NUMBERS 13-11-00366-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JUAN PEREZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Vela, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
Appellant, Juan Perez, appeals the judgment revoking his community supervision
and sentencing him to eight years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Division. In the underlying case, pursuant to a 2008 plea-bargain
agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to family-violence assault, a third-degree felony, and
was sentenced to ten years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West 2011). The trial court
suspended the imposition of confinement and placed appellant on community supervision
for a period of five years.
By two issues, appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte appoint
an English-Spanish interpreter at the revocation hearing: (1) rendered his plea at the
revocation hearing unknowing and involuntary; and (2) violated his rights to due process
and confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision on
various grounds. At the revocation hearing, appellant pleaded “true” to multiple
violations of the terms of his community supervision.
When appellant originally pleaded guilty, he initialed and signed documents,
including “Defendant’s Statement Understanding Admonishments,” wherein he
confirmed that, “I understand and can read the English language” and Defendant’s
Waiver of Rights, a document which included a Waiver of Language Interpreter. The
Waiver of Language Interpreter stated, “I understand and speak the English language[.]”
The Waiver of Language Interpreter informed appellant that he had the right to an
interpreter if he did not fully speak or understand English, and included a waiver of the
right to have an interpreter appointed which appellant executed. When appellant was
later admonished concerning the present revocation hearing, he initialed and signed
identical statements.
2 At the outset of the revocation hearing, the trial court judge explained the
revocation proceeding to appellant, and discussed appellant’s immigration status with
him in considerable detail.1 This conversation was in English and during the revocation
hearing, appellant answered questions and testified in English. His answers on direct-
and cross-examination amounted to more than “yes” or “no” responses, and included
logical and responsive narrative answers to the questions asked. At the end of the
revocation hearing, but before the trial court ruled, appellant was allowed to address the
trial court at some length concerning how the revocation would cause a hardship on his
family. Appellant never requested an interpreter and no objection was made at any time
to proceeding without an interpreter.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the trial court should have sua sponte appointed an
interpreter because the trial court was aware that appellant was a Mexican citizen and
that Spanish was his first language. Under the facts presented, we disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
“One of most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s
right to be present in the courtroom [during] his trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338
(1970). The Confrontation Clause requires that an interpreter be provided when an
accused does not understand the English language. Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 1, 5–6
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet). However, an accused waives his right to
1 Appellant informed the trial court that he was deported after being placed on community supervision and that he re-entered the United States illegally. The record shows that appellant understood that he was subject to deportation regardless of the outcome of the revocation hearing. 3 complain about the lack of an interpreter when he does not object or file a motion for an
interpreter, unless the trial court is aware that the defendant needs an interpreter. See
Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 143–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Baltierra v. State, 586
S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
We review a trial court’s decision on whether to appoint an interpreter for an abuse
of discretion. See Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(addressing adequacy of interpretive services provided for a deaf defendant);
Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d).
The accused in a criminal proceeding has the right to have a language interpreter
appointed on any party’s motion or the court’s own motion if it is determined that the
accused does not understand and speak the English language. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 38.30 (West 2011); see also Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 140–41 & 145
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing the constitutional right to an interpreter and the trial
court’s duty to appoint an interpreter sua sponte when the right to an interpreter has not
been validly waived and the trial court becomes aware the accused requires an
interpreter).
A reviewing court will not conclude that a trial court abused its discretion by not
appointing an interpreter when the record shows the accused adequately understood
English. See Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 201; Vasquez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932,
937 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d). That an accused may be more fluent in
another language does not make it incumbent upon a trial court to appoint an interpreter
for an accused who speaks and understands English. Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at
4 201; see also Martins v. State, 52 S.W.3d 459, 471–72 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.) (concluding the fact that defendant may have been more fluent in Portuguese
than Spanish did not require appointment of English-Portuguese interpreter).
The record shows appellant freely and knowingly waived his right to an interpreter.
Appellant signed admonishments and specifically initialed the admonishment that he was
waiving any right to an interpreter. The clerk’s record contains trial counsel’s certification
that he explained the trial court’s admonishments to appellant. When asked at the
revocation hearing, appellant informed the trial court that he had read the admonishments
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NUMBERS 13-11-00366-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JUAN PEREZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Vela, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
Appellant, Juan Perez, appeals the judgment revoking his community supervision
and sentencing him to eight years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Division. In the underlying case, pursuant to a 2008 plea-bargain
agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to family-violence assault, a third-degree felony, and
was sentenced to ten years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West 2011). The trial court
suspended the imposition of confinement and placed appellant on community supervision
for a period of five years.
By two issues, appellant argues that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte appoint
an English-Spanish interpreter at the revocation hearing: (1) rendered his plea at the
revocation hearing unknowing and involuntary; and (2) violated his rights to due process
and confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision on
various grounds. At the revocation hearing, appellant pleaded “true” to multiple
violations of the terms of his community supervision.
When appellant originally pleaded guilty, he initialed and signed documents,
including “Defendant’s Statement Understanding Admonishments,” wherein he
confirmed that, “I understand and can read the English language” and Defendant’s
Waiver of Rights, a document which included a Waiver of Language Interpreter. The
Waiver of Language Interpreter stated, “I understand and speak the English language[.]”
The Waiver of Language Interpreter informed appellant that he had the right to an
interpreter if he did not fully speak or understand English, and included a waiver of the
right to have an interpreter appointed which appellant executed. When appellant was
later admonished concerning the present revocation hearing, he initialed and signed
identical statements.
2 At the outset of the revocation hearing, the trial court judge explained the
revocation proceeding to appellant, and discussed appellant’s immigration status with
him in considerable detail.1 This conversation was in English and during the revocation
hearing, appellant answered questions and testified in English. His answers on direct-
and cross-examination amounted to more than “yes” or “no” responses, and included
logical and responsive narrative answers to the questions asked. At the end of the
revocation hearing, but before the trial court ruled, appellant was allowed to address the
trial court at some length concerning how the revocation would cause a hardship on his
family. Appellant never requested an interpreter and no objection was made at any time
to proceeding without an interpreter.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the trial court should have sua sponte appointed an
interpreter because the trial court was aware that appellant was a Mexican citizen and
that Spanish was his first language. Under the facts presented, we disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
“One of most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s
right to be present in the courtroom [during] his trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338
(1970). The Confrontation Clause requires that an interpreter be provided when an
accused does not understand the English language. Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 1, 5–6
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet). However, an accused waives his right to
1 Appellant informed the trial court that he was deported after being placed on community supervision and that he re-entered the United States illegally. The record shows that appellant understood that he was subject to deportation regardless of the outcome of the revocation hearing. 3 complain about the lack of an interpreter when he does not object or file a motion for an
interpreter, unless the trial court is aware that the defendant needs an interpreter. See
Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 143–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Baltierra v. State, 586
S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
We review a trial court’s decision on whether to appoint an interpreter for an abuse
of discretion. See Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(addressing adequacy of interpretive services provided for a deaf defendant);
Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d).
The accused in a criminal proceeding has the right to have a language interpreter
appointed on any party’s motion or the court’s own motion if it is determined that the
accused does not understand and speak the English language. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 38.30 (West 2011); see also Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 140–41 & 145
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing the constitutional right to an interpreter and the trial
court’s duty to appoint an interpreter sua sponte when the right to an interpreter has not
been validly waived and the trial court becomes aware the accused requires an
interpreter).
A reviewing court will not conclude that a trial court abused its discretion by not
appointing an interpreter when the record shows the accused adequately understood
English. See Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 201; Vasquez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932,
937 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d). That an accused may be more fluent in
another language does not make it incumbent upon a trial court to appoint an interpreter
for an accused who speaks and understands English. Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at
4 201; see also Martins v. State, 52 S.W.3d 459, 471–72 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.) (concluding the fact that defendant may have been more fluent in Portuguese
than Spanish did not require appointment of English-Portuguese interpreter).
The record shows appellant freely and knowingly waived his right to an interpreter.
Appellant signed admonishments and specifically initialed the admonishment that he was
waiving any right to an interpreter. The clerk’s record contains trial counsel’s certification
that he explained the trial court’s admonishments to appellant. When asked at the
revocation hearing, appellant informed the trial court that he had read the admonishments
with his attorney and that his attorney explained the admonishments to him. When the
trial court asked appellant whether he understood the proceedings, appellant answered,
“Yes, sir.”
Neither the clerk’s record, nor the reporter’s record, shows that appellant ever
expressed difficulty understanding English or requested an interpreter. The record also
shows appellant spoke and understood the English language, and communicated
adequately in English during the revocation hearing. There is no evidence in the record
that appellant’s waiver of the right to an interpreter was invalid or that he had any difficulty
understanding the proceedings against him and participating in them. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by not sua sponte
appointing an interpreter to assist appellant at the revocation hearing. See
Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at 203; Vasquez, 819 S.W.2d at 937–38. We overrule both
of appellant’s issues.
5 III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Gregory T. Perkes Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 26th day of April, 2012.