that a witness testified falsely in Plaintiff’s criminal case. If Plaintiff has been convicted of the charges against him, then this claim is likely barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States
Supreme Court held that a civil rights claim “is not cognizable under § 1983” if the plaintiff’s success would “render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Id. at 486–87. That is, a § 1983 action “is barred if—but only if—success in the action … would necessarily imply or demonstrate that the plaintiff’s earlier conviction was invalid.” Lemos v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). To overcome this bar, a plaintiff must show either that (1) the action, if successful, would not necessarily “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment” or (2) “the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 1005 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). The Complaint does not plausibly allege that Plaintiff’s misconduct claim would be allowed to proceed under
Heck. If, instead of Plaintiff having been convicted, the charges against Plaintiff are still pending, then Plaintiff’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is likely barred by a different legal doctrine that was announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under
Younger, a federal court can hear a civil rights claim related to a pending state criminal case only if “the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights … cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.” Id. at 46.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
KELLY KENNEMER, Case No. 3:25-cv-00032-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
E. CLAYNE TYLER,
Defendant.
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Kelly Kennemer’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional
claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative
defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court is not required to comb through a plaintiff’s exhibits or other filings to determine if the complaint states a plausible claim. Therefore, in its review under §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court has reviewed only the Complaint found at Docket No. 3, not the
police report or other documents attached to the Complaint. See General Order 342, In Re: Procedural Rules for Prisoner Civil Case Filings and for Prisoner E-Filing Program, § A(1)(b) and (c) (“No exhibits may be attached to a complaint or any type of amended complaint, except those showing exhaustion of administrative remedies[,] [and] [n]o affidavits may be attached to a complaint or any type of amended complaint.”).
2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate in the Clearwater County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tyler, the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s state court criminal case, violated Plaintiff’s rights by suborning perjury from a police officer in the course of that case. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant conspired with Defendant’s wife, a
Clearwater County Jail nurse, to “deny treatment that would have yielded exculpatory evidence,” which Plaintiff could have presented in his criminal case. Id. 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following.
A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does
an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). i. Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Course of Plaintiff’s Prosecution Plaintiff claims Defendant knew that a witness testified falsely in Plaintiff’s criminal case. If Plaintiff has been convicted of the charges against him, then this claim is likely barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States
Supreme Court held that a civil rights claim “is not cognizable under § 1983” if the plaintiff’s success would “render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Id. at 486–87. That is, a § 1983 action “is barred if—but only if—success in the action … would necessarily imply or demonstrate that the plaintiff’s earlier conviction was invalid.” Lemos v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). To overcome this bar, a plaintiff must show either that (1) the action, if successful, would not necessarily “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment” or (2) “the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 1005 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). The Complaint does not plausibly allege that Plaintiff’s misconduct claim would be allowed to proceed under
Heck. If, instead of Plaintiff having been convicted, the charges against Plaintiff are still pending, then Plaintiff’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is likely barred by a different legal doctrine that was announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under
Younger, a federal court can hear a civil rights claim related to a pending state criminal case only if “the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights … cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.” Id. at 46. It is only in the most unusual of circumstances that a federal court may interfere in an ongoing state criminal matter or in a threatened state court prosecution. Instead, a court generally must abstain
from hearing the claim. For a federal court properly to abstain from hearing a case under the Younger abstention doctrine, three factors must be present: (1) there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding must implicate an important state interest; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise the constitutional
challenge. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Where abstention is appropriate, a federal court may still entertain an action when “extraordinary circumstances” are present, including: (1) where irreparable injury is both “great and immediate,” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; (2) where the state law is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” id. at 53-54; or (3) where
there is a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief,” id. at 54. Finally, even if Plaintiff’s subornation of perjury claim is not barred by Heck or Younger, it would still be implausible because Defendant is absolutely immune from suit. Prosecutors have absolute immunity for any actions taken in the performance of an integral part of the criminal judicial process. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
Such actions include initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, id. at 410, preparing and filing charging documents, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997), participating in hearings, and “making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings,” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991). Absolute immunity also extends to a prosecutor’s “knowing use of false testimony at trial, … suppression of exculpatory
evidence, and malicious prosecution.” Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A prosecutor is … absolutely immune from liability for the knowing use of false testimony at trial.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that the prosecutor knew a witness testified falsely in Plaintiff’s criminal case is barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.
ii. Medical Treatment Claims Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate conditions of detention, including adequate medical treatment, while they are awaiting trial. A due process violation occurs when the conditions to which the detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions-of-detention claims are analyzed using a
standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although an objective standard must be used in evaluating conditions-of- confinement claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial detainee complaining of unconstitutional conditions of detention must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. Plaintiff contends that Defendant conspired with Defendants’ wife to deny Plaintiff adequate jail medical treatment during the course of Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Plaintiff includes no allegations about his medical care at all, much less sufficient allegations to raise a plausible inference that Defendant acted with objective deliberate indifference. Thus, Plaintiff’s medical treatment claims are implausible.1
B. Other Federal Claims Plaintiff also asserts claims under various federal criminal statutes. Because such statutes do not give rise to civil liability, Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980), these claims are implausible. C. State Law Claims In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff asserts state law claims under various Idaho
criminal statutes. Compl. at 2. However, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear state criminal matters. Additionally, it does not appear that a private right of action is authorized under any of the cited sections. In Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416, 421 (Idaho 1996), the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether an implied private right of action existed under a state
criminal statute. The court held that it did not, basing its decision on the following factors: (1) the statute was enacted to protect the general public, (2) there was no indication that the legislature intended to create a private cause of action, (3) the statute provided for a criminal punishment, and (4) there was no indication that providing an additional civil remedy was necessary to assure the effectiveness of the statute. Id. The
1 To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the failure to provide adequate medical treatment caused a conviction in his state court criminal case, or that it might cause such a conviction in an ongoing state criminal case, any such claim would be subject to Heck or Younger, respectively, as described above. Yoakum court noted that “[i]n the absence of strong indicia of a contrary legislative intent, courts must conclude that the legislature provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.” Id. (relying on Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981). The factors identified in Yoakum apply equally to the state criminal statutes cited by Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s state law claims are implausible. 4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and
conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or
statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. Additionally, any amended complaint must establish that Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by Heck or Younger as set forth above.
Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a
motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by
entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court.
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the
Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as
described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.2 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be
dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a
2 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. $§ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint. 4. Plaintiffs Motion to Review Amended Complaint/Request for Additional Time (Dkt. 6) 1s DENIED. This Motion describes the procedural history of another of Plaintiff's cases and, thus, was apparently mistakenly filed in this case.
ie 1 DATED: May 5, 2025 Se) B. Lynn Winmill US. District Court Judge
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 12