1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
7 Case No. 2:25-cv-474-BJR KELLY STONELAKE, an individual, 8 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 9 v. 10 META Platforms, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, 11
12 Defendant.
13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 26, filed by 15 Plaintiff Kelly Stonelake, seeking reconsideration of the Order Granting in Part and Denying in 16 Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“MTD Order”), Dkt. No. 22. In that MTD Order, the Court 17 found, among other things, that Stonelake failed to state a claim for (1) wrongful discharge in 18 violation of public policy (“WDVPP”), and (2) retaliation pursuant to Washington State’s Silenced 19 No More Act (“SNMA”), RCW § 49.44.211. Id. at 17-19. Stonelake now seeks reconsideration of 20 those findings. Having fully considered the materials and the relevant legal authorities, the Court 21 denies Stonelake’s Motion for Reconsideration. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 22 23
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Western District of Washington Local Rule (“L.R.”) 7(h) provides: “Motions for 3 reconsideration are disfavored. The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a 4 showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which 5 could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” L.R. 7(h). The term 6 “manifest error” means “an error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete 7 disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record.” Error, Black’s Law 8 Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Reconsideration is an “‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in 9 the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of 10 Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 11 Practice § 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)). Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to the
12 sound discretion of the court. Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian 13 Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 A. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 16 1. Stonelake Has Not Shown Manifest Error Nor New Facts or Legal Authority 17 The Court concluded in the MTD Order that Stonelake failed to state a claim for WDVPP 18 because she did not establish that she was constructively discharged. MTD Order at 17-18. 19 Stonelake now argues that these findings were erroneous because the Complaint plausibly alleged 20 that she was constructively discharged while on medical leave. Pl.’s Mot. for Recon. at 7-8. 21 Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”) responds that it is clear that Stonelake’s employment
22 with Meta ended when her position was eliminated, rather than because of her inability to return 23 to work for medical reasons. Def.’s Resp. at 9, Dkt. No. 31.
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 Stonelake has not made a showing of manifest error nor new facts or legal authority. As 2 discussed in this Court’s MTD Order, Stonelake alleges in the Complaint that: 3 • In February 2023, she went on medical leave.
4 • While on medical leave, Stonelake’s position was eliminated but she accepted a new position, the “Builder Role,” which Stonelake had designed with her 5 supervisor.
6 • Stonelake was laid off from Meta effective January 2024.
7 MTD Order at 17-18; see also Compl. ¶¶ 129-30, 132, Dkt. No. 1-1. In her Motion for 8 Reconsideration, Stonelake cites to additional allegations from her Complaint that: 9 • The impact on her mental health from Meta’s culture and treatment prevented her from returning to work prior to her layoff. 10 • Her career trajectory was permanently damaged. 11 Pl.’s Mot. for Recon. at 7-8 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 122-32). These allegations, which the Court 12 previously considered, do not alter its analysis or ultimate conclusion. The Court cannot reasonably 13 infer that Stonelake actually ceased to work as an employee of Meta before she was laid off. Taking 14 the allegations as true, Stonelake was employed by Meta in some capacity until her actual 15 discharge. Therefore, her constructive discharge argument fails. See Korslund v. DynCorp 16 Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 156 Wn.2d 168, 180 (2005) (“[W]here the employee continues to receive 17 employment benefits and is still considered to be an active employee, or where his or her ability 18 to return to work is protected in some other way, that employee has not been constructively 19 discharged.”), overruled on other grounds by Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 184 Wn.2d 268 20 (2015). The Motion for Reconsideration is denied on this issue. 21
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 2. Stonelake’s Request for Leave to Amend is Denied as Futile 2 In the alternative, Stonelake seeks leave to amend the Complaint to add allegations in 3 support of her WDVPP claim. Pl.’s Reply at 5, Dkt. No. 32. Specifically, Stonelake seeks to amend 4 the Complaint to clarify that: 5 • When her prior role was eliminated it automatically “converted” to an individual contributor role and the Builder Role was created for her; 6 • She accepted the Builder Role, hoping to be able to eventually return to 7 work;
8 • While on leave, she required long-term, intensive mental health treatment and has lasting and permanent mental health and executive functioning 9 impairments that prevent her from returning to work at the level at which she worked at Meta; 10 • Job restructures and eliminations were common at Meta; 11 • But for Stonelake’s medical leave and the ongoing severe mental health 12 effects from Meta’s treatment, she would have easily found a new role at Meta rather than getting laid off; 13 • Meta reposted Stonelake’s position after her layoff; and 14
• But for her extended medical leave, Meta would not have eliminated the 15 Builder Role.
16 Id. 17 Leave to amend a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 15(a) “shall be freely 18 given when justice so requires.” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 19 2010). However, where amendment of the complaint would be futile, the court need not permit 20 leave to amend. See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2004). 21 As explained supra, Stonelake’s constructive discharge argument fails because the 22 allegations show that Stonelake maintained employment at Meta in some capacity until she was 23
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 actually discharged. Stonelake’s proposed amendment does not address this deficiency, and several 2 of the proposed allegations are redundant. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 129-33, with Pl.’s Reply at 5. 3 Accordingly, amendment would be futile. Nunes, 375 F.3d at 810. 4 B. Retaliation Pursuant to the Silenced No More Act 5 1. Stonelake Has Not Shown Manifest Error Nor New Facts or Legal Authority 6 The Court concluded in the MTD Order that Stonelake failed to state a claim for retaliation 7 pursuant to the SNMA. This Court reasoned that Section (3) of the statute (which contains the 8 retaliation provision) applies only in cases involving nondisclosure or non-disparagement 9 agreements.
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1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
7 Case No. 2:25-cv-474-BJR KELLY STONELAKE, an individual, 8 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 9 v. 10 META Platforms, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, 11
12 Defendant.
13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 26, filed by 15 Plaintiff Kelly Stonelake, seeking reconsideration of the Order Granting in Part and Denying in 16 Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“MTD Order”), Dkt. No. 22. In that MTD Order, the Court 17 found, among other things, that Stonelake failed to state a claim for (1) wrongful discharge in 18 violation of public policy (“WDVPP”), and (2) retaliation pursuant to Washington State’s Silenced 19 No More Act (“SNMA”), RCW § 49.44.211. Id. at 17-19. Stonelake now seeks reconsideration of 20 those findings. Having fully considered the materials and the relevant legal authorities, the Court 21 denies Stonelake’s Motion for Reconsideration. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 22 23
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Western District of Washington Local Rule (“L.R.”) 7(h) provides: “Motions for 3 reconsideration are disfavored. The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a 4 showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which 5 could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” L.R. 7(h). The term 6 “manifest error” means “an error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete 7 disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record.” Error, Black’s Law 8 Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Reconsideration is an “‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in 9 the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of 10 Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 11 Practice § 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)). Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to the
12 sound discretion of the court. Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian 13 Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 A. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 16 1. Stonelake Has Not Shown Manifest Error Nor New Facts or Legal Authority 17 The Court concluded in the MTD Order that Stonelake failed to state a claim for WDVPP 18 because she did not establish that she was constructively discharged. MTD Order at 17-18. 19 Stonelake now argues that these findings were erroneous because the Complaint plausibly alleged 20 that she was constructively discharged while on medical leave. Pl.’s Mot. for Recon. at 7-8. 21 Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”) responds that it is clear that Stonelake’s employment
22 with Meta ended when her position was eliminated, rather than because of her inability to return 23 to work for medical reasons. Def.’s Resp. at 9, Dkt. No. 31.
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 Stonelake has not made a showing of manifest error nor new facts or legal authority. As 2 discussed in this Court’s MTD Order, Stonelake alleges in the Complaint that: 3 • In February 2023, she went on medical leave.
4 • While on medical leave, Stonelake’s position was eliminated but she accepted a new position, the “Builder Role,” which Stonelake had designed with her 5 supervisor.
6 • Stonelake was laid off from Meta effective January 2024.
7 MTD Order at 17-18; see also Compl. ¶¶ 129-30, 132, Dkt. No. 1-1. In her Motion for 8 Reconsideration, Stonelake cites to additional allegations from her Complaint that: 9 • The impact on her mental health from Meta’s culture and treatment prevented her from returning to work prior to her layoff. 10 • Her career trajectory was permanently damaged. 11 Pl.’s Mot. for Recon. at 7-8 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 122-32). These allegations, which the Court 12 previously considered, do not alter its analysis or ultimate conclusion. The Court cannot reasonably 13 infer that Stonelake actually ceased to work as an employee of Meta before she was laid off. Taking 14 the allegations as true, Stonelake was employed by Meta in some capacity until her actual 15 discharge. Therefore, her constructive discharge argument fails. See Korslund v. DynCorp 16 Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 156 Wn.2d 168, 180 (2005) (“[W]here the employee continues to receive 17 employment benefits and is still considered to be an active employee, or where his or her ability 18 to return to work is protected in some other way, that employee has not been constructively 19 discharged.”), overruled on other grounds by Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 184 Wn.2d 268 20 (2015). The Motion for Reconsideration is denied on this issue. 21
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 2. Stonelake’s Request for Leave to Amend is Denied as Futile 2 In the alternative, Stonelake seeks leave to amend the Complaint to add allegations in 3 support of her WDVPP claim. Pl.’s Reply at 5, Dkt. No. 32. Specifically, Stonelake seeks to amend 4 the Complaint to clarify that: 5 • When her prior role was eliminated it automatically “converted” to an individual contributor role and the Builder Role was created for her; 6 • She accepted the Builder Role, hoping to be able to eventually return to 7 work;
8 • While on leave, she required long-term, intensive mental health treatment and has lasting and permanent mental health and executive functioning 9 impairments that prevent her from returning to work at the level at which she worked at Meta; 10 • Job restructures and eliminations were common at Meta; 11 • But for Stonelake’s medical leave and the ongoing severe mental health 12 effects from Meta’s treatment, she would have easily found a new role at Meta rather than getting laid off; 13 • Meta reposted Stonelake’s position after her layoff; and 14
• But for her extended medical leave, Meta would not have eliminated the 15 Builder Role.
16 Id. 17 Leave to amend a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 15(a) “shall be freely 18 given when justice so requires.” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 19 2010). However, where amendment of the complaint would be futile, the court need not permit 20 leave to amend. See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2004). 21 As explained supra, Stonelake’s constructive discharge argument fails because the 22 allegations show that Stonelake maintained employment at Meta in some capacity until she was 23
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 actually discharged. Stonelake’s proposed amendment does not address this deficiency, and several 2 of the proposed allegations are redundant. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 129-33, with Pl.’s Reply at 5. 3 Accordingly, amendment would be futile. Nunes, 375 F.3d at 810. 4 B. Retaliation Pursuant to the Silenced No More Act 5 1. Stonelake Has Not Shown Manifest Error Nor New Facts or Legal Authority 6 The Court concluded in the MTD Order that Stonelake failed to state a claim for retaliation 7 pursuant to the SNMA. This Court reasoned that Section (3) of the statute (which contains the 8 retaliation provision) applies only in cases involving nondisclosure or non-disparagement 9 agreements. MTD Order at 18-19. Stonelake now argues that the Court’s interpretation of the 10 statute was erroneous based on its plain language and legislative history. Pl.’s Mot. for Recon. at 11 3-6. However, these arguments merely reiterate points Stonelake previously made in response to
12 Meta’s Motion to Dismiss. Compare id., with MTD Resp. at 12-13, Dkt. No. 17. The Court finds 13 no manifest error in its prior ruling. Additionally, Stonelake has not identified any new facts or 14 legal authority that warrant reconsideration of the dismissal of her SNMA claim. Reconsideration 15 is denied on this issue. 16 2. The Court Declines to Certify this Issue to the Washington Supreme Court 17 Should this Court deny the Motion for Reconsideration, Stonelake requests that this Court 18 certify to the Washington Supreme Court the question of whether Section (3) of the SNMA is 19 limited to cases involving nondisclosure or non-disparagement agreements. Pl.’s Mot. for Recon. 20 at 6-7. Stonelake contends that “[t]he issue is narrow and concrete, outcome-determinative on this 21 claim, and the scope of a statute the legislature deemed to have an important public policy purpose
22 is an important policy question.” Id. at 6. Meta responds that certification of Stonelake’s question 23 would be an inappropriate burden to impose on the parties and the Washington Supreme Court.
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 Def.’s Resp. at 7-8. Meta further asserts that (1) the question presented is one that a federal court 2 can answer, and (2) Stonelake fails to show that this issue presents any significant new or substantial 3 question of statutory interpretation. Id. 4 The decision of whether to certify a question to the Washington Supreme Court rests in the 5 discretion of the federal court. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 2019). 6 Courts may certify questions to the Washington Supreme Court when ascertaining local law is 7 necessary to dispose of the proceeding, and when that local law has not been “clearly determined.” 8 RCW § 2.60.020. But federal courts need not use the certification process even if the state law is 9 unclear. Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009). 10 The Washington Supreme Court has not addressed the question raised by Stonelake’s 11 SNMA claim. However, the question is a narrow one, and one that was appropriate for this Court’s
12 consideration. See id. This Court has ruled and will adhere to its ruling without certifying the issue 13 to the Washington Supreme Court. 14 IV. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No. 26) is DENIED. 16 DATED this 31st day of October 2025. 17 A 18 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein 19 U.S. District Court Judge 20 21 22 23
24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION