Kellier v. Acosta

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 23, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-01058·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSHUA KELLIER, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-1058 (CM) NAICA ANTHONY ACOSTA; DHS MRS. ORDER TO AMEND MONTAGNA; DHS MRS. HYLER; NAICA JULIUS DOE; POLICE OFFICER CHEUNG, 5TH PRECINCT, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question and diversity jurisdiction. By order dated March 3, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. Plaintiff also filed an order to show cause, a request for pro bono counsel, and a motion for permission to submit “audio recording evidence.” For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must

determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Named as defendants in this complaint are “NAICA Anthony Acosta” and “NAICA Security personnel” Julius Doe (NAICA defendants); DHS Deputy Director Mrs. Montagna and DHS Ombudsman Mrs. Hyler (DHS defendants), and Police Officer Cheung from the 5th Precinct. NAICA is the Neighborhood Association for Inter-Cultural Affairs, Inc., a non-profit organization serving the homeless, and DHS is the New York City Department of Homeless Services. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “openly discriminated” against him, violated his right to be treated “fairly” and “respectfully,” and conspired to deny him shelter. Because he was forced to sleep in the subway, Plaintiff’s legs swelled. Plaintiff asserts that Montagna said to him, “You have come to our office several times,

you’re not coming upstairs today.” Acosta refused to answer Plaintiff’s questions, hung up on Plaintiff, told Plaintiff to “have a good day,” and said, “I have nothing further to discuss with you.” Then, Acosta said, in a threatening manner, “you and I can personally discuss your issues,” “coerced” Plaintiff “back into the same facility where Plaintiff’s laptop was broken, “i.e. damaged his property without due process of law,” denied Plaintiff bedding “in NAICA comfort INN hotel,” and sent Plaintiff back to a shelter in the Bronx “because [he was] late.” Plaintiff alleges that he was denied regular access to his caseworker, and that NAICA staff “conspire[ed] to keep him at the NAICA Bronx park location in part premised upon criminal negligent homicide.” According to Plaintiff, state law and DHS policy mandates that Defendants house him

and accommodate his vegan diet. Attachments to the complaint show that Plaintiff was treated at Bellevue Hospital. Plaintiff seeks damages for the “pain and suffering” he has experienced from sleeping in the subway, and “on hard surfaces in adverse weather conditions.” Plaintiff further states that he caught lice and contracted the flu while “displaced,” lost any “enjoyment of life,” incurred “hospital fees,” and suffered “emotional distress, anger, pain.” Plaintiff also claims that Police Officer Cheung did not take Plaintiff’s criminal complaint report “against whom ever called the cops on me thus violating the 14 amendment right to equal protection of the law, press.” Attached to the complaint are almost 40 pages of hospital records and documents regarding Plaintiff’s placement in the shelter system. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 Claims Claims Arising out of the Alleged Deprivation of Adequate Shelter To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain facts suggesting that the DHS defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that the DHS and NAICA defendants “openly discriminated” against him, but he does not explain the basis for the discrimination, or show how those Defendants’ conduct arose from discriminatory animus. To the extent Plaintiff is complaining about shelter conditions, there is no constitutional right to a well-run shelter system. In Lindsey v. Normet, the Supreme Court held that there is no “constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.” 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Furthermore, the government has no “obligation to provide adequate housing.” Richardson v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-2545 (WHP), 2013 WL 2124176, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013) (quoting Reaves v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 08-CV-1624 (RJD), 2009 WL 35074, at *3

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