Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad

78 N.W. 965, 76 Minn. 90, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 544
Supreme Court of Minnesota·Decided April 26, 1899·No. Nos. 11,506—(58)·Published·Cited by 18 cases

Opinion

MITCHELL, J.

This was an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's decedent, alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. On March 30, 1897, the deceased, a passenger on defend[91] ant’s road, when alighting from the train, stepped into a hole in the station platform, and sprained his left ankle. He was subsequently attacked by articular, or, as commonly known, “inflammatory,” rheumatism, and on August 16, 1897, died of what is known in medical parlance as “endocarditis,” which means inflammation of the lining membrane of the cavities of the heart. The evidence is conclusive that the rheumatism was the direct and proximate cause of the endocarditis. It would perhaps be more proper to say that the latter is merely a name for the former, when it reaches the membranes surrounding the heart.

It is conceded that the verdict of the jury (which was in favor of the plaintiff) is conclusive that the injury to the ankle of the deceased was caused by the negligence of the defendant. Hence it is liable, if this injury was the proximate cause of the death. In accordance with the decisions of this, as well as of most, if not all, other courts, if the injury proximately caused the rheumatism, then the injury w'as a proximate cause of the death. The fact that the deceased might have been, for any reason, predisposed to rheumatism, would be immaterial, provided that but for the injury that disease would not have resulted. Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 26, 50 N. W. 927; Miller v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 66 Minn. 192, 68 N. W. 862. And, if the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury, the fact that it could not have reasonably anticipated the particular result which followed, viz. that the injury might produce rheumatism, causing death, is also immaterial. Consequences which follow in an unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular results which did in fact follow. We had occasion to consider this question in Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 640, and point out the distinction in that respect between actions in tort and actions on contract.

The precise question presented on this appeal is whether there was legally sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding that [92] the rheumatism of which the deceased died was directly and proximately caused by the injury to his ankle.

The evidence shows that the deceased was 34 years of age; was in good health at the time of the injury; that he had never been sick, at least during his married life of nearly seven years immediately preceding the accident, except for a short time with the grippe, four years previously; that he had never been troubled with anything like rheumatism until after he received this injury; that his father died at the age of between 60 and 70 of what was supposed to be dyspepsia; that his mother was still living at the age of about 70, and had always been in good health, except that she had suffered somewhat from rheumatism during the last year and a half; also that all of his brothers and sisters were living and in good health. The evidence also tends to show that the injury was quite a severe one, producing severe pain, and causing quite serious swelling of the foot and ankle. A physician was called, who at first bandaged the ankle and applied liniment, but subsequently put it into a plaster of Paris cast, in which it was kept for about ten days. During this time the deceased could not, or at least did not, use his injured foot in walking, but moved about the house on crutches. Some time in April — the exact date does not appear, but apparently in the latter part of the month — articular rheumatism developed itself in the swelling of his right foot and ankle, and soon afterwards of his right hand and wrist, and then of the right elbow, and by the middle of May the swelling sometimes reached to his knees. The disease gradually advanced, until finally, along about the latter part of June, he was compelled to take to his bed, where he remained until his death on August 16.

The evidence does' not disclose any apparent cause of the disease, unless it is the injury to his ankle. The deceased was a traveling salesman, and some time about the middle of April, after the sprain had been at least partially cured, he resumed his business trips on the road, using a cane to assist him in walking. He took several of these trips (about six) during the spring and early summer, returning from the last one about June 25, when he took to his bed, as already stated. Each of these trips occupied three or four days, and between them he was frequently confined at home for a time [93] by Ms rheumatism, for which he was undergoing medical treatment. Aside from this testimony as to the antecedent health of the deceased and of his relatives, the character of the injury, and the history of the appearance and progress of the rheumatism, about all of which there was practically no dispute, the evidence consisted exclusively of medical expert testimony as to the nature and causes of articular or inflammatory rheumatism, and particularly as to the cause of it in the case of deceased.

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Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad, 78 N.W. 965, 76 Minn. 90, 1899 Minn. LEXIS 544 (Mich. 1899).

78 N.W. 965 (Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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