Julaine C. Leblanc, Ovey Leblanc v. State Farm Ins. Co.

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 26, 2004
• Docket: CA-0003-1522
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

03-1522

JULIAN C. LEBLANC, OVEY LEBLANC, ET AL.

VERSUS

STATE FARM INS. CO., ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 89,339 HONORABLE KEITH RAYNE JULES COMEAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

JOHN D. SAUNDERS JUDGE

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Billie Colombaro Woodard, and Michael G. Sullivan, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Julius Willis Grubbs Jr. Haik, Minvielle & Grubbs P. O. Box 11040 Iberia, La 70562-1040 (337) 365-5486 Counsel for: Defendant Appellee State of LA., DOTD

Dennis Ray Stevens Gibbens & Stevens 222 W. St. Peter New Iberia, LA 70560 (337) 367-8451 Counsel for: Defendants/Appellees Timothy Edler Rebecca Edler Standard Fire Ins. Co. Michael G. Daiy Toce & Daiy P. O. Box 2716 Lafayette, LA 70502-2716 (337) 233-6818 Counsel for: Intervenor/Appellee Toce & Daiy Law Firm

Andre F. Toce Attorney at Law P. O. Box 2716 Lafayette, LA 70502-2716 (337) 233-6818 Counsel for: Intervenor/Appellee Toce & Daiy Law Firm

Stacy Skolfield Lee Attorney at Law 400 E. Kaliste Saloom, #1400 Lafayette, LA 70508 (337) 291-1743 Counsel for: Defendant Appellee Allstate Ins. Co.

Barry Louis Domingue Simon Law Offices P. O. Box 52242 Lafayette, LA 70505 (337) 232-2000 Counsel for: Plaintiff Appellant Julaine C. LeBlanc Ovey LeBlanc

Charles Martin Kreamer Allen & Gooch 1015 St. John Street Lafayette, LA 70502-3768 (337) 291-1000 Counsel for: Secondary Defendants/Appellants Conn Appliances, Inc. U. S. Fire Ins. Co. North Rivers Insurance Co.

Shane Errol Romero Attorney at Law P. O. Box 10337 New Iberia, LA 70562-0337 (337) 365-6628 Counsel for: Defendant/Appellee Iberia Parish Government SAUNDERS, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Julaine LeBlanc and Ovey LeBlanc, appeal the judgment of the trial

court granting, in part, the defendants’ Motions to Compel Enforcement of Settlement

and Execution of Settlement Documents and Demand for Defense and

Indemnification, filed by the Conn’s defendants, and adopted by the other defendants.

Plaintiffs also appeal the trial court’s judgment that the Mediation Settlement

Agreement executed on March 24, 2003 is an enforceable settlement which the court

ordered enforced, but without the need for the plaintiffs to sign any additional

documents. Additionally, the LeBlancs appeal the trial court’s ruling denying their

Motion for a New Trial and finding it moot in light of its ruling on the Motions to

Compel. We affirm.

FACTS

On Wednesday, July 30, 1997, Julaine LeBlanc was driving in a southerly

direction on Louisiana Highway 86. Paul Julien, while acting in the course and scope

of his employment with Conn’s Appliances, Inc., made a left turn into Louisiana

Highway 86 from the private driveway of Timothy and Rebecca Edler without

yielding to Ms. LeBlanc. Ms. LeBlanc’s vehicle struck Mr. Julien’s vehicle.

As a result of the accident, a lawsuit was filed for personal injuries on behalf

of Julaine LeBlanc on July 30, 1998, and a consortium claim was made on behalf of

Ms. Leblanc’s husband, Ovey LeBlanc, and on behalf of Dustin Courrege.1 Named

as defendants in the original and/or subsequent amending petitions were the driver,

Paul B. Julien, his liability insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company (“State Farm”), Conn’s Appliances, Inc. (“Conn’s”) and its liability

1 Plaintiffs dismissed the claims of Dustin Courrege, with prejudice, because he is not the child of either plaintiff and was not within the formal custody of either plaintiff. insurers, North River Insurance Company (“North River”) and U.S. Fire Insurance

Company (“U.S. Fire”), Tim and Rebecca Edler and their insurer The Standard Fire

Insurance Company (“Standard Fire”), as well as the State of Louisiana, Department

of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”) and Iberia Parish Government.

Following much litigation in this matter, the parties agreed to participate in a

mediation conference in the hopes of settling the lawsuit. The mediation conference

was held on March 24, 2003. All parties were present or represented. Mr. LeBlanc

was not present at the mediation, but at the time of the mediation he and his wife were

both represented by Mr. André Toce, who was present at the mediation. At the

mediation on March 24, 2003, all parties present signed a “Mediation Settlement

Agreement.” The terms of the agreement were as follows:

1) Conn’s, North River, and U.S. Fire agreed to pay the plaintiffs $320,000.00;

2) DOTD agreed to pay the plaintiffs $50,000.00;

3) Iberia Parish Government agreed to pay $10,000.00; and

4) Tim and Rebecca Edler and Standard Fire agreed to pay the plaintiffs $15,000.00.

As of the date of the mediation, State Farm had already paid the plaintiffs

$25,000.00, the limit of its policy, for its underlying policy on the personal vehicle of

Conn’s employee, Mr. Julien. Therefore, the total settlement proceeds to the LeBlancs

were $420,000.00. In addition to the financial settlement, the Mediation Settlement

Agreement contained defense and indemnity language stating that the settlement

“includes consortium claims of Mr. LeBlanc and plaintiff to defend and to hold

harmless the defendants as to same and indemnify as to consortium claims.” The

agreement also stated: “The parties also agree that all claims will be dismissed with

prejudice, and the parties agree that a formal settlement agreement will be executed

2 at a later date.” In addition, it was a term of the agreement that DOTD’s settlement

with the LeBlancs would be in the form of a Consent Judgment. A Consent Judgment

regarding DOTD’s settlement was signed and filed with the Iberia Parish Clerk of

Court on March 25, 2003. A Voluntary Motion and Order to Dismiss Claims of Ovey

LeBlanc was signed by Mr. LeBlanc, ordered by Judge Keith R. J. Comeaux, and filed

with the Iberia Parish Clerk of Court’s office on March 25, 2003. As set forth in the

agreement, all parties agreed that a formal settlement agreement would be executed

at a later date.

On April 1, 2003, Charles Kreamer, Sr., attorney for Conn’s, North River, and

U.S. Fire, faxed a letter to all parties with draft settlement documents attached,

requesting notification by the parties of any necessary revisions. On the afternoon of

April 1, 2003, Mr. Kreamer received a letter from Barry L. Domingue stating that his

services had been retained by the LeBlancs, that Mr. Toce had been terminated by the

LeBlancs, and that there was no settlement of this matter.

On April 2, 2003, all defendants received a letter from Mr. Toce, addressed to

Mr. Domingue, which contained a copy of the settlement agreement, the Voluntary

Motion and Order to Dismiss signed by Ovey LeBlanc, the Consent Judgment on

behalf of DOTD, and that advised that a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

would be filed and the settlement funds deposited in the registry of the court.

On April 7, 2003, Conn’s, North River, and U.S. Fire filed a “Motion to

Compel Enforcement of Settlement and Execution of Settlement Documents and

Demand for Defense and Indemnification.” A similar motion was filed by the Iberia

Parish Government, Timothy and Rebecca Edler, and Standard Fire on April 7, 2003.

On April 7, 2003 plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial.

A hearing on these motions took place May 2, 2003, in front of Judge

3 Comeaux. The trial court held that the signed Mediation Settlement Agreement was

a valid and enforceable compromise as per La.Civ.Code. art. 3071, and denied

plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial. On May 27, 2003, a hearing was held formulating

a final judgment with regard to the trial court’s May 2, 2003 ruling. A Judgment on

Rule was signed May 27, 2003.

The LeBlancs present two assignments of error for our review.

1) That the trial court committed reversible error in finding that a binding settlement agreement existed between the parties.

2) That the trial court committed reversible error in denying plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial where plaintiff’s prior attorney had no authority to enter the Consent Judgment or the Voluntary Motion and Order to Dismiss Claims of Ovey LeBlanc, and where the signature on the Motion purported to be that of Ovey LeBlanc, was, in fact, not the signature of Ovey LeBlanc.

At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial and the Motions to Enforce, the trial

judge stated:

The court finds that Exhibit A is a mediation settlement agreement executed by Julaine LeBlanc, Dennis Stevens, Julius Grubbs, Attorney for State of Louisiana, Dennis Stevens, Attorney for Tim and Rebecca Edler and Standard Fire, by Charles Kreamer, Attorney for Conn’s, by Shane Romero, Attorney for Iberia Parish Government, and by Andre Toce on behalf of Ms. Julaine LeBlanc. The settlement states that the parties agree to settle all claims they have or may have in the above captioned matter in exchange for the payment of a certain amount including all special damages. In exchange for the payment referenced above, the parties agree that this will be a full and complete release of all claims against the defendants and that the plaintiffs will agree to hold harmless indemnifying defendants from and against all claims, liens, and privileges asserted by and on behalf of any health care providers, Medicare, Medicaid, and they further agree the split on how money is to be paid, when money is to be paid, and all parties will pay their own court costs. It settles the whole claim of the plaintiff. I don’t see that any other writing is needed. I don’t see that any other transaction is needed. I find that there has been a compromise to this litigation, and I enforce the compromise.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

The requirements for the valid settlement of a lawsuit are provided in

4 La.Civ.Code. art. 3071, which states:

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.

This contract must be either reduced into writing or recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding. The agreement recited in open court confers upon each of them the right of judicially enforcing its performance, although its substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient form.

(Emphasis added).

LeBlanc’s Assignment Number 1

The LeBlancs do not dispute that Ms. LeBlanc’s signature appears on the

Mediation Settlement Agreement, or that Ms. LeBlanc actually did sign the document.

They argue, however, that the agreement signed at the mediation conference is not a

legally binding compromise as specified in La.Civ.Code art. 3071. The LeBlanc’s

also allege that Ms. LeBlanc signed the Mediation Settlement Agreement under threats

and coercion by her attorney Mr. Toce. Furthermore, they note the existence of the

statement in the agreement that “a formal settlement agreement will be executed at a

later date.” The LeBlancs argue that La.Civ.Code art. 1947 states: “When, in the

absence of a legal requirement, the parties have contemplated a certain form, it is

presumed that they do not intend to be bound until the contract is executed in that

form.” As the agreement specified that a formal settlement would be prepared for

signing by the parties, they claim there was no legally binding settlement until that

formal settlement was signed by the parties. They argue the existence of such a

condition indicates that the parties did not intend this agreement to be a legally

binding settlement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the very fact the defendants filed motions to

5 compel execution of a settlement agreement indicates that the defendants were,

themselves, confused as to the existence of a binding and enforceable settlement

agreement. The LeBlancs allege that the defendants’ need to compel the “execution

of the settlement documents” indicates that no valid compromise existed.

The defendants counter that they were never in any doubt as to the existance of

a valid and enforceable compromise. Their need to compel execution of the legally

binding compromize enacted at the March 24, 2003 mediation conference was merely

the result of Ms. LeBlanc’s failure to fulfill the obligation she undertook by signing

the Mediation Settlement Agreement. As a result of her unwillingness to perform that

to which she had agreed, it was necessary for the defendants in this matter to obtain

an order to compel her to abide by the terms of the agreement. The defendants argue

that the formal settlement agreement referenced in the Mediation Settlement

Agreement was merely a formality and an additional safeguard, and Ms. LeBlanc is

bound by her consensual agreement to the terms set forth in the Mediation Settlement

Agreement.

The defendants point to a factually similar case decided by the fourth circuit.

In Walk Haydel & Assoc. v. Coastal Power Production Co., 98-193, p. 3-4 (La.App.

4 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d 372, 373-74, the court upheld an agreement signed by

parties participating in a mediation, stating:

This Court has held that a compromise is valid if there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to exactly what they intended when the compromise was reached. Pat O’Brien’s Bar, Inc. v. Franco’s Cocktail Prods., Inc., 615 So.2d 429 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied, 617 So.2d 909 (La.1993). In the instant case the parties were involved in a full day of mediation at the end of which they signed a memorandum of settlement which contained several handwritten terms upon which the parties had agreed. The fact that a whole day of negotiations was capped off by the signing of a document which memorialized the agreement between the parties signifies that there had been a meeting of the minds. Otherwise the document would not have been signed, particularly

6 considering who signed.

We must also determine whether this document was sufficient to constitute a legally binding and enforceable agreement. “The only formal essential for a compromise is a writing.” Audubon Ins. Co. v. Farr, 453 So.2d 232, 234 (La.1984). This Court has said “there is no sacrosant form which must be followed” and “it is not necessary that everything intended to be compromised be in one document.” Charbonnet v. Ochsner, 236 So.2d 86, 88 (La.App. 4th Cir.1970), aff'd, 258 La. 507, 246 So.2d 844 (La. 1971). In the instant case, we have a writing and although its terms are handwritten and may encompass less than all the issues between the parties, this does not negate its enforceability. The document in question was in writing and evidenced a meeting of the minds. This Court has stated that a party’s signature on a contract establishes the presumption that he saw and understood the terms of the contract. Barcelona v. Sea Victory Maritime, Inc., 619 So.2d 741 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied, 626 So.2d 1179 (La.1993). Therefore, it is our opinion that the “memorandum of settlement” is a legally binding agreement.

The trial court agreed with the fourth circuit’s interpretation of what constitutes

a binding and enforceable agreement. The LeBlancs cite Anthony v. Liberty Mutual

Ins. Co., 99-1730 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/00), 759 So.2d 910, and Soileau v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 03-120 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/15/03), 857 So.2d 1264, writ denied, 03-3170 (La.

2/6/04), __ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 319195, as support for their contention that, within

this circuit the agreement to reach a settlement, which at most is what they claim the

March 24, 2003 Mediation Settlement Agreement actually was, is not a valid, legally

binding compromise as required by La.Civ.Code art. 3071.

The defendants note that Anthony and Soileau are easily distinguishable from

the present matter in that the “settlement agreements” relied upon in those cases

involved the exchange of vague and arguably unprecise letters between counsel,

without participation by any clients, as being the alleged writings conferring a

7 settlement.2 In the present matter, the Mediation Settlement Agreement contains

specific terms and conditions and was executed by the parties and their counsel after

a full day of mediation.

We find no error in the trial court’s determination that the Mediation Settlement

Agreement signed by the parties is a valid and legally binding compromise as

provided within the terms of La.Civ.Code. art. 3071. By the clear language of the

statute, this Mediation Settlement Agreement signed by the parties to this suit

constitutes a legal and binding compromise. There was absolutely no evidence

presented by the LeBlancs to support their contention that Ms. LeBlanc signed the

agreement under threat or coercion by her attorney, or against her free will. For the

reasons stated above, this assignment of error is without merit. We affirm the finding

of the trial court that the Mediation Settlement Agreement constitutes a meeting of the

minds of all parties who signed it, and therefore is legally binding on the LeBlancs.

LeBlanc’s Assignment 2

The LeBlanc’s allege that their prior attorney, Mr. Toce, had no authority, either

express or implied, to file the Consent Judgment or the Voluntary Motion and Order

to Dismiss Ovey LeBlanc’s claims. They allege that their consent was not obtained

or freely given with respect to those documents, and that the signature appearing on

the Voluntary Motion and Order to Dismiss was not the signature of Ovey LeBlanc.

The defendants note that the trial judge found the Mediation Settlement

2 One judge on the panel in Soileau felt that the letters exchanged were sufficiently precise to create a binding agreement to settle, namely the writing judge in this matter, however the majority disagreed. Despite the disagreement among the panel members, the writing judge finds the facts in the present matter are sufficiently distinguishable from Soileau, and the majority’s opinion in that case does not preclude our finding that a valid compromise was created in this instance. 8 Agreement valid and legally binding, and therefore, by one of the specific terms of the

agreement signed by Ms. LeBlanc, her attorney had express authority to file the

Consent Judgment with respect to Ms. LeBlanc’s claims against DOTD. Ms.

LeBlanc’s signature appears on the Mediation Settlement Document which declares

that a consent judgment will be entered as to the agreement between DOTD and Ms.

LeBlanc. By Ms. LeBlanc’s own admission, Mr. Toce was her attorney until April

1, 2003, several days after the Consent Judgment and Voluntary Dismissal were filed

at the Iberia Parish Cerk of Court. The defendants argue that Mr. Toce clearly had,

not only implied authority to undertake these actions, but express authority to file the

Consent Judgment with the court.

The defendants also note that the LeBlancs present no evidence to support their

contention that the signature appearing on the Voluntary Motion and Order to Dismiss

Claims of Ovey LeBlanc is not the signature of Mr. LeBlanc. Therefore, the LeBlancs

have completely failed to meet their burden of proof and the trial court did not err

when it decided that the Consent Judgment and the Voluntary Dismissal were

enforceable.

We agree with the defendants. Ms. LeBlanc’s signature on the Mediation

Settlement Agreement gave her attorney express authority to file the Consent

Judgment that was specified by its terms. Additionally, after a review of the record,

we are unable to find any evidence presented by the LeBlancs to support their self-

serving contention that the signature appearing on the Voluntary Motion and Order

to Dismiss was not the signature of Mr. LeBlanc. They have simply failed to meet

their burden of proof on this matter. As noted by the trial court, once the Mediation

Settlement Agreement is found to be legally binding, and the validity of their

attorney’s actions in this matter is established, the request for a new trial becomes

9 moot. We find no basis for reversing the trial court’s decisions in this matter.

Conn’s Assignemnt of Error

Conn’s asserts one assignment of error for our review. It contends that the trial

court was manifestly erroneous in failing to order Juliane LeBlanc to defend and

indemnify all defendants against the actions taken by Ovey LeBlanc, including, but

not limited to, the payment of fees, costs, and expenses in prosecuting the defendant’s

motions to enforce settlement and defense of the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

The clause of the Mediation Settlement Agreement dealing with defense and

indemnity was cited above, but we will provide it again here in order to address this

specific assignment of error. The agreement provided that the settlement “includes

consortium claims of Mr. LeBlanc and plaintiff to defend and hold harmless the

defendants as to same and indemnify as to consortium claims.” As a general rule,

Louisiana law does not provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees absent either a

specific statutory provision providing for such relief, or a contractual agreement by

the parties to pay attorney fees.

The provision quoted above is quite specific, and clearly shows that, at most,

the settlement agreement provides for Ms. LeBlanc to defend and hold harmless as to

Mr. LeBlanc’s consortium claims. As the Leblanc’s were specifically arguing the

validity of the Mediation Settlement Agreement containing the indemnity language,

and the validity of the Voluntary Motion and Order to Dismiss filed by Mr. LeBlanc,

the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that Ms. Leblanc was not liable

to defend and indemnify the defendants in the present action.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are cast

against the Plaintiffs, Julaine LeBlanc and Ovey LeBlanc.

10 AFFIRMED.