Kaid v. Tatum

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 14, 2021·No. 1:20-cv-03643·Unknown

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK FLECTRONICALLY FILED DOC#: □□ SAEED KAID, DATE FILED: _ 6/14/2021 Plaintiff, -against- E.L. TATUM, JR., WARDEN; MR. MCBAIN, R & D UNIT MANAGER; ROSA PROTO, 9 & 11 NORTH UNIT MANAGER; E. WALKES, 9 & 11 NORTH UNIT COUNSELOR; S. ESPINET, 9 & 11 NORTH UNIT COUNSELOR; F. OLIVERES, 9 NORTH CASE MANAGER; Z. GARDNER, 9 & 11 NORTH SECRETARY; S. GREGORY, HEALTH SERVICES 20-CV-3643 (ALC) ADMINISTRATOR; A. BUSSANICH, DOCTOR; S. MANDEEP, PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT-CERTIFIED; T. ORDER OF SERVICE THOMAS, REGISTERED NURSE; K. ALRAHEEB, ASSISTANT WARDEN OF PROGRAMS; L. ANDERSON, DEPUTY OFFICER; S. ESGUERRA, CONTRACT RADIOLOGY TECHNICIAN; K. MASTERS, SHU OFFICER; T. DOCTOR, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES; L. SHIVERS, DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICER; JOHN DOE, SHU LIEUTENANT; JOHN DOE, SHU OFFICER; AND MR. BANKS, DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICER, Defendants. ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in F.C.I. Fairton, brings this pro se action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that, while he was detained in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, Defendants violated his rights by failing to protect him and showing deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. By order

dated July 24, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. DISCUSSION A. Service on Named Defendants Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure generally requires that summonses and the complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summonses and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants E.L. Tatum, Jr., Warden; Mr. McBain, R & D Unit Manager; Rosa Proto, 9 & 11 North Unit Manager; E. Walkes, 9 & 11 North Unit

Counselor; S. Espinet, 9 & 11 North Unit Counselor; F. Oliveres, 9 North Case Manager; Z. Gardner, 9 & 11 North Secretary; S. Gregory, Health Services Administrator; A. Bussanich, Doctor; S. Mandeep, Physician Assistant-Certified; T. Thomas, Registered Nurse; K. Alraheeb, Assistant Warden of Programs; L. Anderson, Deputy Officer; S. Esguerra, Contract Radiology Technician; K. Masters, SHU Officer; T. Doctor, Special Investigative Services; L. Shivers, Disciplinary Hearing Officer; and Mr. Banks, Disciplinary Hearing Officer, through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of these Defendants. Because these Defendants are federal Defendants, the Clerk of Court is further instructed to mark the box on the USM-285 forms labeled “Check for service on U.S.A.” The Clerk of Court is

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Kaid v. Tatum, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Kaid v. Tatum (Kaid v. Tatum) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Murray v. Pataki
378 F. App'x 50 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)