Kennemer v. Tyler

• Court: District Court, D. Idaho
• Decided: March 24, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00606
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KELLY KENNEMER, Case No. 3:24-cv-00606-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

JAMIE TYLER,

Defendant.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Kelly Kennemer’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to

state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case

should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989)

(discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee in the Clearwater County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that, in an altercation forming the basis for his arrest, he suffered “traumatic facial

injuries and gun-shot wounds.” Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Plaintiff was later taken to the Clearwater County Jail. Plaintiff claims his wounds became septic. Plaintiff contends that, on January 1, 2023, Defendant Jamie Tyler—a jail nurse or physician’s assistant—

failed “to render any meaningful medical examination, diagnosis, or treatment” for Plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s motivation was malicious, given that she is married to the prosecutor in Plaintiff’s criminal case and allegedly conspired with the prosecutor. Though Plaintiff also contends Defendant Tyler

suppressed evidence, Plaintiff does not identify any such evidence. Id. at 3. 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following.

A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by

conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). i. Claims of Inadequate Jail Medical Treatment Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate conditions of detention, including adequate medical treatment, while they are awaiting trial. A due process violation

occurs when the conditions to which the detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions-of-detention claims are analyzed using a standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir.

2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although courts use an objective standard in evaluating conditions-of- confinement claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with

the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th

Cir. 2016) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial detainee complaining of unconstitutional

conditions of detention must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. Here, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant failed “to render any meaningful medical examination, diagnosis, or treatment” on January 1, 2023. This allegation

is overly vague and generalized. Plaintiff includes no details about how Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s need for medical care, what symptoms Plaintiff presented, what treatment Defendant provided, or why Plaintiff believes any such treatment was not meaningful. Plaintiff also does not allege any further injury as a result of

Defendant’s treatment. Plaintiff may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint. ii. Claims of Suppression of Evidence Related to Plaintiff’s Criminal Case Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant conspired with the prosecutor to suppress evidence in a pending state criminal case may be barred by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which generally prohibits federal courts from interfering in

criminal matters still pending in state court. A federal court can hear a civil rights claim related to a pending state criminal case only if “the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights … cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). It is only in the

most unusual of circumstances that a federal court may interfere in an ongoing state criminal matter or in a threatened state court prosecution. Instead, a court generally must abstain from hearing the claim. For a federal court properly to abstain from hearing a case under the Younger doctrine, three factors must be present: (1) there must be an ongoing state

judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding must implicate an important state interest; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise the constitutional challenge. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Where abstention is appropriate, a federal court

may still entertain an action when “extraordinary circumstances” are present, including: (1) where irreparable injury is both “great and immediate,” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; (2) where the state law is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” id. at 53-54; or (3) where there is a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for

equitable relief,” id. at 54. In an amended complaint, Plaintiff may attempt to show that his claim regarding suppression of evidence is not barred by Younger. Plaintiff is also advised that, if the charges are no longer pending because he was convicted of those charges, his evidence suppression claim likely would be

barred by a different legal doctrine. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not proceed with a civil rights claim if a favorable result on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s criminal conviction or sentence. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87(1994). As the Supreme Court later clarified, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the

relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005).

That is, if success on a civil rights claim would necessarily call into question the validity of a conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first establish that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,

or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. On the other hand, if “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.” Id.

Plaintiff should keep these standards in mind if he has been convicted of the charges against him. B. State Law Claims In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff asserts claims under Idaho state law. See Compl. at 1. Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which

relief may be granted, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, and if the amended complaint includes a plausible state law claim, the Court will reconsider the issue of supplemental jurisdiction.

4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a

sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive

screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a

state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met—

for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of a due process claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing that Plaintiff’s claims related to his criminal case are not

barred by Younger or Heck, as explained above. Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a

pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint

supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering

judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.”

Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if

the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant

simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above and a notice of change of address. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to

Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.1 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint and change of address notice, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without

further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed,

Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.

1 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). es DATED: March 24, 2025 □□□ Softy Me al Rind / Ly B. Lyn Winmill RCT) U.S. District Court Judge

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 12