Julia Teryaeve-Reed v. U.S.A., et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03252
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JULIA TERYAEVE-REED, Case No.: 25cv3252-LL-AHG

11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 12 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF No. 2]; DISMISSING 13 v. COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO 14 COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 AND FOR 15 U.S.A., et al., FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 16 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. Defendants. § 1915(e)(2)(B) [ECF No. 1]; and 17 DENYING REMAINING MOTIONS 18 AS MOOT [ECF Nos. 3, 4] 19 Plaintiff Julia Teryaeve-Reed, an immigration detainee at the time of filing but since 20 removed from the United States,1 proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint. 21 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion to 22 produce documents and for statutory authority, and a motion for expungement of records. 23 See ECF Nos. 2-4. Plaintiff’s 55-page Complaint, which attaches and references 64 pages 24 25

26 27 1 See Order, Teryaeve-Reed v. LaRose, et al., No. 25-cv-2219-AGS-JLB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25) (ECF No. 23) (dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus as moot due to removal 28 1 of exhibits, indicates that it is raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) 2 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 3 (1971). See ECF No. 1 at 1. As discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP motion, 4 dismisses the Complaint without prejudice, and denies the remaining motions as moot. 5 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 6 Generally, a party who institutes a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court 7 of the United States, must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action 8 may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave 9 to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 10 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). If the 11 plaintiff seeing to proceed IFP is a “prisoner,” the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 12 requires submission of a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional 13 equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 Here, at the time of filing, Plaintiff was an immigration detainee being held under 16 the authority of the Department of Homeland Security. See ECF No. 1 at 1. Under the 17 PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused 18 of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or 19 the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 20 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A person detained and subject to removal or deportation, however, is 21 not a “prisoner” under § 1915(h). Agyeman v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 296 22 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e hold that an alien detained by the INS pending 23 deportation is not a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA.”) Because Plaintiff is not 24 a “prisoner,” the filing fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) are inapplicable to this case 25 and as such, the Court need only review her affidavit of assets. 26 “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the 27 affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. 28 Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours 1 & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). Plaintiff attests she is unemployed, does not receive 2 income from any source other than family, does not have a savings or checking account, 3 does not own any assets of value, such as real estate, an automobile, or other similar items, 4 and owes $600,000 in restitution. See ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff 5 has established she is unable to pay the fees or post the securities required to maintain a 6 civil action and therefore GRANTS the IFP motion. See S.D. Cal. CivLR. 3.2(d). 7 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 8 A. Legal Standards 9 A complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte dismissal if it 10 is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] 11 monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 12 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the 13 provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 14 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but 15 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 16 claim.”) 17 “The standard for determining whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 18 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 20 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint to “contain sufficient 21 factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 22 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual 23 allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 24 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere 25 possibility of misconduct” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 26 B. Discussion 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint provide “a short and 28 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” sufficient to 1 “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 2 rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 Plaintiff’s 55-page complaint, which is verbose and difficult to determine which allegations 4 attempt to support which claims, and which relies on 64 pages of exhibits, does not satisfy 5 Rule 8. See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding 6 that verbose and confusing 48-page complaint with 14 pages of addenda and 9 pages of 7 exhibits was properly dismissed under Rule 8); see Arnold v. Hearst Mag. Media, Inc., No. 8 19cv1969-WQH (MDD), 2020 WL 3469367, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2020) (“Exhibits 9 attached to a complaint are not a substitute for factual allegations.”) Therefore, the Court 10 DISMISSES the Complaint in its entirety without prejudice for failure to comply with 11 Rule 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 12 In addition, Plaintiff’s complaint as drafted fails to state a claim under the FTCA or 13 Bivens. 14 1. Federal Tort Claims Act 15 The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for claims arising out of common law torts 16 committed by federal employees, and “authorizes private tort actions against the United 17 States ‘under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable 18 to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 19 occurred.’” U.S. v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). To 20 invoke the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under the FTCA, Plaintiff must plausibly 21 allege she “first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and [her] claim shall 22 have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” 23 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Here, Plaintiff’s FTCA claim must be dismissed because she has not 24 adequately alleged exhaustion of administrative remedies. While Plaintiff states she 25 presented her claims to the Department of Homeland Security for “administrative review” 26 by mailing an “SF-95” to the agency, she acknowledges that she has not received a notice 27 of receipt or any response from the agency. ECF No. 1 at 2. A federal court does not have 28 subject matter jurisdiction over an FTCA claim unless the plaintiff first presented the 1 underlying tort claim to the agency and it was “finally denied” by the agency. See 28 U.S.C. 2 § 2675(a); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1993) (strictly construing 3 administrative exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and holding that FTCA 4 action filed before exhaustion completed could not proceed in district court); Brady v. 5 United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000) (administrative exhaustion requirement 6 in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) is jurisdictional); see also Kimber v. Del Toro, 2024 WL 171386, 7 at *5 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (“A plaintiff seeking to bring suit under the FTCA must affirmatively 8 allege that they filed a claim with the appropriate federal agency and that the agency denied 9 that claim.”) Therefore, as currently pleaded, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 10 FTCA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 11 2. Bivens 12 The Supreme Court “recognized an implicit cause of action against federal officials 13 under the Fourth Amendment in Bivens and extended Bivens’s implied cause of action 14 under the Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment.” Chambers v. C. Herrera, 78 F.4th 15 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). But the Supreme Court has also stated 16 Bivens is a “disfavored judicial activity,” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017), and 17 has consistently refused to extend it beyond those three specific contexts. See Harper v. 18 Nedd, 71 F.4th 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Essentially then, future extensions of Bivens 19 are dead on arrival.”) Plaintiff has not identified an adequate basis for a Bivens claim in her 20 Complaint, so any such claim would be subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim even 21 were the Complaint not subject to dismissal under Rule 8.2 22 C. Leave to Amend 23 Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the GRANTS leave to amend the complaint. See 24 Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 25

26 27 2 To the extent Plaintiff intended to include other legal basis for her claims in the Complaint or its exhibits, the Court finds the Complaint does not comply with Rule 8 as to such claims 28 1 ||dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the 2 || deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”’) 3 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 Accordingly, the Court: 5 l. GRANTS the Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2). 6 2. DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and for failure to 8 || state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 9 3. DENIES as moot the Motion to produce documents and for statutory 10 |} authority (ECF No. 3) and the Motion for expungement of records (ECF No. 4). 11 4. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in which 12 file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in this 13 || Order. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his 14 || original Complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. vy. Richard Feiner 15 || & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 16 original.’’) If Plaintiff fails to timely file a First Amended Complaint, this action will remain 17 || dismissed without further leave of court. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 ||Dated: December 12, 2025 NO 20 DE | 7] Honorable Linda Lopez 9 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 ee