MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 47 Docket: WCB-24-163 Argued: March 5, 2025 Decided: June 3, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
KATHERINE STOVALL
v.
NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY et al.
HORTON, J.
[¶1] New England Telephone Company1 and its insurer, Sedgwick Claims
Management Services (collectively New England Telephone), appeal from a
decision entered by the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation
Board in favor of Katherine Stovall on her petition for restoration of benefits
for a 1996 injury. New England Telephone argues that the Appellate Division
erred by vacating a decision of an administrative law judge (D. Pelletier, ALJ)
denying Stovall’s petition as untimely.2 We agree and therefore vacate the
1 The name of New England Telephone Company changed to “Verizon” after the 1996 date of injury in this case.
2 In addition to contending that Stovall’s petition was untimely, New England Telephone argues that Stovall’s petition is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata and, in the alternative, that the Appellate Division should have remanded the matter for the administrative law judge to adjudicate Stovall’s petition. Our resolution of the appeal on timeliness grounds obviates the need to reach these arguments. 2
Appellate Division decision and remand for the Appellate Division to affirm the
denial of Stovall’s petition as time-barred.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts and procedure are drawn from the procedural
record and the supported findings of the hearing officer and administrative law
judges (ALJs)3 who issued decisions on Stovall’s petitions for award of benefits,
reinstatement, and restoration of benefits in 2006, 2019, and 2023, and on New
England Telephone’s petition for review in 2011. See Michaud v. Caribou
Ford-Mercury, Inc., 2024 ME 74, ¶ 2, 327 A.3d 38.
A. The Initial and Subsequent Injuries
[¶3] In 1996, while employed at New England Telephone, Stovall began
to experience pain in her right hand, fingers, and wrists due to a work-related
injury. By 1998, the pain had spread to both hands, wrists, and forearms, and
she began receiving treatment. Due to the pain, she took a leave of absence
from work in May 1998. She returned in 1999, took a medically recommended
break for another issue, and then returned to work again in April 2000,
restarting treatment for her hand and wrist pain after that. On her treating
3 The title of the Board’s presiding officers changed from “hearing officer” to “administrative law
judge” in 2015. See P.L. 2015, ch. 297 passim (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 2 M.R.S. § 6-E(6) (2025) and 39-A M.R.S. chs. 1, 3, 5, 7 (2025)). 3
physician’s recommendation, Stovall ultimately stopped working on June 29,
2001, due to her pain. Stovall notified New England Telephone in a
communication dated August 1, 2001, that “she had sustained a new
injury/aggravation” as of June 29, 2001. The new injury affected the same parts
of her body as were involved in the 1996 injury but caused more severe pain
and other symptoms. After receiving notice of the new injury, New England
Telephone failed to pay workers’ compensation benefits within fourteen days
and did not file a first report of injury, a notice of controversy, or a
memorandum of payment. See 39-A M.R.S.A. § 205(2), (7) (Supp. 1996)
(memorandum of payment and fourteen-day requirement); 39-A M.R.S.A. § 303
(Supp. 1996) (first report of injury); 39-A M.R.S.A. § 313 (Supp. 1996) (notice
of controversy).
[¶4] In 2004, Stovall filed a petition for award of benefits for the 1996
injury, a petition for award of benefits for the 2001 injury, and a petition for
reinstatement regarding the 2001 injury. On May 17, 2005, New England
Telephone filed a memorandum of payment for the 1996 injury and began
paying benefits. 4
B. The 2006 and 2011 Hearing Officer Decrees
[¶5] On February 27, 2006, a Board hearing officer (Smith, HO) held a
hearing on all three of Stovall’s petitions. Before the hearing began, in a
conversation on the record among the hearing officer and counsel for Stovall
and New England Telephone, it was agreed that any award of benefits resulting
from the hearing would be for the 2001 injury only. New England Telephone
contends that Stovall also agreed that New England Telephone did not have to
file a petition for review in order to terminate its payments on the 1996 injury.
Although Stovall denies such an agreement, it is undisputed that at the hearing
she voluntarily withdrew her petition for award on the 1996 injury.
[¶6] Of note, one of the medical records discussed at the hearing was a
physician’s report on the results of a comprehensive examination of Stovall’s
condition conducted in July and August 2005. The report indicated that Stovall
was asymptomatic and pain-free, had achieved maximum medical
improvement, and had not experienced any permanent impairment due to the
2001 injury. During her testimony at the February 2006 hearing, Stovall was
asked about the report and testified that during the examination, “I told [the
examining physician] I wanted to get back to work and I thought I was ready to
work and—and he said he couldn’t see a reason for me not to.” 5
[¶7] In a decision dated August 6, 2006, the hearing officer denied
Stovall’s petition for reinstatement4 but granted her petition for award based
on the 2001 injury. The hearing officer found that Stovall’s 2001 injury was a
“new gradual injury” that was an aggravation of the 1996 injury but that
involved “much more serious symptoms than in the past.” The hearing officer
noted that New England Telephone had violated its legal obligations by failing,
without an adequate excuse, to pay Stovall benefits based on her 2001 average
weekly wage within fourteen days after receiving notice of the injury. The
decision awarded Stovall total compensation benefits from the date of the 2001
injury to the date of the decision5 and ongoing benefits thereafter at the rate of
40% of her previous total compensation. The decision did not mention the
physician’s report about the 2005 comprehensive examination or Stovall’s
assertion that she felt “ready to work.” New England Telephone did not appeal
from the decision. Instead, as of August 6, 2006, it ceased its payments to
4 As reasons for denying the petition for reinstatement, the hearing officer noted that New England Telephone’s obligation to reinstate had expired and that the only available positions were unsuitable, particularly given that Stovall’s treating physician had continued to impose work restrictions in 2004.
5 The hearing officer also awarded Stovall $10,666.56 in fringe benefits. 6
Stovall for the 1996 injury and began paying benefits in connection with only
the 2001 injury.
[¶8] Four years later, on August 30, 2010, New England Telephone filed
a petition for review, asserting that its obligation to pay benefits on the 2001
injury should cease in 2011 in light of the 520-week durational limit on
compensation payments, see 39-A M.R.S. § 213(4) (2010).6 The hearing officer
who had issued the 2006 decision held a hearing on New England Telephone’s
petition for review in June 2011. The parties stipulated that the durational limit
had been reached, but Stovall argued that she was eligible for continued
benefits for permanent impairment, see id. § 213(1-A)(A). On July 6, 2011, the
hearing officer issued a decision granting the petition for review.
[¶9] In the decision, the hearing officer found that Stovall had not
received any treatment for the 2001 injury since 2005. Although Stovall
testified that she was still experiencing chronic pain and depression as a result
of the 2001 injury, the hearing officer commented that “the record paints a
6 We cite the version of 39-A M.R.S. § 213 that was published in the 2010 Maine Revised Statutes
because it was in effect when the petition for review was filed. Section 213 has since been amended. See, e.g., P.L. 2017, ch. 288, § A-50 (emergency, effective July 15, 2017) (codified at 39-A M.R.S. § 213(4) (2025)). Our later citation to 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B), which governs the discontinuation of payments to an employee, is to the version of the statute in effect on August 6, 2006, when New England Telephone discontinued its payments to Stovall on the 1996 injury. Section 205(9)(B) has since been amended. See, e.g., P.L. 2015, ch. 297, § 5 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2025)). 7
contrary picture.” The hearing officer found that Stovall’s last date of treatment
was in July 2005 and that she underwent an annual physical examination in
August 2005 “without reference to her injury.” The hearing officer did not
credit Stovall’s assertion that she had received a recent prescription for wrist
splints, noting that her testimony and the absence of documentation for the
prescription raised “new issues regarding credibility.”
[¶10] The hearing officer deemed “the most persuasive evidence” in the
record to be the examining physician’s report from 2005 that was briefly
discussed with Stovall at the 2006 hearing. Noting that the medical conclusions
in the report were “not refuted,” the hearing officer adopted the examining
physician’s conclusions that Stovall had achieved “maximum medical
improvement” from the 2001 injury in 2002, that she was asymptomatic and
pain-free, and that she had no permanent impairment, see 39-A M.R.S.
§ 102(16) (2025) (“‘Permanent impairment’ means any anatomic or functional
abnormality or loss existing after the date of maximum medical improvement
that results from the injury.”). Rejecting Stovall’s contention that she was still
experiencing pain, depression, and other symptoms as a result of the 2001
injury, the hearing officer concluded that she had not met her burden of
production to show a genuine issue as to a level of permanent impairment at or 8
above the threshold at which she would be entitled to benefits. Stovall did not
appeal from the hearing officer’s decision.
C. The Petition for Restoration
[¶11] On June 30, 2017, one week short of six years after the July 6, 2011,
hearing officer decision, Stovall filed a petition for restoration of benefits for
her 1996 injury. In connection with the petition, Stovall asserted that she was
entitled to continued benefits because New England Telephone failed to comply
with 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2006) in 2006 when it discontinued payments
on the 1996 injury after she had withdrawn her petition for award of benefits
for the injury. She further asserted that, after crediting the payments she had
received for the 2001 injury, she was entitled to 60% of her total incapacity
benefits from August 6, 2006, to July 6, 2011, and 100% thereafter.
1. The 2019 ALJ Decision and Subsequent Appeal
[¶12] In a decision dated January 17, 2019, the assigned ALJ (McElwee,
ALJ) denied the petition. Based on the hearing officer’s findings in the 2011
decision, the ALJ noted that “the 2001 injury was a significant aggravation, but
an aggravation only, of the 1996 injury,” and concluded that “absent any
evidence whatsoever that the combined effects of the separate injuries could
be divided in any way . . . they became the same condition at the time of the 9
second injury.” Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that New England Telephone’s
“petition for review of incapacity . . . was, in fact, [in] satisfaction of the
requirements of § 205(9)(B)(2) to terminate benefits for both injuries; and that
such benefits were properly terminated by the 7/6/11 decision.”7 The ALJ
denied Stovall’s motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
Stovall appealed, see 39-A M.R.S. § 321-B (2025).
[¶13] The Appellate Division vacated the ALJ’s decision in December
2021 on the ground that, in concluding that the 2011 decision terminated
Stovall’s benefits for both injuries, the ALJ had misapplied the doctrines of res
judicata and laches. The Appellate Division ruled that the 2011 decision
terminated benefits for the 2001 injury only, reasoning that “[i]n Workers’
Compensation proceedings, res judicata is read narrowly to preclude only
issues actually litigated.”8
7 The ALJ also concluded that, in the absence of evidence that Stovall’s condition changed between
the 2011 ruling and 2017, when she filed her petition, her claim was barred by laches. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that laches is inapplicable in a workers’ compensation proceeding.
8 Citing Spencer’s Case, 123 Me. 46, 47, 121 A. 236, 236 (1923), and Wacome v. Paul Mushero Constr. Co., 498 A.2d 593 (Me. 1985), for its conclusion, the Appellate Division declined to follow our more recent workers’ compensation decisions incorporating the “might have been litigated” standard, see Somers v. S.D. Warren Co., 2020 ME 137, ¶ 10, 242 A.3d 1091; Johnson v. Shaw’s Distrib. Ctr., 2000 ME 191, ¶ 6, 760 A.2d 1057. A concurring member of the panel questioned the majority’s analysis, suggesting that Spencer’s Case and Wacome are distinguishable from Stovall’s case because the later claim in both Spencer’s Case and Wacome “involv[ed] a different body part than [the claim] adjudicated earlier.” See Spencer’s Case, 123 Me. at 47, 121 A. at 236 (new claim for thumb injury not precluded by previous claim involving injury to fingers); Wacome, 498. A.2d at 593-94 (new claim 10
[¶14] The Appellate Division remanded the matter for a determination
of whether Stovall’s claim “was [actually] litigated and adjudicated by prior
board decisions and therefore barred” from review. The Appellate Division
further instructed that if, on remand, the ALJ concluded that the doctrine of res
judicata did not apply, the ALJ should consider whether Stovall’s petition was
timely and whether New England Telephone was authorized under 39-A M.R.S.
§ 205(9)(B)(2) to discontinue payments for the 1996 injury.
2. The Proceedings After Remand
[¶15] On remand, a different ALJ (D. Pelletier, ALJ) was assigned. Stovall
contended that her petition should be deemed timely because it was filed
before the expiration of the period during which a petition must be filed when
an employer has paid benefits for an injury. See 39-A M.R.S. § 306(2) (2025) (“If
an employer or insurer pays benefits under this Act, . . . the period during which
an employee or other interested party must file a petition is 6 years from the
date of the most recent payment.”). Although she filed her petition nearly
eleven years after the benefit payments for the 1996 injury had ended, Stovall
contended that the six-year statute had been tolled during the entire time New
for back injury not precluded by previous claim for foot injury). In light of our holding in this case, we need not decide the extent to which the doctrine of res judicata applies here. 11
England Telephone had been paying her benefits on the 2001 injury pursuant
to the 2006 decision. Her argument relied on our decisions holding that “a
workers’ compensation payment by an employer . . . with notice that the
payment related in part to the first injury does toll the statute of limitations on
first-injury claims against the employer as well as against its insurer at the time
of the first injury.” Klimas v. Great N. Paper Co., 582 A.2d 256, 257 (Me. 1990);
see also Pottle v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 551 A.2d 112, 114-15 (Me. 1988).
Stovall contended that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments
on the 2001 injury were related in part to the 1996 injury.
[¶16] The ALJ denied Stovall’s petition. As to res judicata, the ALJ
followed the Appellate Division’s instruction to consider only whether Stovall’s
claim for the 1996 injury “was actually litigated and adjudicated in 2006 or
2011” and determined that her petition was not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. However, the ALJ concluded that the petition was time-barred
because it was filed outside the statutory six-year period and Stovall had not
met her burden under Pottle and Klimas to show that the running of the period
was tolled. See 39-A M.R.S. § 306(2).
[¶17] Noting Stovall’s argument that “all payments made by the
employer for the 2001 injury which ended on July 6, 2011 placed the employer 12
on notice that the 1996 injury was continuing to play a role in the employee’s
condition,” the ALJ found that Stovall had not supplied any medical evidence
supporting her argument and that Stovall had not herself placed New England
Telephone on notice.9 The ALJ also noted the findings in the 2011 decision that
Stovall was asymptomatic and pain-free as to the 2001 injury and had not seen
her treating physician for her condition since 2005. The ALJ accordingly
rejected Stovall’s argument that New England Telephone had
contemporaneous notice that its payments on the 2001 injury were in part
related to the 1996 injury.
[¶18] After the decision was issued, the ALJ denied motions from both
parties for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order denying
Stovall’s motion summarized the ALJ’s reasoning as being that, because Stovall
had been asymptomatic since 2002 as to the 2001 injury, “[i]t follows then that
any symptoms related to the 1996 injury, presumably the underlying condition,
ended in 2002 as well.” Stovall appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appellate
Division. See 39-A M.R.S. § 321-B.
9 The ALJ also referred to an exchange of email messages in 2012 between Stovall and New England Telephone regarding Stovall’s request to be reimbursed for a medical bill that she had paid in 1998. The ALJ found that New England Telephone issued Stovall a check referring to the 2001 injury and that Stovall requested that the check be reissued “with a 1998 injury date.” New England Telephone refused, and Stovall never cashed the check. The ALJ noted that there was no payment that could even arguably have tolled the statutory period. 13
[¶19] On March 28, 2024, the Appellate Division issued a written
decision again vacating the ALJ decision and entered a decision in favor of
Stovall. The Appellate Division again concluded that the doctrine of res judicata
did not bar Stovall’s petition for restoration because “[i]n workers’
compensation proceedings . . . res judicata is read narrowly to preclude the
relitigation of issues actually litigated.”10 The Appellate Division next
concluded that Stovall’s petition for restoration was not untimely under 39-A
M.R.S. § 306(2). The Appellate Division determined that there was sufficient
record evidence, based primarily on the hearing officer’s findings in the 2006
decision, that New England Telephone knew that the 1996 injury “contributed
in some part” to its payments on the 2001 injury and that, therefore, the
limitations period for the 1996 injury was tolled until July 6, 2011—when
payments for the 2001 injury ended. See Pottle, 551 A.2d at 114-15; Klimas,
582 A.2d at 258-59.
[¶20] Rather than remanding the matter for the ALJ to determine
whether Stovall had agreed at the beginning of the 2006 hearing that
New England Telephone could discontinue payments on the 1996 injury, the
10 In its reasoning, the Appellate Division again relied on Spencer’s Case, 123 Me. at 47, 121 A. at 236, and Wacome, 498 A.2d at 593, instead of our more recent decisions, see supra n.8. 14
Appellate Division in effect adjudicated that issue. It ruled that New England
Telephone was not permitted to discontinue payments for the 1996 injury in
2006 because it did not file a petition to cease payments. See 39-A M.R.S.
§ 205(9)(B)(2).11 Based on that conclusion, it awarded Stovall compensation
for the 1996 injury “at the rate established by the 2005 memorandum of
payment, from August 6, 2006, to the present and continuing, with a credit for
benefits paid on Ms. Stovall’s 2001 date of injury.”
[¶21] New England Telephone petitioned for appellate review, see 39-A
M.R.S. § 322 (2025); M.R. App. P. 23, and we granted its petition.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
[¶22] “In the workers’ compensation context, . . . our role on appeal, like
the Appellate Division’s role, is limited by statute.” Potter v. Great Falls Ins. Co.,
11Under the statute in effect at the time, 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2006), an employer could discontinue or reduce payments in two scenarios. First, if no compensation award or scheme had been established, compensation could be discontinued through a certificate sent by certified mail. Id. § 205(9)(B)(1). Second, if a compensation award or scheme had been established, including through a memorandum of payment, see id. § 205(7), the employer had to follow a formal process requiring a petition to the Board followed by “the dispute resolution procedures of [the Workers’ Compensation] Act.” Id. § 205(9)(B)(2). Section 205(9)(B) has since been amended, although the requirements for discontinuation of benefits remain essentially the same. See, e.g., P.L. 2015, ch. 297, § 5 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 39-A M.R.S. § 205(9)(B) (2025)).
Here, in electing to enter a decision for Stovall rather than to remand, the Appellate Division cited New England Telephone’s failure to comply with section 205(9)(B)(2). We agree that an employer’s failure to obtain authorization to discontinue the payment of benefits may support a petition for restoration of benefits, but it has no bearing on whether the petition for restoration is timely. 15
2020 ME 144, ¶ 17, 243 A.3d 1188 (citing 39-A M.R.S. §§ 318, 321-B(2), 322(3)
(2020); M.R. App. P. 23(b)(3)). “We review decisions of the Appellate Division
according to established principles of administrative law, except with regard to
the ALJ’s factual findings.” Michaud, 2024 ME 74, ¶ 12, 327 A.3d 38 (quotation
marks and alteration omitted). By statute, “[t]he administrative law judge’s
decision, in the absence of fraud, on all questions of fact is final; but if the
administrative law judge expressly finds that any party has or has not sustained
the party’s burden of proof, that finding is considered a conclusion of law and
is reviewable . . . .” 39-A M.R.S. § 318 (2025).
[¶23] We focus, as did the Appellate Division, on the ALJ’s determination
after remand that Stovall had failed to meet her burden to show that New
England Telephone was on notice while making payments for the 2001 injury
that the payments were made necessary to some extent by the continued effects
of Stovall’s 1996 injury. Our decisions beginning with Pottle define what
constitutes notice as a matter of law, but as Stovall acknowledges, the issue of
whether New England Telephone was on notice when it made payments for the
2001 injury is at least in part a question of fact. See Boober v. Great N. Paper Co.,
398 A.2d 371, 375 n.10 (Me. 1979); Bradbury v. Inhabitants of Falmouth, 18 Me.
64, 65 (1841) (“[W]hat is, or is not, reasonable notice, has been held to be a 16
question of law”; whether it has been provided is a question of fact). Although
the ALJ’s decision that Stovall did not sustain her burden of proof is subject to
review, see 39-A M.R.S. § 318, neither we nor the Appellate Division may set the
decision aside unless the record compelled the ALJ to decide in Stovall’s favor.
See Leighton v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 111, ¶ 21, 883 A.2d 906; Davidson v.
Bancroft & Martin, 560 A.2d 13, 14 (Me. 1989); St. Pierre v. Morin Brick Co., 427
A.2d 492, 494 (Me. 1981).
B. The Legal Standard
[¶24] The time limits for the filing of workers’ compensation petitions
are governed by the following statutory provisions:
1. Statute of Limitations. Except as provided in this section, a petition brought under this Act is barred unless filed within 2 years after the date of injury or the date the employee’s employer files a required first report of injury if required in section 303, whichever is later.
2. Payment of benefits. If an employer or insurer pays benefits under this Act, with or without prejudice, within the period provided in subsection 1, the period during which an employee or other interested party must file a petition is 6 years from the date of the most recent payment.
39-A M.R.S § 306(1)-(2).12
Section 306(1) is, as its title indicates, a statute of limitations because the limitations period 12
runs from the accrual of the workers’ compensation claim. Section 306(2) is a statute of repose—the six-year period runs from when the employer ceases to pay benefits. See State v. Tucci, 2019 ME 51, 17
[¶25] It is the six-year period in section 306(2) that is at issue here.
Stovall’s petition for restoration of benefits for the 1996 injury was filed nearly
eleven years after payments on the 1996 injury ceased. However, we have
recognized that the statutory periods for filing petitions are tolled when an
employer makes benefit payments for a subsequent injury with notice that the
payments are “for treatment that was in part necessitated by the [prior] injury.”
Klimas, 582 A.2d at 258; see also Pottle, 551 A.2d at 114-15; Leighton, 2005 ME
111, ¶ 1, 883 A.2d 906. In Klimas, we said, “Pottle stands for the proposition
that the . . . statute of limitations would be tolled if either [the employer or its
insurer] had notice at the time payments were made that [the employee] was
still being treated for the [prior] injury.” Klimas, 582 A.2d at 258.
[¶26] In Leighton, we explained the allocation of the burden of proof and
the rationale for the allocation:
[T]he employee bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether the statute of limitations has been tolled. After the employer submits evidence of a date of latest payment that [would render the petition untimely], and assuming that the hearing officer is persuaded by that evidence, if the employee claims that the statute was tolled, the burden shifts to the employee to establish that the employer or insurer had contemporaneous notice that payments
¶ 12 n.2, 206 A.3d 891 (“A statute of limitations governs the time within which an action must be commenced and begins to run when the cause of action accrues, whereas a statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action.”). 18
made within the limitations period but after a subsequent injury related in part to the prior injury.
Allocating the burden to the employee on this issue is supported by reasons of fairness and convenience. The employee is the party that has or can most readily gain control of the evidence required to establish that he or she had informed the employer or insurer that the current incapacity is attributable to both the prior and more recent injury. The employee can satisfy this burden by, for example, submitting medical records that attribute the onset of new symptoms at least in part to the prior injury, along with evidence that the insurer or employer had been made aware of the contents of the records at the time payments were made. Or, the employee could submit proof that he or she had asserted a belief to the employer at the time payments were being made that the older injury is at least in part responsible for the later incapacity.
Leighton, 2005 ME 111, ¶¶ 16-17, 883 A.2d 906.
[¶27] Applied here, our tolling jurisprudence required Stovall to prove
that New England Telephone was on notice while paying benefits for her later
injury that its payments related to both injuries because the prior injury still
required treatment or still affected her condition, separately or in combination
with the later injury.
C. The Issue: Whether Stovall’s Petition for Restoration Was Timely
[¶28] We turn to whether the Appellate Division correctly ruled that the
record evidence compelled the ALJ after remand to decide that Stovall had met
her burden. Because Stovall moved for findings after the ALJ’s decision on
remand, we may not infer that the ALJ made any findings beyond those 19
expressly stated in the decision. See Downing v. Dep’t of Transp., 2012 ME 5,
¶ 19, 34 A.3d 1150.
[¶29] The ALJ’s decision after remand included the following findings:
The 2006 decision described the 2001 injury as a new gradual injury that caused what Stovall’s treating physician termed a significant aggravation of Stovall’s condition, with “much more serious symptoms than in the past.” (Quotation marks and emphasis omitted.)
“The 2006 decision does not make any findings about whether the 1996 injury continued to play a role in part in [Stovall’s] condition,” and the issue was not raised.
“[Stovall] did not supply any medical evidence supporting” her argument that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments related to the 1996 injury and did not testify that she had placed New England Telephone on notice.
The 2005 examining physician’s report stated that “[Stovall] had no pain. She has no neck pain, no shoulder pain, no elbow pain. She denies any wrist pain.” (Quotation marks omitted.)
The hearing officer’s 2011 decision “found that [Stovall] had last seen her own doctor for her wrists, arms, elbows and shoulders in 2005.” 13
[¶30] In vacating the ALJ’s decision on remand, the Appellate Division
noted that the 2006 hearing officer decision “found that Ms. Stovall gave notice
to New England Telephone on August 1, 2001, that ‘she had sustained a new
13 The hearing officer’s 2011 finding that Stovall had not received any treatment for the 2001
injury since 2005 does not bear directly on the issue of whether New England Telephone was on notice while making benefit payments, but it does support an inference that New England Telephone was never notified while making payments that Stovall was being treated for the 1996 injury. 20
injury/aggravation on June 29, 2001 of her prior injury.’” The Appellate
Division also pointed out that the 2006 decision relied in part on Stovall’s
treating physician’s opinion that Stovall’s 2001 injury was “a significant
aggravation of [Stovall’s] underlying condition.” (Quotation marks omitted.)
[¶31] That the 2001 injury was an aggravation of the 1996 injury did not
necessarily serve to satisfy Stovall’s burden. Stovall’s burden was to show that
while New England Telephone was making payments on the 2001 injury, it was
on notice that the 1996 injury contributed to the necessity for workers’
compensation benefits by requiring continued treatment, contributing to
continuing impairment, or otherwise affecting Stovall’s condition. In Pottle, the
employee incurred successive injuries to his left knee, and after the employer
had finished paying benefits for the later injury, it was established medically
that the earlier injury had contributed to the permanent impairment of the
knee. 551 A.2d at 113-15. We held that the employer was not on notice that its
payments on the later injury related to the earlier injury because the
contributing role of the earlier injury was not established until after the
employer had finished paying benefits for the later injury. Id. at 114-15. In a
sense, this case involves the opposite chronology. 21
[¶32] By virtue of Stovall’s notice of injury in 2001 and the opinion of her
treating physician, New England Telephone was on notice before paying any
benefits on the 2001 injury that the 2001 injury was an aggravation of the 1996
injury. However, as the transcript of the 2006 hearing reveals, before starting
payments on the 2001 injury, New England Telephone was also on notice of
what the hearing officer termed the “persuasive” 2005 physician’s report
indicating that Stovall was asymptomatic, pain-free, and without any
permanent impairment from the 2001 injury. Nothing in the record indicates
that New England Telephone received notice to the contrary while paying
benefits for the 2001 injury. Accordingly, there is little room for Stovall’s
argument that while paying benefits for the 2001 injury between 2006 and
2011, New England Telephone was on notice that the effects of the 1996 injury
continued to require treatment or otherwise affect her condition although the
effects of the more serious aggravating 2001 injury to precisely the same parts
of her body had ended as of no later than 2005.
[¶33] Not only does the record evidence not compel a decision in
Stovall’s favor, it furnishes solid support for the ALJ’s conclusion after remand
that Stovall failed to prove that while making payments related to the 2001
injury New England Telephone was on notice that its payments also related to 22
the 1996 injury. We vacate the decision of the Appellate Division and remand
for entry of a decision affirming the ALJ’s denial of Stovall’s petition for
restoration as time-barred.
The entry is:
Decision vacated. Remanded to the Appellate Division for entry of a decision affirming the denial of the petition for restoration of benefits.
Travis C. Rackliffe, Esq. (orally), and Kayla A. Estes, Esq., Tucker Law Group, Bangor, for appellants New England Telephone Co. et al.
Zachary J. Smith, Esq. (orally), Lawsmith Legal Services, L.L.C., Bangor, for appellee Katherine Stovall
Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division case number 23-6 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY