Justich v. Carr

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 20, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-01575
StatusUnknown

This text of Justich v. Carr (Justich v. Carr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Justich v. Carr, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

TONY JUSTICH,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 20-CV-1575-JPS

KEVIN CARR, JOHN TATE, MICHAEL RIVERS, and JOHN DOES ORDER 1-50,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Tony Justich (“Plaintiff”) was an inmate confined at Oshkosh Correctional Institution (“Oshkosh”) when he filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as other state and constitutional rights, of all persons incarcerated in Wisconsin facilities under the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, due to the conditions of Wisconsin prisons during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Docket #1). Plaintiff seeks to make this a class action, with himself representing all prisoners in the Wisconsin prison system. (Id. at 1-2). Additionally, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and for a temporary restraining order. (Docket #4). This Order resolves Plaintiff’s pending motions, addresses his request to proceed as a class, and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time as he is able. Id. On November 5, 2020, the Court permitted Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $23.72 from his release account. (Docket #14). Plaintiff paid that fee on November 19, 2020. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. (Docket #2). He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges that from January 1, 2020 until the present, Defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as other state and constitutional rights, of all persons incarcerated in Wisconsin facilities under the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. (Docket #1). Plaintiff states that Defendants did not properly create, implement, or enforce policies that would prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the prisons. (Id. at 5-8, 10-13). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of confinement at the prisons during the COVID-19 pandemic created an environment that allowed the virus to spread easily. (Id. at 4-5). Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not utilize the various methods of releasing prisoners to prevent overcrowding in the prisons. (Id. at 7-8). Lastly, Plaintiff requests that this case be certified as a class action, with him representing over 20,000 inmates. (Id. at 8-10). 2.3 Analysis First, the Court will address Plaintiff’s request for this case to be certified as a class action and that he represent over 20,000 Wisconsin inmates. The Court must deny Plaintiff’s request for class certification. Under Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the class must be provided adequate representation. Because of this requirement, courts have repeatedly declined to allow pro se prisoners to represent a class in a class action. See Howard v. Pollard, 814 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that it would be plain error to permit an imprisoned pro se litigant to represent his fellow inmates in a class action); Caputo v. Fauver, 800 F. Supp. 168, 169– 70 (D.N.J. 1992) (“Every court that has considered the issue has held that a prisoner proceeding pro se is inadequate to represent the interests of his fellow inmates in a class action.”); Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir.

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213 F.3d 1320 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
Oxendine v. Williams
509 F.2d 1405 (Fourth Circuit, 1975)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
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Caputo v. Fauver
800 F. Supp. 168 (D. New Jersey, 1992)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
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Cesal v. Moats
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Bluebook (online)
Justich v. Carr, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/justich-v-carr-wied-2021.