In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00355-CV ___________________________
JOYCE L. JONES, Appellant
V.
MANSFIELD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 342nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 342-340650-23
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a workers’ compensation claim filed by Appellant
Joyce L. Jones, who sustained a compensable injury while working for Appellee
Mansfield Independent School District (MISD). Jones, acting pro se, appeals from the
trial court’s order granting MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing her causes
of action with prejudice. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 6, 2021, Jones, a teacher’s assistant for MISD, suffered a work-related
injury when she slipped and fell on school premises. She filed a workers’
compensation claim with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’
Compensation (DWC), and MISD accepted a compensable injury extending to certain
strains, including a cervical strain, a lumbar strain, and bilateral shoulder strains. But
Jones contended that the compensable injury extended to other conditions.
Because the parties were unable to agree on the extent of Jones’s compensable
injury, a DWC administrative law judge held a contested hearing to resolve the
dispute. The administrative law judge determined, among other things, that the
compensable injury extended to prepatellar bursitis but not to any of the other
disputed conditions. Jones appealed to the DWC’s appeals panel, which affirmed the
administrative law judge’s decision.
2 In March 2023, Jones filed a petition for judicial review of the appeals panel’s
decision.1 In January 2024, she filed her “Amended Claimant’s Petition for Judicial
Review of the Appeals Panel Decision on Issues of Compensability and Impairment
Rating.” 2 In her amended petition, Jones recited a list of grievances against MISD and
requested the following—and only the following—relief: (1) “[s]poliated [e]vidence
damages” in the amount of $250,000 plus interest and attorney’s fees and
(2) “[e]xemplary damages of $250,000 or four times the amount of the actual
damages, whichever is greater” from the East Texas Educational Insurance
Association (ETEIA).3 In this pleading, Jones did not specify any particular causes of
action, but she generally alleged that MISD had violated her rights and had failed to
fulfill its responsibilities as her employer by, among other things, failing to make
available certain surveillance footage of Jones’s slip-and-fall accident. Significantly, her
amended petition did not include any claims for relief pertaining to compensability or
1 MISD asserts that it was never served with this petition. And Jones has not alleged otherwise. 2 In September 2023, Jones filed a purported pleading simply labelled “Plaintiff’s Petition” that included a litany of complaints against both MISD and the DWC. But this purported pleading did not actually request any relief. 3 Although MISD asserts that the ETEIA was never served with process, Jones maintains that she served her amended petition on the ETEIA by certified mail. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(2). But while the record includes a scanned copy of an envelope addressed to the ETEIA, it does not include a return of service containing the return receipt with the addressee’s signature. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 107(c). Nor did the ETEIA ever file an answer or otherwise make an appearance in the case. Therefore, the trial court never recognized that the ETEIA had been made a party to the lawsuit, nor is the ETEIA a party to this appeal.
3 income benefits—the only issues that had been presented to the DWC administrative
law judge.4
In February 2024, MISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction and, subject thereto, its
original answer. In its plea to the jurisdiction, MISD argued that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because, among other things, Jones’s amended petition sought relief solely
based on issues that had not been addressed by the DWC. Jones filed a response to
MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction, and MISD filed a reply.
In July 2024, following a hearing, the trial court signed an order granting
MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Jones’s claims with prejudice. This
appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In her brief, Jones expresses her dissatisfaction with the trial court’s dismissal of
her case, but she wholly fails to address the jurisdictional issues raised in MISD’s plea to
the jurisdiction. Indeed, she fails to raise a single appellate issue.5 MISD argues that Jones
has forfeited any appellate issues by failing to raise or adequately brief them. We agree.
In her amended petition, Jones vaguely complained that “[t]here is so much on 4
the Decision and Order that’s incorrect. The document is so biased that it is impossible to address all the issues.” But she did not seek any relief based on these complaints. The “Issues Presented” section of Jones’s brief does not actually raise any 5
appellate issues. Rather, it merely contains factual allegations as well as a recitation of the axiom that a “judgment is not final unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party.” One of these factual allegations—that MISD “is a non[]subscriber”—could conceivably be generously construed as an argument that Jones was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking judicial
4 The “[f]ailure to cite applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives
an issue on appeal.” Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no
pet.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co.,
881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing that error may be waived by inadequate
briefing); Jackson v. Vaughn, 546 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, no pet.)
(holding appellant had waived issue due to inadequate briefing); McKinnon v. Wallin,
No. 03-17-00592-CV, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2018,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that pro se appellant had waived his issues by
inadequate briefing). Here, Jones failed to cite any authority applicable to the
jurisdictional issues raised in MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction6 or to include any
review of her claims, see, e.g., Tozi v. RJ & Sons LLC, 614 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, no pet.), but Jones asserts elsewhere in her brief that MISD “has been a self-insured employer” since 1984, and she stipulated before the DWC that MISD is a self-insured workers’ compensation provider. Thus, even liberally construed, the “Issues Presented” section of Jones’s brief does not contain any legitimate appellate issues. See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587–88 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e liberally construe issues presented to obtain a just, fair, and equitable adjudication of the rights of the litigants.”). Nor did Jones fairly raise any such issues elsewhere in her brief. See Espinoza Valle v. Hertz Elec., LLC, No. 03-20-00056-CV, 2021 WL 1991268, at *2 n.3 (Tex.
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In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00355-CV ___________________________
JOYCE L. JONES, Appellant
V.
MANSFIELD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 342nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 342-340650-23
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a workers’ compensation claim filed by Appellant
Joyce L. Jones, who sustained a compensable injury while working for Appellee
Mansfield Independent School District (MISD). Jones, acting pro se, appeals from the
trial court’s order granting MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing her causes
of action with prejudice. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 6, 2021, Jones, a teacher’s assistant for MISD, suffered a work-related
injury when she slipped and fell on school premises. She filed a workers’
compensation claim with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’
Compensation (DWC), and MISD accepted a compensable injury extending to certain
strains, including a cervical strain, a lumbar strain, and bilateral shoulder strains. But
Jones contended that the compensable injury extended to other conditions.
Because the parties were unable to agree on the extent of Jones’s compensable
injury, a DWC administrative law judge held a contested hearing to resolve the
dispute. The administrative law judge determined, among other things, that the
compensable injury extended to prepatellar bursitis but not to any of the other
disputed conditions. Jones appealed to the DWC’s appeals panel, which affirmed the
administrative law judge’s decision.
2 In March 2023, Jones filed a petition for judicial review of the appeals panel’s
decision.1 In January 2024, she filed her “Amended Claimant’s Petition for Judicial
Review of the Appeals Panel Decision on Issues of Compensability and Impairment
Rating.” 2 In her amended petition, Jones recited a list of grievances against MISD and
requested the following—and only the following—relief: (1) “[s]poliated [e]vidence
damages” in the amount of $250,000 plus interest and attorney’s fees and
(2) “[e]xemplary damages of $250,000 or four times the amount of the actual
damages, whichever is greater” from the East Texas Educational Insurance
Association (ETEIA).3 In this pleading, Jones did not specify any particular causes of
action, but she generally alleged that MISD had violated her rights and had failed to
fulfill its responsibilities as her employer by, among other things, failing to make
available certain surveillance footage of Jones’s slip-and-fall accident. Significantly, her
amended petition did not include any claims for relief pertaining to compensability or
1 MISD asserts that it was never served with this petition. And Jones has not alleged otherwise. 2 In September 2023, Jones filed a purported pleading simply labelled “Plaintiff’s Petition” that included a litany of complaints against both MISD and the DWC. But this purported pleading did not actually request any relief. 3 Although MISD asserts that the ETEIA was never served with process, Jones maintains that she served her amended petition on the ETEIA by certified mail. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(2). But while the record includes a scanned copy of an envelope addressed to the ETEIA, it does not include a return of service containing the return receipt with the addressee’s signature. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 107(c). Nor did the ETEIA ever file an answer or otherwise make an appearance in the case. Therefore, the trial court never recognized that the ETEIA had been made a party to the lawsuit, nor is the ETEIA a party to this appeal.
3 income benefits—the only issues that had been presented to the DWC administrative
law judge.4
In February 2024, MISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction and, subject thereto, its
original answer. In its plea to the jurisdiction, MISD argued that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because, among other things, Jones’s amended petition sought relief solely
based on issues that had not been addressed by the DWC. Jones filed a response to
MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction, and MISD filed a reply.
In July 2024, following a hearing, the trial court signed an order granting
MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Jones’s claims with prejudice. This
appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In her brief, Jones expresses her dissatisfaction with the trial court’s dismissal of
her case, but she wholly fails to address the jurisdictional issues raised in MISD’s plea to
the jurisdiction. Indeed, she fails to raise a single appellate issue.5 MISD argues that Jones
has forfeited any appellate issues by failing to raise or adequately brief them. We agree.
In her amended petition, Jones vaguely complained that “[t]here is so much on 4
the Decision and Order that’s incorrect. The document is so biased that it is impossible to address all the issues.” But she did not seek any relief based on these complaints. The “Issues Presented” section of Jones’s brief does not actually raise any 5
appellate issues. Rather, it merely contains factual allegations as well as a recitation of the axiom that a “judgment is not final unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party.” One of these factual allegations—that MISD “is a non[]subscriber”—could conceivably be generously construed as an argument that Jones was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking judicial
4 The “[f]ailure to cite applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives
an issue on appeal.” Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no
pet.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co.,
881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing that error may be waived by inadequate
briefing); Jackson v. Vaughn, 546 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, no pet.)
(holding appellant had waived issue due to inadequate briefing); McKinnon v. Wallin,
No. 03-17-00592-CV, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2018,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that pro se appellant had waived his issues by
inadequate briefing). Here, Jones failed to cite any authority applicable to the
jurisdictional issues raised in MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction6 or to include any
review of her claims, see, e.g., Tozi v. RJ & Sons LLC, 614 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, no pet.), but Jones asserts elsewhere in her brief that MISD “has been a self-insured employer” since 1984, and she stipulated before the DWC that MISD is a self-insured workers’ compensation provider. Thus, even liberally construed, the “Issues Presented” section of Jones’s brief does not contain any legitimate appellate issues. See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587–88 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e liberally construe issues presented to obtain a just, fair, and equitable adjudication of the rights of the litigants.”). Nor did Jones fairly raise any such issues elsewhere in her brief. See Espinoza Valle v. Hertz Elec., LLC, No. 03-20-00056-CV, 2021 WL 1991268, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (liberally construing appellants’ brief and addressing “issue as stated and fairly raised” in the brief’s argument section as opposed to limiting analysis to the narrowly framed issue as stated in the brief’s “issues presented” section). 6 Jones’s statement that “[t]he district court ha[d] jurisdiction over this case because this is a workers[’] compensation case where the evidence of a video of the accident was not provided” was the closest that she came to addressing the relevant jurisdictional issues. But the only authority that she cited for this proposition was Texas Labor Code Section 410.307. And this statute, which governs how a substantial change of condition affects the scope of the evidence that the parties may present
5 citations whatsoever to the record. Thus, any appellate complaints that she might have
raised regarding the jurisdictional issues have been forfeited due to inadequate
briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284; McKinnon,
2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3; see also Amir-Sharif v. Mason, 243 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed
attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure.” (first citing
Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); and then citing Strange
v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied))).
Even if Jones had adequately addressed the jurisdictional issues raised in MISD’s
plea to the jurisdiction, we would nevertheless affirm the trial court’s decision to
dismiss the case. In Jones’s amended petition—which was her live pleading when
MISD filed its plea to the jurisdiction, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 62, 64, 65—the only relief that
she sought was damages based on MISD’s (and the ETEIA’s) alleged wrongful conduct
in connection with the handling of her workers’ compensation claim. Because Jones’s
amended petition exclusively sought relief based on allegations that her workers’
compensation claim had been improperly investigated, handled, or settled and because
Jones did not present these issues to the DWC before raising them in the trial court, the
trial court did not err by granting MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction. See In re Accident Fund
Gen. Ins. Co., 543 S.W.3d 750, 752 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (“When an agency has
regarding the extent of impairment, has no bearing on the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.307.
6 exclusive jurisdiction and the plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies, the
trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss any claim within the
agency’s exclusive jurisdiction.”); In re Old Republic Ins. Co., No. 02-17-00269-CV, 2017
WL 4296386, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 28, 2017, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (mem. op.) (“A workers’ compensation claimant must . . . exhaust all
administrative remedies within the DWC before seeking judicial review.” (citing In re
Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 321 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig.
proceeding [mand. denied]))); see also In re Old Republic Risk Mgmt., No. 12-19-00144-CV,
2019 WL 2462486, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 12, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)
(recognizing that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act “provides the exclusive
procedures and remedies for claims alleging that a workers’ compensation carrier
improperly investigated, handled, or settled a claim for benefits” (citing In re Crawford &
Co., 458 S.W.3d 920, 923–24 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding))).
III. CONCLUSION
Having concluded (1) that Jones failed to raise any legitimate appellate issues,
(2) that she forfeited any issues that she might have raised due to inadequate briefing,
and (3) that the trial court did not err by granting MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction, we
affirm the trial court’s order.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell Justice
7 Delivered: May 15, 2025