Joshua David Mellberg LLC v. Will

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided March 24, 2021·No. 4:14-cv-02025·Unknown

Opinion

WO Joshua David Mellberg, LLC, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) No. CIV 14-2025-TUC-CKJ vs. ) ) ORDER Jovan Will, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) Plaintiffs (collectively “JDM”), Defendants Jovan Will, Tree Fine, Fernando Godinez and Carly Uretz (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) and The Impact Partnership (“Impact”) have each filed Motions for Attorneys’ Fees (Docs. 565, 568, 570). Responses (Docs. 580, 581, 584, 585) and Replies (Doc. 586, 587, 594) have been filed. Additionally, the JDM has filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 583), to which Impact has filed a Response (Doc. 592) and JDM has filed a Reply (Doc. 595). Supplemental documents have also been filed. The Court declines to schedule this matter for oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f); 27A Fed.Proc., L. Ed. § 62:361 (March 2021) ("A district court generally is not required to hold a hearing or oral argument before ruling on a motion."). Motion to Strike (Doc. 583) JDM requests the Court to strike certain statements from the Declarations of William P. Eiselstein and Stephen W. Odom, Jr. that were offered in support of Impact’s fee motion because the statements disclose settlement discussions between the parties. Indeed, the applicable rule states: (a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible — on behalf of any party — either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: * * * * * (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim — except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. Fed.R.Evid. 408(a). However, the rule also states: (b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. Fed.R.Evid. 408(b). While this evidence is offered for another purpose, this is not a delineated purpose of the rule. Although the exceptions are not exhaustive, the Court considers this in determining that Arizona’s public policy interests of protecting the confidentiality of settlement negotiations, Grubaugh v. Blomo ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 238 Ariz. 264, 268 (App. 2015) (recognizing Arizona has a “robust policy of confidentiality of the mediation process”); Miller v. Kelly, 212 Ariz. 283, 287 (App. 2006) (recognizing that “[Arizona’s] strong public policy encouraging settlement of lawsuits . . . would be thwarted by disclosure of information intended to remain confidential”), outweighs any relevance of this evidence. The Court will grant the Motion to Strike. Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party may be made in “exceptional cases” pursuant to the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Supreme Court has stated that an “‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (emphasis added). “[D]istrict courts analyzing a request for fees under the Lanham Act should examine the ‘totality of the circumstances’ [under a preponderance of the evidence standard] to determine if the case was exceptional.” SunEarth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co. Ltd., 839 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2016), en banc. Nonexclusive factors to consider include “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Id., internal citations and quotations omitted. The prevailing party “is the party who prevails as to the substantial part of the litigation.” Testa v. Village of Mundelein, Ill., 89 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.1996); see also Slane v. Mariah Boats, Inc., 164 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir.1999) (“[W]hen one party gets substantial relief it ‘prevails' even if it doesn't win on every claim.”). Indeed, as pointed out by Impact, an award of costs to a defendant that loses on a counterclaim but succeeds in warding off a predominant claim is appropriate. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 1997) (“It is enough that [the party] succeeds “on any significant claim affording some of the relief sought.”); Ira Green, Inc. v. Military Sales & Service Co., 775 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Compared to the amount of time, effort, and resources devoted to the [Plaintiffs’] claims. . . the counterclaims. . . were a sideshow.”). Impact and Individual Defendants prevailed in the initial litigation. Although JDM prevailed in the countersuit, the Court cannot say the issues of the countersuit were close and difficult. Further, while the Court declines to conclude any party litigated in bad faith for the purposes of determining the prevailing party, see e.g. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978) (“It is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight bias could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.”), the Court does not find that an award would chill future litigation. Arizona law provides that the Court may award the successful party in a contested action arising out of a contract reasonable attorneys’ fees. A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). Indeed, “[t]he intent of this statute is for the successful party to recover under ordinary circumstances." Velarde v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 105 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1997), n. 5, quoting G & S Investments v. Belman, 145 Ariz. 258, 268, 700 P.2d 1358, 1368 (App. 1984). The Court has the discretion to determine the circumstances appropriate for the award of fees. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1985). However, “there is no presumption that a successful party should be awarded attorney fees under § 12-341.01.” Motzer v. Escalante, 265 P.3d 1094, 1095 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); see also Manicom v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 336 P.3d 1274, 1283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that an award of attorneys' fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) “is permissive” and “not mandatory”). Indeed, the Court of Appeals of Arizona has stated, “when enforcing a contract that provides for reasonable attorney fees and costs, a trial court retains broad discretion

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