Kaid v. Tatum

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 18, 2021·No. 1:20-cv-03643·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SAEED KAID, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-3643 (LLS) E. L. TATUM, JR., WARDEN, ET AL, ORDER TO AMEND NAMED & UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, TWENTY-EIGHT TOTAL DEFENDANTS, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Center in Fairton, New Jersey, brings this pro se action alleging that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights. By order dated July 24, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Saeed Kaid alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him and showing deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. He sues (1) E. L. Tatum Jr., Warden of the Metropolitan Correctional Center (“MCC”); (2) K. Alraheed, Associate Warden of Programs at MCC; (3) Jane Doe, Associate Warden of Operations; and (4) John Doe, MCC Captain. Although Plaintiff lists four Defendants in the body of the complaint, the caption of the complaint includes only E. L. Tatum Jr., Warden and “Named & Unnamed Defendants, Twenty-Eight Total Defendants.” (ECF No. 2 at 1.) Plaintiff also refers to

individuals in his statement of facts who are not named in the caption of the complaint. It is therefore unclear against whom Plaintiff seeks to assert claims. The following facts are taken from the complaint. On January 9, 2017 at 4:00 a.m., the United States Marshals Service transported Plaintiff from a state-run facility to the MCC. During the MCC booking process, correctional staff working in the “Receiving and Discharge Unit” departed from “FBOP policy.” (ECF No. 2 at 3) Instead of assigning Plaintiff to administrative detention to screen “for possible ‘separatees or other security threats,’” the Unit conducted a “symbolic” screening and assigned Plaintiff to the general population (Unit 11 North) where a cooperating witness in his case was detained. (Id. at 4) At 7:00 p.m., Plaintiff’s cellmate informed him that the cooperating witness, “R.J.,” had a

“big knife” and that Plaintiff should “be careful.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked Deputy Officer Anderson to separate him from R.J. because he “felt that his life was in immediate danger”; Anderson instructed Plaintiff to notify his unit team. (Id.) On January 10, 2017 at 6:45 a.m., during breakfast, R.J. asked Plaintiff to accompany him and then attacked Plaintiff “without any provocation.” (Id.) R.J. stabbed Plaintiff in his “mid-lower back,” shoved Plaintiff down a set of steps injuring Plaintiff’s left foot and ankle, kicked Plaintiff in the head, and stomped on his already injured ankle. (Id. at 5) Plaintiff “yelled for help and summoned prison officials.” (Id.) Deputy Officer Anderson arrived and yelled “stop,” but R.J. “continued to attack Plaintiff.” (Id.) Eventually, backup officers arrived, and Plaintiff was transported to the MCC emergency room. (Id.) In the emergency room, Plaintiff told “R.N. Thomas” that he was stabbed and that his foot and ankle were in “great pain.” (Id. at 6) X-rays revealed that Plaintiff “sustained fractures

in his left foot and ankle joint effusion.” (Id.) Despite “excruciating pain,” Plaintiff “was only provided an ankle brace and then rushed to a detention cell in the Special Housing Unit (‘SHU’) instead of being transported to a local hospital.” (Id.) Plaintiff received only his inhaler and “30 naproxens,” which were prescribed from a previous injury. (Id.) On January 11, 2017, Plaintiff informed “P.A. C. S. Mandeep” that he continued to suffer “severe pain” as a result of his injuries and that he needed “stronger medication.” (Id. at 7) On January 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a sick call request and C.S. Mandeep stated he would notify Health Service Administrator Dr. Gregory Bussanich. (Id.) After several days without any response, Plaintiff asked John Doe SHU Lieutenant for assistance because he was in “extreme pain” and had difficulty walking “to and from the showers” without crutches. (Id.) The John Doe

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