Royse, J.
Appellant is the owner of certain improvement bonds (commonly known as Barrett Law Bonds) issued by the City of Hammond. He brought this action against appellee to recover monies paid to appellee by property owners to be applied by it to the payment of his bonds.
Appellant’s complaint was in four paragraphs. For the purpose of deciding the question presented herein each contains the same averments. After averring the bonds were regularly issued, the complaint is, in part, as follows:
“Plaintiff further alleges that bonds were issued in anticipation of said assessment collections in denominations of five hundred dollars each; that [396]*396said bonds were issued in ten equal series, one series payable each year over the ten year period, from funds to be collected annually to be paid in satisfaction of said bonds and the interest coupons, in accordance with the requirements of the respective series, by said city from the interest and principal of the assessments so collected.
“Plaintiff further alleges that from year to year as the assessments accrued, many of the assessments were paid in to the City at the Treasurer’s Office and collected by the City; that upon the maturity of each of the respective bonds referred to in this complaint, they were respectively presented to the City Treasurer of the City of Hammond, Indiana, for payment, and the payment of same respectively demanded; that payment was refused; that on or about the first day of December, 1933, the City Treasurer of defendant stamped each of said respective vonds and interest coupons as follows: ‘Not paid for want of funds, Henry Heckler, City Treasurer’.
“Plaintiff further alleges that as the installments of special assessments came due from time to time for the payment of the bonds and interest coupons, evidencing the interest on the bonds, some of such assessments were paid; that some of the assessments for the payment of said bonds were defaulted and allowed to remain in default until after said bonds came due, and that said bonds came due December 1, 1933; that at the time said bonds came due a substantial amount of the assessments for the payment of same had been paid by the owners assessed into the treasury of the defendant City for the purpose of paying said bonds, and that said defendant was and is now chargeable therewith; that a substantial amount additional was thereafter paid in to the defendant City of Hammond for purpose of paying said bonds; that defendant city is chargeable therewith; that the bonds heretofore herein referred to are the respective bonds sued upon in each respective paragraph of this amended complaint; that each of the bonds referred to in each separate paragraph of the amended complaint were presented to the City Treasurer of defendant City and payment de[397]*397manded, and full payment refused for want of sufficient funds; that partial payments were made by said City of December 29, 1939; $46.00 to apply on principal and $75.00 to apply on the interest; and that partial payments were again made by the defendant City on the bond sued upon on each paragraph of this amended complaint on January 27, 1942, at which time the sum of $4.00 was paid on each of said bonds; and that on September 25, 1942, the additional sum of $47.68 was paid to apply on each of the respective bonds sued upon in the respective paragraphs of this amended complaint.
“That at the time of said respective payments endorsements were placed on each of said respective bonds in like amounts by said City by its Treasurer, reading as follows:
“PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THIS BOND
Date Paid Amount Paid Balance Due
12-29-39 $46.00 $454.00
1-27-42 4.00 450.00
9-25-42 47.68 402.32
RAY J. MADDEN, TREASURER, LAKE COUNTY
“PAYMENT OF DELINQUENT INTEREST
Date Paid From To Interest
12-29-39 6-1-33 12-1-35 $75.00
RAY J. MADDEN, TREASURER, LAKE COUNTY
“That the sums so indicated were actually paid on said bonds on the dates so endorsed thereon by said City.”
Each bond is then set out in the complaint and the notation of non-payment and partial payment is stamped on the back thereof. It is then averred:
“That there is due the plaintiff from the defendant City of Hammond from the funds paid to and collected by said City as aforesaid on said Bond [398]*39810, Series 2, and interest coupons attached, the sum of $447.32 with interest at six per cent per annum from December 1, 1935.”
To this complaint appellee demurred on the grounds the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In the memorandum to its demurrer appellee says the complaint shows on its face that it is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations and that it appears on the face of the complaint the action is not within any of the exceptions to the statute of limitations. It says the allegation of payments long after the maturity of the bonds is insufficient because, as a matter of law and fact, the money paid was not the money of the City of Hammond; that even if it was a payment by the City it did not waive the statute because the City Treasurer had no such authority. The demurrer was sustained. Appellant refused to plead over and judgment was rendered against him. The error assigned here is the ruling of the trial court on the demurrer.
Appellant contends his complaint does not show on its face that it does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statute of - limitations. He further asserts the statute is tolled indefinitely until the money is paid to the City Treasurer by the property owners. Finally, he says the complaint shows the statute was tolled by the partial payments on the bonds in issue.
It is well settled and the parties agree that unless it clearly appears that the case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statute the question cannot be raised by demurrer. Flanagan, Indiana Pleading and Procedure, pp. 23-24, §12, Comment 9.
Section 48-4404, Burns’ 1950 Replacement, provides, in part, as follows:
[399]*399“It shall be the duty of the proper officer, as herein designated, to stamp on every such bond and coupon presented for payment the date of such presentation and a statement as to whether the same was paid or not on account of want of funds. Upon request of the holders of any matured bond or coupon, it shall be the duty of the officer charged with the payment thereof to make a record thereof, together with the name and address of the holder, and to notify such holder by mail immediately when funds are available to pay the same. Such notices shall be sent in the order in which requests for notices have been made.”
Section 48-4405, Burns’ 1950 Replacement, provides:
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Royse, J.
Appellant is the owner of certain improvement bonds (commonly known as Barrett Law Bonds) issued by the City of Hammond. He brought this action against appellee to recover monies paid to appellee by property owners to be applied by it to the payment of his bonds.
Appellant’s complaint was in four paragraphs. For the purpose of deciding the question presented herein each contains the same averments. After averring the bonds were regularly issued, the complaint is, in part, as follows:
“Plaintiff further alleges that bonds were issued in anticipation of said assessment collections in denominations of five hundred dollars each; that [396]*396said bonds were issued in ten equal series, one series payable each year over the ten year period, from funds to be collected annually to be paid in satisfaction of said bonds and the interest coupons, in accordance with the requirements of the respective series, by said city from the interest and principal of the assessments so collected.
“Plaintiff further alleges that from year to year as the assessments accrued, many of the assessments were paid in to the City at the Treasurer’s Office and collected by the City; that upon the maturity of each of the respective bonds referred to in this complaint, they were respectively presented to the City Treasurer of the City of Hammond, Indiana, for payment, and the payment of same respectively demanded; that payment was refused; that on or about the first day of December, 1933, the City Treasurer of defendant stamped each of said respective vonds and interest coupons as follows: ‘Not paid for want of funds, Henry Heckler, City Treasurer’.
“Plaintiff further alleges that as the installments of special assessments came due from time to time for the payment of the bonds and interest coupons, evidencing the interest on the bonds, some of such assessments were paid; that some of the assessments for the payment of said bonds were defaulted and allowed to remain in default until after said bonds came due, and that said bonds came due December 1, 1933; that at the time said bonds came due a substantial amount of the assessments for the payment of same had been paid by the owners assessed into the treasury of the defendant City for the purpose of paying said bonds, and that said defendant was and is now chargeable therewith; that a substantial amount additional was thereafter paid in to the defendant City of Hammond for purpose of paying said bonds; that defendant city is chargeable therewith; that the bonds heretofore herein referred to are the respective bonds sued upon in each respective paragraph of this amended complaint; that each of the bonds referred to in each separate paragraph of the amended complaint were presented to the City Treasurer of defendant City and payment de[397]*397manded, and full payment refused for want of sufficient funds; that partial payments were made by said City of December 29, 1939; $46.00 to apply on principal and $75.00 to apply on the interest; and that partial payments were again made by the defendant City on the bond sued upon on each paragraph of this amended complaint on January 27, 1942, at which time the sum of $4.00 was paid on each of said bonds; and that on September 25, 1942, the additional sum of $47.68 was paid to apply on each of the respective bonds sued upon in the respective paragraphs of this amended complaint.
“That at the time of said respective payments endorsements were placed on each of said respective bonds in like amounts by said City by its Treasurer, reading as follows:
“PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THIS BOND
Date Paid Amount Paid Balance Due
12-29-39 $46.00 $454.00
1-27-42 4.00 450.00
9-25-42 47.68 402.32
RAY J. MADDEN, TREASURER, LAKE COUNTY
“PAYMENT OF DELINQUENT INTEREST
Date Paid From To Interest
12-29-39 6-1-33 12-1-35 $75.00
RAY J. MADDEN, TREASURER, LAKE COUNTY
“That the sums so indicated were actually paid on said bonds on the dates so endorsed thereon by said City.”
Each bond is then set out in the complaint and the notation of non-payment and partial payment is stamped on the back thereof. It is then averred:
“That there is due the plaintiff from the defendant City of Hammond from the funds paid to and collected by said City as aforesaid on said Bond [398]*39810, Series 2, and interest coupons attached, the sum of $447.32 with interest at six per cent per annum from December 1, 1935.”
To this complaint appellee demurred on the grounds the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In the memorandum to its demurrer appellee says the complaint shows on its face that it is barred by the ten-year statute of limitations and that it appears on the face of the complaint the action is not within any of the exceptions to the statute of limitations. It says the allegation of payments long after the maturity of the bonds is insufficient because, as a matter of law and fact, the money paid was not the money of the City of Hammond; that even if it was a payment by the City it did not waive the statute because the City Treasurer had no such authority. The demurrer was sustained. Appellant refused to plead over and judgment was rendered against him. The error assigned here is the ruling of the trial court on the demurrer.
Appellant contends his complaint does not show on its face that it does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statute of - limitations. He further asserts the statute is tolled indefinitely until the money is paid to the City Treasurer by the property owners. Finally, he says the complaint shows the statute was tolled by the partial payments on the bonds in issue.
It is well settled and the parties agree that unless it clearly appears that the case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statute the question cannot be raised by demurrer. Flanagan, Indiana Pleading and Procedure, pp. 23-24, §12, Comment 9.
Section 48-4404, Burns’ 1950 Replacement, provides, in part, as follows:
[399]*399“It shall be the duty of the proper officer, as herein designated, to stamp on every such bond and coupon presented for payment the date of such presentation and a statement as to whether the same was paid or not on account of want of funds. Upon request of the holders of any matured bond or coupon, it shall be the duty of the officer charged with the payment thereof to make a record thereof, together with the name and address of the holder, and to notify such holder by mail immediately when funds are available to pay the same. Such notices shall be sent in the order in which requests for notices have been made.”
Section 48-4405, Burns’ 1950 Replacement, provides:
“No interest shall be paid on any bonds or coupons issued prior to March 16, 1929, after the maturity thereof except from the date on which they are first presented for payment and stamped ‘Not paid for want of funds.’ It shall be the duty of the proper officer as herein designated to stamp upon every such bond and coupon presented for payment the date of such presentation, and the statement as to whether the same was paid, or not paid, on account of want of funds.”
We must first determine when the statute commenced to run. In 54 C. J. S. §108, p. 9, it is stated:
“The general rule, as embodied in most statutes, is that, unless a statute specifically provides otherwise, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time when a complete cause or right of action accrues or arises, or when a person becomes liable to an action, and, according to the general rule which is applicable to any and all kinds of actions in a court, not until that time. It has been said that this rule is never questioned, but that the difficulty lies in determining when the cause of action is to be deemed as having accrued.”
To the same effect, 34 Am. Jur., p. 23, §13.
[400]*400In a negligence action our Supreme Court, in The Board of Commissioners of Wabash County v. Pearson (1889), 120 Ind. 426, 22 N. E. 134, speaking through Judge Elliott, said: (p. 428)
“The appellee’s cause of action did not accrue until he was injured, and, although the defendant’s negligence runs back to 1871, the action is not barred by the statute of limitations. The two elements of the appellee’s cause of action are the legal injury and the resulting damages. City of North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314. The statute did not begin to run until the right of action accrued, and this did not accrue until the two elements came into existence. There is, therefore, no force in the argument that the acts of negligence were committed in 1871, and that the statute then commenced to run, notwithstanding the fact that the appellee was not injured until 1884.”
See also: City of Ft. Wayne v. Hamilton et al. (1892), 132 Ind. 487, 495, 32 N. E. 324; 37 C. J. p. 813, §158; Moody v. Prov. Irr. Dist. (Cal.), 77 Pac. 2d 253, 255, 85 Pac. 2d 128.
The City Treasurer is authorized by statute to receive payments on these bonds and to make payment to the bondholders. §48-1215, §48-4401, Burns’ 1950 Replacement.
These bonds are not the general obligation of the City. However, when the property owner pays all or any part of the assessment to the City, the lien upon the property is to that extent discharged and the City becomes the principal obligor upon the bond to the extent of the payments received by it. Read et al. v. Beczkiewicz, Treasurer, et al. (1939), 215 Ind. 365, 374, 375, 18 N. E. 2d 789, 19 N. E. 2d 465; City of Bloomington v. Citizens National Bank (1914), 56 Ind. App. 446, 105 N. E. 575; City of Hammond v. [401]*401Melville, et al. (1944), 114 Ind. App. 602, 52 N. E. 2d 845 (Transfer denied).
Applying the foregoing authorities to the question presented here, it seems clear to us that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against appellant until after appellee received payments on the assessments from the property owners and refused appellant’s demand for payment of the amount received.
The ten-year statute applies to these bonds. City of Hammond v. Welsh (1946), 224 Ind. 349, 353, 67 N. E. 2d 390.
If a property owner does not pay his assessments within ten years from date of their last maturity, he may assert the statute as defense to an action on the bonds. Under such circumstances the City is not and never was liable for the payment of the bonds. It seems to us it would be unconscionable to say that where a property owner after the statute had run, determined not to take advantage of his personal privilege and paid the money to the proper city official, that then the City could retain this money and refuse to pay the bondholders the amount paid in. Yet this is the contention of appellee here.
The complaint herein avers these bonds were presented to the City Treasurer for payment and payment was refused; that on or about the 1st day of December, 1933, the City Treasurer, as provided by statute, stamped these bonds “Not paid for want of funds”; that prior to and after said date substantial payments had been made to the City Treasurer for the purpose of paying said bonds; that thereafter, in 1939 and 1942, partial payments were made by the City Treasurer to appellant on these bonds. In this case we must consider these averments as true. [402]*402Therefore, when' the City Treasurer had received payments for these bonds prior to December 1, 1933, and on that date stamped them as not paid for want of funds, he concealed the truth from appellant and thereby was guilty of at least constructive fraud. Fraud stays the statute of limitations. Shipman, Executor v. Shipman, Guardian (1934), 99 Ind. App. 445, 192 N. E. 849; 54 C. J. S. 219, §206.
Appellee contends the complaint is bad because it is indefinite and uncertain. However, it did not file a motion to require appellant to make his complaint more specific, etc. Wayne Works v. Hicks Body Co., Inc. (1944), 115 Ind. App. 10, 22, 55 N. E. 2d 382; Wabash R. Co. v. Gretzinger (1914), 182 Ind. 155, 162, 104 N. E. 69.
For the reasons herein stated, we are of the opinion the complaint does not show on its face that it does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statute. The demurrer was improperly sustained.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to the trial court to overrule the demurrer.
Crumpacker, J., not participating.