Kakish v. Streetwork Project, Safe Horizon

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 17, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-06264
StatusUnknown

This text of Kakish v. Streetwork Project, Safe Horizon (Kakish v. Streetwork Project, Safe Horizon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kakish v. Streetwork Project, Safe Horizon, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RAMZI KAKISH, Plaintiff, -against- 21-CV-6264 (LTS) STREETWORK PROJECT, SAFE ORDER TO AMEND HORIZON; CAROLYN STRUDWICK, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Ramzi Kakish brings this pro se action alleging that his employer has discriminated against him based on his sex. The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims as arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131. By order dated July 27, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Ramzi Kakish brings his claims using the Court’s general complaint form.1 Plaintiff checks the box on the form to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction, and in

1 The complaint does not specify Plaintiff’s sex. For the purposes of this order, the Court assumes Plaintiff identifies as male. response to the question on the form asking which of his federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, Plaintiff writes, “Discrimination based on sex at workplace.” (ECF 2, at 2.) He sues his former employer, Streetwork Project, and its Associate Vice President Carolyn Strudwick. The “facts” section of the complaint form reads in its entirety:

I was assigned desperate [sic] duties based on my sex. There was an attempt by a coworker to coerce me into taking orders. This person said in front of clients and another coworker “that’s a man!” about me. She was trying to force me to do a job task that I was not assigned nor did I agree to. I was assigned to do the same duties as she was in that shift. She is not a supervisor or management and therefore did not have authority to tell me what to do. Management at Streetwork Project knew how she treated me and did nothing about it. I voiced my concerns to supervisors. I specifically told them that this coworker is “delegating” my tasks and I was unhappy about this. They did not do anything to help. The same coworker was sexually inappropriate. She slapped a sandwich in a sexual manner and made a joke mocking that I’m a “virgin” and laughed. I have mentioned that it was my first time trying a plastic face mask. This occurred in April 2020 at the beginning of the pandemic. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he received medical and psychiatric treatment “immediately after quitting” his job at Streetwork Project on November 2, 2020. He maintains that he has been on psychotropic medications to manage his symptoms “that were reinstated while on the job.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been unemployed throughout 2021 and seeks “a year salary of $41,000” since he has “been on unemployment since leaving the job.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks “additional money for damages to [his] mental health.” (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Title VII claims Because Plaintiff alleges that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of his sex, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer

... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This antidiscrimination provision prohibits employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).

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Kakish v. Streetwork Project, Safe Horizon, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kakish-v-streetwork-project-safe-horizon-nysd-2021.