Judy Flummerfelt v. City of Taylor, Mich.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 10, 2026
Docket25-1169
StatusUnpublished

This text of Judy Flummerfelt v. City of Taylor, Mich. (Judy Flummerfelt v. City of Taylor, Mich.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Judy Flummerfelt v. City of Taylor, Mich., (6th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0114n.06

Case No. 25-1169

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Mar 10, 2026 JUDY FLUMMERFELT; FRANCES RIDENOUR; KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) ANTHONY HAMILTON; HOLLY HAMILTON, ) Plaintiffs - Appellees, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN CITY OF TAYLOR, MICHIGAN; RICHARD ) SOLLARS; JEFFREY BAUM; REALTY ) OPINION TRANSITION LLC; TAYLOR REHAB TWO LLC; ) TAYLOR SOUTH LLC; SHADY AWAD; HADIR ) ALTOON; ABIGAIL INVESTMENTS, LLC ) Defendants, ) ) ) WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN TREASURER, ) Eric Sabree ) Defendant - Appellant. )

Before: McKEAGUE, LARSEN, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Judy Flumerfelt,1 Frances Ridenour, Anthony

Hamilton, and Holly Hamilton sued Wayne County, Michigan; the City of Taylor, Michigan;

Richard Sollars (the former Mayor of Taylor); and a number of other City of Taylor officials,

residents, and businesses for their roles in an alleged plan to deprive Plaintiffs of their properties

without just compensation. Even though the scheme outlined in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint

raises multiple claims and implicates numerous defendants, our jurisdiction in this interlocutory

1 The district court (and corresponding appellate) docket misspells Flumerfelt’s name as “Flummerfelt.” No. 25-1169, Flummerfelt, et al. v. Wayne County Treasurer

appeal is limited. We are asked to consider only whether the Wayne County Treasurer—Eric

Sabree—is protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. But we must answer a

threshold question first: who did Plaintiffs sue? The record makes clear that Plaintiffs sued Wayne

County, not its treasurer. Sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims against Wayne

County, and sovereign immunity of the Wayne County Treasurer is irrelevant. We AFFIRM the

district court’s denial of sovereign immunity but clarify that Wayne County is the named

defendant, not the Wayne County Treasurer.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case stems from the administration of Michigan’s delinquent-tax foreclosure scheme.

Under the Michigan General Property Tax Act, when an individual fails to pay taxes, the

government can foreclose on the tax-delinquent property. Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78(3), (6). A

county can elect to seek foreclosures, in which case it would designate its treasurer as the

“foreclosing governmental unit,” a term the statute uses to describe a treasurer who conducts

foreclosures on behalf of a county. Id. § 211.78(3), (8); Bowles v. Sabree, No. 22-1912, 2024 WL

1550833, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2024). If a county takes this “voluntary” step of designating its treasurer as the foreclosing governmental unit, Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78(6), then the county’s

treasurer is bound by state law to follow a specific foreclosure process, see id. § 211.78h; see also

Bowles, 2024 WL 1550833, at *1-3. Alternatively, a county can elect for the state to act as the

foreclosing governmental unit. Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78(3), (8)(a)(ii).

Wayne County elected to seek foreclosures under the Michigan General Property Tax Act.

And between 2015 and 2018, Wayne County—through its treasurer—initiated foreclosure

proceedings on each of Plaintiffs’ properties. Plaintiffs allege that after the treasurer conducted

foreclosure proceedings through the process mandated by state law, the City of Taylor bought the

titles for Plaintiffs’ properties and sold them to third parties (other named defendants) for cents on

2 No. 25-1169, Flummerfelt, et al. v. Wayne County Treasurer

the dollar, which deprived Plaintiffs of any surplus value gained from the transactions. This lawsuit

followed.

B. Procedural History

The procedural history is messy, but the dust settles neatly to resolve this appeal. Plaintiffs

argue that they sued Wayne County, but the Wayne County Treasurer insists he is the named

defendant rather than the county itself. Discussing the details of the procedural history helps

disentangle the web of confusion regarding the proper parties in this matter. In short, Wayne County’s inexplicably contradictory pleading makes this case appear much

harder and more complicated than it seems at first glance. But there is no reasonable basis to

dispute the district court’s initial (and correct) conclusion that Wayne County is the named

defendant in this lawsuit. Wayne County and its treasurer ignored Plaintiffs’ pleadings, the district

court’s findings, and its own concessions in an attempt to substitute in the Wayne County Treasurer

as the defendant and assert the defense of sovereign immunity. We reject this procedural

gamesmanship that appears to have confused Plaintiffs and the district court, and we restore this

lawsuit to its proper form to reinforce basic civil procedure principles that respect a court’s initial

decisions and allow a plaintiff to choose the parties they sue.

1. Initiating the Lawsuit

From the beginning, the amended complaint—both in the caption and the substance of the

allegations—listed only Wayne County as a defendant. It did not list the Wayne County Treasurer

as a defendant.2 Plaintiffs sued Wayne County for federal constitutional violations (under the

2 Nor did the initial complaint list the Wayne County Treasurer as a defendant; Plaintiffs have always framed their claims against Wayne County itself. While the initial complaint had one allegation that mentioned “Defendant[] Wayne County Treasurer,” Compl., R.1 at PageID 20, the caption and all other allegations referred to “Wayne County” as the defendant subject to the lawsuit, e.g., id. at PageID 1, 2, 10- 11, 19, 21. Further, the amended complaint removed the reference to “Defendant[] Wayne County

3 No. 25-1169, Flummerfelt, et al. v. Wayne County Treasurer

Takings Clause as well as substantive and procedural due process) and a state-law inverse

condemnation claim.

But even though the amended complaint made clear that Wayne County was the defendant

rather than the Wayne County Treasurer, there was a clerical mistake on the summons. The court

issued a summons for “Wayne County Treasurer.” Summons, R.9 at PageID 120. Adding to the

confusion, the county official who accepted the summons appears to have done so on behalf of

both “Wayne County Treasurer” and “the County Clerk.” Id. Two attorneys from the same law

firm filed appearances on behalf of “Defendant Wayne County Treasurer.”

2. First Motion to Dismiss

Operating as if a named defendant, the Wayne County Treasurer filed a motion to dismiss,

asserting that Plaintiffs raised four claims “against the Treasurer.” Mot. to Dismiss First Am.

Compl., R.46 at PageID 316. The Wayne County Treasurer argued that because his foreclosure

activity was mandated by state law, he was operating as an arm of the state and should be entitled

to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The motion raised no arguments regarding

a faulty summons or deficient service. In response, Plaintiffs clarified that “Defendant Wayne

County’s Motion to Dismiss largely stems from a faulty premise, that Plaintiffs are suing Eric

Sabree, the Wayne County Treasurer. But the First Amended Complaint is clear on its face that Plaintiffs are bringing this case against Wayne County itself.” Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, R.54

at PageID 453.

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