Josue Chicas-Lemos v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 18-71959
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSUE ANTONIO CHICAS-LEMOS, AKA No. 18-71959 Josue Chicas, AKA Josue Antonio Chicas Del Cid, AKA Josue Delchicas, Agency No. A206-407-402

Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 2, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Josue Antonio Chicas-Lemos, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions

for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). When the BIA conducts its own review of the record, “our review is

limited to the BIA’s decision except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly

adopted.” Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we

deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the determination that Chicas-Lemos

did not apply for asylum within a reasonable time of changed circumstances and

that extraordinary circumstances did not excuse his delay in filing.1 See Ruiz v.

Bondi, No. 23-1095, 2025 WL 3704362, at *10 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025) (stating

the standard of review for determinations regarding extraordinary circumstances);

Taslimi v. Holder, 590 F.3d 981, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the standard

of review for determinations regarding changed circumstances). The IJ found that

the killing of Chicas-Lemos’s aunt in 2013 was a changed circumstance, but

Chicas-Lemos did not file his application for asylum until 2016. He explained that

he “has only a 9th grade education, [and] did not know asylum was an option until

he consulted his present attorney.” But we have rejected the argument that

“ignorance of the legal requirements for filing an asylum application is an

1 Chicas-Lemos does not contest that he failed to apply for asylum within one year of his arrival in the United States.

2 18-71959 ‘extraordinary circumstance.’” Alquijay v. Garland, 40 F.4th 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.

2022); see id. at 1103–04 (rejecting a similar argument that a petitioner’s relative

youth and lack of English language skills created a legal disability that excused the

late filing). Thus, the asylum claim is time-barred. See Taslimi, 590 F.3d at 984

(describing the time bar and its exceptions); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D).

2. Substantial evidence also supports the determination that, with respect

to withholding of removal, Chicas-Lemos failed to demonstrate that the harm he

suffered had a nexus to any protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,

1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating the standard of review and nexus requirement for

withholding of removal). Although the BIA noted that Chicas-Lemos’s family may

constitute a particular social group, nothing in the record suggests that his

membership in this group led to his past harms because he left El Salvador for the

United States in 2007, six years before the incidents between his cousin and gang

members. As for future persecution, substantial evidence supports the

determination that Chicas-Lemos did not establish that he is “more likely than not”

to be persecuted on account of a protected ground. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558

F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2)). In the roughly

three years between his aunt’s death and his merits hearing before the IJ, no other

member of Chicas-Lemos’s family was injured by the gang, despite being similarly

situated.

3 18-71959 3. Lastly, substantial evidence supports the CAT determination because

Chicas-Lemos has not demonstrated that any future harm will be “inflicted by, or

at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting

in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(1). Chicas-Lemos points to the country conditions in El Salvador. But

this evidence does not establish that the Salvadoran government is unable or

unwilling to control gang violence. See, e.g., Amaya v. Garland, 15 F.4th 976, 987

(9th Cir. 2021) (“Given the lack of evidence supporting a claim of torture by the

government, and the evidence demonstrating that El Salvador does not acquiesce

to gang violence, substantial evidence supports the agency's denial of CAT

relief.”). Nor does it establish that Chicas-Lemos “face[s] any particular threat of

torture beyond that of which all citizens of [El Salvador] are at risk.” Dhital v.

Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

4 18-71959