Home/California Court of Appeal/Junge v. Midland Counties Public Service Corp.

Junge v. Midland Counties Public Service Corp.

100 P.2d 1073, 38 Cal. App. 2d 154, 1940 Cal. App. LEXIS 621
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 25, 1940
DocketCiv. 12352
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 100 P.2d 1073 (Junge v. Midland Counties Public Service Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Junge v. Midland Counties Public Service Corp., 100 P.2d 1073, 38 Cal. App. 2d 154, 1940 Cal. App. LEXIS 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).

Opinions

McCOMB, J.

From a judgment in favor of (a) plaintiff Warren Junge in the sum of $35,000 and (b) plaintiff John L. Junge, father of Warren Junge, in the sum of $10,000, after trial before a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from defendants ’ negligence, defendants appeal.

Viewing the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs (respondents) , the essential facts are:

August 15, 1937, plaintiff Warren Junge, age 13, and his mother, who were living on a farm in San Luis Obispo County, arose about 6:00 A. M. Said plaintiff’s mother found that there was no electricity in her home, whereupon she and her son left their house, climbed through a barbed wire fence and started to milk their cows. After four or five cows had been milked, they noticed that one of the power wires which came to their premises from the main transmission line had fallen and was lying across the wire fence through which they had climbed. They completed the milking of the cows, returned to their house and found that they were still without electricity. Plaintiff Warren Junge then telephoned to defendant MeKie, the service man for defendant Midland Counties Public Service Corporation. Plaintiff Warren Junge and his mother again went outside and commenced picking carrots, at which time they noticed a grass fire along the wire fence. Plaintiff Warren Junge attempted to put out the fire while his mother went into their [157]*157home to call assistance. While engaged in attempting to extinguish the fire, plaintiff Warren Junge came into contact either with the fallen wire or the fence which had become energized by the fallen wire, which was one of two high voltage wires located on a pole situated on the premises on which plaintiff Warren Junge lived and which conveyed 11,-000 volts of electricity. As a result he was rendered unconscious and severely burned.

Defendant McKie at 6:30 A. M. learning that the electricity was off on the circuit which supplied the residence in which plaintiff Warren Junge lived, left his home and traveled by automobile a distance of eight miles to a regulator station, where at 7:10 A. M. he found the automatic switch upon the circuit open, which he-immediately closed and which switch, through action of the automatic circuit breaker, reopened at 7:11 A. M. At 7:13 A. M. he reclosed the switch, energizing the circuit "with 11,000 volts of electricity. At 7:14 A. M. the switch again opened.

Defendants rely for reversal of the judgment on these propositions:

First: There is no substantial evidence to sustain a finding that defendants were in any way negligent.
Second: The trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding evidence that defendant McKie on closing the automatic switch twice was acting in accordance with the practice of the best managed concerns in the industry.
Third: The trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury as follows:
“If you believe from the evidence that Warren Junge was injured by coming in contact with high voltage electricity without knowledge of the danger therefrom, the electric current for which ivas furnished by defendants, such fact, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, affords reasonable evidence of defendants’ want of care and it then devolves upon defendants to show that the injuries resulting to Warren Junge from said electricity did not occur from any negligent act or acts on their part.”
Fourth: The verdicts in favor of (a) plaintiff Warren Junge in the sum of $35,000 and (b) John L. Junge in the sum of $10,000 are excessive.

The first proposition is untenable. The evidence disclosed that:

[158]*158(a) At the time Mrs. Junge arose there was no electricity flowing into her home.
(b) At the time Mrs. Junge and her son finished milking the cows and climbed back through the wire fence and went into the house the grass had not as yet become ignited.
(c) At 7:10 A. M. defendant McKie closed the automatic switch which had opened, indicating there was trouble on the
11.000 volt electric circuit, a portion of which transversed the Junge premises. At 7:11 A. M. the switch reopened through the action of the automatic circuit breaker and at 7:13 said defendant reclosed the switch. At 7:14 the switch again opened.
(d) On leaving her home for the second time to pick carrots Mrs. Junge noticed that grass fires had started on her premises.
(e) Plaintiff Warren Junge, while endeavoring to put out the fires that had started was severely burned by coming in contact with either the wire fence or the fallen wire which had been energized by electricity.
(f) Witness Boyles, assistant manager of operations of the Southern California Edison Company, called on behalf of defendant, testified relative to the practice of his company on closing automatic switches which had opened: “On our system on the 2300 to 4000 volt circuit we reclose twice; on 11.000 and 16,000 we reclose once.” (Italics added.)

From the foregoing facts the jury were justified in finding that the high voltage wire had fallen before plaintiff Warren Junge and his mother first left their home on the morning of August 15, 1937 (fact [a], supra), that the reclosing of the automatic switch by defendant McKie caused the grass to catch on fire (facts [b] and [c], supra), that after the first closing of the switch causing the fire and before its closing the second time by defendant McKie, plaintiff Warren Junge started to put out the grass fire (facts [c] and [d], supra), and that it was negligent for defendant McKie to close the automatic switch the second time, since so doing was contrary to the practice of the best managed companies in the industry (facts [e] and [f], supra).

The second proposition is likewise untenable. Witness Boyles, who was assistant manager of operations of the Southern California Edison Company, was permitted to tes[159]*159tify as to the practice of the Southern California Edison Company relative - to the reclosing of automatic switches when opened by some interruption on the electric circuits. The witness Plummer also testified as to the practice of the Modesto Irrigation District relative to the closing of automatic circuit breakers, it being conceded that both of the aforementioned companies were among the best managed in the State of California.

The third proposition is also untenable. Defendants urge that this instruction is vulnerable to these objections:

(1) It shifts to defendants the burden of proving that they were not negligent.
(2) The cause of the injury being established, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable.

1 The first objection is without merit. In Bergen v. Tulare County Power Co., 173 Cal. 709 [161 Pac. 269], the trial court in giving an instruction relative to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bringle v. Lloyd
537 P.2d 1060 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1975)
Williams v. City of Long Beach
268 P.2d 1061 (California Supreme Court, 1954)
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.
268 P.2d 1041 (California Supreme Court, 1954)
Blair v. Williams
240 P.2d 1043 (California Court of Appeal, 1952)
Butcher v. Queen City Iron & Metal Co.
221 P.2d 265 (California Court of Appeal, 1950)
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co.
203 P.2d 522 (California Supreme Court, 1949)
Taylor v. Sims
164 P.2d 17 (California Court of Appeal, 1945)
Kling v. Crown Finance Corp.
146 P.2d 54 (California Court of Appeal, 1944)
Junge v. Midland Counties Public Service Corp.
100 P.2d 1073 (California Court of Appeal, 1940)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
100 P.2d 1073, 38 Cal. App. 2d 154, 1940 Cal. App. LEXIS 621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/junge-v-midland-counties-public-service-corp-calctapp-1940.