JULIO C. LOPEZ DE ANDA v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC et al.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-07354
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JULIO C. LOPEZ DE ANDA, Case No. 2:25-cv-07354-MCS-SSC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION TO REMAND 12 (ECF NO. 14) 13 v.

14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff Julio C. Lopez de Anda initiated this action 2 against Defendant General Motors LLC in the Los Angeles County Superior Court by 3 filing a complaint that asserts claims under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 4 (“MMWA”) and the California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”). (See 5 generally Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) Defendant removed the case to federal court on 6 August 8, 2025, invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal 2–6, 7 ECF No. 1.) 8 Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to state court. (Mot., ECF No. 14.)1 9 Defendant filed a brief opposing the motion. (Opp’n, ECF No. 19.)2 Plaintiff did not 10 file a timely reply. (See Initial Standing Order § 9(b), ECF No. 8 (setting briefing 11 deadlines departing from local rules).) The Court deems the motion appropriate for 12 decision without oral argument and vacates the hearing set for November 10, 2025. Fed. 13 R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. R. 7-15. 14 15 I. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A defendant may remove a civil action brought in state court to a federal district 17 court with original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts 18 “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 19 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 20 A party may move to remand a case to state court within 30 days after the filing 21 of a notice of removal “on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter 22 jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). An “untimely removal is a procedural defect” that 23 24

25 1 The Court admonishes Plaintiff’s counsel for its failure to participate in a prefiling 26 conference of counsel. See C.D. Cal. R. 7-3. Notwithstanding, the Court considers the motion on its merits in the interest of judicial economy. 27 2 Defendant also filed a notice of supplemental authority, which the Court considers. 28 (Notice, ECF No. 20.) 1 may justify such a remand motion. Maniar v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 979 F.2d 782, 2 784 (9th Cir. 1992). 3 As relevant here, where “the initial pleading set[s] forth” a claim that provides a 4 ground for removal, the removal must be accomplished “within 30 days after the receipt 5 by the defendant” of a copy of the pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1); see also id. 6 § 1446(b)(3) (providing a different deadline “if the case stated by the initial pleading is 7 not removable”). 8 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff argues that his federal MMWA claim provided a basis for federal- 11 question jurisdiction that was ascertainable from the face of the complaint, so 12 Defendant’s removal of the action over 30 days after service was untimely under 13 § 1446(b)(1). (Mot. 4–5; compare Yang Decl. Ex. 1 ¶ 5, ECF No. 14-1 (indicating 14 Defendant was served on Feb. 21, 2025), with Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 (filed 15 Aug. 8, 2025).) Defendant maintains that § 1446(b)(1) is not applicable because the 16 complaint does not set forth a claim providing a ground for removal. According to 17 Defendant, although Plaintiff pleaded a federal MMWA claim, such claims are only 18 cognizable in federal court if they place $50,000 or more in controversy, and the amount 19 placed in controversy by Plaintiff’s MMWA claim was not clear from the face of the 20 complaint. (Opp’n 9–12.)3 21 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the § 1446(b)(1) clock began to run when 22 Defendant received service because his complaint as originally pleaded was removable 23 under the Court’s federal-question jurisdiction. Acknowledging discordant authority, 24 this Court subscribes to the position that, for the purposes of § 1446(b)(1), a pleading 25 26 3 Defendant asserts that its removal was timely because it removed the action “based on its own investigation” that uncovered a basis for diversity jurisdiction, before it received 27 a pleading that set forth a removable claim or a paper from which it could ascertain the 28 case was removable. (Opp’n 6–7.) 1 containing an MMWA claim “set[s] forth” a federal claim removable under §§ 1331 2 and 1441(a) irrespective of whether the amount placed in controversy by the claim is 3 stated or certain on the face of the complaint. 4 The Court begins by reviewing the MMWA itself. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) 5 establishes a private right of action for consumers damaged by a failure to comply with 6 obligations under the MMWA or a written warranty, implied warranty, or service 7 contract. In part because the warranties to which the MMWA refers are contingent on 8 state law, see 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7), an MMWA claim based on breach of a written or 9 implied warranty is effectively a federal “cause of action for express and implied 10 warranty claims under state law.” Floyd v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 966 F.3d 1027, 1032 11 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Nguyen v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 932 F.3d 811, 817 n.3 (9th Cir. 12 2019) (“[T]he Act calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, 13 not the creation of additional federal law.” (quoting Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 14 1000, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1986))); In re Sony Grand WEGA KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear 15 Projection HDTV TV Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (describing 16 the “federal cause of action” created by the MMWA that provides protections 17 coextensive with state law). 18 The statute contemplates the litigation of MMWA claims in either state or federal 19 court. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). Whereas there are no limitations on MMWA suits 20 brought in a state court, id. § 2310(d)(1)(A), suits brought in a federal district court are 21 subject to certain limitations, id. § 2310(d)(1)(B). To wit: 22 No claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought [in a district 23 court]— 24 (A) if the amount in controversy of any individual 25 claim is less than the sum or value of $25; 26 (B) if the amount in controversy is less than the sum or 27 value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) 28 1 computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in 2 this suit; or 3 (C) if the action is brought as a class action, and the 4 number of named plaintiffs is less than one hundred. 5 Id. § 2310(d)(3). Congress thus limited the reach of such claims “to avoid trivial or 6 insignificant actions being brought as class actions in the federal courts.” H. R. Rep. 7 No. 93-1107, at 42 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7724.4 8 Numerous courts have interpreted the term cognizable as used in § 2310(d)(3) to 9 have jurisdictional significance. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the MMWA 10 “provides that federal courts do not have federal-question jurisdiction over breach-of- 11 warranty actions” that are incognizable under § 2310(d)(3). Ware v. Best Buy Stores, 12 L.P., 6 F.4th 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). The Third and Sixth Circuits are in accord. See 13 Rowland v. Bissell Homecare, Inc., 73 F.4th 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2023) (“By imposing 14 additional requirements for federal jurisdiction, Congress manifested an intent to 15 restrict access to federal court for MMWA claims.”); Schultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr., 512 F.3d 16 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The MMWA is a somewhat unique federal statute in that 17 merely alleging a violation of the act is insufficient to confer federal question 18 jurisdiction; a separate $50,000 amount in controversy requirement must also be 19 satisfied.”). 20 Like its sister circuit courts, the Ninth Circuit has used the term jurisdiction in 21 assessing the limitations of § 2310(d)(3). In dicta, one panel observed that a plaintiff’s 22 class action MMWA “claims do not appear viable” in federal court given 23

24 4 Of course, the United States Congress of 1974 likely did not have single-plaintiff 25 defective vehicle litigation in mind when it set the floor for aggregated claims at 26 $50,000, which at the time could have bought 12 new 1974 Chevrolet Impalas. See Leonard Sloane, Personal Finance: Costs of Buying a New Car, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 27 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/16/archives/personal-finance-costs-of- 28 buying-a-new-car-percentage-increases.html [https://perma.cc/HP44-RVP2]. 1 noncompliance with § 2310(d)(3)(C), and that the plaintiff had not “contend[ed] that 2 federal jurisdiction . . . can be grounded on the [MMWA].” Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. 3 Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 574 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004). Another panel examining a case 4 originally filed in federal court found jurisdiction lacking where it was apparent to a 5 legal certainty from the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs could not recover over 6 $50,000 on their MMWA claim for breach of the warranty on their leaky motor home. 7 Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2004). The panel 8 described the $50,000 floor prescribed in § 2310(d)(3)(B) as a “jurisdictional 9 prerequisite.” Id. at 1040. More recently, one panel described § 2310(d) as a provision 10 that “gives federal courts jurisdiction over claims where the amount in controversy 11 equals or exceeds a specified amount,” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 12 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir. 2018); another panel described § 2310(d)(3) as “impos[ing] 13 specific limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts,” Floyd, 966 F.3d at 14 1032; and yet another reiterated that “federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an 15 MMWA claim if the amount in controversy is less than $50,000,” Shoner v. Carrier 16 Corp., 30 F.4th 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B)). 17 None of these Ninth Circuit panels, however, expressly opined on whether 15 18 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(B) and (3)’s limitations on litigating MMWA claims in federal 19 court concern exercise of federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, let alone 20 whether a complaint that states an MMWA claim “set[s] forth” a case removable on a 21 federal-question basis within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). See Steel Co. v. 22 Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (“Jurisdiction . . . is a word of many, 23 too many, meanings . . . .” (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 24 (D.C. Cir. 1996))). For this reason, regardless of what the decisions imply about the 25 jurisdictional significance of § 2310(d)(3), they are not binding on the issue before this 26 Court. See CPC Pat. Techs. PTY Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., 34 F.4th 801, 809 (9th Cir. 2022) 27 (“[U]nstated assumptions on non-litigated issues are not precedential holdings binding 28 1 future decisions.” (alteration in original) (quoting Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, 2 Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1985))). 3 First principles of federal-question jurisdiction militate a conclusion that 4 § 2310(d)(3) prescribes prudential, not jurisdictional, limitations on federal MMWA 5 litigation.5 District courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 6 the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A case arises 7 under federal law within the meaning of § 1331 if a well-pleaded complaint establishes 8 either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief 9 necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Proctor v. 10 Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1219 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). 11 Congress saw fit to create “a federal private cause of action” when it enacted the 12 MMWA over 50 years ago. Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imps., Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 917 13 (9th Cir. 2005). Even a decision as to whether an MMWA claim meets the conditions 14 for maintenance of the claim in federal court turns on federal law. It should be axiomatic 15 that a claim brought under the aegis of a cause of action Congress authorized arises 16 under federal law within the meaning of § 1331. 17 In Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012), a unanimous 18 Supreme Court held that “there is no serious debate that a federally created claim for 19 relief is generally a sufficient condition for federal-question jurisdiction.” 565 U.S. at 20 377 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the presumption of concurrent 21 jurisdiction in the state and federal courts over federal claims persists even in the face 22

23 5 This position is consistent with the Court’s longstanding approach to defective vehicle 24 cases with MMWA claims. See, e.g., Kunstel v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-cv-06859- MCS-SSC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (Scarsi, J.) 25 (accepting plaintiffs’ argument that their complaint stated a removable federal claim 26 under the MMWA, so removal was untimely); Hadley v. Tropicana Mfg. Co., No. 2:23- cv-06091-MCS-PD, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137333, *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023) 27 (Scarsi, J.) (deeming an MMWA claim incognizable and dismissing it for failure to state 28 a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)—not for lack of jurisdiction). 1 of a statute that expressly prescribes that a federal claim be litigated in a state court. See 2 id. at 377–79 (construing Telephone Consumer Protection Act). The Court reasoned 3 that the district courts retain jurisdiction over federal claims under § 1331 unless a 4 federal statute “expressly or by fair implication[] excludes federal-court adjudication.” 5 Id. at 379. Another unanimous Court offered a “readily administrable bright line” test: 6 If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on 7 a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and 8 litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle 9 with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory 10 limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat 11 the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. 12 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (citation and footnote omitted). 13 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Maronyan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 14 658 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2011), is similarly instructive. There, the panel examined 15 whether 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a), another MMWA provision that requires exhaustion of 16 claims before seeking recovery in court, is jurisdictional. Id. at 1039–40. Observing that 17 “a failure to satisfy a statutory prerequisite to filing suit deprives a court of subject 18 matter jurisdiction only when Congress provides a sweeping and direct jurisdictional 19 mandate,” the panel majority concluded that the exhaustion requirement “does not 20 operate as a jurisdictional bar.” Id. at 1040, 1043. 21 Here, Congress did not “clearly state[],” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, or provide “a 22 sweeping and direct jurisdictional mandate,” Maronyan, 658 F.3d at 1040, that the 23 limitations on federal litigation of MMWA claims in 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(B) and (3) 24 implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. Congress could have expressly incanted 25 jurisdictional import into § 2310(d)(3)(B), as it has in other statutes creating federal 26 rights of action, but it left the language of federal jurisdiction unspoken here. See 27 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 n.11 (“Certain statutes confer subject-matter jurisdiction 28 only . . . for actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds or falls below a stated 1 amount.” (citations omitted)); see also, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 814 (“United States district 2 courts shall only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed by the owner of 3 the property to be condemned exceeds $3,000.”); 22 U.S.C. § 6713(a)(1)(B) (“The 4 district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction . . . of any civil action 5 or claim described in subparagraph (A) that does not exceed $10,000.”); 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1346(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . of . . . [a]ny other 7 civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount . . . .”); 8 but see Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 644 (2002) (citing Steel, 9 523 U.S. at 90–91, for the proposition that “even a statutory provision that uses the word 10 ‘jurisdiction’ may not relate to ‘subject-matter jurisdiction’”). 11 Instead, Congress decreed that a claim that fails to meet the demands of 12 § 2310(d)(3) is not cognizable in a suit brought in a federal district court. The term 13 cognizable is, at best, ambiguous as to its jurisdictional character. The word could mean 14 “within the court’s jurisdiction,” but it also could mean “[c]apable of being known or 15 recognized.” Cognizable, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The latter meaning 16 finds ample support in the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court’s lexicon, including in 17 cases discussing subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stavrianoudakis v. U.S. Fish & 18 Wildlife Serv., 108 F.4th 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff suffers a 19 ‘constitutionally cognizable injury’ whenever the government succeeds in pressuring 20 the plaintiff into forfeiting a constitutional right in exchange for a benefit or the 21 government withholds a benefit based on the plaintiff's refusal to surrender a 22 constitutional right.” (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 23 595, 607 (2013))); United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 402 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To 24 determine whether a given claim is cognizable under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255, we focus on 25 the relief sought in the claim itself, not on relief sought in other claims mentioned 26 elsewhere in the motion.”); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 27 Cir. 1990) (“Dismissal [under Rule 12(b)(6)] can be based on the lack of a cognizable 28 legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”). 1 Given the bright-line rule the Supreme Court articulated in Arbaugh, absent an express 2 statement that the district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that are not 3 cognizable, the Court reads the word to denote a nonjurisdictional, prudential limitation 4 on MMWA litigation in federal court, one that does not overcome the presumption of 5 concurrent jurisdiction of the state and federal courts.6 Accordingly, allegations raising 6 an inference that at least one of the subdivisions in § 2310(d)(3) is met are not necessary 7 for an MMWA claim to set forth a claim that arises under federal law. 8 This disposition comports with another important principle of federal litigation: 9 the plaintiff “is the master of the complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 10 398–99 (1987). In other words, through appropriate pleading, a plaintiff may elect to 11 litigate its case in state court “by eschewing claims based on federal law.” Id. at 399. 12 Put yet another way, whether to plead a federal claim is an issue that touches upon the 13 choice of tribunal, a strategic litigation decision reserved to the plaintiff. Some 14 California plaintiffs who bring claims relating to defective motor vehicles prefer a state- 15 court forum and, in aid of remaining in state court, elect to assert claims under the SBA 16 and not the MMWA even though an MMWA claim may be asserted on the same facts 17 to vindicate the same right. See Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 958 n.2 (9th Cir. 18 2009) (“The substantive elements are the same under the Song-Beverly Act and 19 Magnuson-Moss Act. Under both, the court applies state warranty law.” (citations 20 omitted)); Cruz v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:24-cv-00263-SAB, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21 22 6 The Third Circuit’s decision in Rowland, 73 F.4th at 180–82, and the dissent in Maronyan, 658 F.3d at 1044–45 (Smith, J., dissenting), offer persuasive reasoning that 23 might support the position that Congress “by fair implication[] exclude[d] federal-court 24 adjudication” of MMWA claims that do not meet one of the subdivisions of § 2310(d)(3). Mims, 565 U.S. at 379. The Maronyan dissent is nonbinding, and the 25 Court declines to follow Rowland because the panel approached the issue without 26 applying the binding principles of federal-question jurisdiction stated in § 1331, Mims, and Arbaugh that guide this Court’s analysis. See generally 73 F.4th at 180–82. 27 Applying those principles, reasonable minds could disagree about the jurisdictional 28 character of the word cognizable as used in § 2310(d)(3). 1 140674, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2024) (determining plaintiffs’ MMWA claim sought 2 to remedy the same injury already litigated in prior SBA case for the purposes of res 3 judicata), R. & R. adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167541 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2024). 4 To the extent those plaintiffs’ SBA claims are not removable on diversity grounds or 5 otherwise, the plaintiffs’ decision to forego MMWA claims to help cement their place 6 in state court should be respected. Those plaintiffs who initiate their actions in state 7 court and plead MMWA claims do so at increased risk of losing their choice of forum 8 through removal. 9 The disposition is also eminently practical. The bright-line rule to which this 10 Court subscribes provides an easily administrable standard for defendants who prefer 11 to litigate defective vehicle cases in federal court. If a state-court complaint states an 12 MMWA claim, it is removable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1446(a). 13 In short, Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a federal MMWA claim, which provides a 14 basis for federal-question jurisdiction apparent from the face of the pleading, 15 notwithstanding the lack of allegations clarifying the amount the claim places in 16 controversy. Thus, under § 1446(b)(1), Defendant had to remove the action within 30 17 days of service of the complaint, which it did not. Because removal was untimely, the 18 case must be remanded. 19 In connection with the motion, Plaintiff requests an award of fees incurred 20 because of removal. (Mot. 8–9.) “An order remanding the case may require payment of 21 just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the 22 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). An award of fees and costs is discretionary. Martin v. 23 Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005). The Court declines to exercise its 24 discretion to issue an award given Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the Court’s rules 25 governing motions for fees. (Initial Standing Order § 10(d).)7 26

27 7 The Court also questions the veracity of representations by counsel regarding the time 28 incurred after removal. (Yang Decl. ¶ 11.) For example, the Court doubts that drafting l The Court remands the case to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, No. 2 | 25STCV04169. The Court directs the Clerk to effect the remand immediately and close 3 | the federal case. 4 5 | ITTS SO ORDERED. 6 7 | Dated: October 15, 2025 dA L Soorwi g MARK C. SCARSI 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 this motion required over an hour and a half of attorney time given that counsel filed 26 | several substantially identical motions in other cases assigned to this judicial officer. 97 | See generally, e.g., Motion to Remand, Alvarez v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 5:25-cv- 01955-MCS-MAA (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025), ECF No. 14. Time spent toward most of 28 | these motions must have been saved in adapting the first that was drafted. 12