Kemp v. NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 26, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-00579·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KECIA KEMP, Plaintiff, -against- 21-CV-0579 (LTS) NYC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE; NYC DEPARTMENT ORDER TO AMEND OF CITYWIDE ADMINISTRATION SERVICES; NYC HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112- 12117; the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; and the New York City Human Rights Laws, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131, alleging that her former employer discriminated against her based on her race and sex. By order dated June 10, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Kecia Kemp, using the Court’s form complaint for employment discrimination, identifies herself as “Black,” “Female,” and “born in 1964.” (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) In the section of the complaint form that lists relevant statutes, she checks all boxes, indicating that she seeks to assert federal claims under all of the statutes. (Id.) But Plaintiff fails to include allegations to

support the federal claims she asserts in this complaint. Plaintiff alleges that her former employer “[b]lacklisted and labeled [her] to other employers to prevent [her] from receiving fair employment.” (ECF No.1 at 5.) She also alleges the following: Employment was terminated and not able to be reinstated, as of July 20, 2020. Due to a Sec. 72 of civil law1 in 2016 of July 12th, prior to decision made in Sec. 72 hearing June 2016. In May of 2016 on the 13th, Plaintiff was offered a settlement of $55,000.00. Once Plaintiff refused on May 27, 2016, Plaintiff was subjected to Sec. 72 with derogatory medical review by Defendants’ doctors. (Id.) Plaintiff attached to the Court’s form complaint for employment discrimination additional typewritten pages titled “EEOC Complaint.” These pages seemingly detail the events giving rise to her claims, but the allegations are not clear. (Id. at 14-22.) Plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also attaches to her complaint three notices of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), each dated October 29, 2020, as proof that she

1 Here, Plaintiff apparently refers to Section 72 of the New York Civil Service Law, which provides that, “[w]hen in the judgment of an appointing authority an employee is unable to perform the duties of his or her position by reason of a disability, other than a disability resulting from occupational injury or disease as defined in the workers’ compensation law, the appointing authority may require such employee to undergo a medical examination to be conducted by a medical officer selected by the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction.” N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 72. filed charges against each of the Defendants and exhausted her administrative remedies. (Id. at 11-13). DISCUSSION A. Employment Discrimination Claims At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) [a protected

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