BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., C.J., delivered the opinion of the court. RYAN, J. (pp. 418-419), delivered a separate concurring opinion. COHN, D.J. (pp. 419-422), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Circuit Judge.
Keith and Jacqueline Theobald, appeal the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. The Theobalds being residents of Indiana, jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship and the amount involved. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). They argue on appeal that a vehicle abandoned two feet onto the shoulder of an interstate highway for at least thirty hours is a nuisance under Ohio law. We conclude that such an abandoned vehicle could be a nuisance, but the decision to tow the vehicle is an act within the discretion of the patrolling officer, thus falling under the grant of immunity in Ohio Code § 2744.03(A)(3). We AFFIRM the district court.
While driving west on Interstate 275, Keith Theobald suffered severe injuries in a car accident within the boundaries of the City of Montgomery and Hamilton County, Ohio. His pickup truck was the fourth car in a four-vehicle chain reaction collision. This multi-vehicle accident occurred both on and off the westbound side of Interstate 275. The collision started when a vehicle drifted off the highway and collided with an automobile abandoned on the berm. This collision pushed the moving vehicle back into traffic striking Theobald’s truck. Theobald’s vehicle tumbled across all traffic lanes of westbound Interstate 275 then hit several trees off to the side of the highway. Mr. Theobald was ejected from the vehicle at some point, and he was eventually found by paramedics in the woods some distance from his truck.
The abandoned vehicle which started the chain reaction multi-vehicle collision was parked on the paved shoulder two feet off the far right traffic lane. The owner had abandoned the vehicle when he experienced a fuel system problem. The vehicle had been abandoned for approximately thirty hours. The portion of the Interstate at issue was pajrolled by police officers from both Hamilton County and the City of Montgomery.
After winning a substantial jury verdict against the owner of the abandoned vehicle, the appellants filed a new complaint against several defendants in federal district court claiming that those parties were negligent in failing to keep Interstate 275 free from nuisance. The defendants named in the complaint were Hamilton County’s Sheriff, Highway Department and Board of Commissioners; the City of Montgomery; its Mayor; its Chief of Police; and the State Highway Department. At oral argument the Court was notified that the City of Montgomery defendants had settled with the appellants.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. See Pfennig v. Household Credit Servs. Inc., 286 F.3d 340, 343 (6th Cir.2002). We construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 489 (6th Cir.1990). A complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can [416]*416prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993). Because this action was brought in Ohio and premised on diversity jurisdiction, this Court is bound by Ohio’s substantive law on nuisance. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). We review the district court’s application of state law de novo. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir.2001).
In 1985 the Ohio General Assembly enacted the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act “in response to the judicial abolishment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Franks v. Lopez, 69 Ohio St.3d 345, 632 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1994). The Act granted sovereign immunity to political subdivisions while at the same time creating several exceptions to this general rule. Political subdivisions are generally immune from liability “for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision ... in connection with governmental or proprietary function.” Ohio Code § 2744.02(A)(1). The Act carves out several exceptions to this general rule, and the appellants argue that the nuisance exception found in Ohio Code § 2744.02(B)(3) applies in this situation. This section states “political subdivisions are liable for injury, death or loss to persons or property caused by their failure to keep public roads, highways ... open, in repair, and free from nuisance.” Ohio Code § 2744.02(B)(3).
Even if a case falls within the nuisance exception, a political subdivision can still avoid liability if any of section 2744.03’s immunities and defenses apply. For example, a political subdivision is immune from liability if the employee’s action or failure to act was “within the discretion of the employee with respect to policy making, planning, or enforcement powers by virtue of the duties and responsibilities of the office or position of the employee.” O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(3). A political subdivision is also immune if the injury resulted from the employee’s “performance of a judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, or quasi-legislative function.” O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(1). Immunity can be maintained if the conduct was not negligent and was required or authorized by law. O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(2). The Act provides several other defenses; however, for the purposes of this claim, they are irrelevant.
For the appellants to successfully plead their claim under the Act, they must overcome two hurdles. First, their claim must fall within the 2744.02(B)(3) nuisance exception to the Act’s general grant of sovereign immunity. Second, the defendants’s actions must escape any of the immunities or defenses codified in section 2744.03. As for the first issue, the appellants assert that a vehicle abandoned for thirty hours two feet onto the far right shoulder of a highway are sufficient facts under Ohio law to constitute a nuisance and thus survive Hamilton County’s motion to dismiss. In short, the appellants argue a jury should decide whether Hamilton County’s officers patrolling this portion of the Interstate failed to keep the Interstate open and free from nuisance by failing to have the vehicle towed.
The Ohio case law addressing nuisance under section 2744.02(B)(3) is substantial and encompasses a broad array of circumstances. The district court opinion focused primarily on Williamson v. Pavlovich,
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BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., C.J., delivered the opinion of the court. RYAN, J. (pp. 418-419), delivered a separate concurring opinion. COHN, D.J. (pp. 419-422), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Circuit Judge.
Keith and Jacqueline Theobald, appeal the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. The Theobalds being residents of Indiana, jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship and the amount involved. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). They argue on appeal that a vehicle abandoned two feet onto the shoulder of an interstate highway for at least thirty hours is a nuisance under Ohio law. We conclude that such an abandoned vehicle could be a nuisance, but the decision to tow the vehicle is an act within the discretion of the patrolling officer, thus falling under the grant of immunity in Ohio Code § 2744.03(A)(3). We AFFIRM the district court.
While driving west on Interstate 275, Keith Theobald suffered severe injuries in a car accident within the boundaries of the City of Montgomery and Hamilton County, Ohio. His pickup truck was the fourth car in a four-vehicle chain reaction collision. This multi-vehicle accident occurred both on and off the westbound side of Interstate 275. The collision started when a vehicle drifted off the highway and collided with an automobile abandoned on the berm. This collision pushed the moving vehicle back into traffic striking Theobald’s truck. Theobald’s vehicle tumbled across all traffic lanes of westbound Interstate 275 then hit several trees off to the side of the highway. Mr. Theobald was ejected from the vehicle at some point, and he was eventually found by paramedics in the woods some distance from his truck.
The abandoned vehicle which started the chain reaction multi-vehicle collision was parked on the paved shoulder two feet off the far right traffic lane. The owner had abandoned the vehicle when he experienced a fuel system problem. The vehicle had been abandoned for approximately thirty hours. The portion of the Interstate at issue was pajrolled by police officers from both Hamilton County and the City of Montgomery.
After winning a substantial jury verdict against the owner of the abandoned vehicle, the appellants filed a new complaint against several defendants in federal district court claiming that those parties were negligent in failing to keep Interstate 275 free from nuisance. The defendants named in the complaint were Hamilton County’s Sheriff, Highway Department and Board of Commissioners; the City of Montgomery; its Mayor; its Chief of Police; and the State Highway Department. At oral argument the Court was notified that the City of Montgomery defendants had settled with the appellants.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. See Pfennig v. Household Credit Servs. Inc., 286 F.3d 340, 343 (6th Cir.2002). We construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 489 (6th Cir.1990). A complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can [416]*416prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993). Because this action was brought in Ohio and premised on diversity jurisdiction, this Court is bound by Ohio’s substantive law on nuisance. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). We review the district court’s application of state law de novo. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir.2001).
In 1985 the Ohio General Assembly enacted the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act “in response to the judicial abolishment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Franks v. Lopez, 69 Ohio St.3d 345, 632 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1994). The Act granted sovereign immunity to political subdivisions while at the same time creating several exceptions to this general rule. Political subdivisions are generally immune from liability “for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision ... in connection with governmental or proprietary function.” Ohio Code § 2744.02(A)(1). The Act carves out several exceptions to this general rule, and the appellants argue that the nuisance exception found in Ohio Code § 2744.02(B)(3) applies in this situation. This section states “political subdivisions are liable for injury, death or loss to persons or property caused by their failure to keep public roads, highways ... open, in repair, and free from nuisance.” Ohio Code § 2744.02(B)(3).
Even if a case falls within the nuisance exception, a political subdivision can still avoid liability if any of section 2744.03’s immunities and defenses apply. For example, a political subdivision is immune from liability if the employee’s action or failure to act was “within the discretion of the employee with respect to policy making, planning, or enforcement powers by virtue of the duties and responsibilities of the office or position of the employee.” O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(3). A political subdivision is also immune if the injury resulted from the employee’s “performance of a judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, or quasi-legislative function.” O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(1). Immunity can be maintained if the conduct was not negligent and was required or authorized by law. O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(2). The Act provides several other defenses; however, for the purposes of this claim, they are irrelevant.
For the appellants to successfully plead their claim under the Act, they must overcome two hurdles. First, their claim must fall within the 2744.02(B)(3) nuisance exception to the Act’s general grant of sovereign immunity. Second, the defendants’s actions must escape any of the immunities or defenses codified in section 2744.03. As for the first issue, the appellants assert that a vehicle abandoned for thirty hours two feet onto the far right shoulder of a highway are sufficient facts under Ohio law to constitute a nuisance and thus survive Hamilton County’s motion to dismiss. In short, the appellants argue a jury should decide whether Hamilton County’s officers patrolling this portion of the Interstate failed to keep the Interstate open and free from nuisance by failing to have the vehicle towed.
The Ohio case law addressing nuisance under section 2744.02(B)(3) is substantial and encompasses a broad array of circumstances. The district court opinion focused primarily on Williamson v. Pavlovich, 45 Ohio St.3d 179, 543 N.E.2d 1242 (1989), where the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a string of illegally parked cars opposite a public school constituted a nuisance. The Williamson court [417]*417examined whether the illegally parked cars were either an “actual physical condition” or an “obstruction” that constitutes a nuisance. Id. at 183, 543 N.E.2d 1242. The Williamson court held that the illegally parked cars neither possessed an element of permanency nor significantly impeded the flow of traffic. Id. Following Williamson, the district court found that a time frame of thirty hours is not long enough for the abandoned vehicle to possess the necessary element of permanency and become an “actual physical condition.”
We are unpersuaded that Williamson leads to this result. Keeping a road free from nuisance has been interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court to “include more than just conditions of the roadway.” Harp v. City of Cleveland Heights, 87 Ohio St.3d 506, 511, 721 N.E.2d 1020 (2000). In the case at bar, the nature of the abandoned vehicle’s obstruction and its dangerousness are questions of fact to be determined by a jury-
Be this as it may, the outcome of this case does not depend on whether the abandoned vehicle could be found to be a nuisance. Rather, this case turns on whether the function of the patrolling officers in deciding not to have this vehicle towed was discretionary, thus falling under one of the immunities provided in section 2744.03(A)(3). This section states that political subdivisions are immune from liability if the act in question was “within the discretion of the employee with respect to policy making, planning or enforcement powers by virtue of the duties and responsibilities of the office or position of the employee.” Ohio Code § 2744.03(A)(3) (emphasis added). In patrolling Interstate 275, Hamilton County police officers are exercising discretion with respect to the enforcement powers and duties of their position. The decision when to have a vehicle towed because of its dangerous nature certainly falls under the province of section 2744.03(A)(3). On the facts of this case, their decision not to have the vehicle towed was discretionary and in no way implies recklessness on the part of the patrolling officers.
There is still a question, however, whether under Ohio law the immunity granted under section 2744.03(A)(3) is compatible with the nuisance exception found in section 2744.02(B)(3). In Franks v. Lopez, 69 Ohio St.3d 345, 632 N.E.2d 502, (1994), the Ohio Supreme Court confronted the question whether design and construction defects as well as failure to erect signs could be deemed nuisances under section 2744.02(B)(3). The Franks court noted that
these categories [design and construction defect, failure to install signs] simply do not constitute a nuisance as this term has been defined. Additionally, these allegations involve discretionary functions provided in R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (5). Thus the defenses found in 2744.03(A)(3) and (5) preclude the imposition of liability on a political subdivision for any acts or omissions related to these discretionary functions. Id. at 506.
A few courts have interpreted this language in Franks to suggest that the action of keeping a public road free from nuisance is not a discretionary function and therefore the immunities and defense found in section 2744.03(A)(3) and (5) are not valid rejoinders to a nuisance claim under section 2744.02(B)(3). See Beck ex rel. Estate of Beck v. Adam Wholesalers, 2001 WL 1155820, *7 (Ohio App. 6 Dist. Sept. 28, 2001); See Jones v. Shelly Co., 106 Ohio App.3d 440, 445, 666 N.E.2d 316 (Ohio App.5th.1995) (holding that where an alleged negligent act .of a political subdivision constitutes a nuisance, the “discretion[418]*418ary” defense under sections 2744.03(A)(3) and (5) do not apply).
When examining the language in Franks, it is wrong to interpret this language as suggesting that the immunities granted in sections 2744.03(A)(3) and (5) are incompatible with a nuisance claim under section 2744.02(B)(3). After noting that construction defects and the posting of signs are categories incompatible with Ohio’s definition of nuisance, the Franks court then states “Additionally, these allegations involve discretionary functions provided in R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (5). Thus the defense found in 2744.03(A)(3) and (5) preclude the imposition of liability on a political subdivision for any acts or omissions related to these discretionary functions.” Id. at 506 (emphasis added). This sentence says little about the legal character of nuisances, whether they can involve discretionary acts or not. Rather this sentence just states the obvious, that is, there is an alternative method by which the Franks court could have disposed of the case. In short, even if construction design and the placing of signs were nuisances under Ohio Law, the immunity granted in sections 2744.03(A)(3) and (5) would apply.
The facts of this case involve discretionary actions on the part of the patrolling officers. Therefore the immunity found in section 2744.03(A)(3) applies. The decision whether an abandoned vehicle obstructs traffic or presents sufficient danger to mandate towing involves the judgment of the patrolling officers, which, exercised in this instance, was clearly not reckless.
The judgment is affirmed.