OPINION
HANSON, Justice.
The issue presented in this case is similar to the one' stated by the United States Supreme Court in its 1987 decision of As-[568]*568ahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California as follows:
[Wjhether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ■”
480 U.S. 102, 105, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (plurality opinion) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). In Asahi, the Court answered this question against jurisdiction. Id. at 116, 107 S.Ct. 1026. Likewise, the court of appeals concluded that Minnesota’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over respondent Meikikou Corporation (Meikikou) would violate the guarantee of due process provided by the United States Constitution. Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 670 N.W.2d 11, 19 (Minn.App.2003). We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, though on slightly different grounds.
Plaintiff James Donald Juelich was injured while providing maintenance to a scissor-lift table manufactured by Meiki-kou. He brought a personal injury/products liability action against Meikikou and appellants Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corporation (YMO) (who manufactured the laser-cutting machine that included the table as a component part) and Mazak Nissho Iwai Corporation (MANI) (the international distributor for YMO of the laser-cutting machines).
Meikikou is a Japanese corporation who manufactured the scissor-lift table at its factory in Japan. Meikikou sold the table to Ishihara Shoji, Meikikou’s Japanese distributor, in Japan. On instruction from Shoji, Meikikou delivered the table to Seiko Keisakusho in Japan, who delivered it to YMO in Japan. YMO used the table as a part of a laser-cutting machine, known as a “Super Turbo X510 System,” that it manufactured in Japan. YMO then sold the system to YMO’s Illinois subsidiary corporation, MANI, which was YMO’s international distributor. MANI sold the system to Gladwin Machinery & Supply Company, a Minnesota supplier, and Glad-win sold the system to Aries Precision Sheet Metal Company, the Minnesota company that was Juelich’s employer. MANI’s service technician installed the equipment at Aries and trained Juelich and another employee in its operation.
MANI produced evidence that 122 YMO systems with Meikikou tables had been delivered in the United States, including 17 of them in Minnesota. There also was evidence that Meikikou knew that YMO intended to market the laser systems in the United States. On July 3, 2000, Meiki-kou employees met in Japan with representatives of YMO and Shoji to discuss YMO’s sales of the laser systems in the United States. At the request of YMO, Meikikou provided English warning labels to be placed on the tables by YMO once the tables were installed in the YMO laser-cutting machine. Meikikou also provided YMO an operations manual in Japanese that was to be used by YMO in preparing an English manual for the system. Meiki-kou was not involved in preparing the English manual.
There was also evidence that Meikikou maintains an English language website that features Meikikou as a world player in the scissor-lift table field. The website identifies Meikikou’s domestic and international “associated” companies, including four in the United States. The website [569]*569focuses primarily on a description of Meik-ikou as a corporation and only slightly on a description of its products. It does not contain any mechanism for ordering products. Meikikou does not otherwise direct any advertising to Minnesota businesses. Meikikou is a member of two international business groups, is ISO1 certified, and maintains worldwide insurance coverage.
Meikikou answered Juelich’s complaint and raised lack of personal jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. Meikikou then served a cross-claim against Gladwin and a third-party claim against Aries. Both YMO and MANI asserted cross-claims against Meikikou.
Meikikou moved to dismiss Juelich’s complaint and YMO and MANI’s cross-claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. That motion was based on the unsworn affidavit of Tsutomu Odaguehi, Meikikou’s Managing Director and General Manager of Development. The district court first ordered Meikikou to answer interrogatories and to produce Odaguehi for his deposition. After the deposition, Meikikou provided excerpts of Odaguchi’s testimony to the court. Odaguehi testified that Meiki-kou has no involvement with the scissor-lift tables once they are delivered to Seiko in Japan; that Meikikou does not sell scissor-lift tables to United States customers -directly; that Meikikou sells its products only to Japanese companies, some of which incorporate components obtained from Meikikou into their own products and then sell them overseas; that Meikikou produces English warning labels for its Japanese customers ;but only Japanese language operations manuals; and that, whenever YMO alerted Meikikou that it intended to sell the finished product in another country, Meikikou would follow YMO’s instructions to install safety valves or comply with other specifications particular to that country.
After receiving excerpts from Odagu-chi’s deposition, the district court granted Meikikou’s motion to dismiss.2 Juelieh filed a notice of appeal and YMO and MANI filed joint appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The court • of appeals concluded that Asahi “clarified the stream-of-commerce theory,” quoting from Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion that the “placement of a product into a stream of commerce, without more, is not. an. act of the defendant purposely directed toward the forum State.” Juelich, 670 N.W.2d at 18 (quoting Asahi 480 U.S. at 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026.). YMO and MANI petitioned this court for further review. Juelieh settled all of his claims with YMO and MANI and did not seek further review. Thus, the only claims against Meikikou that remain in this action are the cross-claims of YMO and MANI.
I.
Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law which we review de novo. V.H. v. Estate of Birnbaum, 543 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Minn.1996). Once jurisdiction has been challenged by the defen[570]*570dant, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that sufficient contacts exist with the forum state. Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Service, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 n. 1 (Minn.1983). At the pretrial stage, however, the plaintiffs allegations and supporting evidence are to be taken as true. Id. (citing Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, Wisconsin, 307 Minn. 290, 293, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 (1976)).
Minnesota’s long-arm statute, Minn.Stat. § 543.19 (2002), permits Minnesota courts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent of federal due process. Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn.1992). Due process requires that the defendant have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state3 and that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154).
Minnesota’s Five-Factor Test
In Minnesota, a five-factor test has been used to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is consistent with due process. Hardrives, Inc., 307 Minn. at 294, 240 N.W.2d at 817 (citing Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir.1965)). This test requires the court to evaluate:
(1) the quantity of contacts with the forum state;
(2) the nature and quality of those contacts;
(3) the connection of the cause of action with these contacts;
(4) the interest of the state providing a forum; and
(5) the convenience of the parties.
Id.
The first three factors determine whether minimum contacts exist and the last two factors determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable according to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Although distinct, there is an interplay between the minimum contacts factors and the reasonableness factors because they all trace their origin to the holding of International Shoe, that a court cannot subject a person to its authority where maintenance of the suit would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has described this interplay as follows:
We think * * * the reasonableness prong of the due process inquiry evokes a sliding scale: the weaker the plaintiffs showing on [minimum contacts], the less [571]*571a defendant need show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction. The reverse is equally true: an especially strong showing of reasonableness may serve to fortify a borderline showing of [minimum contacts].
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir.1994); accord Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174.
The jStream-of-Commerce Theory of Minimum Contacts
This court has recognized that minimum contacts may be indirect, under the stream-of-commerce theory. In Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.1985), we considered the personal jurisdiction over a New Jersey manufacturer of a product, that caused injury to a Minnesota resident. Although the manufacturer had no office in Minnesota, owned no property here, had no agent to represent it here and was not licensed to do business here, we held that the manufacturer was subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota because the manufacturer placed its products in “the stream of commerce” through its contacts with distributors who sold the products throughout the United States and within Minnesota. Id. at 722. We' determined that the manufacturer’s contacts, though indirect, were sufficient and purposeful, stating: “[The manufacturer’s] distribution contacts and marketing efforts were calculated attempts to create a national market for [its] product, a market which specifically includes Minnesota.” Id.
The decision in Rostad relied upon the “stream-of-commerce theory” enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-son, where the Court stated:
When a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,” it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State. Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated'occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to servé, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
444 U.S. 286, 297-98, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (citation omitted).4
Two years after our decision in Rostad, ■ the United States Supreme Court decided Asahi. The facts of Asahi are strikingly similar to those of this case. Asahi involved an indemnification action brought in California by Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese tire manufacturer, against Asahi, the Japanese [572]*572tire-valve manufacturer that had sold an allegedly defective component part to Cheng Shin. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106, 107 S.Ct. 1026. The Court unanimously held that the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi “would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” given the burden on the Japanese defendant and the minimal interest of California in the indemnification dispute. Id.
The Asahi Court split four-to-four on the initial question whether introducing products into the “stream of commerce” satisfies the due process requirement of minimum contacts in a product liability case.5 Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia, set forth the most restrictive test of whether a nonresident party has sufficient contacts with a forum to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Justice O’Connor concluded that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State,” even if the defendant is aware “that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State.” Id. at 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor offered the following examples of additional conduct that would show purposeful direction: “designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.” Id.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, rejected the “something more” test and concluded that due process is afforded as long as the defendant knew its product was being marketed in the forum state. Id. at 116— 17, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Justice Brennan’s approach was largely a rearticulation of the dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen, which stated that when a manufacturer or distributor attempts to serve a market “directly or indirectly * * *, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in [that market] if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.” 444 U.S. at 297, 100 5.Ct. 559.
Because the Asahi Court failed to reach a majority on the proper test to apply when determining minimum contacts, it was error for the court of appeals to rely on Justice O’Connor’s “something more” approach in this case.6 We conclude that the first three factors of our five-factor test (which trace their roots to the landmark decision of International Shoe and its progeny) continue to provide the proper framework for determining whether a foreign defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
While the Asahi Court was split with respect to the proper test for determining minimum contacts, a majority of the Court [573]*573held that “[t]he strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 113 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463, 61 S.Ct. 339); see id. at 116, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 121, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Stevens, J., joined by White and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The majority concluded that, after weighing the factors set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the exercise of jurisdiction against Asahi would be “unreasonable and unfair.” (Opinion of Justice O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 116.)
The factors weighed by the Court, beyond the minimum contacts, were “the burden on .the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief.” 480 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026. These are consistent with factors four and five of our five-factor test. Thus, our five-factor test continues to provide the appropriate analytical framework for determining whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process.
II.
To determine whether Meikikou is subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota, we will apply the five-factor test..
(1) The quantity of contacts with the forum state
Although all of Meikikou’s activities took place in Japan, YMO/MANI argue that-the existence of 17 Meikikou lift tables in Minnesota and 122 in the United States, together with evidence of Meikikou’s knowledge that YMO planned to market the laser system in the U.S., is sufficient to provide the minimum contacts necessary to confer personal jurisdiction on a Minnesota court.
YMO/MANI rely heavily on this court’s decision in Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 722, but Rostad is distinguishable. Unlike the manufacturer in Rostad, Meikikou is a foreign national corporation, it only manufactured a component part of a product that reached Minnesota, and it did not conduct any distribution or marketing efforts in the United States. Meikikou did not advertise its product in the United States or Minnesota, and the distribution and marketing efforts that were undertaken by YMO, MANI and Gladwin in Minnesota were not undertaken on behalf of Meikikou. MANI acted as a distributor for YMO, not for Meikikou. It was Ishi-hara Shoji who acted as Meikikou’s distributor and it acted only in Japan.
YMO/MANI suggest that the stream-of-commerce theory should be applied because of the relationship between Meikikou and YMO and the economic gain that Meikikou realized through sales in the United States and in Minnesota. Although Meikikou realized economic gain from the seventeen tables it sold to YMO that ended up in Minnesota, its relationship with YMO was confined to Japan and its relationship with the United States seller, MANI, was remote. MANI has no contractual relationship with Meikikou. Although Meikikou was informed of YMO’s plans to sell in the United States, there is no evidence that Meikikou participated in or knew the details of YMO’s distribution or marketing plans, that Meikikou knew that MANI’s sales would include Minnesota or that MANI was such a large distributor that one would necessarily conclude that its sales would be made in Minnesota.
In quantity, Meikikou’s contacts with Minnesota were far less than those present [574]*574in Rostad and even less than those present in Asahi Thus, the quantity of contacts factor does not weigh significantly in favor of jurisdiction.
(¾) The nature and quality of Meiki-kou’s contacts
In assessing the quality of contacts, this court looks to whether the party purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Minnesota. Dent-Air, Inc., 332 N.W.2d at 907. YMO/MANI argue that Meikikou, in conjunction with YMO, chose to penetrate the United States market. YMO/MANI point to a single meeting in Japan in July 2000 where representatives from YMO and Meikikou met to discuss Meikikou’s manufacturing of the scissor-lift tables for incorporation in the Super Turbo X-510 systems. At this meeting, Meikikou was informed that the systems were destined for the United States and, therefore, English warning labels should be attached to the tables. Meikikou also purchased an insurance policy that covers claims made worldwide, including those made in Minnesota. The English labels and the insurance policy were not, however, particularly directed to Minnesota. The labels were useful in many countries and all other states of the United States and the insurance was useful worldwide.
YMO/MANI assert that Meikikou’s maintenance of a website, accessible by anyone in the world with access to an internet connection, demonstrates Meiki-kou’s intent to purposefully avail itself of the Minnesota market. Courts that have considered this issue have examined “the nature and quality of the commercial activity conducted on the Internet” to determine whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the laws of the forum state. See, e.g., Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. VocalTec Communications, Inc., 122 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1050 (D.Minn.2000) (quoting Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.1999)). Because Meiki-kou’s website merely provides general corporate information and does not include an order-taking function, it is properly categorized as a “passive” website. Id. Maintenance of a passive website generally does not support the exercise of jurisdiction. Id.
Meikikou manufactured only a component part, did not create, control or even influence the distribution by YMO of the finished product, and took no initiative in developing a United States market. Although Meikikou took certain actions to enable YMO to market its product in the United States, its actions fall short of the affirmative efforts to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in the United States, as required by Worldr-Wide Volkswagen. See, e.g., Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 947 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that knowledge that an object would be sold in the forum was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction without showing that the defendant directed some activity towards the forum); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 375-76 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that purchasers bringing product into forum when manufacturer did not control distribution system and did not advertise or solicit business was insufficient to confer jurisdiction.).7 Thus, the quality of Meikikou’s contacts with Minnesota does not weigh strongly in favor of jurisdiction.
[575]*575
(3) The connection of the cause of action with these contacts
Even if one were to conclude that Meikikou did have material contacts with Minnesota under the stream-of-commerce theory, those contacts do not, demonstrate- that Meikikou purposefully availed itself of the protection of Minnesota law. Dent-Air, Inc., 332 N.W.2d at 907. The sale of the Super Turbo X510 system to Aries, Juelich’s employer, arose from the unilateral actions of several intervening suppliers, namely Shoji, YMO, MANI and Gladwin. Meikikou had contractual relations only with Shoji and YMO, and those were only in Japan and were several steps removed from any sale or delivery in the U.S. “[T]he mere ‘unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.’ ” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298, 100 S.Ct. 559 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). Thus, the connection of Juelich’s claim to Meikikou’s contacts with Minnesota does not materially favor the exercise of jurisdiction.
(If) The interest of the state providing a forum
YMO/MANI contend that Minnesota has an interest in providing a forum because plaintiff Juelich was a Minnesota resident at the time of. the accident, his employer and Aries, was a Minnesota corporation and Aries’ workers’ compensation insurer paid benefits to Juelich. But Juelich is not a party to this appeal and whatever subro-gation interest .Aries or its insurer may have had in Juelich’s claim is not before this court. Thus, the current situation is virtually identical to that in Asahi because the c[ispute between Meikikou and YMO/ MANI “is primarily about -indemnification rather than about safety standards.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-15, 107 S.Ct. 1026. And like Asahi, it is “not at all clear at this point” that Minnesota law should govern the question of whether a Japanese corporation should indemnify another Japanese corporation on the basis of a sale and shipment made in Japan. See id. at 115, 107 S.Ct. 1026.
Even if Juelich were still a party to-this case) the state’s interest in providing him a forum to seek compensation from Meikikou would be lessened by -the fact, that Meikikou only supplied a component part and Juelich could pursue his claim against the manufacturer and distributor of the finished product. Because Minnesota no longer has an interest in the resolution of this dispute, this factor does not favor the exercise of jurisdiction.8
(5) The convenience of the parties
Regardless of the forum ultimately selected, some witnesses will be re-[576]*576quired to travel to a foreign country. Therefore, convenience of the parties and witnesses is a neutral factor in the analysis. Given that the transaction on which the indemnification claim is based took place in Japan and Meikikou delivered the lift table in Japan, YMO/MANI have “not demonstrated that it is more convenient to litigate its indemnification’ claim” in Minnesota rather than in Japan. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114, 107 S.Ct. 1026. YMO/MANI claim that they “have expended substantial time and resources seeking a resolution through the Minnesota courts.” But YMO/MANI were on notice from the outset that Meikikou challenged personal jurisdiction. If Minnesota has any residual interest in this action because it has invested court time in bringing the case to this point, that interest is outweighed by the demands that the parties would place on Minnesota to resolve their remaining indemnity issues.
When considering factors 4 and 5 together, we are left with the same conclusion as the one reached by the majority in Asahi — exercise of jurisdiction over Meiki-kou, a foreign national defendant, “would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026. Because YMO/MANI have failed to establish that Meikikou had sufficient contacts with Minnesota and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would be offended by the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Meikikou, we affirm the decisions of the court of appeals and the district court dismissing the complaint against Meikikou.
Affirmed.
MEYER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.